Dynamic Oligopoly and Price Stickiness

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How does market concentration affect the potency of monetary policy? To tackle this question we build a model with oligopolistic sectors. We provide a formula for the response of aggregate output to monetary shocks in terms of demand elasticities, concentration, and markups. We calibrate our model to the evidence on pass-through, and find that higher concentration significantly amplifies non-neutrality. To isolate the strategic effects of oligopoly, we compare our model to one with monopolistic firms and modified consumer preferences that ensure firms face comparable residual demands. Finally, the Phillips curve for our model displays inflation persistence and endogenous cost-push shocks.

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1 Introduction

The recent rise in product-market concentration in the U.S. has been viewed as a driving force behind several macroeconomic trends. For instance, Gutiérrez and Philippon (2017) document an increase in the mean Herfindahl-Hirschman index since the mid-nineties, and argue that it has weakened investment. Autor, Dorn, Katz, Patterson and Van Reenen (2017) and Barkai (2020) relate the rising concentration of sales over the past 30 years in most US sectors to the fall in the labor share.¹

What are the implications of trends in concentration or market power for the transmission of monetary policy? Do strategic interactions in pricing between increasingly large firms amplify or dampen the real effects of monetary shocks? The baseline New Keynesian model is not designed to address these questions. Following the recognition that some form of imperfect competition and pricing power is required to model nominal rigidities, the New Keynesian literature has been built on the tractable paradigm of monopolistic competition, pervasive in other areas of macroeconomics and international trade. Under monopolistic competition, markups only depend on tastes, through consumers’ elasticity of substitution between competing goods, which leaves no room for changes in concentration to affect markups or monetary policy.

In this paper, we provide a new framework to study the link between market structure and monetary policy. We generalize the standard New Keynesian model by allowing for dynamic oligopolistic competition between any finite number of firms in each sector of the economy, also allowing for heterogeneity across sectors. In each sector, firms compete by setting their prices, but they do so in a staggered and infrequent manner due to nominal rigidities. We use this model to study the aggregate real effects of monetary shocks and highlight the restrictions imposed by monopolistic competition. Departing from monopolistic competition to study oligopoly poses new challenges, because it requires solving a dynamic game with strategic interactions at the sectoral level and embedding it into a general equilibrium macroeconomic model. We focus on Markov equilibria of our dynamic game, where the pricing strategy, or reaction function, of every firm is a function of the prices of its competitors.

¹Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte and Trachter (2020) document, however, diverging trends in national and local measures of concentration. We will discuss how to interpret our results in light of these two views.
Despite these complexities, our first result derives a closed-form formula for the response of aggregate output to small monetary shocks. Our formula inputs the cross-sectoral distribution of three sufficient statistics: market concentration as captured by the effective number of firms within a sector, demand elasticities, and markups. The intuition is based on the link between the steady state markup that can be sustained in an oligopolistic equilibrium and the slope of the reaction function of each firm to the prices of its competitors. All else equal, steeper reaction functions lead to higher equilibrium markups: each firm has little incentives to cut prices when it knows that this would lead its rivals to cut prices as well for some time. Inverting the logic, we can infer from high observed markups that reaction functions are steep and therefore complementarities in pricing are strong, which in turn implies a slow pass-through of monetary shocks into prices and therefore large real effects on output. In this way, our formula encapsulates a tight restriction between endogenous markups and stickiness, conditional on demand elasticities.\(^2\)

While our key sufficient statistics, demand elasticities and markups, can be estimated at any given point in time, they are endogenous objects that change in reaction to shifts in fundamentals. To perform counterfactual experiments, we take a more structural approach and solve numerically the oligopolistic equilibrium in terms of fundamentals. We use a flexible Kimball (1995) demand system that allows us to parametrize separately demand elasticities and superelasticities, as the latter can affect monetary policy transmission through variable markups even under monopolistic competition.

In our main exercise, we vary the number of firms \(n\) in each sector while keeping preference parameters fixed. We find that higher concentration (lower \(n\)) can significantly amplify or dampen the real effects of monetary policy, depending on how properties of the residual demand vary with \(n\). When preferences are CES, higher concentration amplifies monetary policy transmission. Maximal effects are attained under duopoly, for which the half-life of the price level in reaction to monetary shocks is around 40% higher than under monopolistic competition. With Kimball preferences, higher concentration actually dampens monetary policy transmission if the superelasticity of demand is high enough, and the dampening can be arbitrary large. It is thus essential to first understand the link between concentration

\(^2\)In the standard monopolistic competition model desired markups are constant and only a function of the demand elasticity. However, in a strategic environment the endogenous markup is no longer a simple function of the demand elasticity.
and demand functions.

