Legislators' Response to Changes in the Electorate: The Great Migration and Civil Rights*

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Abstract

Between 1940 and 1970, during the second Great Migration, more than 4 million African Americans moved from the South to the North of the United States. In this period, blacks were often excluded from the political process in the South, but were eligible to vote in the North. We study how, by changing the composition and the preferences of the northern electorate, the Great Migration affected both voters' demand for racial equality and legislators' support for civil rights legislation. We predict black inflows by interacting historical settlements of southern born blacks across northern counties with the differential rate of black emigration from different southern states after 1940. We find that black in-migration increased the Democratic vote share and encouraged grassroots activism, not only among black but also, and crucially, among white voters. In turn, Congress members representing areas more exposed to black inflows became increasingly supportive of civil rights. They were not only more likely to vote in favor of pro-civil rights bills, but also more willing to take direct actions, such as signing discharge petitions, to promote racial equality. Investigating the mechanisms, we document that both "between" and "within" party changes contributed to the shift in the position of northern legislators on civil rights. Taken together, our findings suggest that the Great Migration played an important role in the development and success of the civil rights movement.

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1 Introduction

In 1940, only 25% of African Americans lived outside the US South. By 1970, at the end of the second Great Migration (henceforth, Great Migration), this number had increased to 55% (Boustan, 2016). This very same period witnessed the efforts and the eventual success of the civil rights movement to eliminate *de jure* racial segregation and remove (at least formally) barriers to black political participation. Given the resistance of southern politicians to extend the franchise to blacks, federal legislation often promoted by northern congressmen played a key role in the process of enfranchisement (Lawson, 1976).

In this paper, we study the political effects of the Great Migration across northern areas. In particular, we ask how changes in the composition and preferences of local constituencies induced by black inflows affected both voters' demand for racial equality and northern politicians' support for civil rights legislation. At the onset of the Great Migration, blacks were *de facto* or *de jure* prevented from voting in most southern states (Cascio and Washington, 2014). Conversely, there were no restrictions to black political participation in the North. In fact, historical and anecdotal evidence suggests that African American communities represented an appealing pool of voters for northern politicians (Moon, 1948). Since black migrants often had friends and relatives in the South, their arrival likely increased the salience of the "southern issue" in northern areas, and raised demand for civil rights legislation among the black electorate. However, it is ex-ante unclear the effect that the Great Migration had on *whites'* attitudes towards racial equality.

On the one hand, it is possible that the racial mixing of previously homogeneous, white neighborhoods triggered whites' backlash. Indeed, the arrival of black migrants into white neighborhoods was often accompanied by tensions and riots in several northern cities during this period (Collins and Margo, 2007; Reny and Newman, 2018; Sugrue, 2014). Moreover, evidence from this and other contexts indicates that migrants – either international or internal – are often opposed by existing residents, who may respond by voting for anti-migrants politicians and reducing the provision of public goods (Dustmann et al., 2019; Tabellini, 2019), or by leaving areas experiencing in-migration altogether (Boustan, 2010; Shertzer and Walsh, 2019; Tabellini, 2018).

On the other hand, there are reasons to expect that black arrivals might have increased support for civil rights at least among some whites. First, most pro-civil rights actions until the late 1960s were focused on the US South, suggesting that northern whites were unlikely to be directly affected by blacks' demand for racial equality.[1] In

[1]The first federal piece of legislation that directly affected northern areas was the Federal Housing Act (FHA) in 1968. This, together with busing in the 1970s, was a turning point that dramatically

fact, strategic white voters might have even sought to ameliorate conditions prevailing in the South so as to reduce blacks' incentives to move to the North. Second, as noted by Myrdal (1944), "[t]he average Northerner does not understand the reality and the effects of such [Southern] discriminations", and so "[t]o get publicity is of the highest strategic importance to [blacks]." In Myrdal's view "a great majority of white people in American would be prepared to give the [black] a substantially better deal if they knew the facts" (Myrdal, 1944, page 47), and the Great Migration could have been precisely the tool to make northern whites aware of the conditions prevailing in the South. Finally, black in-migration might have offered an opportunity to labor unions to strengthen their political clout by forming a cross-race coalition (Adams, 1966; Schickler, 2016), which might have amplified blacks' demand for civil rights in the northern electorate.

In the first part of the paper, we investigate if overall support for civil rights increased or if, instead, whites' hostile reactions partially or completely offset any direct effect coming from black arrivals. Our main proxy for support for civil rights is the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections, but we also consider the presence and activity of grassroots pro-black organizations. Our choice to focus on the Democratic vote share is based on widespread evidence that, by the early 1940s, the Democratic Party had unambiguously become the party defending blacks' interests outside the South (Moon, 1948; Schickler, 2016).[2] In the second part of the paper, we study how members of the House responded to the changes in the composition and in the preferences of their electorate induced by the Great Migration. To disentangle the mechanisms, we decompose any observed change in politicians' behavior in two parts. First, a "between" party realignment that might have occurred if, for instance, more conservative Republicans were replaced by more liberal Democrats. Second, adjustments taking place "within" parties if, in response to black inflows, parties endogenously modified their platforms and ideology.

To estimate the political effects of black in-migration, we construct a version of the shift-share instrument (Card, 2001; Boustan, 2010), and assign black outflows from each southern state to northern counties based on pre-existing settlements of African Americans outside the South. These predicted flows strongly correlate with actual black migration, but are more plausibly orthogonal to any omitted variables that may drive both black migration and changes in political conditions in the North. Notably, the shift-share instrument does not merely apportion more blacks to counties with more African Americans in 1940, but rather, it combines two separate sources of variation.

changed racial relations in the North.

[2]Below, we also provide direct evidence in support of this statement by analyzing the behavior of Democratic and Republican legislators across non-southern districts.

First, geographic dispersion of blacks born in different southern states and living in different northern counties in 1940. Second, time-series variation in black emigration rates from different southern states for each decade between 1940 and 1970.

Hence, the predicted number of black migrants in each northern county will depend both on the 1940 "mix" of southern born blacks and on the heterogeneity in outmigration from each southern state between 1940 and 1970. The validity of the instrument rests on one identifying assumption: the evolution of political conditions after 1940 should not be simultaneously correlated with the 1940 composition of blacks' enclaves in northern counties and with migration patterns across southern states after 1940. There are two main threats to identification, which we address in several ways.

First, the fixed characteristics of northern areas that attracted (more) blacks from specific southern states before 1940 might have had persistent, confounding effects both on changes in racial attitudes and on migration patterns. For instance, larger urban centers, which might have attracted more African Americans from specific southern states during the first Great Migration (1915-1930), might have also become more liberal on racial views in subsequent decades (for reasons other than black inflows after 1940). If this were true, and if the same southern states that sent more black migrants before 1940 also had higher emigration rates between 1940 and 1970, then the identifying assumption would be violated. We tackle this potential issue in several ways. First, we document that predicted black in-migration is not correlated with the pre-1940 change in either economic or political conditions across northern counties. Second, we allow counties to be on differential trends by interacting year dummies with several 1940 local characteristics, such as black, immigrant, and urban share of the population, initial support for the Democratic Party, and the employment share in manufacturing. Third, we perform a battery of placebo checks to show that the instrument is uncorrelated with local demand shocks like WWII contracts or New Deal relief programs. Fourth, we replicate the analysis separately controlling for a measure of predicted labor demand, constructed by interacting the 1940 industry composition of northern counties with industry growth rates after 1940 at the national level.

The second threat to the validity of the instrument is that outmigration from each southern state might be correlated with (local) pull factors systematically related to 1940 settlers' state of origin. We address this potential concern in two ways. First, we interact year dummies with the share of blacks born in each southern state. This is a key exercise to check that the variation behind the instrument is not disproportionately driven by specific destination-origin combinations, which may also be spuriously correlated with the evolution of political conditions in the North (see also Borusyak et al., 2018). Second, following Boustan (2010) we construct a modified version of the instrument that exploits only variation in local push factors across southern counties

to predict black outflows from the US South.

Using this instrument, and controlling for any county invariant and state time-varying unobservable characteristic, we find that black in-migration to non-southern counties had a positive and large effect on support for the Democratic Party in Congressional elections. Our estimates imply that 1 percentage point increase in the black share raised the Democratic vote share by almost 1.5 percentage points, or 4% relative to the 1940 mean. This is a large effect: even under the aggressive assumption that all new black migrants immediately voted for the Democratic Party as soon as they arrived, it must be the case that some whites started voting for the Democratic Party because of black in-migration. We provide evidence that these results are unlikely to be driven either by the endogenous migration response of whites to the suburbs (Boustan, 2010) or by the inflow of southern white migrants. First, we aggregate the unit of analysis to the commuting zone (CZ) – a spatial unit significantly larger than the county and that included the urban-suburban (white) migration patterns that might have been induced by the arrival of blacks; second, we separately control for predicted southern white in-migration. Reassuringly, in both cases, results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those estimated in our baseline specification.

Turning to voter participation, black in-migration was positively associated with turnout, although our estimates are relatively small and imprecisely estimated. This pattern is consistent with the historical evidence that black migrants were quickly incorporated in the political life of northern cities (Moon, 1948). At the same time, the fact that black arrivals both had a positive (although not statistically significant) impact on turnout and raised the Democratic vote share by more than one for one suggests that black in-migration may have increased whites' propensity to vote for the Democratic Party. As argued by Schickler (2016), one possible explanation for this pattern is that labor unions formed a cross-race coalition with blacks, incorporating the latter in their rank and file, to increase their political influence. Once such a coalition was formed, its members may have been able to more effectively coordinate (Democratic) political campaigns, thereby attracting new white voters. In line with this interpretation, exploiting the demographic characteristics of northern counties, we show that the effects of black inflows were significantly larger in places with more competitive elections, with a higher share of unskilled and unionized white workers, and where the manufacturing sector was more important.

Finally, and consistent with the Great Migration raising demand for racial equality, we document that black arrivals had a strong and positive effect both on the frequency of non-violent pro-civil rights demonstrations, where both blacks and whites participated, and on the presence of local organizations (such as the NAACP). Although black arrivals may have also triggered whites' backlash, for instance by fueling tensions in the housing

market,[3] our findings strongly suggest that, on average, the Great Migration increased overall support for civil rights across northern counties.

In the second part of the paper, we analyze how northern legislators responded to changes in the composition and preferences of their constituencies. When answering this question, we face two empirical challenges. First, while demographic variables, including black in-migration, are measured at the county level, legislators' behavior is available at the congressional district (CD) level. Second, because of redistricting, CD boundaries did not remain constant over time. To deal with these issues, we develop a procedure that allows us to match CDs of different years to a baseline Congress – the 78^{th} Congress – and then construct a time-invariant mapping between counties and CDs.

We summarize our main result by taking a snapshot of the ideology on racial issues of members of the House at the end of the 88^{th} Congress – the Congress that passed the Civil Rights Act (CRA) of 1964, one of the milestones of the civil rights movement. We rely on the civil rights scores constructed by Bateman et al. (2017), which are based on a legislator's past voting behavior on civil rights bills, and take more negative (resp. positive) values for more liberal (resp. conservative) ideology. We find that legislators representing CDs that received more African Americans between 1940 and 1960 had significantly more liberal voting records on racial issues at the end of the 88^{th} Congress. Comparing CDs at the 75^{th} and at the 25^{th} percentiles of black in-migration, civil rights scores of legislators in the more exposed district were 0.35 standard deviations lower (i.e. more liberal) than in the less exposed one.

The positive association between black inflows and liberal ideology on racial issues is not simply due to African Americans moving to CDs where Congress members were already more likely to support civil rights legislation. In fact, our findings are robust to controlling for initial ideology prevailing in the CD, and to considering the effects of black inflows on changes in congressmen's ideology over time. Exploring the dynamics of such changes, we document that the shift towards more liberal positions on racial issues took place almost entirely during the 1940s, and was driven by CDs switching from the Republican to the Democratic Party. Instead, during the 1950s, black inflows induced within party adjustments, with politicians of each party moving in opposite ideological directions.

Specifically, while black arrivals induced Democratic legislators in already Democratic districts to become even more supportive of civil rights, they lead Republican Congress members to hold more conservative positions on racial issues. One potential explanation for this pattern is that Republican candidates strategically chose to

[3]Indeed, we document that the effects of black inflows varied inversely with the probability of inter-racial interactions in the housing market.

adopt a more conservative position on racial issues so as to win the votes of whites who were becoming increasingly concerned about the racial mixing of their neighborhoods (Sugrue, 2014). It is also possible that national level considerations on racial realignment influenced the process of adjustment among northern legislators of the two parties (Kuziemko and Washington, 2018).

During this period, voting records might be only a poor proxy for legislators' behavior on civil rights legislation. This is because the seniority system prevailing at the time allowed southern, senior Senators to block pro-civil rights bills, preventing them from even reaching the floor of the House (Schickler, 2016). As discussed in Pearson and Schickler (2009), one effective strategy at the disposal of northern legislators to evade gatekeeping imposed by southern committee leaders was the discharge petition process. If a discharge petition is signed by at least 218 members, the resolution specified in the petition is discussed and voted on the House floor. Thus, congressmen committed to the civil rights agenda may have used signatures on discharge petitions as a tool to circumvent the resistance of southern Senators.

Using data from Pearson and Schickler (2009), we verify this conjecture and show that legislators representing CDs that received more African Americans during the Great Migration were significantly more likely to sign discharge petitions. First, we document that, in both the 1940s and the 1950s, the decadal change in the black share was positively associated with the number of signatures on discharge petitions per legislator across northern CDs. Second, we focus on the 1940-1950 decade, when petitions on the same topics were signed both at the beginning and at the end of the decade, and ask if changes in the black share lead to changes in legislators' propensity to sign (pro-civil rights) discharge petitions. Even when comparing legislators' behavior within a decade, we find a strong and positive effect of black inflows on the probability of signing a discharge petition. As for the voting behavior of Congress members, also for discharge petitions we observe first a "between" party change (in the 1940s), which was followed by a "within" party adjustment (in the 1950s).

This paper contributes to at least three strands of literature. First, our work is related to the vast literature on the civil rights movement. On the one hand, many papers have studied the consequences of the Civil Rights and the Voting Rights Acts (Aneja and Avenancio-Leon, 2019; Cascio and Washington, 2014; Cascio et al., 2010; Reber, 2011). On the other, building on the seminal contribution by Carmines and Stimson (1989), a large body of the literature has investigated the causes of the southern "dealignment" (Besley et al., 2010; Kousser, 2010; Kuziemko and Washington, 2018; Trende, 2012; Wright, 2013).[4] We contribute to this literature by taking a different

[4]In a recent paper, Boustan and Tabellini (2019) document that black outmigration contributed to racial realignment by inducing southern whites to make political concessions, such as the extension of

perspective. We show that black arrivals to northern areas, by changing the composition and the preferences of local constituencies, altered legislators' incentives to push for civil rights legislation, and likely played a key role in the success of the civil rights movement. Our findings are also consistent with and complement the recent works by Schickler (2016) and Grant (2020) who argue that, respectively, the incorporation of African Americans into the Democratic coalition after the New Deal and the increased political competition at the national level due to the Great Migration were important mechanisms behind the racial realignment of American political parties.

Second, our results speak to the literature on the relationship between voters' demand and politicians' behavior (Caughey and Warshaw, 2018; Lott and Kenny, 1999; Mian et al., 2010, 2013; Miller, 2008).[5] Closest to our paper, Cascio and Washington (2014) have documented that the Voting Rights Act (VRA) shifted the distribution of local spending across southern counties towards blacks, once the latter became eligible to vote. We expand on their findings by focusing on the US North rather than the South and by analyzing one of the potential causes, rather than consequences, of the VRA – i.e. the response of northern politicians to the change in the characteristics, and thus in the demands, of their constituency due to black in-migration.

Finally, we complement the literature on the effects of the Great Migration in the North. Although several papers in economics have studied its effects on the residential decision of whites, intergenerational mobility, immigrant assimilation, and public finance (Boustan, 2010; Shertzer and Walsh, 2019; Derenoncourt, 2018; Fouka et al., 2018; Tabellini, 2018), very little evidence exists on its political effects. Our paper seeks to fill this gap, focusing in particular on the potential role of the Great Migration on the development and the success of the civil rights movement.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the historical background. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 lays out the empirical strategy, constructs the instrument for black in-migration, and estimates the first stage. Section 5 studies the effects of black inflows on demand for civil rights legislation, while Section 6 investigates how Congress members responded to changes in the composition and in the preferences of local constituencies driven (directly and indirectly) by the Great Migration. Section 7 summarizes the robustness checks, which are then extensively discussed in the appendix. Section 8 concludes.

the franchise and the equalization of spending between black and white schools.

[5]See also the recent review of the literature in Warshaw (2019).

2 Historical Background

2.1 The Great Migration

Between 1940 and 1970, more than 4 million African Americans left the US South for northern and western destinations. This unprecedented migration episode is usually referred to as the (Second) Great Migration. From 1915 to 1930, the First Great Migration brought to the North 1.5 million blacks. However, the Second Great Migration – from now onwards the Great Migration – was substantially larger in magnitude and had more profound implications for American politics and for race relations (Boustan, 2010; Schickler, 2016). Most black migrants moved to urban centers in the Northeast and in the mid-West, but the Great Migration was a geographically widespread phenomenon, which affected also the West and less urbanized areas outside the South (Figure 1).

Black migrants were pulled to the North and the West by economic opportunities and pushed away from the South by racial oppression, political disenfranchisement, and poor working conditions (Boustan, 2016). On the one hand, the outbreak of WWII increased demand for labor in northern and western factories, raising the potential gains from migration. Even after the WWII-related labor demand shock was over, higher expectations of upward social and economic mobility kept attracting African Americans to the North at least until the late 1960s (Derenoncourt, 2018). On the other hand, widespread violence and disenfranchisement, together with a separate and unequal school system, provided strong incentives for blacks to leave the South (Margo, 1991). Moreover, the mechanization of agricultural harvest in the 1940s and 1950s reduced demand for labor in the already depressed southern agricultural sector, further increasing the pool of prospective migrants (Grove and Heinicke, 2003; Whatley, 1985).

Out-migration from the South was strongest during the 1940s, with a black emigration rate of almost 15%, but remained high until the late 1960s (Figure 2). As a consequence of this migration episode, during which the US South lost 40% of its 1940 black population, the racial profile of the United States changed dramatically. While only 25% of African Americans were living outside the South in 1940, this figure had increased to more than 50% by 1970. On average, the black share of the population in northern and western cities moved from less than 4% to more than 15% in just three decades. These numbers were an order of magnitude higher for main hubs like Chicago, Detroit, or St. Louis, where the black share moved from 8, 9, and 11 percent to 32, 43, and 41 percent respectively (Gibson and Jung, 2005).

2.2 Black Migrants and Northern Politics

The demographic change induced by the Great Migration had the potential to alter the political equilibrium, especially in industrial and urban centers. Already during the first wave of the Great Migration, between 1915 and 1930, both parties had tried to gain the votes of African Americans by including them in local political machines of cities like Chicago, Philadelphia, and St. Louis (Moon, 1948). As their number grew, blacks became an increasingly appealing target for northern politicians. Moreover, in part as a consequence of the New Deal, from the late 1930s, the labor movement started to actively incorporate African Americans in its ranks. For instance, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) leadership believed that "[black] support was crucial for the union's prospects in industrial workplaces" (Schickler, 2016). This position was further reinforced by the migration of blacks to northern and western urban centers, which made African American workers even more valuable to unions. Using newly digitized survey data at the individual level, Farber et al. (2018) document that, while non-southern whites were significantly more likely than blacks to be union members in 1940, this advantage had disappeared, and actually reversed, by 1960.

As a result of these trends, a class-based coalition, pushing for both racial and economic liberalism emerged, and African Americans quickly realized that, in stark contrast with the regime prevailing in the South, the Democratic Party's platform was more aligned with their interests than the Republican's one (Schickler, 2016). Black activists and organizations such as the NAACP used their newly acquired and growing political influence to exert pressure on northern members of the Democratic Party in order to pursue the civil rights agenda. On the contrary, although the GOP had historically represented the interests of African Americans, it gradually shifted away from its initial positions, and its support for civil rights became more and more tepid.