We use evidence on the heterogeneity in idiosyncratic cost pass-through across small and large firms from Amiti, Itskhoki and Konings (2019) to calibrate how concentration affects the shape of demand functions, and find substantial amplification. The rise in the average Herfindahl index observed in the U.S. since 1990 increases the response of output (and decreases the response of inflation) to monetary shocks by around 15%.

What explains these results? The number of competitors in a market has an effect on firms’ strategic incentives, but also on the residual demand faced by each firm. We disentangle these two ways through which oligopolistic competition differs from monopolistic competition. On the one hand, “feedback effects” make each firm care about its rivals’ current and future prices when setting its price. On the other hand, “strategic effects” arise because each firm realizes its current pricing decision can affect how its rivals will set their prices in the future. Feedback effects are present in monopolistic competitive models with non-CES demand, but strategic effects can only exist when the number of firms is finite. To isolate these two effects for each \( n \), we compare the oligopolistic model with \( n \) firms to a “non-strategic” scenario in which the \( n \) firms act myopically, ignoring the effect of their prices on competitors’ future incentives. The non-strategic equilibrium is isomorphic to a model with monopolistic competition and Kimball preferences modified to match the elasticity and superelasticity of the residual demand in the finite \( n \) model. We find that departures from monopolistic competition are mostly working through feedback effects, that is changes in the shape of residual demand. While strategic effects matter for the level of steady state markups, they only have a modest impact on monetary policy transmission. Of course, this quantitative conclusion can only be reached after solving the full, strategic, model.

Standard models of monopolistic competition featuring non-CES demand can thus be viewed as simple approximations to an oligopolistic reality, and our framework provides a rigorous mapping from micro-evidence on pass-through and concentration, that may change over time and with competition policy, to the reduced-form Kimball parameter driving these models. It does not follow, however, that oligopoly is isomorphic to monopolistic competition up to some recalibration. The oligopoly model yields a unique link between markups and monetary policy transmission, in the aggregate and in the cross-section, that cannot arise under monop-
olistic competition, even with non-CES demand. Under monopolistic competition, predictions of the model depend on calibrating two independent parameters of demand functions: the markup only depends on the elasticity, and the price response to monetary policy only depends on the superelasticity. Oligopolistic competition, on the other hand, highlights a tight connection: the superelasticity of residual demand has a positive effect on both markups and the pass-through of monetary policy. Therefore, controlling for concentration and demand elasticity, our model predicts that monetary policy is transmitted relatively more through sectors or regions with higher markups, because they are the ones featuring the slowest price adjustment following monetary shocks.

Moreover, the quantitative near-equivalence between the oligopoly model and the recalibrated non-strategic economy depends on the specific processes for real and monetary shocks. In order to go beyond the permanent money supply shocks most commonly studied in the literature, we derive a three equations New Keynesian model with an oligopolistic Phillips curve that allows for more general shocks and non-stationary dynamics. We find that strategic effects are quantitatively important once we allow for richer dynamics. In particular, the oligopolistic Phillips curve features a form of endogenous inflation persistence (or equivalently, endogenous cost-push shocks) that can dampen fluctuations in inflation and output relative to the non-strategic model.

**Related Literature**

An important early exception to the complete domination of monopolistic competition in the macroeconomics literature on firm pricing is Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), who propose a model of oligopolistic competition to explain the cyclical behavior of markups. Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) later embed their model into a general equilibrium framework with aggregate demand shocks driven by government spending. These two papers assume flexible prices and abstract from monetary policy. Another important difference is that we focus on Markov equilibria, in line with the more recent industrial organization literature, rather than trigger-strategy price-war equilibria.

The first paper to combine non-monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities

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3Rotemberg and Saloner (1987) study a static partial-equilibrium menu-cost model, comparing the incentive to change prices under monopoly and duopoly.
in general equilibrium is Mongey (2018). This paper uses a rich quantitative model with two firms, menu costs, and idiosyncratic shocks to show that duopoly can generate significant non-neutrality relative to the Golosov and Lucas (2007) benchmark. It also finds that duopoly is closer to monopolistic competition under Calvo pricing than with menu costs. Our paper takes a complementary approach, more analytical but assuming Calvo pricing and abstracting from idiosyncratic shocks. This allows us to go beyond two firms and explore different questions, in particular by changing industry concentration and separating strategic complementarities from residual demand effects. Modeling more than two firms also lets us incorporate recent evidence on cost pass-through and market shares from Amiti, Itskhoki and Konings (2019) to infer the relation between concentration and monetary non-neutrality. As we show, this evidence implies that even under Calvo pricing, oligopoly leads to significant amplification.