Bringing direct evidence from our setting, Figure A.1 plots the share of northern Democrats (blue bars) and Republicans (red bars) voting in favor of the civil rights bills between Congresses 78 and 88 (see Table A.2 for the detailed list of bills). Both in the 1940s and in the 1950s, Democrats in the North were more likely to support civil rights bills.[6] A very similar, and in fact much stronger, picture stands out when comparing the probability of signing discharge petitions on pro-civil rights legislation across Congress members of the two parties (Figure A.3).[7]

Since black voters living in the North often had relatives and friends in the South,

[6]Figure A.2 replicates Figure A.1 for the whole US and documents that, once the US South is included, not surprisingly, the patter is reversed, with Democrats being on average less likely to vote in favor of pro-civil rights bills.

[7]Table A.3 presents more granular statistics for specific issues, and documents that Democrats were always substantially more likely than Republicans to sign discharge petitions in support of civil rights legislation.

they were deeply concerned with racial relations prevailing there. That blacks' concerns were taken into serious consideration by northern politicians is reflected in the type of bills and discharge petitions voted upon and discussed by Congress members. Most of them were focused on approving anti-lynching legislation, abolishing the literacy test and the poll tax, and eliminating *de jure* school segregation. Acting as a watchdog, the NAACP and other activist groups often criticized northern legislators for their mild or insufficient support of the civil rights agenda. These advocacy groups influenced black voters' expectations about the behavior of northern representatives who, in turn, took an increasingly liberal and active position on civil rights related legislation.

3 Data

To study the political effects of the Great Migration on non-southern counties and CDs between 1940 and 1970, we collected and combined data from several sources. As noted in the introduction, since demographic variables (including black population) are available at the county level, we develop a time-invariant mapping between counties and CDs. Moreover, because of redistricting, CD boundaries change over time; we thus construct a procedure that allows us to fix CD geography to that of Congress 78, which we take as our "baseline" Congress year. Appendix B presents the construction of the county to CD cross-walk and describes the strategy used to fix CD boundaries. In Appendix B, we also explain the timing convention adopted in the CD analysis, where we consider two Congress periods – 78 to 82 (corresponding to 1944-1952) and 83 to 88 (corresponding to 1954-1964) – that we match respectively to the 1940-1950 and to the 1950-1960 change in black population.

Black in-migration and demographic variables. Data on black and total population as well as on other demographic variables for non-southern counties come from the County Databooks, from Haines, Michael R., and Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (2010), and from the 1940 full count Census of Population (Ruggles et al., 2015). To construct the instrument for changes in black population, we combine information from three different datasets. First, we rely on the full count Census of Population (Ruggles et al., 2015) to obtain the distribution of settlements of southern born blacks living across northern counties in 1940. We then combine these data with black migration rates from Gardner and Cohen (1992) and Bowles, Gladys K., Tarver, James D., Beale, Calvin L., and Lee, Everette S. (2016) for 1940-1950 and for 1950 to 1970 respectively.[8] When turning to CD level analysis, we aggregate county

[8]The datasets provide county-level migration rates by race. We compute the number of black migrants from each southern county, for each decade, and aggregate them at the state level. When defining the US South, we follow the Census definition but, as in Boustan (2010), we exclude Mary-

level variables using the procedure described in Appendix B.

Electoral outcomes. Data on electoral returns in Congressional elections at the county level are taken from Clubb et al. (1990). We consider the Democratic vote share and turnout, defined as the share of votes cast in the election over the total number of eligible voters in the county. Since Census data are available at the decennial level, and because Congressional elections are held every two years, we focus on electoral returns for exact Census years from 1940 to 1970.

Local support for civil rights. We obtain measures of local support for the civil rights movement from two sources. First, we use the dataset assembled by Gregory and Hermida (2019) combining a variety of sources that includes the number of non-violent demonstrations organized between 1942 and 1970 by the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) – an inter-racial group of students from the University of Chicago that coordinated sits-in and similar forms of civil disobedience mainly across northern cities to protest against segregation in the South. We match the geographic coordinates of each event to the centroid of each county in our sample to derive the number of events taking place in a county during each decade. Second, we collect data on the presence of NAACP chapters from Gregory and Estrada (2019).[9] As for CORE demonstrations, we match the exact geographic coordinates available from this dataset to the non-southern counties in our sample, and construct an indicator variable equal to one if a NAACP chapter was present in the county in a given year.[10]

Legislators' ideology. We measure the ideology of northern legislators on civil rights by using the scores constructed by Bateman et al. (2017). As for the commonly used DW Nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985), legislators are assigned a score that is a function of their past voting behavior and takes more negative (resp. positive) values for more liberal (resp. conservative) positions. We rely on the Bateman et al. (2017) scores for two reasons. First, they were calculated by restricting attention solely to civil rights bills, as classified by Katznelson and Lapinski (2006). Second, they were constructed by allowing the policy content to be Congress specific and to vary over time. Bateman et al. (2017) develop two main versions of their civil rights scores – one that assumes that the ideal points of legislators remain constant over time, and one that instead does not make such assumption. We focus mostly on the latter, but results are unchanged when using the former. As a further check, we validate our results by also using data on the voting behavior of individual legislators on each civil rights bill from Swift et al. (2000).

Signatures on discharge petitions. During this historical period, the prevailing

land and Delaware, two states that received net black inflows during the Second Great Migration (Table A.1).

[9]We thank James Gregory for kindly sharing both datasets with us.

[10]Due to data limitations, it was possible to construct such indicators for 1940 and 1960 only.

seniority system gave southern committee chairs substantial control over the type of bills that were discussed in the House. In particular, since southern Democrats controlled key committees, such as the Rules Committee, they could block any proposed civil rights-related bill (Schickler, 2016). In most cases, civil rights bills reached the floor and were voted in the House only when a discharge petition was successful at collecting at least 218 signatures. A discharge petition can be filed if a bill or a resolution has remained stuck in the Rules Committee for at least seven days or in a legislative committee for at least twenty days. Once a petition is filed, it moves to the floor, where it can be voted on, if it is signed by at least 218 Congress members (Beth et al., 2003).

We rely on the dataset assembled by Pearson and Schickler (2009), who were able to locate the names of legislators who signed any discharge petition between the 71^{st} and the 94^{th} Congress.[11] Following the definition used in Pearson and Schickler (2009) and Schickler (2016), we restrict attention to discharge petitions relating to racial issues, and use signatures on such petitions as a proxy for a legislator's involvement with (and support for) civil rights. Since most petitions were signed in the 1940s, and because they are not comparable across decades (Table A.4), we first consider each decade separately and construct the total number of petitions signed per legislator. Next, we exploit the fact that, during the 1940s, there was a sizeable number of petitions filed both at the beginning and at the end of the decade on at least three topics – poll tax, anti-discrimination employment legislation (FECP), and anti-lynching legislation – to construct the change in the number of discharge petitions signed by legislators on each topic over time.

Table 1 presents summary statistics for the main variables considered in our analysis, reporting 1940 levels in Panel A and their (decadal) changes in Panel B. The black share in the average county was around 1.85 percent in 1940, and increased to 2.5 percent in 1970 (not shown).[12] These average values, however, mask substantial heterogeneity. This is visible in Figure A.4, where we plot the 1940 black share for the counties in our sample. As it appears, in 1940, blacks living outside the South were concentrated in the urban centers of the Northeast and the Midwest, in border states like Missouri and Kansas, and in southern California and some areas of Arizona and New Mexico. For example, in Cook County (IL), the black share in 1940 was already as high as 8 percent, and rose to 21.5 percent by 1970. Similarly, the black share in Philadelphia County (PA) increased from more than 12 percent in 1940 to almost 35 percent in 1970, whereas that in Alameda County (CA) rose from 2 to 15 percent during the same

[11] Except for this recently assembled dataset, the names of congressmen who sign the discharge petitions are made public only when the petition is able to collect at least 218 signatures. We thank the authors for kindly agreeing to share their data with us.

[12] We drop non-southern counties that had no African American population in 1940, and for which the instrument for black in-migration (described below) cannot be constructed.

period (Figure 3).

Turning to our main outcomes, the Democratic vote share and turnout in 1940 were on average 42.6 and 71 percent. Focusing on the 78^{th} Congress, our baseline Congress year, civil rights scores were on average negative. This is consistent with the idea that northern legislators, already by 1940, were relatively liberal on racial issues. The average decadal change in ideology scores was very close to zero, although this confounds important differences both between parties and between Congress periods (Bateman et al., 2017; Schickler, 2016). As noted above, signatures on discharge petitions were significantly more common in the 78^{th}- 82^{nd} than in the 83^{rd} - 88^{th} Congress period (see also Tables A.4 and A.5). Furthermore, while the poll tax and FECP legislation were the most common topics during the 1940s, 5 of the 8 discharge petitions filed between the 83^{rd} and the 88^{th} Congress were on the Civil Rights Act.

4 Empirical Strategy

4.1 Estimating Equations

Our empirical analysis is divided in two parts. In the first one, we estimate the effects of the Great Migration on demand for civil rights legislation; in the second part, we analyze politicians' response to changes in the composition and in the preferences of their electorate.

Starting from the "demand" side, we consider both electoral outcomes and grassroots activism. As described in Section 3, all these variables are available at the county level. Stacking the data for the three decades between 1940 and 1970, we estimate

$$\Delta y_{c\tau} = \delta_{s\tau} + \beta \Delta Bl_{c\tau} + \gamma X_{c\tau} + u_{c\tau} \tag{1}$$

where $\Delta y_{c\tau}$ is the change in the outcome of interest in county c during decade τ. When focusing on electoral outcomes, $\Delta y_{c\tau}$ refers to the change in the vote share of the Democratic Party – the pro-black party in the North after 1940 (see Section 2.2) – and turnout in Congressional elections. We proxy for grassroots activism using the frequency of pro-civil rights demonstrations and the presence of local NAACP chapters.

The key regressor of interest, $\Delta Bl_{c\tau}$, is the change in the black share in county c during period τ, but results are very similar when considering the change in the number of blacks, separately controlling for the change in total population (see Appendix C). $\delta_{s\tau}$ includes interactions between period and state dummies, and $X_{c\tau}$ is a vector of interactions between period dummies and 1940 county characteristics. In our most preferred specification, these are the 1940 black share and a dummy equal to one if

the Democratic vote share was higher than the Republican vote share in the 1940 Congressional elections, but in Appendix C we add more interactions to probe the robustness of our results. Since equation (1) is taken in (stacked) first differences and always controls for interactions between period and state dummies, the coefficient of interest, β, is estimated from changes in the share of blacks within the same county over time, as compared to other counties in the same state in a given period.

To deal with the potential concern that black inflows changed the political equilibrium in northern counties by triggering "white flight" (Boustan, 2010), in Appendix C we re-estimate equation (1) by aggregating the unit of analysis to the (larger) commuting zone (CZ), and document that results remain unchanged. Appendix C also verifies that our findings are unchanged when, rather than estimating stacked first difference regressions as in equation (1), both the dependent and the independent variables are taken in levels, and the analysis is conducted using a stacked panel dataset that includes county (or CD) fixed effects.

The second part of the paper asks if black arrivals altered the behavior of northern legislators in the 25 years leading up to the CRA of 1964. Focusing on CDs, and relying on the time-invariant unit of analysis described in Appendix B to overcome the issue posed by redistricting, we re-estimate different versions of equation (1) where c no longer refers to the county but, instead, to the CD. Differently from the analysis of voters' demand, we estimate first difference equations separately for each of the two Congress periods – 78 to 82 and 83 to 88 – corresponding to the 1940-1950 and to the 1950-1960 decades. We do so for three main reasons. First, redistricting was rather uncommon within these two Congress periods, and mostly occurred after Congress 82. Analyzing the two periods separately thus increases the precision of our measurement, and allows us to perform additional robustness checks.[13] Second, since the content of bills and discharge petitions varied substantially across decades, comparing the behavior of politicians in the early 1940s with their behavior in the early 1960s might be misleading.[14] Finally, separately analyzing the impact of black inflows on each decade allows us to study if and how legislators' responses varied over time. As a robustness check, Appendix C documents that results are unchanged when estimating stacked first difference regressions.

We begin the analysis of legislators' behavior by focusing on their voting patterns on civil rights bills. As explained in Section 3, our main variable of interest is the ideology

[13]For example in Appendix C, we verify that redistricting during this period was uncorrelated with black inflows, party switches, and changes in legislators' behavior.

[14]For instance, while 7 out of 14 discharge petitions were about abolishing the poll tax and introducing anti-lynching legislation in the 78-82 Congress period, these issues were no longer considered in the 83-88 period. Conversely, 5 out of 8 discharge petitions in the 83-88 Congress period were about the Civil Rights Act – a topic that had never been the subject of a discharge petition in the 78^{th} to 82^{nd} Congresses (Table A.4).

score constructed by Bateman et al. (2017), but we also consider the actual votes cast by Congress members. In this case, $\Delta y_{c\tau}$ is the change in the position on civil rights held by legislator(s) representing CD c between the beginning and the end of Congress period τ, and $\Delta Bl_{c\tau}$ is the corresponding change in the black share.

Next, we test if black inflows induced Congress members to sign more discharge petitions to actively promote the civil rights agenda, and estimate a specification of the form:[15]

$$y_{c\tau} = \delta_s + \tilde{\beta}_\tau \Delta Bl_{c\tau} + \gamma_\tau X_c + u_{c\tau} \tag{2}$$

where the coefficient $\tilde{\beta}_\tau$ is specific to each decade τ (1940-1950 and 1950-1960). Although equation (2) ensures that the petitions considered are comparable with each other, it nonetheless has a potential drawback. Since the outcome of interest is a stock (i.e. the number of petitions signed per legislator during the decade) rather than a flow, the specification does not correspond to a proper difference-in-differences as before, and thus does not account for potential time-invariant unobservables at the CD level.

To overcome this potential concern, we exploit the fact that for three topics – poll tax, FECP legislation, and anti-lynching legislation – there was a sufficient number of petitions filed both at the beginning and at the end of the 1940-1950 decade. We compute the difference in the probability of signing a discharge petition at the end and at the beginning of the 1940-1950 decade, and estimate a first-difference specification analogous to equation (1) where (as for ideology scores) $\Delta y_{c\tau}$ refers to the change in the probability of signing a discharge petition on a given topic between the beginning and the end of the Congress period.

4.2 Instrument for Changes in Black Population

The key empirical challenge we face in our analysis is that black migrants might have moved to places where politicians were already more likely to support civil rights legislation. Similarly, it is possible that black inflows were correlated with changes in local economic conditions that might have in turn affected the political environment of northern cities. To overcome these and similar concerns, we predict black inflows in northern area c during decade τ using a version of the shift-share instrument commonly used in the immigration literature (Boustan, 2010; Card, 2001).

This instrument predicts the number of black in-migrants moving to county c in decade τ by interacting the distribution of southern born blacks across non-southern counties before the Great Migration with the number of black migrants from each southern state in each decade after 1940. Formally, $\Delta Bl_{c\tau}$ in equation (1) is instrumented

[15] To account for the fact that some districts had more than one legislator, we scale these outcomes by the number of congressmen that represented each district during decade τ.

with:

$$Z_{c\tau} = \sum_{j \in South} sh_{jc} Bl_{j\tau} \tag{3}$$

where sh_{jc} is the share of blacks born in southern state j and living in c in 1940 (relative to all blacks born in state j who lived outside of state j in 1940), and $Bl_{j\tau}$ is the number of blacks who left state j during period τ. Since we are interested in the effects of changes in the black share, we further scale $Z_{c\tau}$ by 1940 county population. Following Card and Peri (2016), we do not scale $Z_{c\tau}$ by contemporaneous population because this might introduce endogeneity in the instrument.

As discussed in Boustan (2010) and Derenoncourt (2018) among others, black settlements in the North were highly persistent over time. At the turn of the twentieth century, as the first African Americans started to move northwards, migration patterns were influenced by the newly constructed railroad network. For instance, the presence of the *Illinois Central*, which was connecting several Mississippi counties to Chicago and a number of southern railroads to northern hubs in Missouri and Illinois, explains why black migrants from Mississippi were disproportionately concentrated in Chicago or St. Louis (Grossman, 1991).

The stability of black enclaves was further reinforced by the process of chain migration during the first wave of the Great Migration, between 1915 and 1930. During this period, 1.6 million blacks migrated to northern and western cities, typically following historically determined patterns, and moving to areas with a larger share of individuals from their home state or county (Collins and Wanamaker, 2015; Wilkerson, 2011). Figure 4 plots the share of southern-born blacks living in northern counties in 1940, documenting that, indeed, there was wide variation in settlement patterns across both destination and origin areas.

4.2.1 Identifying Assumptions and Instrument Validity

The shift-share instrument rests on one key assumption. The evolution of political conditions in northern counties after 1940 must not be simultaneously correlated with the 1940 composition of (southern born) black migrants and with trends in southern emigration after 1940. This assumption can be violated for three reasons.

First, if the time-invariant characteristics of counties that pulled blacks from specific states before 1940 were also correlated both with post-1940 migration patterns from the South and with changes in support for civil rights in northern counties. For example, larger and more industrialized urban centers, which might have attracted more African Americans from specific states during the first Great Migration, might have become significantly more liberal on racial issues after 1940. If this were the case, and if southern

states with higher emigration rates before 1940 also experienced stronger out-migration after 1940, this would introduce a spurious correlation between the instrument and support for civil rights.

We deal with this and similar concerns by performing two sets of robustness checks, which are described in detail in Appendix C. First, we show that pre-period changes in the outcomes of interest are not correlated with post-1940 changes in black in-migration predicted by the instrument. Second, we augment our baseline specification by interacting year dummies with several 1940 county characteristics, such as the fraction of blacks, support for the Democratic Party, and the urban share of the population. In particular, controlling for the interaction between the 1940 fraction of blacks and year dummies implies that the effects of black in-migration are identified exploiting variation only in the (southern state) composition of African Americans' enclaves across counties, holding constant the size of their black populations.

Second, one may be concerned that the instrument is spuriously correlated with changes in labor demand across northern counties due to the allocation of war-related contracts during WWII – one of the triggers of the second Great Migration (Boustan, 2016). To address this concern, we perform an extensive set of placebo checks, and document that our instrument for black in-migration is uncorrelated with WWII spending and with the generosity of New Deal relief programs across counties. We also replicate our analysis by separately controlling for a measure of predicted labor demand, constructed by interacting the 1940 industrial composition of US counties with the national growth rate of different industries between 1940 and 1970.

Finally, the identifying assumption would be violated if outmigration from each southern state were not independent of cross-county pull factors systematically related to 1940 black settlers' state of origin. We address this concern, formalized in recent works by Borusyak et al. (2018) and Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018), in two ways. First, we examine the degree to which the instrument relies on variation coming from specific northern county-to-southern state combinations. We replicate our analysis by interacting year dummies with the share of blacks born in each southern state and who lived across northern and western counties in 1940, i.e. sh_{jc} in equation (3). Reassuringly, the strength of the instrument and all our results remain unchanged when performing this exercise. Second, following Boustan (2010) and Derenoncourt (2018), we replace actual outmigration from the South with that estimated by exploiting only initial conditions across southern counties. Reassuringly, replicating the analysis with the instrument constructed using this procedure, which is described in detail in Appendix C.4, leaves all results unchanged.

4.2.2 First Stage

Table 2 reports first stage results. The dependent variable is the decadal change in the black share across counties, and the main regressor of interest is the instrument constructed in equation (3). Column 1 only includes interactions between state and period dummies, whereas columns 2 and 3 add interactions between period dummies and, respectively, the 1940 black share and a dummy for the Democratic vote share being larger than the Republicans vote share in Congressional elections in 1940. In all cases, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between actual and predicted changes in black inflows. This relationship becomes stronger and more precisely estimated as we add more controls.

The point estimate in column 3 – our most preferred specification – implies that a 10 percentage point increase in the predicted black share (due to southern in-migration) is associated with a 4 percentage point increase in the actual black share. Figure 5 presents the graphical analogue of column 3, plotting the relationship between the change in the black share and the instrument, after partialling out state by period fixed effects and the interactions between year dummies and the 1940 controls mentioned above.