The literature on variable markups in international trade (e.g., Atkeson and Burstein 2008) highlights the importance of market structure and for cost (e.g., exchange rate) pass-through in static settings. We study a dynamic version of these models, as is needed to analyze monetary policy, and show which properties of residual demand functions matter in this context (see also Neiman (2011) for a partial equilibrium dynamic duopoly model of exchange rate pass-through with menu costs). In particular, we use the evidence from Amiti, Itskhoki and Konings (2019) on heterogeneous pass-through behavior across small and large firms to calibrate our oligopolistic model.

Kimball (1995) introduced non-CES aggregators that generate variable markups even under monopolistic competition. As we show in section 6, there is a close connection between this class of models (e.g., Klenow and Willis 2016, Gopinath and Itskhoki 2010) and our oligopolistic model. By making the market structure explicit, our paper provides foundations for the dynamic pricing complementarities embedded in the monopolistic Kimball aggregator, in a way consistent with the data.

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Calvo pricing remains an important benchmark in the literature on price stickiness, due to its tractability, but additionally, recent work on menu costs, such as Gertler and Leahy (2008), Midrigan (2011), Alvarez, Le Bihan and Lippi (2016b) and Alvarez, Lippi and Passadore (2016a), show that certain menu-cost models may actually behave close to Calvo pricing.

Several papers, including Benigno and Faia (2016) and Corhay, Kung and Schmid (2020) with Rotemberg pricing and Etro and Rossi (2015) and Andrés and Burriel (2018) with Calvo pricing, consider models of monopolistic competition that depart from the standard CES setting because the demand curve faced by a firm depends on the number of competitors; but firms still behave atomistically, taking rivals’ current and future prices as given.
on firm size and long-run pass-through. Relative to this strand of the literature, the oligopolistic model also generates unique predictions on the cross-sectional relation between markups, concentration, and monetary policy transmission.

In addition to the dynamic pricing with staggered price stickiness we focus on, market structure can affect the degree of monetary non-neutrality through other margins. Nakamura and Steinsson (2013) organize sources of complementarities in pricing into “micro” (e.g., variable markups or decreasing returns to scale) and “macro” complementarities (e.g., intermediate inputs). Afrouzi (2020) studies the incentives to acquire information in a flexible prices rational-inattention oligopolistic model, while a large literature studies the feedback between the cyclicality of markups and entry and exit dynamics (e.g. Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz, 2007).

2 A Macro Model with Oligopolies

In this section we first describe the economic environment, preferences, technology, and the market structure. We then define an equilibrium.

The household side of our model is standard. On the production side, we depart from the atomistic monopolistic competitive framework in favor of oligopolies, with a finite number of firms, producing differentiated varieties in each sector. These firms compete with each other by setting prices at random intervals of time, resulting in a staggered set of price changes.

**Basics.** Time is continuous with an infinite horizon \( t \in [0, \infty) \).\(^6\) We abstract from aggregate uncertainty. This suffices to study the impact and transitional dynamics induced by an unanticipated shock. Following much of the menu-cost literature, we focus on such a monetary shock, and our goal is to understand the degree of monetary non-neutrality it induces.

There are three types of economic agents: households, firms and the government. Households are described by a continuum of infinitely lived agents that consumes nondurable goods and supplies labor to a competitive labor market.

Firms produce across a continuum of sectors \( s \in S \). Each sector is oligopolistic, with a finite number \( n_s \) of firms \( i \in I_s \), each producing a differentiated variety. Firms

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\(^6\)Our analysis translates easily to a discrete-time setup, but continuous time has a few advantages and permits comparisons with the menu-cost literature (e.g. Alvarez and Lippi, 2014).
can only reset prices at randomly spaced times, so the price vector within a sector is a state variable. By setting $n_s \to \infty$ or $n_s = 1$ we obtain a standard monopolistic setup, where each firm has a negligible effect on competitors. Otherwise, there are strategic interaction across firms within a sector, but not across sectors (due to the continuum assumption). We study the dynamic game within a sector and focus on Markov equilibria.

The government controls the money supply, provides transfers and issues bonds, to satisfy its budget constraint.

**Household Preferences.** Utility is given by

$$\int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} U(C(t), \ell(t), m(t)) dt,$$

with real money balances $m(t) = \frac{M(t)}{P(t)}$ and aggregate consumption

$$C(t) = G \left( \{C_s(t)\}_{s \in S} \right),$$

$$C_s(t) = H_s \left( \{c_{i,s}(t)\}_{i \in I_s} \right),$$

where $\{C_s\}$ and $\{c_{i,s}(t)\}$ describe sectoral consumption across sectors $s \in S$ and good varieties across firms $i \in I_s$ within each sector, respectively. $G$ and $H_s$ are aggregator functions homogeneous of degree one.