Columns 4 to 6 explore the robustness of our first stage to: *i*) constructing the instrument using 1930 black shares (column 4); *ii*) estimating regressions weighted by 1940 county population; and *iii*) estimating a long-differences specification for the 1940 to 1970 change in the black share (against the corresponding change in the instrument). In all cases, the first stage remains strong, becoming significantly larger in the weighted specification. Appendix C performs additional robustness checks and shows that results are unchanged when including additional interactions, when considering level regressions (separately controlling for changes in total county population), and when dropping counties with very high or low values for changes in the black share.[16]

5 Demand for Civil Rights Legislation

This section studies the effects of the Great Migration on demand for civil rights across non-southern counties. Section 5.1 documents that black inflows increased the Democratic vote share and encouraged grassroots activism in support of racial equality. This was due both to the direct effect of black migrants and to the behavior of white voters, who became increasingly supportive of civil rights. Section 5.2 explores the mechanisms. It shows that support for civil rights increased more in areas with more unionized and

[16] Also, Table A.11 in Appendix A reports first stage results at the CD level and documents that, as for the county-level analysis, there is a strong relationship between actual and predicted changes in the black share.

unskilled workers, suggesting that a cross-race coalition emerged between the labor movement and African Americans.

5.1 Main Results

5.1.1 Congressional Elections

Contrary to the situation prevailing in the US South, since the New Deal, Democrats had become the pro-black party in the North and in the West of the United States (Moon, 1948; Schickler, 2016). As discussed in Schickler (2016), such racial realignment was more likely to emerge in local, Congressional elections than in nation-wide Presidential elections. Motivated by these observations as well as by the evidence presented in Section 2.2, we focus on electoral outcomes in Congressional elections, and rely on the Democratic vote as the main measure of support for the pro-black party.

Panel A of Table 3 presents our main results for the effects the Great Migration on the Democratic vote share, estimating equation (1) with OLS in columns 1 and 2, and with 2SLS from column 3 onwards. There is a positive and (except for column 1) statistically significant relationship between the change in the black share and support for the Democratic Party. Our most preferred specification is reported in column 3 where, in addition to instrumenting the change in the black share with the instrument constructed in equation (3), we also interact year dummies with: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 black share; and *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republican vote share in Congressional elections. The positive and large relationship between black in-migration and the Democratic vote share is robust to weighting by 1940 population (column 4) and to estimating long difference regressions (column 5).

Our findings are not only statistically significant, but also economically large. The point estimate in column 3 implies that one percentage point increase in the black share raised the Democratic vote share by 1.9 percentage points, or by almost 5% relative to the 1940 mean. For large recipient counties such as Cook county (IL) or Wayne county (MI), where the black share increased by more than 15 percentage points between 1940 and 1970, black in-migration likely altered the political landscape dramatically. Although OLS estimates are positive and statistically significant, they are an order of magnitude smaller than 2SLS ones. As we demonstrate below, the direction of OLS bias evident in Panel A of Table 3 is consistent across most of the outcomes considered in our paper. This pattern indicates that black migrants endogenously selected areas where support for the Republican Party was rising faster. One possible reason is that counties where the Republican Party was becoming more popular were also experiencing faster

income growth, thereby attracting more black migrants.[17]

The historical evidence suggests that black migrants were quickly incorporated in the political life of northern and western counties, and almost immediately started to vote in receiving areas (Moon, 1948; Schickler, 2016). In line with this idea, our 2SLS estimates show that changes in the black share have a positive but small and imprecisely estimated effect on turnout (Panel B of Table 3, columns 3 to 5). These patterns are also consistent with the possibility that some white residents started to vote because of black arrivals, for instance because black in-migration, by strengthening the ranks of the Democratic party, induced party activists to more effectively organize rallies and political campaigns (Cantoni and Pons, 2016; Pons, 2018).[18]

The effects on vote shares and turnout are not necessarily only due to the behavior of black migrants. In fact, black inflows likely altered the political equilibrium by changing whites' behavior as well. One potential concern with the interpretation of our findings is that black in-migration triggered "white flight", inducing whites to (selectively) leave areas more exposed to the Great Migration (Boustan, 2010). In Appendix C, we explore in detail this possibility, and find very little evidence consistent with it. First, we document that our results are unchanged when focusing on a much larger geographic unit that should have included any county-to-county white migration response, i.e. CZs. Second, we directly explore the extent to which black inflows were associated with changes in white population in our sample.

Previewing results reported in Appendix C, Figures A.5 and A.6 plot the relationship between the change in the number of whites over 1940 population (y-axis) and the predicted number of black migrants scaled by 1940 population (x-axis) at the county and CZ level respectively. As in our baseline specification, all regressions partial out interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 black share; and *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections was larger than that for the Republican Party. Reassuringly, both figures document that (predicted) black arrivals are uncorrelated with changes in white population, suggesting that white flight is unlikely to explain the electoral results described above. Also, and importantly, in Appendix C we verify that changes in the black share are not associated with any systematic change in the *composition* of white residents in receiving areas.

There exist additional mechanisms – not necessarily threatening our identification strategy – through which black inflows might have altered whites' behavior. For in-

[17] In unreported regressions we indeed find a negative and significant relationship between the change in the Democratic vote share and a number of proxies for economic growth, such as population growth, population density, or industrial expansion.

[18] Differently from Panel A, OLS estimates in Panel B display a negative and statistically significant correlation between black in-migration and turnout. However, both the direction and the size of OLS bias are consistent with those in Panel A.

stance, it is possible that, due to the increasing racial diversity of initially homogeneous neighborhoods, whites' support for racial equality declined, offsetting, at least in part, blacks' demand for civil rights (Collins and Margo, 2007; Olzak et al., 1996; Reny and Newman, 2018). On the contrary, as discussed in Schickler (2016), whites living in urban areas (the most common destinations of black migrants) might have formed a coalition with African Americans in order to strengthen their political clout. Such a coalition, in turn, may have organized political campaigns more frequently and effectively, ultimately inducing some white voters to join the Democratic voting bloc. In this case, whites' response would amplify the direct effect of black inflows on support for civil rights. We return to these issues in Section 5.2 below, where we explore how our results vary depending on a number of 1940 county characteristics. Before doing so, however, in the next section we study the effects of the Great Migration on grassroots activism in support of racial equality.

5.1.2 Pro-Civil Rights Demonstrations and NAACP Presence

In Table 4, we proxy for local activism using the frequency of non-violent demonstrations in support of civil rights organized by the CORE – an inter-racial group of students from the University of Chicago that coordinated forms of civil disobedience across northern cities to protest against segregation in the South. In columns 1 to 4, the dependent variable is the decadal change in the number of demonstrations on civil rights. Since CORE data are available only from 1940 onwards, columns 1 and 3 implicitly assume that there were no demonstrations in the 1930 to 1940 decade (a reasonable assumption, since the first registered demonstration took place in 1942). To test the robustness of our results, in columns 2 and 4, we thus focus only on the 1950s and 1960s.

Both OLS and 2SLS estimates (reported in columns 1-2 and 3-4 respectively) are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that black inflows raised the number of pro-civil rights demonstrations occurring in non-southern counties. Column 5 reports the effects of the Great Migration on the (change in) the probability that at least one demonstration took place in a given decade. The coefficient is again positive and statistically significant, implying that not only more demonstrations took place overall, but also that grassroots activism took off in new areas over time.

For a subset of CORE events, we were able to identify the race of participants. We exploit this to test if not only blacks, but also whites participated in these events. Column 6 restricts attention to CORE demonstrations with both African American and white protesters. While the point estimate on black inflows is one third smaller than that in column 5, it nonetheless remains positive and statistically significant. Notably, results in column 6 represent a (very conservative) lower-bound for the probability

that whites joined pro-civil rights demonstrations, since only for approximately 40% of CORE events participants' race was reported, and we define a protest as having white participants only when the CORE data explicitly reported the presence of whites.

In Table 5, we turn to the 1940-1960 change in the probability that a county had a NAACP chapter in place.[19] As for Table 4, OLS and 2SLS estimates are reported in columns 1-2 and 3-4 respectively. In the full sample of counties, black inflows have no effects on the local presence of NAACP chapters (columns 1 and 3). However, once we focus on counties that did not have a chapter in 1940 (columns 2 and 4), both OLS and 2SLS estimates become positive and statistically significant. The fact that we do not find any effect for counties that already had a chapter in place in 1940 is not surprising: it is most likely that in these places black inflows increased the number of members of NAACP chapters – something that we are not able to measure in our data. Instead, in counties where the NAACP was not present at baseline, black in-migration probably created a critical mass of activists that justified the opening of new local chapters.

5.2 Mechanisms: Black Inflows and Whites' Reactions

As noted above, black inflows likely affected whites' behavior. On the one hand, it is possible that racial mixing of previously homogeneous neighborhoods triggered whites' backlash against blacks. Existing evidence suggests that, especially from the 1960s, white homeowners became increasingly hostile towards African Americans at least in some northern and western cities (Reny and Newman, 2018; Collins and Margo, 2007). When this was the case, since the Democratic Party was associated with a pro-civil rights agenda, Republican candidates often adopted conservative positions on racial issues to gain the votes of whites concerned about the growing racial diversity of their neighborhoods (Sugrue, 2014). Under this scenario, whites' reactions would dampen the (positive) effect of the Great Migration on the Democratic vote share. In particular, even assuming that all black migrants (immediately) voted in favor of the Democratic Party, the Democratic vote share should increase by less than one for one with each new black arrival in the presence of whites' backlash.

On the other hand, black inflows may have raised whites' involvement with and support for civil rights. First, exposure to black migrants might have increased whites' awareness of the brutal conditions prevailing in the South, in turn fostering their demand to promote racial equality in the region (Myrdal, 1944). Second and related, inter-group contact might have reduced negative stereotypes and prejudice held by whites, changing their attitudes towards blacks (Allport, 1954; Steinmayr, 2018). Fi-

[19]Data on the presence of NAACP chapters are available only for 1940 and 1960, preventing us from estimating a stacked first difference specification.

nally, economic incentives might have favored the formation of a cross-race coalition between whites and black migrants. This possibility is discussed, among others, in Schickler (2016) and Sugrue (2008), who argue that the labor movement in northern and western urban areas saw the Great Migration as a window of opportunity to strengthen its political clout.

Consistent with the previous idea, union leaders actively sought to promote the civil rights agenda in order to attract blacks in their rank and file.[20] Once a liberal coalition on both economic and racial issues was formed, its members were likely in a better position than before to organize effective political campaigns. As documented in a number of recent papers (Cantoni and Pons, 2016; Pons, 2018), actions such as canvassing can have a large effect both on turnout and on partisan support. Thus, the formation of a pro-Democratic coalition, favored by black arrivals to northern cities, might have put the Democratic Party in an advantageous position relative to the Republican Party.

The previous discussion provides us with testable predictions to understand whether the reaction of white voters (if any) amplified or dampened the direct impact of black inflows. We start by observing that the coefficient on the effects of black in-migration on the Democratic vote share reported in column 3 of Table 3 implies that – even under the extreme assumption that every black migrant immediately voted for the Democratic Party – each new black raised the vote share of the Democratic Party by more than one for one. These patterns thus indicate that black in-migration induced at least some whites to start voting for Democrats, possibly by increasing their support for racial equality. Consistent with this idea, column 6 of Table 4 shows that, indeed, not only blacks but also whites joined pro-civil rights demonstrations.

If one of the mechanisms behind our results is the formation of a cross-race coalition that more effectively organized (pro-Democratic) political campaigns, black inflows should have a larger effect in counties with more competitive elections. Here, indeed, incentives to actively conduct canvassing or similar activities should be higher. Moreover, precisely in these areas a better organized political machine can make a difference to attract pivotal voters. To test this idea, which is also discussed in Grant (2020), Figure 6 splits the sample between counties with political competition in 1940 elections above (orange bar) and below (blue bar) the median, and shows that black arrivals had a larger effect on the Democratic vote share where 1940 elections were more competitive.[21] The rest of Figure 6 turns to one of the specific channels discussed above, namely the possibility that black inflows encouraged the formation of a cross-race coali-

[20]For instance, in 1944 CIO leader John Brophy declared that "behind every lynching is the figure of the labor exploiter, the man or the corporation who would deny labor its fundamental rights" (Schickler, 2016).

[21]We define counties with more competitive elections as those where the margin of victory (of either party) in 1940 Congressional elections was smaller.

tion between African Americans and labor unions.[22]

Again splitting the sample between counties above and below the 1940 median, Figure 6 documents that the effects of black in-migration were larger where the share of the white labor force in manufacturing and of unskilled white workers was higher. Finally, to more directly test the role played by labor unions, we collected data from Troy (1957) on the share of unionized workers affiliated with the CIO in 1939.[23] In line with the historical evidence described in Schickler (2016), the impact of the Great Migration was significantly stronger in areas where CIO unionization rates were higher. Overall, the patterns in Figure 6 have a twofold interpretation. First, they suggest that counties that were more reliant on manufacturing and more heavily unionized were better able to attract black voters to the Democratic party. Second, with black migrants strengthening the cross-race liberal coalition in those counties, the ability of the Democrats to attract additional voters to their ranks could have been further increased.

These trends are evident not only for electoral results, but also for the direct engagement (of whites) with civil rights. Figure A.7 replicates Figure 6 focusing on pro-civil rights demonstrations, and paints a very similar picture: grassroots activism was more likely to emerge where more workers were employed in manufacturing and in unskilled occupations, and where CIO unionization rates were higher. In turn, such grassroots activism may have promoted a more efficient organization of political campaigns, attracting more white voters to the Democratic Party.

We conclude this section by exploring the possibility that, even though on average the Great Migration shifted whites' attitudes in favor of civil rights, in some cases it created political discontent and resulted in electoral losses for the Democratic Party. First, we investigate the possibility that black arrivals increased labor market competition for whites. This seems unlikely since, as discussed in Sugrue (2014) and in Boustan (2009), northern labor markets were highly segmented along racial lines, and African Americans very rarely competed for jobs directly with whites. Consistent with this conjecture, 2SLS estimates reported in Tables A.8 and A.9 show that black inflows were not associated with changes in labor market outcomes for white men. Since data on employment, occupation, or wages are separately available by race (and gender or age) only from micro-censuses, we focus on years 1940 and 1960 to maximize the geographic coverage of our sample: for 1940, we use full count data, while for 1960 we rely on the

[22]Table A.6 reports the formal (2SLS) regression results displayed in Figure 6. As it appears, in some cases, the F-stat for weak instruments is low, suggesting that results should be interpreted with caution.

[23]Since data are not available at the county, but only at the state level, we split observations according to the distribution of CIO unionization rates at the state level.

5% sample of the US census (Ruggles et al., 2015).[24] Also, since a limited number of respondents per county is available from the 5% sample, we aggregate the data to the CZ, and conduct the analysis at this level.[25]

Table A.8 documents that the 1940 to 1960 change in the black share had a negative, but very small and imprecisely estimated impact on the probability of employment (column 1) and on labor force participation (column 2) for white men. Similarly, black inflows had no effects on the probability of working in manufacturing (column 3), on the log of occupational scores (column 4), and on the log of wages (column 5) for white men. In Table A.9, we go one step further and verify that black arrivals had no impact on employment and wages among white men holding unskilled jobs (columns 1 and 2) or working in manufacturing (columns 3 and 4) – the two most exposed sectors to potential labor market competition brought about by the Great Migration (Boustan, 2016; Sugrue, 2014).

Next, we turn to what is typically considered the main reason behind whites' backlash in the North, namely the rising racial diversity of previously white and homogeneous neighborhoods (Collins and Margo, 2007; Reny and Newman, 2018; Sugrue, 2014). One would expect stronger opposition to black migrants and a smaller increase (or even a decline) in the Democratic vote share in areas where the probability of inter-racial interactions in the housing market was higher. Since white residents were also concerned about the declining value of their houses due to black arrivals, discontent should be more likely to emerge where whites' homeownership rates were higher (Sugrue, 2014). Splitting the sample as before, Table A.10 confirms these predictions. First, black inflows had a smaller effect on the Democratic vote share where the (white) homeownership rate was higher (columns 1 and 2). Second, in counties with lower residential segregation, where the probability of inter-racial contact in the housing market was higher, black arrivals actually had a negative and large impact on the Democratic vote share.[26]

To sum up, this section documented that, on average, white voters sided with blacks to demand for civil rights legislation. Our evidence, consistent with Schickler (2016), suggests that this was at least in part due to the formation of a cross-race coalition between black migrants and unskilled, unionized white workers.[27] At the same time,

[24]For 1950 and 1970, instead, only 1% samples are available. This severely limits the number of respondents per county and the number of counties that we can identify in the data.

[25]Results in Tables A.8 and A.9 are obtained when focusing on white men above the age 18 who were not enrolled in school. As discussed in detail in Appendix C, not all CZs in our sample can be identified in the 1960 census. Reassuringly, as documented in Table C.12, restricting attention to the sample of CZs that can be identified in the 1960 Census leaves our main political results unchanged (see Appendix C.3 for more details).

[26]We measure residential segregation using the index developed by Logan and Parman (2017).

[27]Data limitations prevent us from testing whether increased awareness of the conditions prevailing

however, we showed that, due to concerns over racially mixed neighborhoods, support for civil rights and for the Democratic Party did not increase among all whites.

6 Legislators' Behavior

This section studies the impact of the Great Migration on legislators' propensity to support civil rights legislation, and tests how Congress members responded to the changes in the composition and in the preferences of their electorate brought about by black in-migration. First, it shows that Congress members representing CDs that received more black migrants became more likely to vote in favor of pro-civil rights bills (Section 6.1). Second, it finds that black inflows increased the probability that northern legislators signed discharge petitions to promote racial equality (Section 6.2). Finally, it documents that both "between" and "within" party adjustments were responsible for the change in legislators' behavior (Section 6.3).

6.1 Ideology Scores

We begin the analysis of legislators' behavior by taking a snapshot of the ideology of members of the House on racial issues at the end of the 88^{th} Congress – the Congress that passed the CRA. As discussed above, we proxy for legislators' ideology using the "agnostic" version of the civil rights scores constructed by Bateman et al. (2017), which take more negative (resp. positive) values for more liberal (resp. conservative) voting behavior on civil rights bills. Figure 7 plots the relationship between the ideology of legislators in the 88^{th} Congress and the 1940 to 1960 predicted black in-migration over 1940 CD population, after partialling out state dummies, the 1940 black share, and the 1940 Democratic dummy already described before.

There is a negative and statistically significant relationship between black inflows and the ideology scores of northern legislators. That is, CDs that received more blacks over this 20 year period were represented by legislators with a significantly more liberal ideology on racial issues in 1964. This association, formally reported in column 2 of Table A.12, is quantitatively large: 1 standard deviation increase in the black share (around 5 percentage points) reduces the Bateman et al. (2017) scores by almost one third of a standard deviation.[28] One potential concern with the relationship displayed in Figure 7 is that black migrants might have moved to places where legislators were already more supportive of civil rights. To assuage this concern, in column 3 of Table A.12, we include the ideology score of legislators corresponding to the baseline, i.e.

in the South also induced whites to more actively support civil rights legislation.

[28]Table A.12 (column 2) reports the 2SLS regression associated to the reduced form specification plotted in Figure 7. OLS results for the same specification are reported in column 1.

78^{th}, Congress. Reassuringly, results are almost identical to those reported in column 2.[29]

Next, in Table 6 we estimate the effects of black in-migration on the change in the voting behavior of northern legislators for each Congress period (78 to 82 and 83 to 88) separately using first difference regressions. As in Figure 7, Panel A proxies for legislators' voting behavior using the "agnostic" version of the Bateman et al. (2017) scores, while Panels B and C show that results are robust to using, respectively, the "constrained" version of the scores and the probability of voting in favor of the pro-civil rights bills considered in Congress during this period.[30]

Columns 1 and 2 focus on Congress period 78 to 82, and present, respectively OLS and 2SLS results. Consistent with the relationship plotted in Figure 7, 2SLS estimates confirm that black in-migration had a strong, negative impact on civil rights scores of legislators in the 1940-1950 decade. However, between the 83^{rd} and the 88^{th} Congress, black inflows did not lead to any further change in the ideology of congressmen, as inferred from legislators' voting behavior (columns 3 and 4). These findings suggest that legislators quickly reacted to the change in the preferences and in the composition of their constituencies. After an initial change in ideology, however, no further shift occurred, at least on average.

The change in ideology taking place between 1944 and 1952 might be due either to changes in the party in power – a "between" party adjustment – or to changes occurring within parties – a "within" party adjustment. Moreover, it is possible that the muted response to black in-migration observed on average during the 83-88 Congress period masks heterogeneity in legislators' behavior (both between and within parties). In Section 6.3, we explore these issues, and isolate the "between" and the "within" party components at play during each Congress period. Before doing that, however, in the next section we turn to another, probably more compelling, measure of legislators' involvement with civil rights – signatures on discharge petitions.

6.2 Signatures on Discharge Petitions

As discussed in Schickler (2016), voting behavior on civil rights bills is only an indirect and weak proxy for legislators' involvement with and support for racial issues. Indeed, due to gatekeeping imposed by southern Democrats, civil rights bills were unlikely to

[29]Our findings are also unchanged when using the "constrained" version of the civil rights scores (column 4).

[30]Specifically, starting from the 9 bills concerned with civil rights (see Table A.2), for each Congress period, we computed the average probability of voting in favor of a bill at the end and at the beginning of the period. Then, we computed the difference between the two to construct the change in the probability of supporting civil rights legislation, which is used as dependent variable in Panel C of Table 6.

reach the floor of the House, unless northern legislators were able and willing to undertake some non-standard action. Signing a discharge petition on civil rights represents the best example of such non-conventional tools at disposal of non-southern legislators (Pearson and Schickler, 2009). Ideally, one would like to test whether changes in the black share lead to a change in legislators' propensity to sign discharge petitions. However, for this to be possible, discharge petitions would have to be comparable across decades. Table A.4 reveals that, not only more discharge petitions were signed between Congresses 78 and 82 than between Congresses 83 and 88, but also that the type of petitions were significantly different across periods.

For this reason, rather than estimating a proper differences-in-differences specification, we begin by asking if, in each of the two decades, the change in the black share was associated with a higher number of petitions signed per legislator. Table 7 presents results from equation (2) for Congress periods 78-82 and 83-88 in columns 1 and 2 and in columns 3 and 4 respectively. The dependent variable is the number of signatures on discharge petitions per legislator signed during each Congress period, and is regressed against the corresponding change in the black share. We always control for state dummies, for the 1940 black share, and for the 1940 Democratic dummy.

OLS and 2SLS estimates are positive, statistically significant, and economically large for both decades. According to column 2, one percentage point increase in the black share is associated with a 15% increase in the number of signatures on discharge petitions per legislator between Congresses 78 and 82.[31] Both the OLS and the 2SLS point estimates for the 83-88 Congress period are smaller (columns 3 and 4). However, since the average number of petitions signed in this decade was also lower (Table A.4), the implied magnitude for the effects of black in-migration is comparable to – if not larger than – that of the previous decade.

Interpreting results in Table 7 might be challenging because they are obtained from a "levels on changes" specification, implying that unobservable CD fixed characteristics cannot be controlled for. To overcome this potential concern, we focus on the 1940 to 1950 decade and exploit the fact that, during this time period, several discharge petitions were filed and signed on the same topics both at the beginning and at the end of the decade. We consider three main topics: fair employment legislation (FEPC), the poll tax, and anti-lynching legislation. These were, together with the literacy test, the main battlegrounds of the civil rights movement during this period.[32]

Although all three topics featured prominently in the political debate during the 1940s, some differences existed between them. First, the salience of both the poll tax

[31]This number is obtained by dividing the coefficient in column 2 (that can be interpreted as the effect of one percentage point change in the black share) through the 1940-1950 average number of petitions signed per legislator, 1.32.

[32]However, no discharge petition was ever filed on the literacy test.

and anti-lynching legislation gradually declined relative to that of anti-discrimination employment legislation during the 1940s. For instance, the last discharge petition on either the poll tax or anti-lynching legislation was filed during the 80^{th} Congress, whereas discharge petitions on FEPC were filed also in the early 1950s (Table A.5). Second, anti-lynching legislation and, to a lesser extent, the abolition of the poll tax almost exclusively concerned racial relations in the South; conversely, employment protection legislation had direct, strong impact not only in the South but also in the North (Sugrue, 2014). For both reasons, one may expect FEPC to be the most relevant category, where northern legislators may have tried to signal their (pro-civil rights) stance the most.

Figure 8 plots the 2SLS point estimate (with 95% confidence intervals) for the effects of changes in the black share on the change in the probability of signing a discharge petition on any of the three topics (first dot) and then on each topic separately (second to fourth dots from the left). Consistent with the previous discussion, while black in-migration had a positive effect on the probability of signing a discharge petition on all topics, it had a somewhat larger impact on FEPC relative to the other categories, even though this difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels.[33]

6.3 Decomposition: Within vs Between Party Changes

The previous two sections showed that black in-migration increased both the probability of voting in favor of civil rights bills and the propensity to sign discharge petitions to promote racial equality among northern Congress members. These effects might come from two, non-mutually exclusive forces. First, changes taking place between parties if, for instance, Republican legislators were replaced by Democratic legislators. Second, changes taking place within parties, if the ideology of Congress members of the same party shifted towards more liberal positions. In this section we seek to isolate, for each Congress period, which of the two forces can explain the patterns documented above.

To do so, we first create dummies that take the value of 1 for each possible party transition experienced by a CD between the beginning and the end of the Congress period – from Republican to Democratic, from Republican to Republican, from Democratic to Democratic, and from Democratic to Republican. Next, we interact such dummies with the change in the black share, to test to what extent changes in the party in power in a CD can explain the effects of the Great Migration on legislators'

[33]Table A.13 reports 2SLS and OLS estimates corresponding to results plotted in Figure 8. The change in the probability of signing a petition on FEPC, anti-lynching legislation, and the poll tax is taken over Congresses 81 to 78, 80 to 77, and 79 to 77 respectively. Since petitions on the three topics were not always signed in the same Congress year and were not always comparable with each other (Table A.5), we checked the robustness of our results using a number of alternative time windows. Reassuringly, they always remained similar to those presented in Figure 8.

behavior. We start from legislators' ideology, focusing on the agnostic version of the Bateman et al. (2017) scores, and report 2SLS results for both the direct effect of black in-migration and its interaction with each of the four dummies in Table 8.[34]

During the 78 to 82 period (Panel A) the change in legislators' voting behavior is entirely accounted for by the "between" party component, and is driven by CDs switching from the Republican to the Democratic Party (column 1). When turning to the subsequent Congress period (Panel B), however, a very different picture emerges. While the "between" party component is again at play (column 1), a stronger, "within" party adjustment is evident (columns 2 and 3) in this decade. In particular, CDs with a Republican (resp. Democratic) legislator in both the 83^{rd} and the 88^{th} Congress became more conservative (resp. more liberal) on racial issues in response to black in-migration between 1954 and 1964. This pattern suggests that the muted change in Congress members' ideology documented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 masks substantial heterogeneity. Moreover, it indicates that, after producing a shift from the Republican to the Democratic Party in the 1940s, the Great Migration likely contributed to the rise in polarization along party lines in the following decade. These findings bear some similarity to the dynamics recently documented in Autor et al. (2017) for the effects of import competition from China since the early 2000s.

Table 9 repeats the analysis just described focusing on legislators' propensity to sign discharge petitions. The structure of the table is the same as Table 8: Panel A (resp. Panel B) present 2SLS results for the 78 to 82 (resp. 83 to 88) Congress period. As for legislators' ideology, between 1944 and 1952, the effects of the Great Migration on signatures on discharge petitions are entirely driven by newly elected legislators in CDs that switched from the Republican to the Democratic Party. Conversely, between 1954 and 1964, such "between" party mechanism no longer operated. Instead, as in Table 8, black inflows lead Congress members representing CDs that remained Republican (resp. Democratic) throughout to sign a significantly lower (resp. higher) number of discharge petitions to promote racial equality. While our data prevent us from identifying whether the "within" party dynamics just described were due to changes in the ideology of the same candidate or to the election of new, more extreme candidates (within the same party), we are nonetheless able to draw two main conclusions.

First, during the 1940-1950 decade, black in-migration lead to the replacement of Republican Congress members with Democratic legislators who held more liberal racial positions and were more likely to support civil rights. Second, during the ten years leading up to the CRA, black arrivals increased the ideological distance on racial issues

[34]The interaction between the party transition dummy and the change in the black share is instrumented by interacting the transition dummy with the instrument for black in-migration constructed in equation (3).

between the two parties, possibly because the Republican Party strategically tried to win the votes of whites who were becoming increasingly concerned about the racial mixing of their (previously homogeneous) neighborhoods (Sugrue, 2014). These patterns are also consistent with the possibility that local responses to the Great Migration were partly influenced by national-level considerations: even though the Democratic Party might have "lost the South" by openly promoting the civil rights agenda (Kuziemko and Washington, 2018), this strategy might have been instrumental to win urban areas of the West and the North. At the same time, the Republican Party might have tried to strengthen its conservative position at the national level, in order to more easily attract dissatisfied white voters leaving the Democratic Party in the South.

7 Summary of Robustness Checks

In this section we provide a summary of robustness checks, which we more extensively discuss in Appendix C. The first set of checks is aimed at increasing the confidence in the exogeneity of the initial black shares (from each southern state) across northern and western counties, which are used to construct the instrument for black in-migration. First, we show that our instrument is uncorrelated with both WWII contracts and New Deal spending across counties (Table C.1). Second, to address concerns that 1940 black settlements might be correlated with county-specific characteristics that may have had a time varying effect on changes in political conditions, we interact period dummies with several 1940 county characteristics (Table C.2).[35] Also, and importantly, Table C.2 documents that results are unchanged when augmenting the baseline specification with a measure of predicted industrialization constructed using a Bartik-style strategy that combines the 1940 industrial composition of non-southern counties with national growth across industries. Third, to deal with the possibility that the 1940 share of blacks (from each southern state) were not independent of cross-county pull factors systematically related to settlers' state of origin (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2018), we replicate our county-level results interacting year dummies with the share of blacks from each southern state (Figures C.1 and C.2).

The second set of placebo checks shows that, crucially, there is no correlation between pre-period changes in any of the outcomes of interest and the change in the black share predicted by the instrument either at the county or at the CD level (Table C.3). Next, we provide evidence that our results are robust to excluding potential outliers, i.e. counties and CDs that experienced extremely large and low changes in the black share (Table C.4). We also document that our findings are unlikely to be driven by

[35]For instance, we consider the urban share of the population, the employment share in manufacturing, the employment to population ratio, and the immigrant share of the population in 1940.

the simultaneous inflow of southern white migrants (Table C.5), and that results are robust to using alternative specifications, including regressions in levels (rather than in changes) that control for county or CD fixed effects (Tables C.6 and C.7).

Third, we provide extensive evidence that our analysis at the county level is unlikely to be biased due to population responses among whites, such as "white flight" (Boustan, 2010). First, we replicate our results focusing on a larger geographic area (i.e. CZs) that likely accounted for most (urban-suburban) white outmigration, if any (Tables C.8 and C.9). Second, we show that our results are robust to estimating a specification in levels, which allows us to separately control for changes in county population (Table C.10). Third, we directly investigate the extent to which black in-migration was associated with white out-migration in our sample. In contrast with (Boustan, 2010), we find very little evidence of "white flight" either at the county level or at the CZ level (Table C.11).[36] Also, and importantly, we document that black inflows are not systematically related to changes in the composition of white residents (Tables C.12 and C.13).

Fourth, we address the concern that local pull shocks across northern destinations might be correlated with the pre-1940 distribution of black settlements, in turn casting doubts on the validity of the instrument. Following (Boustan, 2010, 2016), we construct a version of the instrument that replaces the actual number of blacks leaving each southern state in each decade with that predicted exploiting only variation in conditions across southern counties. After estimating a zeroth-stage to predict black emigration (Table C.14), we document that both the first and the second stage results reported in the main text are unchanged when using this modified version of the instrument (Table C.15 and Table C.16).

Fifth, we show that our CD-level results are robust to estimating stacked first difference regressions akin to those used for the county-level analysis (Table C.17). We also verify the accuracy of the CD boundary adjustment procedure described in Appendix B by comparing the county level results for the effects of black inflows on the Democratic vote share with those obtained using CD level data (Table C.18). Finally, we document that state-mandated redistricting between Congress 78 and Congress 82 is not correlated with either changes in the black share or changes in political conditions (Table C.19).[37]

[36]One possible explanation for this pattern is that Boustan (2010) considers migration from the central city to the suburbs. In many cases, such migration patterns would not cross county (not to mention CZ) boundaries. Moreover, while Boustan (2010) focuses on an exclusively urban sample, we consider all non-southern counties, including more rural ones.

[37]This check cannot be performed between Congress 83 and Congress 88 because most CDs were subject to redistricting in this period.

8 Conclusions

The second Great Migration of African Americans was one of the largest episodes of internal migration in American history. Between 1940 and 1970 more than 4 million blacks left the US South for northern and western destinations. During this same period, the civil rights movement struggled and eventually succeeded to eliminate formal impediments to black political participation and to remove (at least) *de jure* racial segregation. In this paper, we study the effects that black in-migration had on both voters' demand for racial equality and legislators' support for civil rights legislation. While it is natural to expect that black inflows increased demand for civil rights among the black electorate, the response of white voters is ex-ante ambiguous. On the one hand, higher racial diversity of northern neighborhoods might have sparked whites' backlash against African Americans. On the other, the Great Migration might have increased white voters' awareness of the brutal conditions prevailing in the South. Furthermore, black arrivals might have favored the formation of a cross-race coalition between white, unionized workers and black migrants. Such coalition, in turn, may have coordinated actions to support civil rights and to mobilize white voters who were previously not concerned about racial equality.

Using a version of the shift-share instrument (Card, 2001; Boustan, 2010) to predict black in-migration to northern and western counties, we first show that changes in the black share had a positive and large effect on the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections. The magnitude of our estimates implies that demand for civil rights (and support for the pro-civil rights party) increased not only among black, but also and crucially, among white voters. Consistent with this idea, we also document that the arrival of African Americans raised both the frequency of non-violent demonstrations in support of civil right, where both blacks and whites participated, and the presence of local grassroots organizations (such as the NAACP).

In the second part of the paper, we study how politicians responded to changes in the electorate induced by the Great Migration. We find that CDs that received more African Americans between 1940 and 1960 were represented by legislators who, in 1964 – when the CRA was passed – had significantly more liberal voting records on civil rights bills. Tracing out the dynamics of the effects of black in-migration, we document that changes in legislators' ideology were stronger in the 1940-1950 decade, and were driven by the replacement of Republican legislators with more liberal Democratic Congress members. In the following decade, instead, black arrivals increased the ideological distance between Democratic and Republican legislators who became, respectively, more liberal and more conservative in response to the Great Migration. Using data on signatures on discharge petitions, we document very similar patterns, and show that black

inflows induced northern and western legislators to actively promote racial equality.

The civil rights movement and its major achievements were due to a multitude of forces and actors. Our findings shed light on a specific, so far under-appreciated mechanism – Northern legislators' response to the change in the composition and in the preferences of their local electorate – that likely contributed to the eventual success of civil rights legislation. Results in this paper, when contrasted with other works on the political effects of migration, also raise an intriguing question: under what conditions, can migration and inter-group contact lead to the formation of cross-group coalitions? When, instead, is backlash from original residents more likely to emerge?

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Figures and Tables

Figure 1. Change in the Black Share across US Counties, 1940 to 1970



Notes: The map plots the change in the share of blacks in the population between 1940 and 1970 for the non-southern counties in our sample.

Figure 2. Black Emigration Rates from the South, by Decade



Notes: The figure plots the black emigration rate from the US South for each decade. *Source:* Adapted from Boustan (2016).

Figure 3. Black Share in Northern Counties, 1940 vs 1970



Notes: Black share of the population for selected non-southern counties in 1940 (light blue) and in 1970 (black). *Source:* Authors' calculation from IPUMS data.

Figure 4. Share of Southern Born Blacks in Northern Counties, 1940



Notes: Share of African Americans born in selected southern states living in non-southern counties in 1940. *Source:* Authors' calculation from IPUMS data.

Figure 5. First Stage



Notes: The y-axis (resp. x-axis) reports the decadal change in the share of blacks (resp. predicted black in-migration over 1940 population) for the three decades between 1940 and 1970 across non-southern counties. Each point in the scatter diagram represents the residual change in the two variables, after partialing out period by state fixed effects, and interactions between period dummies and the 1940 black share and a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections was larger than the Republican vote share in 1940.

Figure 6. Heterogeneous Effects on the Democratic Vote Share



Notes: The bars report the marginal effect of changes in the black share (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the change in the Democratic vote share for counties with each 1940 variable above (resp. below) the sample median in orange (resp. blue). See the main text for a discussion of each variable, and Table A.6 for the coefficients and standard errors corresponding to the graph.

Figure 7. Ideology Scores and Black In-Migration



Notes: the y-axis reports the "agnostic" version of the civil rights score from Bateman et al. (2017) for legislators representing the non-southern CDs in our sample during Congress 88. The x-axis reports the 1940 to 1960 predicted black in-migration over 1940 population. The figure reports the residual scatterplot of a regression of the civil rights scores against predicted black inflows, after partialling out state fixed effects the 1940 black share and a dummy equal to 1 if the district was represented by a Democrat legislator in 1944.

Figure 8. Change in Signatures on Discharge Petitions



Notes: the figure plots the 2SLS coefficient (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for the effects of the 1940-1950 change in the black share on the corresponding change in the number of signatures on discharge petitions per legislator. The first dot on the left ("All") includes discharge petitions on employment protection legislation (FEPC), to promote anti-lynching legislation, and to abolish the poll tax. The three remaining dots refer to each of the three issues. All regressions partial out state dummies, the 1940 share black, and a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic party at baseline was representing the district at baseline. Results (both for OLS and 2SLS) are reported in Table A.13.

Table 1. Summary Statistics

Variables	Mean	Median	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs
			Panel A: 1940 Levels			
Black Share (county)	1.851	0.443	4.334	0.003	46.55	1,139
Black share (CD)	1.681	0.204	3.742	0.002	19.30	286
Democratic Vote Share	42.65	44.00	15.96	0	85.00	1,139
Turnout	71.03	71.60	10.32	23.00	97.60	1,139
Civil Rights Scores	-0.358	-0.224	0.680	-2.008	1.431	286
			Panel B: Changes			
Black Share (county)	0.187	0.009	1.110	-11.88	12.79	3,418
Black Share (CD)	1.070	0.121	2.034	-0.086	11.69	571
Democratic Vote Share	1.071	0.299	14.07	-67.09	78.60	3,418
Turnout	-5.758	-12.40	17.89	-64.30	43.00	3,418
Civil Rights Scores	-0.008	0	0.595	-2.907	1.948	567

Notes: The sample includes a panel of the 1,139 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for our definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. When relevant, county variables are collapsed at the Congressional District level, fixing boundaries to Congress 78 as explained in the text. Democratic vote share and turnout refer to Congressional elections, and civil rights scores are the ideology scores from Bateman et al. (2017). Panel A presents 1940 values, while Panel B reports decadal changes for each of the variables.