Following Golosov and Lucas (2007), in most of the paper we adopt the specification

$$U(C, \ell, m) = \frac{C^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} + \alpha \log m - \ell.$$

As is well known, these preferences help simplify the aggregate equilibrium dynamics; we consider more general preferences in section 7.1. In addition, we assume CES aggregation across sectors: \footnote{When $\omega = 1$ we set $G(\{C_s\}) = \exp \int_S \log C_s ds$.}

$$G \left( \{C_s\}_{s \in S} \right) = \left( \int_S C_s^{1-\frac{1}{\omega}} ds \right) \frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\omega}}$$

but crucially, $H_s$ can be more general than CES. We make no assumption on $H_s$ beyond homotheticity until section 5.
**Firms.** Each firm $i \in I_s$ in sector $s \in S$ produces linearly from labor according to the production function,

$$y_{s,i}(t) = \ell_{s,i}(t).$$

We assume a linear production function and no sectoral or idiosyncratic differences in productivity for simplicity.

Firms receive opportunities to change their price $p_{i,s}$ at random intervals of time, determined by a Poisson arrival rate $\lambda_s > 0$, the realizations of which are independent across firms and sectors. Between price changes, firms meet demand at their posted prices.

Individual firm nominal profits are

$$\Pi_{i,s}(t) = p_{i,s}(t)y_{i,s}(t) - W(t)\ell_{i,s}(t)$$

and aggregate firm nominal profits $\Pi(t) = \int \sum_{i \in I_s} \Pi_{i,s}(t) \, ds$. Firms seek to maximize the present value of profits,

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \int_0^\infty Q(t)\Pi_{i,s}(t) \, dt$$

where $Q(t) = e^{-\int_0^t R(s) \, ds}$ denotes the nominal price deflator between period $t$ and 0.

Although there is no aggregate uncertainty, the expectation averages over the idiosyncratic uncertainty about the dates at which changes are allowed for each firm and its immediate competitors within a sector. (This firm objective can be justified in a number of ways, such as by introducing an asset market for the stock price of firms.)

**Household Budget Constraints.** The flow budget constraint can be summarized by

$$P(t)C(t) + \dot{B}(t) + \dot{M}(t) = W(t)\ell(t) + \Pi(t) + T(t) + R(t)B(t)$$

for all $t \geq 0$, where $B(t)$ are bonds paying nominal interest rate $R(t)$, $M(t)$ nominal money holdings, $W(t)$ the nominal wage, $T(t)$ nominal lump-sum transfers, and $P(t)$ the (ideal) price index given by

$$P(t) = P(\{p_{i,s}(t)\}).$$
where $\mathcal{P}(\{p_{i,s}\}) \equiv \min_{\{c_{i,s}\}} \sum_{i \in I_s} p_{i,s} c_{i,s} ds$ s.t. $G \left( \left\{ H_s \left( \{c_{i,s}\}_{i \in I_s} \right) \right\}_{s \in S} \right) = 1$. For $\omega \neq 1$, we can write $\mathcal{P}(\{p_{i,s}\}) \equiv (\int P_s^{1-\omega} ds)^{\frac{1}{1-\omega}}$ with $P_s = \mathcal{P}_s(p_{1,s}, p_{2,s}, \ldots, p_{n,s})$.

Let $A(t) = B(t) + M(t)$ denote total nominal wealth. Households are also subject to the No Ponzi condition $\lim_{t \to \infty} Q(t)A(t) \geq 0$. This leads to the present value condition

$$\int_0^\infty Q(t)(P(t)C(t) + T(t) + R(t)M(t) - W(t)\ell(t) - \Pi(t))dt = A(0) = M(0) + B(0).$$

**Demand.** Define the vector of prices within a sector $s$ as

$$p_s(t) = (p_{1,s}(t), p_{2,s}(t), \ldots, p_{n,s}(t))$$

and let $p_{-i,s}(t) = (p_{1,s}(t), \ldots, p_{i-1,s}(t), p_{i+1,s}(t), \ldots, p_{n,s}(t))$ denote the vector that excludes $p_{i,s}(t)$. The demand for firm $i \in I_s$ can be written as

$$c_{i,s}(t) = D_{i,s}(p_{i,s}(t), p_{-i,s}(t); C(t), P(t)).$$

Given symmetry, constant returns and the CES structure across sectors, we obtain

$$D_{i,s}(p_{ir}, p_{-i}; C, P) = d^i(p_{ir}, p_{-i})CP^\omega.$$ 

The demand faced by firm $i$ is a stable function of the price vector $d^i(p_{ir}, p_{-i})$. This demand captures within-sector substitution as well as across-sector substitution. Firms understand that they can switch expenditure in both ways by changing their price.