Table 2. First Stage

Dep. variable	Change in Black Share					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Change in Predicted Black Share	0.261** (0.121)	0.407*** (0.139)	0.392*** (0.137)	0.361*** (0.103)	1.148*** (0.311)	0.309*** (0.115)
State by Year FEs	X	X	X	X	X	X
1940 Black Share		X	X	X	X	X
1940 Dem Dummy			X	X	X	X
Weighted					X	
Specification	Stacked FD	Stacked FD	Stacked FD	Stacked FD	Stacked FD	LD
Initial Shares	1940	1940	1940	1930	1940	1940
R-squared	0.171	0.200	0.210	0.205	0.503	0.241
Observations	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418	1,139

Notes: The sample includes a panel of the 1,139 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for our definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The dependent variable is the decadal change in the black share, defined as the number of blacks divided by total population, in the county. The main regressor of interest is the instrument constructed in the main text (equation (4)). Columns 1 to 5 control for interactions between state dummies and period dummies. Columns 2 to 5 add interactions between period dummies and the 1940 black share. Column 3 also includes interactions between period dummies and a dummy equal to 1 if the 1940 Democratic vote share is above the Republicans vote share. Column 4 replicates column 3 by constructing the instrument using the 1930 share of blacks (from each southern state) in the county. Column 5 replicates column 3 by running regressions weighted by 1940 county population. Column 6 estimates a long difference specification that controls for state dummies, the 1940 black share, and the 1940 Democratic dummy described above. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table 3. Congressional Elections

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) 2SLS	(4) 2SLS	(5) 2SLS
	Panel A: Democratic Vote Share *(1940 mean: 42.78)*				
Change in Black Share	0.238	0.358**	1.936***	1.650***	2.364***
	(0.182)	(0.181)	(0.555)	(0.286)	(0.827)
	Panel B: Turnout *(1940 mean: 71.06)*				
Change in Black Share	-0.499***	-0.497***	0.198	0.390*	0.405
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.328)	(0.235)	(0.436)
F-stat			8.199	13.65	7.267
Specification	FD	FD	FD	FD	LD
1940 Black Share		X	X	X	X
1940 Dem Dummy		X	X	X	X
Weighted				X	
Observations	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418	1,138

Notes: The sample includes a panel of the 1,139 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for our definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The table reports stacked first difference regressions in columns 1 to 5, and long difference regressions in column 6. The dependent variable is the decadal change in the Democratic vote share (resp. turnout) in Congressional elections in Panel A (resp. Panel B). Columns 1 and 2 estimate equation (1) in the text with OLS, while remaining columns report 2SLS estimates. The main regressor of interest is the change in the black share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (4) in the text from column 3 onwards. All regressions control for state by period fixed effects. 1940 black share (resp 1940 Demo dummy) refers to interactions between period dummies and the 1940 black share (resp. a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share). F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table 4. Demonstrations Organized by CORE

Dep. variable	Change in					
	Number of Protests				1[Protest]	
	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) 2SLS	(4) 2SLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) 2SLS
Change in Black Share	0.453**	0.628**	0.237**	0.311**	0.032**	0.012**
	(0.224)	(0.308)	(0.099)	(0.123)	(0.013)	(0.005)
Drop 1940		X		X		
White Participants						X
F-stat			8.199	8.171	8.199	8.199
Observations	3,418	2,279	3,418	2,279	3,418	3,418

Notes: The sample includes a panel of the 1,139 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The dependent variable is the change in the number of non-violent demonstrations in favor of the civil rights legislation coordinated by the CORE in columns 1 to 4, and the change in the probability that at least one demonstration took place in columns 5 and 6. The main regressor of interest is the decadal change in black share. Columns 1 and 2 (resp. 3 to 6) present OLS (resp. 2SLS) estimates. 2SLS regressions are based on the shift-share instrument described in equation (4) in the text. Columns 2 and 4 drop the 1940 to 1950 decade. Column 6 includes only demonstrations that were joined by at least some white protesters. All regressions control for state by period fixed effects and for interactions between period dummies and: i) the 1940 black share; ii) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table 5. NAACP

Dep. variable	Change in NAACP Presence (1960-1940)			
	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) 2SLS	(4) 2SLS
Change in Black Share	-0.006	0.057***	0.003	0.122**
	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.057)
NAACP Absent in 1940		X		X
F-stat			8.919	9.520
Observations	1,139	932	1,139	932

Notes: The sample includes a panel of the 1,139 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for our definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The dependent variable is the 1940 to 1960 change in the local presence of a NAACP chapter taken from Gregory and Estrada (2019). The main regressor of interest is the 1940 to 1960 change in black population over 1940 county population. Columns 1 and 2 (resp. 3 and 4) present OLS (resp. 2SLS) estimates. 2SLS regressions are based on the shift-share instrument described in equation (4) in the text. Cols 1 and 3 (resp. 2 and 4) present results for the full sample (resp. for counties with no NAACP chapter in 1940). All regressions control for state by period fixed effects and for interactions between period dummies and: i) the 1940 black share; ii) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** $p< 0.01$, ** $p< 0.05$, * $p< 0.1$.

Table 6. Changes in Ideology

Dep. variable	Change in			
	(1) OLS	(2) 2SLS	(3) OLS	(4) 2SLS
	Panel A. Agnostic Scores			
Change in Black Share	-0.034	-0.115**	-0.001	0.039
	(0.026)	(0.046)	(0.026)	(0.043)
F-stat		15.76		15.87
Observations	286	286	287	287
	Panel B. Constrained Scores			
Change in Black Share	-0.041	-0.125**	0.004	0.050
	(0.028)	(0.050)	(0.026)	(0.044)
F-stat		15.76		15.87
Observations	286	286	287	287
	Panel C. Pr(Vote Yes)			
Change in Black Share	0.016*	0.043**	-0.004	-0.029
	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.006)	(0.018)
F-stat		17.34		14.30
Observations	294	294	294	294
Congress	78^{th}-82^{nd}	78^{th}-82^{nd}	83^{rd}-88^{th}	83^{rd}-88^{th}

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the Agnostic version of the civil rights scores from Bateman et al. (2017) between Congresses 78 and 82 (resp. 83 and 88) in Panel A (resp. Panel B). The main regressor of interest is the corresponding change in the black share in the Congressional District, and is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in the text in columns 2 to 4. Column 1 reports OLS results, whereas columns 2 to 4 report 2SLS estimates. All regressions control for state dummies, for the 1940 black share, and for a dummy equal to 1 if the district was represented by a Democrat in Congress 78. Column 3 (resp. 4) restricts attention to Congressional Districts that did not (resp. that did) switch party during the Congressional period. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the Congressional District level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table 7. Discharge Petitions (Levels on Changes)

Dep. variable	Number of Petitions per Legislator			
	(1) OLS	(2) 2SLS	(3) OLS	(4) 2SLS
Change in Black Share	0.199***	0.212**	0.052***	0.144***
	(0.039)	(0.096)	(0.016)	(0.054)
F-stat		20.26		16.94
Observations	298	298	298	298
Congress	78^{th}-82^{nd}	78^{th}-82^{nd}	83^{rd}-88^{th}	83^{rd}-88^{th}

Notes: The sample includes the 298 non-southern Congressional Districts that were representing non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for our definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, with at least one African American resident in 1940, and for which data on signatures for discharge petitions (Pearson and Schickler, 2009) were available. The dependent variable is the total number of signatures on discharge petitions per legislators during Congresses 78-82 in columns 1 and 2, and during Congresses 83-88 in columns 3 and 4. The main regressor of interest is the decadal change in the black share in the Congressional District, and is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in the text in columns 2 to 4. Columns 1 and 3 report OLS results, whereas columns 2 and 4 report 2SLS estimates. All regressions control for state dummies, for the 1940 black share, and for a dummy equal to 1 if the district was represented by a Democrat in Congress 78. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the Congressional District level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table 8. Between vs Within Party Adjustments: Ideology Scores

Dep. variable	Change in Civil Rights Score			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel A. Congress Period 78^{th}-82^{nd}			
Change in Black Share	-0.092*	-0.120**	-0.124***	-0.115**
	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Change in Black Share*(Transition)	-0.087**	0.019	0.023	0.008
	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.044)
AP F-stat (black share)	9.860	9.080	14.58	7.810
AP F-stat (interaction)	19.46	70.02	57.43	62.66
KP F-stat	6.818	6.972	6.788	8.015
Observations	286	286	286	286
	Panel B. Congress Period 83^{rd}-88^{th}			
Change in Black Share	0.033	0.023	0.086	0.039
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.055)	(0.043)
Change in Black Share*(Transition)	-0.092***	0.134***	-0.050*	-0.035
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.056)
AP F-stat (black share)	9.730	7.940	7.960	20.02
AP F-stat (interaction)	22.85	151.4	99.99	6.850
KP F-stat	9.333	7.983	8.244	7.841
Observations	287	287	287	287
Transition	Rep-Dem	Rep-Rep	Dem-Dem	Dem-Rep

Notes: The table presents 2SLS results. The dependent variable is the change in the Agnostic version of the civil rights scores from Bateman et al. (2017) between Congresses 78 and 82 (resp. 83 and 88) in Panel A (resp. Panel B). The main regressors of interest are the corresponding change in the black share in the Congressional District and its interaction with a dummy equal to 1 if the Congressional District underwent the party transition reported at bottom of the table. The change in the black share is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in the text. All regressions control for state dummies, for the 1940 black share, and for a dummy equal to 1 if the district was represented by a Democrat in Congress 78. AP F-stats are the partial F-stats for the joint significance of the instruments in the two first stages. K-P F-stat is the Kleibergen-Paap F-stat for joint significance of instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table 9. Between vs Within Party Adjustments: Discharge Petitions

Dep. variable	Number of Petitions per Legislator			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel A. Congress Period 78^{th}-82^{nd}			
Change in Black Share	0.179*	0.244**	0.239**	0.214**
	(0.106)	(0.098)	(0.095)	(0.097)
Change in Black Share*(Transition)	0.154**	-0.089	-0.072	-0.042
	(0.078)	(0.084)	(0.060)	(0.053)
AP F-stat (black share)	11.50	13.55	17.73	10.07
AP F-stat (interaction)	19.48	33.24	33.78	60.51
KP F-stat	9.202	7.931	8.773	10.32
Observations	298	298	298	298
	Panel B. Congress Period 83^{rd}-88^{th}			
Change in Black Share	0.144***	0.148***	0.031	0.144***
	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.054)
Change in Black Share*(Transition)	0.005	-0.139***	0.105***	0.041
	(0.046)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.094)
AP F-stat (black share)	8.820	8.710	8.710	12.43
AP F-stat (interaction)	7.750	21.29	40.66	0.670
KP F-stat	8.570	8.718	8.977	1.333
Observations	298	298	298	298
Transition	Rep-Dem	Rep-Rep	Dem-Dem	Dem-Rep

Notes: The table presents 2SLS results. The dependent variable is the total number of signatures on discharge petitions per legislator for Congresses 78 to 82 (resp. 83 to 88) in Panel A (resp. Panel B). The main regressors of interest are the corresponding change in the black share in the Congressional District and its interaction with a dummy equal to 1 if the Congressional District underwent the party transition reported at bottom of the table. The change in the black share is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in the text. All regressions control for state dummies, for the 1940 black share, and for a dummy equal to 1 if the district was represented by a Democrat in Congress 78. AP F-stats are the partial F-stats for the joint significance of the instruments in the two first stages. K-P F-stat is the Kleibergen-Paap F-stat for joint significance of instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

A Appendix – Additional Figures and Tables

Figure A.1. Northern Legislators Supporting Civil Rights Bills, by Party



Notes: Blue (resp. red) bars plot the share of Democrat (resp. Republican) members of Congress in the non-South US voting in favor of bills in support of civil rights between the 78^{th} and the 88^{th} Congresses. The first two bars refer to the average between the 78-82 and the 83-88 periods, while the remaining bars display results for each Congress period separately. The 9 bills on the civil rights voted upon in Congress between the 78^{th} and the 88^{th} Congress are listed in Table A.2.

Figure A.2. Overall Support for Civil Rights Bills, by Party



Notes: Blue (resp. red) bars plot the share of Democrat (resp. Republican) members of US Congress voting in favor of bills in support of civil rights between the 78^{th} and the 88^{th} Congresses. The first two bars refer to the average between the 78-82 and the 83-88 periods, while the remaining bars display results for each Congress period separately. The 9 bills on the civil rights voted upon between the 78^{th} and the 88^{th} Congress are listed in Table A.2.

Figure A.3. Discharge Petitions on Civil Rights Signed by Northern Legislators



Notes: Blue (resp. red) bars plot the share of Democrat (resp. Republican) members of Congress in the non-South US signing discharge petitions in favor of civil rights bills between the 78^{th} and the 88^{th} Congresses. The first two bars refer to the average between the 78-82 and the 83-88 periods, while the remaining bars display results for each of the two Congress periods separately.

Figure A.4. Black Share in 1940



Notes: The map plots the 1940 share of blacks (divided by county population) for the non-southern counties in our sample.

Figure A.5. Predicted Black Inflows and White Population (County)



Notes: The y-axis (resp. x-axis) reports the decadal change in white population over 1940 population (resp. predicted black in-migration over 1940 population) for the three decades between 1940 and 1970 across non-southern counties. Each point in the scatter diagram represents the residual change in the two variables, after partialling out period by state fixed effects, and interactions between period dummies and the 1940 black share and a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections was larger than the Republican vote share in 1940.

Figure A.6. Predicted Black Inflows and White Population (CZ)



Notes: The y-axis (resp. x-axis) reports the decadal change in white population over 1940 population (resp. predicted black in-migration over 1940 population) for the three decades between 1940 and 1970 across non-southern CZs. Each point in the scatter diagram represents the residual change in the two variables, after partialling out period by state fixed effects, and interactions between period dummies and the 1940 black share and a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections was larger than the Republican vote share in 1940.

Figure A.7. Heterogeneous Effects on Pro-Civil Rights Demonstrations



Notes: The bars report the marginal effect of changes in the black share (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the change in pro-civil rights demonstrations for counties with each 1940 variable above (resp. below) the sample median in orange (resp. blue). See the main text for a discussion of each variable, and Table A.7 for the coefficients and standard errors corresponding to the graph.

Table A.1. List of Southern States

Alabama	North Carolina
Arkansas	Oklahoma
Florida	South Carolina
Georgia	Tennessee
Kentucky	Texas
Louisiana	Virginia
Mississippi	West Virginia

Notes: The table presents the list of southern states considered in our analysis. We follow the Census definition except for Delaware and Maryland: as Boustan (2010) we assign to the North, as these were net recipient of black migrants during this period.

Table A.2. Civil Rights Bills Voted in the House, 1943-1964

Congress	Year	Bill Number	Northern Democrats voting Yes	Northern Republicans voting Yes
78	1943	HR-7	0.830	0.795
79	1945	HR-7	0.842	0.697
80	1947	HR-29	0.913	0.982
81	1949	HR-3199	0.942	0.696
81	1950	HR-4453	0.790	0.720
84	1956	HR-627	0.914	0.875
85	1957	HR-6127	0.927	0.843
86	1960	HR-8601	0.843	0.813
88	1964	HR-7152	0.918	0.817

Notes: The table lists the bills voted upon in the House of Representatives between Congress 78 and Congress 88. The last two columns report the share of northern Democrats (resp. Republicans) who voted in favor of each bill relative to all northern Democrats (resp. Republicans).

Table A.3. Discharge Petitions, by Party

	Poll Tax	Lynching	FECP	Housing	Civil Rights Act	Total
	Panel A. Congress period: $78^{th} - 82^{nd}$					
Share Democrats	0.564	0.552	0.500	0.138	-	0.422
Share Republicans	0.304	0.239	0.132	0.024	-	0.147
	Panel B. Congress period: $83^{rd} - 88^{th}$					
Share Democrats	-	-	0.632	-	0.677	0.651
Share Republicans	-	-	0.043	-	0.175	0.154

Notes: The table presents the share of Democrats and Republicans signing discharge petitions on each topic reported in the top row for the 78-82 (resp. 83-88) Congresses in Panel A (resp. Panel B). When no discharge petition of a given type was filed in a congress period, the corresponding entry is left missing. Table A4 reports additional summary statistics for signatures on discharge petitions. See Table A5 for the complete list of discharge petitions (by date and by topic). Source: authors calculation from Pearson and Schickler (2009).

Table A.4. Discharge Petitions: Summary Statistics

Variables	Mean	Median	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs
Congress Period	Panel A: Discharge Petitions by Issue					
	Poll Tax	Lynching	FECP	Housing	Civil Rights Act	Total
78^{th} to 82^{nd}	4	3	5	2	0	14
83^{rd} to 88^{th}	0	0	2	1	5	8
	Panel B: Discharge Petitions by Legislator – Summary Statistics					
	Mean	Median	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs.
78^{th} to 82^{nd}	0.772	0.600	0.553	0	2.333	298
83^{rd} to 88^{th}	0.441	0.385	0.298	0	1.286	298

Notes: Panel A presents the number of discharge petitions filed in the two Congress periods (78-82 and 83-88) by type. Panel B reports the summary statistics for the number of petitions signed per legislator for the Congressional Districts in our sample, in either Congress period.

Table A.5. Discharge Petitions by Type and Date

Congress	Number	Topic	Total signatures
73	14	House Restaurant Desegregation	145
74	32	Lynching	218
75	1	Lynching	75
75	5	Lynching	218
76	10	Lynching	218
76	12	Lynching	59
76	34	Poll Tax	49
77	1	Poll Tax	218
77	3	Lynching	59
77	4	Poll Tax	31
77	15	Lynching	29
78	1	Poll Tax	10
78	3	Poll Tax	219
78	5	Lynching	82
78	18	FEPC	41
79	1	Poll Tax	218
79	3	Lynching	150
79	4	FEPC	187
79	24	Public Accommodation	6
80	2	Poll Tax	41
80	9	Lynching	80
81	7	Housing Discrimination	24
81	20	FEPC	110
81	21	FEPC	100
82	6	FEPC	16
83	4	Public Accommodation	71
83	5	FEPC	72
84	5	Civil Rights Act	148
85	1	Civil Rights Act	105
85	6	Civil Rights Act	3
86	3	Civil Rights Act	214
88	2	Anti-Discrimination	4
88	5	Civil Rights Act	174
91	11	Fair Employment	136

Notes: The table reports the list of all pro-civil rights discharge petitions filed between Congresses 73 and 91. Source: adapted from Pearson and Schickler (2009).

Table A.6. Heterogeneity across Counties: Democratic Vote Share

Dep. variable	Change in Democratic Vote Share			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel A: Above Median			
Change in Black Share	2.795**	3.068**	1.536***	2.545**
	(1.310)	(1.314)	(0.263)	(1.013)
F-stat	4.774	3.688	28.32	3.677
Observations	1,720	1,715	1,703	1,716
	Panel B: Below Median			
Change in Black Share	1.252**	0.690	-0.610	1.386
	(0.537)	(0.859)	(0.752)	(0.989)
F-stat	5.462	4.819	8.310	4.444
Observations	1,698	1,703	1,715	1,702
Characteristic	Political Competition	Share Manufacturing	Share Workers in CIO	Share Unskilled Workers

Notes: The table reports 2SLS results of regressions where the dependent variable is the change in the Democratic vote share, and the main regressor of interest is the change in the black share. It is instrumented using the predicted change in the number of blacks over 1940 population constructed with the shift-share instrument described in the main text. Panel A (resp. B) reports results for the sample of counties with the characteristic reported at the bottom of the table above (resp. below) the sample median in 1940. Political competition (column 1) is defined as the absolute value of the margin of victory of either Party in Congressional elections; Share Manufacturing (column 2) is the employment share of men in the manufacturing sector; Share Workers in CIO (column 3) is the share of unionized workers that are affiliated with the CIO at the state level (data from Troy, 1957); Share Unskilled Workers (column 4) is the share of unskilled men in the labor force (the classification of skill is based on Katz and Margo, 2014). All regressions control for state by period fixed effects, and for interactions between period dummies and i) the 1940 black share; ii) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. Significance levels: *** $p< 0.01$, ** $p< 0.05$, * $p< 0.1$.

Table A.7. Heterogeneity across Counties: Pro-Civil Rights Demonstrations

Dep. variable	Change in Protests			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel A: Above Median			
Change in Black Share	0.300*	0.350**	0.354**	0.363**
	(0.160)	(0.160)	(0.151)	(0.174)
F-stat	4.774	3.688	28.32	3.677
Observations	1,720	1,715	1,703	1,716
	Panel B: Below Median			
Change in Black Share	0.120	-0.018	0.140	-0.009
	(0.124)	(0.023)	(0.113)	(0.031)
F-stat	5.462	4.819	8.310	4.444
Observations	1,698	1,703	1,715	1,702
Characteristic	Political Competition	Share Manufacturing	Share Workers in CIO	Share Unskilled Workers

Notes: The table reports 2SLS results of regressions where the dependent variable is the change in pro-civil rights demonstrations, and the main regressor of interest is the change in the black share. It is instrumented using the predicted change in the number of blacks over 1940 population constructed with the shift-share instrument described in the main text. Panel A (resp. B) reports results for the sample of counties with the characteristic reported at the bottom of the table above (resp. below) the sample median in 1940. Political competition (column 1) is defined as the absolute value of the margin of victory of either Party in Congressional elections; Share Manufacturing (column 2) is the employment share of men in the manufacturing sector; Share Workers in CIO (column 3) is the share of unionized workers that are affiliated with the CIO at the state level (data from Troy, 1957); Share Unskilled Workers (column 4) is the share of unskilled men in the labor force (the classification of skill is based on Katz and Margo, 2014). All regressions control for state by period fixed effects, and for interactions between period dummies and i) the 1940 black share; ii) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county. Significance levels: *** $p< 0.01$, ** $p< 0.05$, * $p< 0.1$.

Table A.8. Black Inflows and Whites' Economic Outcomes

Dep. variable	1940-1960 Change in				
	Labor Force	Employed	Manufacturing	Log Occupational Scores	Log Wages
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Change in Black Share	-0.389	-0.512	1.229	0.003	0.077
	(0.424)	(0.488)	(0.764)	(0.007)	(0.068)
F-stat	26.39	26.39	26.39	26.39	26.39
Observations	125	125	125	125	125
1940 Mean Dependent Variable	85.82	78.68	16.64	3.037	5.755

Notes: In columns 1 to 3, the dependent variable is the 1940-1960 change in the share of white men above 18 not enrolled in school who are: i) in the labor force (column 1); ii) employed (column 2); iii) employed in manufacturing (column 3). In columns 4 and 5, the dependent variable is the 1940-1960 change in the log occupational score and in log wages for white men above 18 not enrolled in school. The table reports 2SLS results for the effects of the 1940-1960 change in the black share, instrumented with the shift-share IV described in the main text. The analysis is restricted to the 125 CZs for which demographic variables were available from the 1960 5% sample of the micro-census. All regressions are weighted by 1940 population, and control for state fixed effects, and include: the 1940 black share, and the 1940 Democratic winner dummy. The bottom row reports the 1940 mean of the dependent variable. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CZ level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.9. Black Inflows and Whites' Economic Outcomes: Unskilled and Manufacturing

Dep. variable	1940-1960 Change in			
	Share Employed	Log Wages	Share Employed	Log wages
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Change in Black Share	-0.003	-0.004	-0.002	0.006
	(0.004)	(0.027)	(0.003)	(0.024)
F-stat	26.39	26.39	26.39	26.39
Observations	125	125	125	125
1940 Mean Dependent Variable	86.68	6.134	88.76	6.428
Sector	Unskilled	Unskilled	Manufacturing	Manufacturing

Notes: The dependent variable is the 1940 to 1960 change in the probability of employment and in log wages for white men not enrolled in school and above the age of 18 working in the unskilled sector (resp. in manufacturing) in columns 1 and 2 (resp. columns 3 and 4). The table reports 2SLS results for the effects of the 1940-1960 change in the black share, instrumented with the shift-share IV described in the main text. The analysis is restricted to the 125 CZs for which demographic variables were available from the 1960 5% sample of the micro-census. All regressions are weighted by 1940 population, and control for state fixed effects, and include: the 1940 black share, and the 1940 Democratic winner dummy. The bottom row reports the 1940 mean of the dependent variable. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CZ level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** $p< 0.01$, ** $p< 0.05$, * $p< 0.1$.

Table A.10. Inter-Racial Contacts in the Housing Market: Democratic Vote Share

Dep. variable	Change in Democratic Vote Share			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Change in Black Share	3.431**	1.308***	2.440***	-4.250**
	(1.740)	(0.253)	(0.945)	(2.042)
F-stat	4.023	12.51	6.912	27.75
Observations	1,701	1,717	1,479	1,480
Sample	Below Median	Above Median	Below Median	Above Median
Characteristic	White Home Ownership rate	White Home Ownership rate	Pr(cross-race interactions)	Pr(cross-race interactions)

Notes: The table reports 2SLS results of stacked first difference regressions where the dependent variable is the change in the Democratic vote share. The main regressor of interest is the change in the black share, and is instrumented using the predicted change in the number of blacks over 1940 population constructed with the shift-share instrument described in the main text. Columns 1 and 2 (resp. 3 and 4) split the sample below and above the median for the white homeownership rate (resp. probability of cross-race interactions). Probability of cross-race interactions (columns 3 and 4) is the opposite of the residential segregation index from Logan and Parman (2017): counties with a residential segregation index above (resp. below) the median are those where the probability of cross-race interactions is below (resp. above) the median. White homeownership rate is the rate of homeownership among white household heads in the county. All regressions control for state by period fixed effects, and for interactions between period dummies and i) the 1940 black share; ii) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.11. First Stage – Congressional District Dataset

Dep. variable	Change in Black Share			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel A: 1940-1950 Decade			
Change in Predicted Black Share	1.813***	1.616***	1.535***	1.086***
	(0.156)	(0.377)	(0.387)	(0.368)
Observations	286	286	286	286
	Panel B: 1950-1960 Decade			
Change in Predicted Black Share	1.368***	1.305***	1.189***	0.758***
	(0.107)	(0.310)	(0.291)	(0.254)
Observations	287	287	287	287
	Panel C: 1940-1960 Decades			
Change in Predicted Black Share	1.594***	1.741***	1.635***	1.525***
	(0.157)	(0.362)	(0.361)	(0.382)
Observations	294	294	294	294
State FEs	X	X	X	X
1940 Black Share		X	X	X
1940 Dem Dummy			X	X
Weighted				X

Notes: The table replicates the first stage regressions reported in Table 2 in the main text for our sample of Congressional Districts. Panel A focuses on the 1940-1950 decade; Panel B considers the 1950-1960 decade; and Panel C considers the 1940 to 1960 period. All columns control for state dummies; column 2 includes the 1940 black share, and column 3 further controls for a dummy equal to 1 if the district was represented by a Democrat in Congress 78. Column 4 replicates column 3 by running regressions weighted by 1940 population. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county (or CZ) level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.12. Black In-Migration and Legislators' Ideology in 1964

Dep. variable	Civil Rights Score, 88^{th} Congress			
	(1) OLS	(2) 2SLS	(3) 2SLS	(4) 2SLS
Change in Black Share	-0.041***	-0.050**	-0.046**	-0.048**
	(0.008)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)
F-stat		20.54	19.84	19.79
Observations	294	294	294	294
Initial Conditions			X	X
Ideology Score	Agnostic	Agnostic	Agnostic	Constrained

Notes: The sample includes the 294 non-southern Congressional Districts that were representing non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for our definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, with at least one African American resident in 1940, and for which the civil rights scores from Bateman et al. (2017) were available for Congress 88. The dependent variable is the "Agnostic" (resp. "Constrained") version of the civil rights scores from Bateman et al. (2017) for legislators in Congress 88 in columns 1 to 3 (resp. 4). The main regressor of interest is the 1940 to 1960 change in the black share in the Congressional District, and is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in the text in columns 2 to 4. Column 1 reports OLS results, whereas columns 2 to 4 report 2SLS estimates. All regressions control for state dummies, for the 1940 black share, and for a dummy equal to 1 if the district was represented by a Democrat in Congress 78. Columns 3 and 4 also include the civil rights score in the district in Congress 78. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the Congressional District level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.13. Change in Signatures on Discharge Petitions

Dep. variable	Change in Number of Petitions per Legislator			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel A: 2SLS			
Change in Black Share	0.332***	0.164***	0.112**	0.090*
	(0.120)	(0.062)	(0.054)	(0.050)
F-stat	20.20	20.27	20.20	20.20
	Panel B: OLS			
Change in Black Share	0.200***	0.113***	0.067***	0.031
	(0.056)	(0.035)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Observations	298	297	298	298
Issue	All	FEPC	Anti-Lynching	Poll-Tax

Notes: The sample includes the 298 non-southern Congressional Districts that were representing non-southern US counties (see Table A1 for our definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, with at least one African American resident in 1940, and for which data on signatures for discharge petitions (Pearson and Schickler, 2009) were available. The dependent variable is the change in the number of signatures on discharge petitions per legislators during the Congress years reported in the table. Panel A reports 2SLS estimates for the decadal change in the black share in the Congressional District, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in the text. Panel B reports the corresponding OLS estimates. All regressions control for state dummies, for the 1940 black share, and for a dummy equal to 1 if the district was represented by a Democrat in Congress 78. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the Congressional District level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

B Appendix – Matching Counties to Time-Invariant Congressional Districts

When studying the effects of black inflows on the behavior of northern legislators, we face two main difficulties. First, while the African American population and other demographic variables are measured at the county level, legislators' behavior is available at the CD level. Second, the boundaries of CDs change over time due to redistricting. We overcome both challenges by first matching counties to CDs, and then by constructing a time-invariant cross-walk to map CDs that get redistricted over time to their baseline geography.

B.1 County-CD Crosswalk

To overcome the first problem, and to assign to each CD the corresponding "black in-migration shock" we perform a spatial merge of 1940 county maps with CDs, following the procedure used in Feigenbaum and Hall (2015).[38] Since there is no one-to-one mapping between counties and CDs, two cases can arise. First, some CDs are wholly contained within a single county; in this case, we directly assign county level variables to CDs, assuming that the effect of black in-migration is uniform within the county. Second, some CDs straddle county boundaries. In such cases, we assign county level values to the CD, weighting them by a county's area share of the CD.[39] Figure B.1 displays the county (gray lines) to CD (black lines) mapping just described for the 78^{th} Congress, restricting attention to non-southern states.

[38] The only difference with their procedure is that we use counties rather than CZs.

[39] Following Feigenbaum and Hall (2015), we test the robustness of our results using other weights, such as maximum area.

Figure B.1. CD-county Map



Notes: The figure presents a map of counties (gray lines) and Congressional Districts (black lines) for the non-South US during the 78^{th} Congress.

B.2 Time Invariant CD Crosswalk

Until the early 1960s, there was no pre-determined rule mandating states to redraw CD boundaries after each decennial Census. Moreover, especially in the North, gerrymandering was substantially less common than it is today (Snyder and Ansolabehere, 2008). Between 1900 and 1964, despite major demographic shifts induced by international and internal migration (Boustan et al., 2013), redistricting across non-southern districts was typically non-strategic (Engstrom, 2013). If anything, the lack of systematic redistricting rules likely introduced a pro-rural bias: more densely populated areas (i.e. urban areas) grew gradually under-represented at the CD level, likely diluting the effects of black inflows, which were concentrated in urban centers (see Figure 2 in the main text).[40] However, even during the 1940-1965 period, the boundaries of many CDs were changed, often multiple times. To overcome this empirical challenge, we develop a procedure that allows us to match all CDs between 1930 and 1970 to a baseline Congress.[41]

We define the 78^{th} Congress (January 6, 1943 to December 19, 1944) as our baseline

[40]This observation suggests that our analysis should identify a lower bound for the effects of black inflows on legislators' (pro-civil rights) behavior.

[41]While our analysis focuses on years after 1940, we also construct the cross-walk for the pre-1940 decade in order to perform several robustness and falsification checks.

Congress year for two main reasons. First, although the 76^{th} Congress might have been a more natural choice (as it corresponds to the 1940 Census year), several CDs underwent redistricting between this Congress year and the 78^{th} Congress. In contrast, very few states redistricted between the 78^{th} and the 82^{nd} Congress. Second, Congress 78^{th} is the earliest Congress for which CD-level population estimates are available from Adler (2003), thus allowing us to benchmark the population figures estimated in our procedure with other measures. We thus rely on Congress 78 as our baseline year, and consider the following two Congress periods: 78 to 82, which we match to the 1940 to 1950 Census decade; and, 83 to 88, which we match to the 1950 to 1960 year.[42] We perform a number of robustness checks to show that our results do not depend on the choice of the baseline Congress year, and that they are qualitatively similar when restricting the sample to CDs that did not undergo redistricting over the 78 to 82 Congress period.

Using this timing convention, for every Congress between 71 and 91, we perform a spatial merge between CD maps and the map corresponding to the 78^{th} Congress. Then, political outcomes (e.g. ideology scores, number of discharge petitions signed by legislators, etc.) are collapsed to the 78^{th} Congress using a weighting procedure similar to that adopted when matching counties to CDs. The logic of our strategy is simple: we fix the 1944 (i.e. the 78^{th} Congress) geography of CDs, and we link them to CDs that represented the same geographic area in subsequent (or previous) Congress years.[43] Then, we calculate a weighted average of political outcomes that correspond to the area originally represented by CDs according to the 1944 map.

To illustrate this procedure, we ask how the 78^{th} Congress would have looked like, had its geography persisted until Congress 86. We now explain how we proceed to collapse the political outcomes corresponding to the geography of Congress 86 "back" to that of Congress 78. Suppose that the area represented by a single CD in Congress 78 gets split in two separate CDs by Congress 86. To assign political variables of new CDs back to the level of the original CD, we adopt a weighting procedure, based on weights constructed in four steps. First, we overlay the map of the initial CD to that of the two CDs in Congress 86, and divide the area in cells derived by this spatial merge. Second, we assign the 1940 county population to each cell in proportion to the area share of the cell that is included in the county. Third, we sum over all cells that compose the CD to obtain an estimate of CD population as of Congress 78. Finally, we divide the area of each cell by such estimated CD population.

Political variables corresponding to the geography of the 78^{th} Congress for subse-

[42]The reason to consider the 88^{th} Congress in the second decade is that this was the Congress that approved the CRA.

[43]When states have more than one district, we drop at-large Congressional seats from the spatial merge (e.g. at-large seats for the state of New York are dropped between 1933 and 1945).

quent Congress years are computed by taking the weighted average of the outcomes of the newly formed CDs, using the weights constructed as explained above. In Appendix C, we validate the accuracy of this approach by replicating our (baseline) county-level results for the Democratic vote share using CD level data from Swift et al. (2000). Reassuringly, when conducting the analysis at the CD level, results remain qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported in the main text (see Table 3).

C Appendix – Robustness Checks

In this section we present a variety of robustness checks. First, we report results from a placebo exercise to increase confidence in the exogeneity of initial black shares (from each southern state) across northern and western counties. Second, we document that our findings are unlikely to be driven either by pre-existing trends or by the simultaneous inflow of southern born white migrants, and that they are robust to a number of alternative specifications. Third, we provide evidence against the possibility that results are affected by white outmigration systematically induced by black in-migration. Fourth, we construct an alternative version of the instrument that predicts black out-migration from each southern state exploiting only variation across local push factors across southern counties. Finally, we compare the effects of black in-migration on the Democratic vote share at the county level with those estimated at the CD level to verify the accuracy of the cross-walk described in Appendix B.

C.1 Initial Shares, County Characteristics, and Local Shocks

In Table C.1, we start by investigating if the instrument constructed in equation (3) in the main text is correlated with county-specific pull factors, such as WWII contracts (Panel A) and New Deal spending (Panel B). As discussed in Boustan (2016), the surge in demand across northern and western factories triggered by WWII was one of the pull factors of the Great Migration. Similarly, the generosity of New Deal spending might have influenced the location decision of African Americans prior to 1940 (Boustan et al., 2010), while at the same time having long-lasting effects on political conditions across northern counties. It is thus important to verify that predicted black in-migration is uncorrelated with such local demand shocks.

The dependent variable in Table C.1 is the change in predicted black in-migration, scaled by 1940 county population. Each column considers each decade separately. We always include the set of controls used in our most preferred specification – i.e., state dummies, the 1940 black share, and a dummy equal to 1 if in 1940 the Democratic vote share was higher than the Republicans vote share in Congressional elections. Reassuringly, in all cases the coefficient is not statistically significant, very imprecisely estimated, and close to zero. These results suggest that the measure of predicted black in-migration is uncorrelated with local pull-factors that might have affected both political conditions and patterns of migration at the county level.

Next, to address concerns that 1940 black settlements (from each southern state) might be correlated with county-specific characteristics that may have had a time varying effect on changes in political conditions, we interact period dummies with several

Table C.1. Placebo

Dep. variable	Predicted Change in Black Share			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel A: WWII			
Spending per capita	0.009	0.004	0.001	0.003
	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.072)
	Panel B: New Deal			
Spending per capita	-0.040	0.023	0.051	0.031
	(0.065)	(0.059)	(0.049)	(0.163)
Decade	1940-1950	1950-1960	1960-1970	1940-1970
Observations	1,139	1,139	1,140	1,139

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the predicted number of black migrants over 1940 county population. Each column considers the period specific to the decade reported at the bottom of the table. All regressions control for state dummies, for the 1940 black share, and for a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. In Panel A, the main regressor of interest is WWII spending per capita at the county level. In Panel B, the main regressor of interest is per capita New Deal spending at the county level. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

1940 county characteristics (Table C.2). Column 1 replicates the baseline specification estimated in the main text for the two key (county-level) outcomes of interest: the dependent variable is the change in the Democratic vote share and in turnout in Congressional elections in Panels A and B respectively. For completeness, Panel C reports first stage estimates. Columns 2 to 5 augment the baseline specification by including interactions between period dummies and, respectively, the 1940: *i*) urban share; *ii*) share of employment in manufacturing; *iii*) male employment to population ratio; *iv*) fraction of immigrants. Reassuringly, the coefficient remains stable and, for the Democratic vote share, highly significant. Finally, in column 6 we augment the baseline specification by separately controlling for a predicted measure of labor demand growth constructed using a Bartik-type approach. Restricting attention to non-southern counties, we first compute the 1940 share of employment in each 1-digit industry in each county; then, we interact these initial shares with the national growth rate of employment in that industry.[44] Once again, results are quantitatively very similar to those reported in column 1.

Figure C.1. Interacting Year Dummies with Initial Shares: Democratic Vote Share



Notes: The Figure plots the 2SLS point estimate (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for the effects of a change in the black share on the Democratic vote share, augmenting the baseline specification reported in Table 3 with interactions between period dummies and the 1940 share of blacks born in each southern state. The very first dot on the left reports the coefficient for the baseline specification.

[44]To more precisely proxying for labor demand shocks in non-southern industries, we compute the national growth rate for the non-South only. Results are unchanged when including the US South to compute national demand growth.

Table C.2. Interactions between Year dummies and 1940 Characteristics (County)

Dep. variable	Predicted change in black share					
	(1) 2SLS	(2) 2SLS	(3) 2SLS	(4) 2SLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) 2SLS
	Panel A: Democratic Vote share					
Change in Black Share	1.936***	2.258***	1.947***	1.794***	1.993***	2.119***
	(0.555)	(0.629)	(0.616)	(0.529)	(0.630)	(0.623)
	Panel B: Turnout					
Change in Black Share	0.198	0.375	0.263	0.251	0.343	0.246
	(0.328)	(0.386)	(0.368)	(0.334)	(0.376)	(0.366)
	Panel C: First stage					
Change in Predicted Black Share	0.392***	0.351***	0.357***	0.400***	0.351***	0.360***
	(0.137)	(0.120)	(0.130)	(0.139)	(0.124)	(0.127)
F-stat	8.199	8.556	7.523	8.293	7.936	8.012
Observations	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,391
Interactions	Baseline	Urban share	Manuf. Share	Empl. to Pop.	Immigrant share	Baseline
Bartik Industry Growth						X

Notes: The table replicates the main specification (also reported in column 1) for results reported in Table 2 (column 3) and Table 3 (column 5) by including the interaction between period dummies and, respectively, the 1940: i) urban share (column 2); ii) employment share in manufacturing (column 3); iii) male employment to population ratio (column 4); iv) immigrant share (column 5). In column 6, the baseline specification is augmented by separately controlling for a measure of predicted industrial growth constructed with a Bartik-style strategy described in the text of the appendix. Panel C reports the first stage for the 2SLS results presented in Panels A and B. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Finally, we deal with the possibility that the 1940 share of blacks (from each southern state) were not independent of cross-county pull factors systematically related to settlers' state of origin (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2018). To do so, we replicate our county-level results by interacting year dummies with the share blacks from each southern state, i.e. sh_{sc} in equation (3) in the main text. In Figures C.1 and C.2, we plot 2SLS coefficients for the effects of changes in the black share on the change in the Democratic vote share and in turnout respectively. The very first dot on the left of the graphs represents the coefficient from our baseline specification (see also column 3 in Table 3). Once again, reassuringly, both the precision and the magnitude of our estimates is very stable across specifications.

Figure C.2. Interacting Year Dummies with Initial Shares: Turnout



Notes: The figure plots the 2SLS point estimate (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for the effects of a change in the black share on turnout, augmenting the baseline specification reported in Table 3 with interactions between period dummies and the 1940 share of blacks born in each southern state. The very first dot on the left reports the coefficient for the baseline specification.