Discounted nominal profits are then

$$\int_0^\infty e^{-\int_0^t R(s)ds} C(t)P(t)^\omega d^i(p_{ir}(t), p_{-i}(t)) (p_{i,s}(t) - W(t)) dt$$

**Markov Equilibria.** A strategy for firm $i$ specifies its desired reset price at any time $t$ should it have an opportunity to change its price. A Markov equilibrium involves a strategy that is a function only of the price of its rivals and calendar time $t$,

$$g_{i,s}(p_{-i}; t).$$

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8We have $\mathcal{P}(\{p_{i,s}\}) \equiv \log \int \exp P_s ds$ when $\omega = 1.$
Given that sectors are symmetric and firms are symmetric within sectors, we con-
sider strategies \( g(p, t) \) that are symmetric, except in section 4.2.

**Equilibrium Definition.** Given initial prices \( \{p_{i(s)}(0)\} \), an equilibrium is sequence
for the aggregate price \( P(t) \), wage \( W(t) \), interest rate \( R(t) \), consumption \( C(t) \), labor
\( \ell(t) \) and money supply \( M(t) \), as well as demand functions for consumers \( d(p, p_{-i}; t) \)
and strategy functions for firms \( g(p_{-i}; t) \) such that: (a) consumers optimize quanti-
ties taking as given the sequence of prices and interest rates; (b) the firm reset price
strategy \( g \) is optimal, given the path for \( P(t), C(t) \) and its rivals’ strategies \( g \) and
demand function of consumers \( d \); (c) consistency: the aggregate price level evolves
in accordance with the reset strategy \( g \) employed by firms; (d) markets clear: firms
meet demand for goods, the supply of labor equals aggregate demand for labor

\[
\ell(t) = \int \sum_{i \in I_s} \ell_{i,s}(t) \, ds
\]

and the demand for money equals supply \( M(t) \).

## 3 Stationary Oligopoly Game within a Sector

We first focus on the dynamics within a sector, assuming all conditions external
to the sector are fixed and given: the wage, the nominal discount rate, aggregate
consumption and price are assumed constant. These assumptions imply that the
oligopoly game within an industry is stationary. This partial equilibrium analysis
also characterizes a steady state in general equilibrium.

We shall later explore conditions under which we can use the sectoral dynamics
we characterize here to study the aggregate macroeconomic adjustment to a mon-
etary shock.

### 3.1 Prices, Demands and Profits

We now focus within a sector, suppressing the notation conditioning on \( s \in S \) we
collect prices within the sector in a vector

\[
p = (p_1, \ldots, p_n)
\]
and let \( p_{-i} = (p_1, \ldots, p_{i-1}, p_{i+1}, \ldots, p_n) \) denote competitor prices for firm \( i \). The profit function for firm \( i \) is then

\[
\Pi^i(p) = d^i(p, p_{-i})(p_i - W).
\]

Since \( R(t) = \rho \) we have \( Q(t) = e^{-\rho t} \) and firms maximize

\[
\mathbb{E}_0 \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} d^i(p, p_{-i})(p_i - W) dt.
\]

### 3.2 Markov Equilibria

In a Markov equilibrium firms \( i \) follow a strategy specifying the reset price

\[
p^*_i = g_i(p_{-i})
\]

they will chose in the event that they receive a price change opportunity. Together with an initial price vector and the Poisson arrival rate this fully describes the stochastic dynamics within the sector. We focus on differentiable symmetric Markov equilibria, where

\[
g_i = g.
\]

Let \( V^i(p) \) denote the value function obtained by firm \( i \), where the argument \( p \) is a vector of \( n \) prices. The Bellman equation is then

\[
\rho V^i(p) = \Pi^i(p) + \lambda \sum_j \left[ V^i(g_j(p_{-j}), p_{-j}) - V^i(p) \right]
\]

where \( \Pi^i \) is the profit function of firm \( i \) and for each \( j \)

\[
g_j(p_{-j}) = \arg\max_{p'_j} V^i(p'_j, p_{-j}).
\]

satisfying the optimality condition

\[
V^i_{p_j}(g_j(p_{-j}), p_{-j}) = 0.
\]

The right-hand side of (1) states that with Poisson rate \( \lambda \), one of the firms indexed by \( j = 1, \ldots, n \) (including firm \( i \)) will adjust its price to \( g_j(p_{-j}) \), which will make firm \( i \)’s value jump to \( V^i(g_j(p_{-j}), p_{-j}) \), shorthand notation for \( V^i(p_1, \ldots, p_{j-1}, g_j(p_{-j}), p_{j+1}, \ldots, p_n) \).

**Remark 1.** There could be multiple equilibria even within the Markov class, but our
main results apply for any differentiable selection. The differentiability assumption rules out “kinked demand curve” and “Edgeworth cycles” Markov equilibria studied by Maskin and Tirole (1988) in a Bertrand duopoly model with perfectly substitutable goods as firms become infinitely patient, which in our setting is equivalent to the flexible prices limit $\lambda \to \infty$ as the model only depends on the ratio $\rho/\lambda$.

Maskin and Tirole (1988) show that firms can “collude” around the joint monopoly price in this limit. Firms can achieve high profits in steady state, because if not, a firm could deviate to the monopoly price knowing that its rival would follow suit and undercut by a small amount once it gets to reset its price, which eventually ensures some large profit to the deviator once it gets to reset its price again. Figure 16 in Appendix I shows that away from the joint limit of perfect substitution and flexible prices, value function iteration converges to a standard “smooth” (and monotone) MPE that corresponds to the one we study locally. We trace out the locus of existence of equilibria in the $(\epsilon, \lambda)$-space (where $\epsilon$ is the within-sector elasticity of substitution), and find that our smooth equilibrium disappears as $\epsilon$ exceeds 9 for $\lambda$ around 1. While the curse of dimensionality prevents us from solving numerically for the full non-linear MPE with general $n$, we conjecture that the existence bounds are tightest for $n = 2$, as increases in the number of firms lead to a smaller potential monopoly profit (the case of monopolistic competition $n \to \infty$ being an extreme example). Similarly, a higher outer elasticity $\omega$ lowers the joint monopoly profit, which enlarges the region of existence of the smooth equilibrium.

### 3.3 A Steady State Condition

We now provide a key expression for the slope of the reset price strategy at a steady state. Differentiating the Bellman equation (1) and making use of symmetry, we obtain at the steady state $\bar{p}$ of a symmetric equilibrium:

$$0 = \Pi^i_{p_i}(\bar{p}) + \lambda \sum_{j \neq i} \left[ V^i_{p_j}(\bar{p}) \frac{\partial g^i_j}{\partial p_i}(\bar{p}) \right]$$

$$V^i_{p_k}(\bar{p}) = \frac{\Pi^i_{p_k}(\bar{p})}{\rho + \lambda} + \frac{\lambda}{\rho + \lambda} \sum_{j \neq i, k} \left[ V^i_{p_j}(\bar{p}) \frac{\partial g^i_j}{\partial p_k}(\bar{p}) \right] \quad \forall k \neq i$$

Denote $\frac{\partial g^i_j}{\partial p_k}(\bar{p}) = \beta$ for all $k \neq j$. Using $\sum_k \sum_{j \neq i, k} V^i_{p_j}(\bar{p}) = (n - 2) \sum_{k \neq i} V^i_{p_k}(\bar{p})$, and the symmetry of $\Pi_{p_k}$ across $k \neq i$, we obtain
\[ 0 = \Pi_{p_i}(\bar{p}) + \frac{\lambda (n-1) \beta}{\rho + \lambda [1 - (n-2)\beta]} \Pi_{p_k}(\bar{p}) \] (3)

With flexible prices, firms would continuously play the static Nash equilibrium price \( p^{NE} \) that solves \( 0 = \Pi_{p_i}(p^{NE}) \). From (3) we see that the steady state price \( \bar{p} \) of the dynamic oligopoly game is above the static Nash price \( p^{NE} \) if and only if \( \beta > 0 \). Therefore, unlike under monopolistic competition, the steady state price is affected by the presence of nominal rigidities. Moreover, as the influence of any single rival \( \Pi_{p_k} \) vanishes when \( n \) increases, the steady state price converges to the Nash price (i.e., monopolistic competition) as \( n \) grows to infinity.

**Sufficient Statistics: Markups and Elasticities.** The main object of our analysis is the slope \( (n-1) \beta \) of the reaction function, where the term \( n-1 \) scales the aggregate effect of the rivals. We can further simplify (3) to write \( (n-1) \beta \) in terms of observable sufficient statistics. Use

\[
\frac{\Pi_{p_j}^i}{-\Pi_{p_i}^i} = \frac{e_j^i \left( \frac{p_i - W}{p_j} \right)}{-e_i^j \left( \frac{p_i - W}{p_i} \right) - 1}
\]

where

\[
e_i^j = \frac{\partial \log d_i}{\partial \log p_i}, \quad e_j^i = \frac{\partial \log d_j}{\partial \log p_j}
\]

to rewrite in terms of demand own- and cross-elasticities

\[
(n-1) \beta = \frac{\rho + \lambda}{\lambda} \frac{1}{\frac{\lambda}{n-1} + \frac{e_i^i}{-e_i^i - \bar{p} W}}
\]