C.2 Pre-Trends and Additional Robustness Checks

In Table C.3, we perform a key placebo check to show that there is no correlation between pre-period changes in the outcomes of interest and the change in the black share predicted by the instrument either at the county or at the CD level. Panel A reports our baseline specification for the effects of changes in the black share on: *i*) the change in the Democrats vote share and in turnout (columns 1 and 2); *ii*) the change

Table C.3. Main Results – Pre-Trends

Dep. variable	Democratic Vote Share	Turnout	Civil Rights Scores	Discharge Petitions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel A: Baseline Specification			
Change in Black Share	1.936***	0.196	-0.115**	0.212**
	(0.555)	(0.327)	(0.046)	(0.096)
F-stat	8.199	8.199	15.76	20.26
Observations	3,418	3,418	286	298
	Panel B: Test for Pre-Trends			
Change in Black Share	0.558	0.100	0.018	0.052
	(0.433)	(0.442)	(0.017)	(0.035)
F-stat	7.268	7.268	160.2	20.64
Observations	1,138	1,138	202	298

Notes: Panel A reports the baseline 2SLS specification for the four key outcomes considered in our analysis. Panel B regresses the 1940-1934 change in the Democratic vote share and in turnout against the 1940 to 1970 change in the instrument in columns 1 and 2, and the change in Bateman et al. (2017) civil rights scores and in the number of discharge petitions between Congress 73 and Congress 78 against the 1940 to 1960 change in the instrument in columns 3 and 4. We define the pre-period using the first election year after the New Deal election of 1932, i.e. 1934. Results are unchanged when using other definitions of pre-period. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county (or at the Congressional District) level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

in Civil Rights scores between Congresses 78 and 82 (column 3); and *iii*) the number of discharge petitions signed between Congresses 78 and 82 (column 4).

In Panel B, we start by regressing the 1934 to 1940 change in the Democrats vote share (column 1) and in turnout (column 2) against the 1940 to 1970 predicted number of black in-migrants over 1940 population. In both cases, reassuringly, the coefficient is not statistically significant and, especially in column 1, very different from that estimated in Panel A. When constructing the "pre-1940" change in political outcomes, we consider the first election year after the elections of 1932 so as to make sure that our results are not confounded by post-New Deal realignment (Schickler, 2016). However, our findings are unchanged when using other election years, such as 1930 or 1932. In columns 3 and 4 of Table C.3 , we then regress the change in the civil rights scores and the number of signatures on discharge petitions per legislators between Congresses 73 and 78 against the subsequent change in black in-migration across CDs predicted

Table C.4. Drop Outliers

Dep. variable	Democratic Vote Share (1)	Turnout (2)	Civil Rights Scores (3)	Discharge Petitions (4)
	Panel A: Baseline Specification			
Change in Black Share	1.936***	0.196	-0.115**	0.212**
	(0.555)	(0.327)	(0.046)	(0.096)
F-stat	8.199	8.199	15.76	20.26
Observations	3,418	3,418	286	298
	Panel B: Trim 1^{st} and 99^{th} percentiles			
Change in Black Share	2.442***	-0.038	-0.115**	0.206*
	(0.685)	(0.618)	(0.049)	(0.105)
F-stat	21.86	21.86	15.15	19.09
Observations	3,350	3,350	282	294

Notes: Panel A reports the baseline 2SLS specification for the four key outcomes considered in our analysis. Panel B replicates Panel A omitting counties (columns 1-2) and Congressional Districts (columns 3-4) with changes in the black share in the 1st and 99th percentile. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county (or at the Congressional District) level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

by our instrument.[45] Also in this case, there is no statistically significant relationship between the pre-period change in the outcomes and post 1940 change in predicted black in-migration. Moreover, the point estimates are quantitatively small and different from those reported in Panel A.

As discussed in the main text, some areas of the US North and West, such as Chicago, Detroit, and Los Angeles, received a disproportionately large inflow of black migrants between 1940 and 1970. One may thus be concerned that our results are driven by outliers. To address this potential issue, we replicate our results by excluding counties and CDs at the top 1^{st} and at the bottom 99^{th} percentiles of the distribution of changes in black migration. Results, reported in Panel B of Table C.4, are unaffected and remain quantitatively close to the baseline specification (reported in Panel A to ease comparisons).

Yet another potential concern is that black in-migration might be correlated with simultaneous white inflows from the South. As documented in Gregory (2006) among others, between 1940 and 1970 even more whites than blacks left the US South. The

[45] As we did for electoral outcomes, we focus on the first post-New Deal Congress period, i.e. Congress 73, but results are unchanged if we focus on earlier ones.

historical evidence suggests that African Americans were significantly more likely than whites to settle in metropolitan areas either in the Northeast or in the West, while white migration was more evenly distributed across the non-South (Gregory, 1995). However, it is still possible that the patterns of white and black migration from the South were correlated with each other. If this were to be the case, at least part of our findings might be due to the arrival of white – rather than black – migrants. Due to data limitations, we cannot measure the actual change in southern born white migrants after 1940 at the county level. However, to overcome this problem, we construct a predicted measure of white in-migration from the US South implementing the same procedure used to construct the instrument for black in-migration (see equation (3) in the main text).

Specifically, we first compute the share of whites born in each southern state who were living in a non-southern county as of 1940. Next, we interact these shares with the number of white migrants from each southern state in each decade between 1940 and 1970. Finally, for each non-southern county and for each decade, we sum the predicted number of whites moving from each origin over all southern states to obtain the total number of (predicted) white migrants moving to county c during decade τ. In formulas, this measure is given by:

$$ZW_{c\tau} = \sum_{j \in South} sh^{w}_{jc} Wh_{j\tau} \tag{4}$$

where sh^{w}_{jc} is the share of whites born in southern state j and living in non-southern county c in 1940, relative to all whites born in j living outside this state; and $Wh_{j\tau}$ is the number of whites who left southern state j during decade τ.

In Column 1 of Table C.5, we regress the actual change in the number of blacks against the predicted number of black ($Z_{c\tau}$) and white ($ZW_{c\tau}$) migrants, after partialling out the baseline set of controls. Reassuringly, the coefficient for black migration is positive and statistically significant. Instead, the coefficient on the predicted number of white migrants is negative and not statistically significant. Column 2 replicates column 1 by scaling the number of blacks and the predicted number of migrants by contemporaneous and 1940 county population respectively. Also in this case, there is a positive and highly significant relationship between the change in the black share and the corresponding instrument. The coefficient on predicted white in-migration is now statistically significant, but it is negative and an order of magnitude smaller (in absolute value) than the instrument for black in-migration. In columns 3 to 6, we more directly investigate the robustness of our results – both at the county and at the CD level – to the inclusion of $ZW_{c\tau}$. We re-estimate the baseline specification for our four main outcomes of interest and, in all cases, results remain very similar to those presented in the main text.

We conclude this section by performing a few, additional robustness checks. First,

Table C.5. Southern White In-migration

Dep. Variable	Change in Black Population		Change Democratic Vote Share	Change Turnout	Change Civil Rights Scores	Discharge Petitions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Predicted Black Migrants	2.180***	0.432***				
	(0.315)	(0.145)				
Predicted White Migrants	-0.200	-0.075***				
	(0.411)	(0.027)				
Change in Black Share			1.476***	0.392	-0.113***	0.213**
			(0.461)	(0.364)	(0.044)	(0.090)
Specification	Levels	Shares				
Pred. White Migrants			X	X	X	X
F-stat			8.949	8.949	25.40	30.52
Observations	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418	286	298

Notes: Columns 1 and 2 regress the change in black population (in levels and as a share of county population) against the instrument for black migration described in equation (4) and a similar measure of predicted southern white in-migration described in the appendix. In column 1, the predicted black and white number of migrants are in levels, while in column 2 they are scaled by 1940 county population. Columns 3 to 6 augment the baseline specifications for the main results reported in the main text by simultaneously controlling for the predicted share of white migrants scaled by 1940 population. All regressions control for period by state fixed effects and for the interactions included in the baseline specification in the text. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level (or at the Congressional District level), in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** $p< 0.01$, ** $p< 0.05$, * $p< 0.1$.

Table C.6. Congressional Elections: Robustness and Additional Outcomes

Dep. variable	(1) Democratic Vote Share	(2) Democratic Vote Margin	(3) 1[Democrat Winner]
Change in Black Share	2.477**	4.195***	0.044***
	(0.967)	(1.148)	(0.016)
Drop 1960-1970	X		
1940 mean dep. variable	42.65	-8.109	0.348
F-stat	10.40	8.206	8.052
Observations	2,278	3,401	3,333

Notes: The table presents 2SLS results. Column 1 replicates the baseline specification for the effects of changes in the black share on the Democratic vote share by omitting the 1960-1970 decade. In columns 2 and 3, the dependent variable is, respectively, the Democrats-Republicans vote margin in Congressional elections and a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share was higher than the Republicans vote share in Congressional elections. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

in column 1 of Table C.6, we show that the change in the Democrats vote share is not merely driven by the Civil Rights Act or the Voting Rights Act: here, we replicate the baseline specification estimated in Table 3 in the main text (for the Democratic vote share) by excluding the 1960 to 1970 decade. Reassuringly, the point estimate on changes in the black share remains positive and statistically significant – and, if anything, its magnitude becomes even larger than for the full sample. Next, in columns 2 and 3 we document that our results are qualitatively similar when the dependent variable is defined as the Democratic vote margin (relative to Republicans) and as a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share is larger than the Republicans vote share.

Finally, we verify that our results are robust to estimating regressions in levels rather than in changes, and separately controlling for county (or CD) fixed effects. In particular, rather than estimating equation (1), we stack the data for the four decades between 1940 to 1970 (included), and run a regression of the form:

$$y_{ct} = \xi_c + \delta_{st} + \beta Bl_{ct} + \gamma X_{ct} + u_{ct} \tag{5}$$

where y_{ct} is the Democratic vote share or turnout in Congressional elections in county c in year t, ξ_c and δ_{st} are county and state by year fixed effects, and Bl_{ct} is the black share in county c in year t. Similarly to what we did before, in X_{ct} we control for interactions between year dummies and: i) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote

share was higher than the Republican vote share in Congressional elections in 1940; and *ii*) the baseline fraction of blacks.

In our baseline specification, we used predicted black inflows in each decade to instrument for the change in black population. However, when estimating equation (5), an instrument is needed for black population in each year from 1940 to 1970. That is, 1940 can no longer be used as "baseline" year to predict black inflows. Also, since we are now interested in black population (relative county population) rather than in its change, we need an instrument for the stock – and not the change – of blacks in the county. We thus modify the baseline instrument constructed in the main text in two ways. First, we use 1930 settlements of African Americans across northern counties to apportion post-1930 outmigration from the South. Second, after predicting the inflow of blacks to county c in the ten years prior to year t, we recursively add previous predicted inflows to generate a measure of predicted stock.[46]

With this instrument at hand, we proceed to estimate equation (5) with 2SLS, and report results in Panel A of Table C.7 for the Democratic vote share and turnout in columns 1 and 2 respectively. Reassuringly, results remain similar to those reported in Table 3: the effect of the black share on the Democratic vote share is positive, statistically significant, and economically large (column 1), whereas there is no statistically significant relationship between the black share and turnout (column 2). Panel B of Table C.7 documents that also OLS results are in line with the corresponding estimates from the stacked first difference specification reported in column 2 of Table 3.[47]

Next, columns 3 and 4 of Table C.7 turn to the CD analysis. As in the main text, we consider two separate Congress periods – Congresses 78 to 82 and Congresses 83 to 88 – and estimate (5) for each of the two periods separately focusing on the agnostic version of the Bateman et al. (2017)'s scores.[48] Reassuringly, also in this case, results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to our baseline estimates: an increase in the black share has a negative and statistically significant effect on the ideology scores between Congresses 78 and 82 (column 3); instead, between Congresses 83 and 88, the relationship between the black share and legislators' ideology is small and not statistically significant.[49]

[46]As before, we scale the predicted number of blacks by 1940 county population. Results are unchanged when dividing it by 1930 population.

[47]Panel C reports first stage estimates, and shows that also for a specification in levels, there is a strong and statistically significant association between the instrument and the actual black share. In fact, the F-stat for weak instrument is even higher in this specification than in our baseline one reported in the main text.

[48]Note that when estimating the effects of black inflows on the propensity of legislators to sign discharge petitions, we regressed the total number of signatures over a decade against the change in the black share. Hence, it is not possible to replicate this specification in "levels", while separately controlling for CD fixed effects.

[49]As for columns 1 and 2, Panels B and C report OLS and first stage estimates corresponding to

Table C.7. Stacked Panel Specification

Dep. variable	Democratic Vote Share	Turnout	Agnostic Scores (78-82)	Agnostic Scores (83-88)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Panel A: 2SLS			
Black Share	2.005***	-0.099	-0.103**	0.021
	(0.473)	(0.268)	(0.042)	(0.025)
F-stat	18.83	18.83	13.51	17.28
	Panel B: OLS			
Black Share	0.294**	-0.397***	-0.030	0.035***
	(0.148)	(0.104)	(0.024)	(0.012)
	Panel C: First Stage			
Predicted Black Share	0.392***	0.392***	1.535***	1.701***
	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.418)	(0.410)
Observations	4,328	4,328	572	574

Notes: The table replicates the baseline stacked first difference results by running panel stacked regressions. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is the Democratic vote share and turnout in Congressional elections, and the sample includes the 1,086 non-southern US counties (see Table A1 for our definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, with at least one African American resident in 1940, and for which the instrument based on 1930 black settlements could be constructed. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the agnostic version of the Bateman et al. (2017) ideology score, and attention is restricted to Congressional Districts (CDs). Column 3 consider a stacked panel for Congresses 78 and 82, whereas column 4 focuses on the two Congresses 83 and 88. The regressor of interest is the black share over county (or CD) population, which is instrumented using the predicted number of blacks (derived using 1930 black settlements) scaled by 1940 county (or CD) population. Panel A (resp. B) reports 2SLS (resp. OLS) results, while Panel C reports first stage estimates for the 2SLS regressions in Panel A. All regressions control for county (columns 1-2) or CD (columns 3-4) fixed effects, for state by year fixed effects, and for interactions between year dummies and: i) the 1930 black share; ii) a dummy equal to 1 for having a Democratic incumbent in 1940. F-stat in Panel A is the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county (or CD) level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

C.3 Investigating the Role of White Flight

In a seminal contribution, Boustan (2010) documented that during the Great Migration black inflows to central cities triggered systematic white outmigration to the suburbs – a phenomenon commonly referred to as "white flight". The sample considered in our paper differs substantially from that in Boustan (2010). Moreover, county boundaries typically do not correspond to urban-suburban geography. However, it is possible that white flight was responsible for at least part of our findings. To deal with this potential concern, we perform an extensive set of robustness checks.

First, we replicate our analysis aggregating counties to a much larger geographic unit – commuting zones (CZs). Table C.9 (Panel B) presents 2SLS results for the baseline specification in columns 1 and 2, and for a specification where regressions are weighted by CZ population in columns 3 and 4.[50] Unweighted regressions are somewhat imprecise, and, even though the effect of black in-migration on the Democratic vote share is positive, it is not statistically significant. However, once we include population weights, the effect of black inflows on the Democratic vote share becomes again highly significant and economically large, confirming the pattern estimated in Table 3 in the main text (and reported in Panel A of Table C.9).

Table C.8. First stage – Commuting Zones

Dep. variable	Change in Black Share			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Change in Predicted Black Share	0.599***	0.637**	0.671***	0.645**
	(0.169)	(0.254)	(0.171)	(0.276)
State by Year FEs	X	X	X	X
Full Controls		X	X	X
Weighted			X	
Specification	Stacked FD	Stacked FD	Stacked FD	LD
Observations	1,125	1,125	1,125	375

Notes: The table presents first stage results for the relationship between the actual change in the black share at the decadal level and the predicted number of black in-migrants over 1940 population at the CZ level. Column 1 only includes state by period fixed effects. Column 2 includes the full set of interactions used in the baseline specification in the paper. Columns 3 and 4 replicate column 2 by, respectively, running weighted regressions (by 1940 population) and considering a long difference regression. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CZ level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

2SLS results displayed in Panel A.

[50] See Table C.8 for the first stage associated with 2SLS results reported in Table C.9.

Table C.9. Congressional Elections – Commuting Zones

	(1) Democratic Vote Share	(2) Turnout	(3) Democratic Vote Share	(4) Turnout
	Panel A: County-level Regressions			
Change in Black Share	1.936***	0.198	1.650***	0.390*
	(0.555)	(0.328)	(0.286)	(0.235)
F-stat	8.199	8.199	13.65	13.65
Observations	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418
	Panel B: Commuting Zone-level Regressions			
Change in Black Share	0.975	-0.790*	2.759***	0.673
	(1.003)	(0.429)	(1.052)	(0.569)
F-stat	6.288	6.288	15.43	15.43
Observations	1,125	1,125	1,125	1,125
Weighted			X	X

Notes: Panel A reports the baseline 2SLS specification for the county-level analysis, using unweighted (resp. weighted) regressions in columns 1 and 2 (resp. columns 3 and 4). Panel B replicates results in Panel A focusing on the CZ level sample. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county (Panel A) or CZ (Panel B) level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Second, to directly control for the possibility that the black migration was correlated with changes in total population at the county level, in Table C.10 we re-estimate our baseline specification by consider the effects of a change in the number (rather than the share) of blacks. This allows us to simultaneously control for changes in total county population. Reassuringly, results remain in line with our baseline specification: changes in the number of blacks have a strong, positive impact on the Democratic vote share and no effect on turnout.

Third, and to more directly investigate the potential role of white flight, in Table C.11 we ask if black in-migration is systematically related to changes in white population, either at the county or at the CZ level. In columns 1 and 2 the dependent variable is the change in the number of whites in a county, and the main regressor of interest is the (instrumented) change in the number of blacks.[51] Column 1 considers the full sample, while column 2 restricts attention to counties with the 1940 urban share above the sample median – a sample more similar to that considered in Boustan (2010). In both cases, the coefficient is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Moreover, the point estimate is positive, rather than negative, suggesting that black inflows were not systematically associated with white outflows at least in our (county-level) sample.

In columns 3 to 7, we scale the change in both white population and black (predicted) in-migration by 1940 population, and repeat the analysis conducted in columns 1 and 2. While at the county level (columns 3 and 4) there is now a negative relationship between changes in the share of blacks and of whites over 1940 population, this is very imprecisely estimated. Moreover, when we focus on CZs (columns 5 and 6), the point estimate becomes positive, and remains statistically insignificant. Since we showed above that unweighted regressions at the CZ level may suffer from a weak first stage, column 6 replicates results in column 5 weighing by 1940 CZ population. Reassuringly the pattern is unchanged. Finally, column 7 focuses on the sample of CZs with the 1940 urban share above the sample median. As for counties, also in this case the coefficient on changes in the black share becomes negative. However, it remains very imprecisely estimated and quantitatively small.[52] We interpret results in Tables C.9 to C.11 as strongly suggestive that our results are unlikely to be driven by white flight.

Finally, we ask whether black inflows were systematically associated with changes

[51] As usual, we control for state by period fixed effects, and for interactions between period dummies and the 1940 black share and a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share was larger than the Republicans vote share in 1940.

[52] For instance, a coefficient as in column 7 implies that one percentage point increase in the black share was associated with a reduction in white population over 1940 population of 0.018 percentage points. Considering that the change in white population (relative to 1940) population in the sample of "urban" CZs was around 17% in our sample period, the estimated coefficient in column 7 is indeed not only imprecisely estimated, but also quantitatively small.