Constant returns to scale imply that the cross-elasticity is related to the own-elasticity through \( (n-1)e_j^i = -(1 + e_i^i) \). For any \( n \), we obtain the slope in terms of only two steady state objects, the own-elasticity and the markup:

**Proposition 1.** In a sector with \( n \) firms, the slope of the reaction function around the steady state \( \beta = \frac{\partial \delta_i}{\partial p_k}(\bar{p}) \) satisfies

\[
(n-1)\beta = \frac{\lambda + \rho}{\lambda} \frac{1}{1 + \frac{1}{(n-1)(|e_j^i|-1)(\bar{\mu}-1)-1}}
\]

(4)

where \( e_i = \frac{\partial \log d_i}{\partial \log p_i} \) and \( \bar{\mu} = \frac{\rho}{W} \).
Proposition 1 is our first main result, showing how to locally infer unobserved steady state strategies from a small number of potentially observed sufficient statistics. Taking as given market concentration $n$ and the demand elasticity $\epsilon_i$, a higher steady state markup $\bar{\mu}$ is associated with a higher slope $\beta$. Conversely, for a given observed markup $\bar{\mu}$, a higher elasticity (in absolute value) also reflects a higher slope.

The intuition behind this result is based on reverse causality. Suppose that $\beta$ is high. Then, if firm $i$ decreases its price below the steady state, its rivals will set low prices as well, which undermines firm $i$'s incentives to cut prices. This threat of undercutting allows to sustain a high equilibrium markup. On the other hand, when rivals do not react, for instance in the limit where firm $i$ is an infinitesimal player as in monopolistic competition, then the equilibrium markup is low, equal to the static Nash level.

Turning the argument on its head, for a given elasticity $\epsilon_i$, a high equilibrium markup must then be a consequence of steep reaction functions; we will later analyze the factors that govern these reactions. And conversely, for a given markup, a higher demand elasticity would decrease the Nash markup that arises under monopolistic competition, hence oligopolistic competition would imply a higher “abnormal markup” relative to monopolistic competition, that can again only be sustained through a steep reaction function. In the next section, we will show that strong reaction functions imply a low pass-through of aggregate cost shocks and thus persistent real effects of monetary policy.

**Remark 2** (Markups and Reaction Functions: Dynamic vs. Static Oligopoly.). When sectors or regions are heterogeneous in terms of concentration (holding demand elasticities $\epsilon_i$ fixed to simplify this discussion), equation (4) implies a cross-sectional empirical relation between markup and response to aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, conditional on concentration, as captured by $n$. As we show in the next section, monetary non-neutrality increases with $(n-1)\beta$. Hence our model predicts that regressing a measure of sectoral or regional non-neutrality (such as the cumulative output effect of a monetary shock) on average markups, controlling for concentration, should yield a positive coefficient.

This conditional correlation is specific to our dynamic model, in which the markup does not depend solely on demand elasticities, but is also affected by other properties of demand such as superelasticities (see section 5.2), or the frequency of price
changes (section 5.4). This prediction provides a stark contrast with the case of dynamic monopolistic competition, in which the steady state markup only depends on the demand elasticity and is entirely disconnected from the slope of the reaction function, but also with static oligopoly models such as Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and Amiti et al. (2019). While those models may display an unconditional correlation between markup and slope of reaction function (or, as we explain later on, markup elasticity), they predict that the correlation disappears once controlling for elasticities and concentration.

4 Aggregate Effects of Permanent Monetary Shocks: Sufficient Statistics

We now study an unanticipated permanent shock to money. In particular, suppose initial prices are all equal, \( p_{s,i} = P_- \), and aggregates are at a steady state with constant \( M_-, C_-, \ell_-, W_- \) and \( R_- = \rho \). Consider a permanent monetary shock arriving at \( t = 0 \) so that \( M(t) = M_+ = (1 + \delta)M_- \) for all \( t \geq 0 \).

In general, firms would have to forecast the path of macroeconomic variables \( P(t) \) and \( C(t) \) when choosing their reset price strategies \( g_{i,s} \). These strategies would in turn affect the evolution of \( P(t) \) and \( C(t) \). It is possible to accommodate this fixed-point problem numerically or under additional assumptions, as we do in section (7.1), but for now we want to focus on clear analytical results. In the spirit of Golosov and Lucas (2007), our assumptions on preferences lead to the following simplification:

**Proposition 2.** Equilibrium aggregates satisfy

\[
W(t) = (1 + \delta)W_-
\]

\[
P(t)C(t)^\sigma = \rho M(t) = \rho M_+
\]

\[
R(t) = \rho
\]

If in addition

\[
\omega \sigma = 1
\]

then the game in each sector \( s \) along the transition is equivalent to the stationary oligopoly game studied earlier.
Proposition 2 is very useful, as it shows when firms can ignore the transitional dynamics of macroeconomic variables following the monetary shock, and therefore allows us to extend results based on the partial equilibrium game in section 3 to general equilibrium. This is an exact result, not an approximation for small monetary shocks as in Alvarez and Lippi (2014). Unless otherwise noted, we set
\[ \omega = \sigma = 1 \]
which implies condition (6).