Table C.10. Levels Specification and Control for Total Population

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) 2SLS	(4) 2SLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) 2SLS
	Panel A: Democratic Vote Share					
Change in Black Population	2.932***	3.551***	4.065***	4.194***	5.005***	4.562***
	(0.746)	(0.805)	(0.968)	(1.039)	(1.217)	(0.866)
	Panel B: Turnout					
Change in Black Population	-0.245	-0.719	0.394	0.156	-0.035	0.886
	(0.772)	(0.782)	(0.811)	(0.839)	(0.866)	(0.891)
	Panel C: First Stage					
Change in Predicted Black Population			2.135***	2.167***	2.153***	2.147***
			(0.321)	(0.314)	(0.311)	(0.320)
F-stat			44.28	47.66	47.91	44.93
Specification	FD	FD	FD	FD	FD	LD
1940 Black Share		X		X	X	X
1940 Dem dummy		X			X	X
Observations	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418	1,138

Notes: Panels A and B replicate results reported in Table 3 in the main text estimating a specification in levels, where the key regressor of interest is the change in the number of blacks in the county. All regressions separately control for the change in total county population. Panel C reports the first stage associated with 2SLS results in Panels A and B. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table C.11. White Flight (County and CZ)

Dep. Variable	Change in White Population		Change in White Population over 1940 Population				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Change in Black Population	0.318	0.278					
	(0.429)	(0.410)					
Change in Black Share			-0.005	-0.018	0.018	0.002	-0.010
			(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.018)
F-stat	52.01	57.30	8.199	5.011	6.288	15.43	22.53
Observations	3,418	1,712	3,418	1,712	1,125	1,125	564
Urban		X		X			X
Geography	County	County	County	County	CZ	CZ	CZ

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in white population in columns 1 and 2, and the change in white population over 1940 population in columns 3 to 6. Columns 1 to 4 restrict attention to counties, whereas columns 5 to 7 focus on CZs. Columns 2 and 4 (resp. column 7) report results for counties (resp. CZs) with the 1940 urban share of the population above the sample median. All regressions control for state by period fixed effects, and for interactions between period dummies and 1940 black share and Democratic winner dummy. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county (or CZ) level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

in the *composition* of white residents. Indeed, even if on average black in-migration was not correlated with changes in the number of whites, it may still be possible that the Great Migration triggered compositional changes among whites. To address this possibility, we collected data from the 5% sample of the 1960 Census of Population and from the full count Census of 1940.[53] Given the limited sample size and geographic coverage of the 1960 Census, we were forced to aggregate the data to the CZ, conducting the analysis at this level. Restricting attention to white men above the age of 18 and not enrolled in school, we created the share of residents in this group who were: *i*) high skilled; *ii*) employed in manufacturing; *iii*) in the labor force; *iv*) homeowner; and *v*) above the age of 65.[54]

Then, we estimated long difference regressions, where the 1940 to 1960 change in the share of white men above 18 and not in school was regressed against the corresponding (instrumented) change in the black share. As in our baseline specification, we always partial out state dummies, the 1940 black share, and a dummy equal to 1 if the 1940 Democratic vote share was higher than the Republican vote share.[55] Since it was not possible to collect 1960 data for all CZs in our baseline sample, we first verify that the effects of changes in the black share on changes in the Democratic vote share and turnout hold in this restricted sample (see columns 3 and 4 of Table C.12). Next, in Table C.13, we perform the robustness check explained above. Reassuringly, in all cases, the coefficient on the change in the black share is not statistically significant and quantitatively small. Moreover, coefficients do not seem to display a consistent pattern. Overall, results in Table C.13 suggest that not only black inflows did not trigger changes in the number of whites, but also (and crucially) they did not lead to any systematic change in the composition of white residents.

[53]For both 1950 and 1970, only a 1% sample is available, limiting substantially the geographic coverage of the datasets. For this reason, we restricted attention to 1940 and 1960.

[54]Considering all white men, irrespective of age and school enrollment status leaves all results unchanged.

[55]As discussed above, since the first stage at the CZ level is rather weak when estimating unweighted regressions, we perform the analysis running weighted regressions. However, reassuringly, results for our placebo exercise are unaffected when estimating unweighted regressions.

Table C.12. CZ Results: Full Sample and Restricted Sample

Dep. variable	Change in			
	(1) Democratic Vote Share	(2) Turnout	(3) Democratic Vote Share	(4) Turnout
Change in Black Share	2.759***	0.673	2.704***	0.942
	(1.052)	(0.569)	(0.920)	(0.617)
F-stat	15.43	15.43	19.44	19.44
Observations	1,125	1,125	375	375
Restricted Sample			X	X
1940 Mean Dep. Variable	43.35	69.82	41.70	67.31

Notes: The dependent variable is the decadal change in the Democratic vote share (resp. in turnout) in Congressional elections in columns 1 and 3 (resp. 2 and 4). Columns 1 and 2 consider the baseline (full) sample of CZs, while columns 3 and 4 restrict attention to CZs for which demographic variables were available from the 1960 5% sample of the micro-census. The table reports 2SLS results for the effects of the decadal change in the black share, instrumented using the shift-share IV described in the main text. All regressions are weighted by 1940 population, and control for state by period fixed effects, and for interactions between period dummies and 1940 black share and Democratic winner dummy. The bottom row reports the 1940 mean of the dependent variable. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CZ level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table C.13. Black Inflows and Whites' Compositional Changes

Dep. variable	Change in				
	(1) High Skilled	(2) Manufacturing	(3) Labor Force	(4) Homeowner	(5) 65+
Change in Black Share	-0.348	1.229	-0.389	-0.021	0.108
	(0.626)	(0.764)	(0.424)	(0.526)	(0.334)
F-stat	26.39	26.39	26.39	26.39	26.39
Observations	125	125	125	125	125
1940 Mean Dep. Variable	12.17	16.64	85.84	53.54	11.06

Notes: The dependent variable is the 1940-1960 change in the share of white men above 18 not enrolled in school who are: i) high skilled (column 1); ii) employed in manufacturing (column 2); iii) in the labor force (column 3); iv) homeowner (column 4); v) above the age of 65. The table reports 2SLS results for the 1940-1960 change in the black share, instrumented with the shift-share IV described in the main text. The analysis is restricted to the 125 CZs for which demographic variables were available from the 1960 5% sample of the micro-census. All regressions are weighted by 1940 population, and control for state fixed effects, and include: the 1940 black share, and the 1940 Democratic winner dummy. The bottom row reports the 1940 mean of the dependent variable. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CZ level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

C.4 Push Factors Instrument

C.4.1 Instrument Construction and Zeroth Stage

One potential concern with the shift-share instrument constructed in equation (3) in the main text is that the black emigration rate from southern states might be influenced by local shocks in northern destinations. If such shocks were in turn correlated with the pre-1940 distribution of southern born African Americans across northern counties, then, the identifying assumption would be violated (for a formal discussion see also Borusyak et al., 2018). To deal with this potential threat, we construct a modified version of the instrument that, rather than using actual black out-migration, estimates it exploiting variation solely induced by local push factors.

Following Boustan (2010, 2016) and Derenoncourt (2018), we model emigration from each southern county for each decade between 1940 and 1970 as a function of local push

factors. In particular, we estimate an equation of the form

$$mig_{kj\tau} = \alpha_j + \beta_\tau Push_{kjt_0} + u_{kj\tau} \tag{6}$$

where $mig_{kj\tau}$ is the black net migration rate in county k of southern state j during decade τ, and $Push_{kjt_0}$ is a vector of economic and political conditions at baseline, which we allow to have a time-varying effect across decades. These include the 1940: share of land cultivated in cotton; share of farms operated by tenants; share of the labor force in, respectively, manufacturing, mining, and agriculture. As in Boustan (2016), we also include WWII spending per capita and the 1948 vote share of Strom Thurmond in Presidential elections.[56] Our most preferred specification includes state fixed effects, α_j, but results are unchanged when omitting them (see also Boustan, 2016). Finally, in contrast with Boustan (2010, 2016), we fix the characteristics of southern counties to 1940 (or, for Thurmond vote share, 1948) rather than using the beginning of each decade to reduce concerns of correlated shocks between northern and southern counties.[57]

Results from (6) are reported in Table C.14. Columns 1 to 3 refer to, respectively, the 1940-1950, the 1950-1960, and the 1960-1970 decade. All coefficients have the expected sign. A higher share of land in cotton and of farms operated by tenants in 1940 are associated with subsequent emigration. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the coefficient is not statistically significant for the 1940-1950 decade, possibly because cotton mechanization was more prevalent in the 1950s (Grove and Heinicke, 2003). As in Boustan (2016), a higher share of the labor force in mining and agriculture is associated with a larger emigration rate. Similarly, reflecting a more hostile political environment, counties with a higher vote share for Thurmond in 1948 are predicted to have a higher emigration rate throughout the period. Finally, consistent with WWII spending increasing labor demand, the black in-migration rate is higher in counties with more WWII contracts.

After estimating equation (6), we construct the predicted number of migrants by multiplying the fitted values from (6) by the beginning of decade black population. We then aggregate these (predicted) flows to obtain the predicted number of black migrants from each state in each decade, $\hat{Bl}_{s\tau}$. Finally, we replace the actual number of black migrants, $Bl_{s\tau}$, with this predicted value to construct a modified version of the shift-share instrument in equation (3) in the main text.

[56] Data on the cotton share comes from the Census of Agriculture, the vote share of Thurmond was taken from David Leip's Atlas, while all remaining variables were collected from the County Databooks.

[57] Following Boustan (2016), in counties where the black migration rate was above 100, we replace it with the latter value. We also exclude counties with less than 30 black residents in 1940. All results are robust to omitting these restrictions.

Table C.14. Zeroth Stage

Dep. variable	Net Black Migration Rate		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Share land in cotton	-0.012	-0.302**	-0.163**
	(0.088)	(0.123)	(0.077)
Share farms with tenants	0.042	0.045	-0.173***
	(0.056)	(0.064)	(0.047)
WWII spending per capita	2.228***	0.393	0.046
	(0.352)	(0.359)	(0.313)
Thurmond vote share	-0.085**	-0.083**	-0.158***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.042)
Share LF in manufacturing	-0.348***	-0.248***	-0.080
	(0.090)	(0.074)	(0.070)
Share LF in mining	-0.440**	-0.697***	-0.522***
	(0.197)	(0.179)	(0.152)
Share LF in agriculture	-0.504***	-0.486***	-0.209***
	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.045)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X
R-squared	0.256	0.283	0.163
Observations	1,163	1,163	1,163
Decade	1940-1950	1950-1960	1960-1970

Notes: The dependent variable is the net black migration rate for southern counties for each decade indicated at the bottom of the table. All regressors refer to 1940, except for Thurmond vote share, which is the vote share of Thurmond in 1948 Presidential elections. All regressions include state fixed effects. See the appendix for the definition and source of variables included in the table. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table C.15. First Stage (Push Instrument)

Dep. variable	Change in Black Share			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Change in Predicted Black Share	0.261**	0.428***	0.413***	1.289***
	(0.132)	(0.156)	(0.154)	(0.348)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X
1940 Black Share		X	X	X
1940 Dem Dummy			X	X
Weighted				X
R-squared	0.166	0.197	0.208	0.504
Observations	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418

Notes: The sample includes a panel of the 1,139 non-southern US counties for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The dependent variable is the decadal change in the black share, defined as the number of blacks divided by total population, in the county. The main regressor of interest is the push factors version of the instrument constructed in the appendix. All columns control for interactions between state dummies and period dummies. Columns 2 to 4 add interactions between period dummies and the 1940 black share. Column 3 also includes interactions between period dummies and a dummy equal to 1 if the 1940 Democratic vote share is above the Republicans vote share. Column 4 replicates column 3 by running regressions weighted by 1940 county population. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

C.4.2 Results

Table C.15 replicates the first stage results reported in the main text with those for the push factor version of the instrument described above. Reassuringly, also in this case, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the actual change in the black share and the instrument. Column 1 only includes interactions between state and period dummies, whereas columns 2 and 3 add interactions between period dummies and, respectively, the 1940 black share and a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share was higher than the Republicans vote share in Congressional elections of 1940. As for the baseline version of the instrument, the inclusion of additional controls makes the instrument stronger and more precisely estimated. Finally, in column 4, we show that the first stage is equally strong, and larger in magnitude, when regressions are weighted by 1940 county population.

Table C.16 documents that our main results hold when using the push-factor version of the instrument: in Panel A, we report the baseline specification, and in Panel B we instrument the change in the black share with the alternative version of the instrument. With the exception of the change in the ideology scores (column 3), all other

results remain close to those estimated in the main text. If anything, the coefficient on the Democratic vote share is even larger in magnitude. Taken together, this exercise increases the confidence that our main results are not driven by local pull shocks simultaneously correlated with the pre-1940 distribution of black settlements across northern counties.

C.5 Additional Robustness Checks on CD Results

C.5.1 CD Results Using Stacked First Difference Regressions

In this section we verify that results on legislators' behavior obtained with first difference regressions estimated separately for each decade (Section 6) are robust to estimating stacked first difference regressions. Since only one discharge petition was filed after Congress 88 (Table A.5), when focusing on signatures on discharge petitions, we keep the timing convention used in the main analysis. That is, we stack the number of discharge petitions signed during Congress period 78-82 and those signed during Congress period 83-88, and estimate a stacked first difference regression with two time periods.

When dealing with legislators' ideology scores, instead, we have the opportunity to more closely replicate the analysis conducted at the county level for the Democratic vote share and turnout in Congressional elections, since the Bateman et al. (2017) scores are available also after the 88^{th} Congress. We thus divide the period between 1944 and 1970 in three Congress "sub-periods": 78-82, 82-86, and 86-90.[58] As we did in the main text, we take the difference between the ideology score of legislators representing a CD at the end and at the beginning of each of the three periods. Then, we stack the data and estimate the model in stacked first differences.

Results from this exercise are reported in Table C.17. Columns 1 and 2 present OLS and 2SLS estimates for the effects of changes in the black share on the change in legislators' ideology scores, while columns 3 and 4 focus on signatures on discharge petitions. In both cases, 2SLS estimates are in line with those reported in the main text: black inflows have a negative (resp. positive) impact on legislators' ideology scores (resp. propensity to sign discharge petitions).[59]

[58] To be more precise, Congress 90 ended in 1969, but in order to keep the three periods of equal length, we opted for Congress 90 rather than for Congress 91. Results remain very similar when defining the third Congress period as 86-90.

[59] The F-stat in column 2 is relatively low, suggesting that in this setting (differently from the first difference results reported in the main text) a weak instrument problem may be present.

Table C.16. Main Results: Push Instrument

	(1) Democratic Vote Share	(2) Turnout	(3) Civil Rights Scores	(4) Discharge Petitions
	Panel A: Baseline Specification			
Change in Black Share	1.936***	0.196	-0.115**	0.212**
	(0.555)	(0.327)	(0.046)	(0.096)
F-stat	8.199	8.199	15.76	20.26
Observations	3,418	3,418	286	298
	Panel B: Push Factors IV			
Change Black Share	2.594***	0.152	-0.060	0.242**
	(0.769)	(0.327)	(0.042)	(0.098)
F-stat	7.200	7.200	11.65	15.26
Observations	3,418	3,418	286	298

Notes: Panel A reports the baseline 2SLS specification for the four key outcomes considered in our analysis. Panel B replicates results in Panel A using the push factors version of the instrument constructed in the appendix. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county (or at the Congressional District) level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table C.17. Replicating CD Results in Stacked First Differences

Dep. Variable	Change in Agnostic Scores		Signatures on Discharge Petitions	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS
Change in Black Share	0.688	-5.138**	0.094***	0.171**
	(0.599)	(2.604)	(0.022)	(0.068)
F-stat		5.159		19.99
Observations	857	857	596	596

Notes: The table replicates baseline results for the effects of changes in the black share at the CD level estimating stacked first difference regressions. Columns 1-2 (resp. 3-4) focus on the change in the Agnostic score from Bateman et al. (2017) (resp. the signatures per legislator on discharge petitions). Columns 1-2 consider three Congress periods: 78-82, 82-86, and 86-90. Since only one discharge petition was filed after Congress 88, instead, columns 3-4 report results for the 78-82 and 83-88 periods. All regressions include interactions between period dummies and: i) state dummies; ii) the 1940 black share; iii) a dummy equal to one if the Democratic candidate was incumbent in Congress 78. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the Congressional District level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

C.5.2 Comparing County and CD Estimates for Democratic Vote Share

In this section we verify the accuracy of the cross-walk constructed in Appendix B to keep the CD geography constant to Congress 78. To do so, we first collect data on electoral returns for Congressional Elections between 1940 and 1970 at the CD level from Swift et al. (2000). Next, we apply our CD boundary adjustment procedure, and then we re-estimate the baseline specification for the effects of black in-migration on the Democratic vote share at the CD (rather than county) level. To match CD and county elections, we consider the Congress years corresponding with each Census year, i.e. Congresses 76 (for 1940), 81 (for 1950), 86 (for 1960), and 91 (for 1970). As we did for the county level regressions, we first difference the data, and stack them to obtain a panel with three Congress periods – 76-81, 81-86, and 86-91.

Table C.18 reports 2SLS estimates from this exercise, comparing the baseline county-level estimates (columns 1 and 2) with the CD level ones (columns 3 and 4). As in our most preferred specification, all regressions include interactions between period dummies and: i) state dummies; ii) the 1940 black share; iii) and a dummy for Democratic incumbency in 1940. Columns 1 and 3 present results for the full period (i.e. from 1940 to 1970). Not only also in the CD sample black in-migration has a positive and statistically significant effect on the Democratic vote share. But also, the point esti-

Table C.18. County vs CD Level Estimates: Democratic Vote Share

Dep. variable	Change in Democratic Vote Share			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Change in Black Share	1.936***	2.477**	1.191**	0.657**
	(0.555)	(0.967)	(0.492)	(0.327)
F-stat	8.199	10.40	7.345	21.27
Observations	3,418	3,418	886	591
1940 Mean Dep. Variable	42.65	42.65	41.81	41.81
Drop 1960-1970 decade		X		X
Geography	County	County	CD	CD

Notes: The table presents 2SLS estimates for the effects of the change in the black share on the Democratic vote share. Columns 1 and 2 report the baseline specification at the county level, for the three decades between 1940 and 1970 (column 1) and omitting the 1960-1970 decade (column 2). Columns 3 and 4 replicate columns 1 and 2 estimating the same regressions at the CD level. All regressions control for state by period fixed effects, and for interactions between period dummies and 1940 black share and Democratic winner dummy. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county (or CD) level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

mate is very similar in the two samples. As a robustness check, columns 2 and 4 omit the 1960-1970 decade to rule out the possibility that our results are unduly affected by the "realignment" following the CRA and the VRA. Even though the point estimate for the CD level becomes smaller in magnitude, it nonetheless remains positive and statistically significant.

Overall, this exercise suggests that the CD boundary adjustment procedure developed in Appendix B is accurate, increasing the confidence in the CD level results obtained in the second part of the paper.

C.5.3 Redistricting, Black Inflows, and Political Outcomes

One potential concern with results in Section 6 is that the decision of redistricting a CD was at least partly driven by the arrival of African Americans. If this were to be the case, and if redistricting had an effect on political outcomes, then our results may be biased. As noted in Appendix B, until 1964 (i.e. the end of our sample period), redistricting was unlikely to be strategic (Engstrom, 2013), and was typically mandated at the state level. We exploit the fact that between Congress 78 and Congress 82, five states in our sample (Arizona, Illinois, New York, Maryland, and Pennsylvania) required their CDs to redistrict to test whether redistricting was systematically correlated with either black inflows or changes in political conditions (e.g. party switches, changes in

legislators' ideology, etc.).[60]

In Table C.19, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a CD belongs to a state that did not mandate redistricting, and is regressed against: *i* changes in the black share (with OLS in column 1 and with 2SLS in column 2); *ii* a dummy if the CD underwent a party switch; *iii* the change in the Bateman et al. (2017) ideology score (column 4); and *iv* the number of discharge petitions signed per legislator (column 5). Since the dependent variable varies at the state level, we cannot control for state fixed effects; yet, we include (as in our baseline specifications) the 1940 black share and the 1940 Democratic dummy. Reassuringly, the coefficient is never statistically significant, does not display any systematic pattern, and is always quantitatively small. Overall, this exercise thus suggests that neither changes in the black share nor changes in political conditions were systematically associated with state-mandated redistricting.

Table C.19. Redistricting Checks

Dep. variable	1[Non-Redistricting State]				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Change in Black Share	0.014	0.039			
	(0.013)	(0.038)			
Party Switch			0.084		
			(0.061)		
Change in Ideology Scores				-0.007	
				(0.049)	
Signatures on Discharge Petitions					-0.035
					(0.023)
F-stat		17.31			
Observations	286	286	286	286	298

Notes: The dependent variable a dummy equal to 1 if the CD belongs to a state that did not mandate redistricting between Congress 78 and Congress 82. In columns 1 and 2, the main regressor of interest is the change in the black share during the 1940-1950 decade. Column 1 (resp. column 2) presents OLS (resp. 2SLS) results. Columns 3, 4, and 5 regress the redistricting state dummy against, respectively, a dummy equal to 1 if the CD experienced a party transition during the 78-82 Congress period, the change in Bateman et al. (2017) scores, and the signatures on discharge petitions per legislator. All regressions control for the 1940 black share, and for a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CD level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

[60]This check cannot be performed between Congress 83 and Congress 88 because most CDs were subject to redistricting in this period.