**Remark 3.** The classic paper by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) analyzes (non-Markov) trigger strategies that sustain high “collusive” prices in bad times but lead to price wars during booms, because the latter are periods with higher temporary profits to compete over. However, we just showed conditions under which, in general equilibrium, treating the dynamic game as a repeated game can be misleading, as the effect of real interest rates cancels out exactly the effect of higher aggregate demand \( C(t) \). Away from this benchmark, the incentives to cut prices could be higher or lower in booms, depending on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution \( 1/\sigma \).

### 4.1 Aggregation and Transitional Dynamics

We are interested in the speed of convergence of the aggregate price level to its new steady state \( \bar{P} = (1 + \delta) P_0 \). From (5), this speed also tells us the effect of the monetary shock on aggregate consumption.

After the shock, each sector follows stochastic dynamics displayed in Figure 1. When firm \( i \) has an opportunity to adjust its price, it does so only when it wasn’t the last firm to adjust. The sectoral price level \( P_s \) follows a stochastic process, and unlike with monopolistic competition, there is no law of large numbers at the sector level with a finite number of firms. However, aggregating across the continuum of (potentially heterogeneous) sectors yields a deterministic law of motion for the first-order dynamics of the aggregate price level:

**Proposition 3.** To first-order in the size of the monetary shock \( \delta \), the aggregate price level follows for \( t \geq 0 \)
\[
\log P(t) - \log \bar{P} = -\delta \int_s e^{-\lambda(1-(n_s-1)\beta_s)t} \, ds, \tag{7}
\]
where \( \beta_s \) is the slope \( \frac{\partial g_i}{\partial p_{js}} \) in sector \( s \). Therefore the cumulative output effect of the shock is
Figure 1: Price dynamics within a sector following an aggregate monetary shock.

\[
\bar{p} = g(p_0 - i)
\]

Note: Illustration with \( n = 2 \). Both prices start from \( p(0) \) and converge stochastically to \( \bar{p} \) on a discrete grid \( \{ p(0), g(p(0)), g(g(p(0))), \ldots \} \). If a firm was the last one to adjust its price, nothing happens until its rival can adjust. A steeper policy \( g \) implies slower convergence in expectation.

(for arbitrary \( \sigma \))

\[
\int_0^\infty \log \left( \frac{C(t)}{C} \right) dt = \frac{\delta}{\sigma \lambda} \times \int s \frac{ds}{1 - (n_s - 1) \beta_s}.
\]

In the standard New Keynesian model with monopolistic competition and CES demand, the half-life of the price level following a monetary shock (up to a factor \( \ln 2 \)) is simply \( 1/\lambda \) (as in Woodford 2003).\(^9\) Suppose that sectors only differ in the number of firms, that is, all sectors with \( n \) firms feature the same demand function. Then if \( \nu_n \) is the mass of sectors with \( n \) firms, the half-life of the aggregate price level in the oligopolistic model is

\[
hl = \frac{1}{\lambda} \times \sum_n \frac{\nu_n}{1 - (n - 1) \beta_n}.
\]

A higher average slope across sectors implies a slower convergence of the price level \( P(t) \) to its new steady state, and larger real effects of monetary policy. If \( (n - 1) \beta_n \) is low on average, then firms in each sector will reset prices close to the new steady state when given a chance, speeding up the convergence.

\(^9\)With more general demand structures, for instance Kimball demand, the half-life can depart from \( 1/\lambda \) even under monopolistic competition, see Proposition 7 below.
Combining the results from Propositions 1 and 3, we know the response of the aggregate price level and thus of output to a permanent monetary shock as a function of the distribution of three steady state statistics: markups, demand elasticities and industry concentration. If we can observe or estimate these sufficient statistics and how they evolve over time, for instance following trends in market power, then it is not necessary to solve the full MPE to analyze how the real effects of monetary policy evolve.

For instance, our formula tells us that all else equal, higher observed markups imply higher (unobserved) slopes \((n - 1) \beta n\). However, this is only true when fixing the demand elasticity, and if instead higher markups reflect a decline in the elasticity of substitution between competing varieties, then higher markups may be associated with lower slopes instead, as we illustrate in section 5.2. Similarly, an increase in market concentration, captured by a fall in the number of firms \(n\), would also increase monetary non-neutrality holding markups and demand elasticities unchanged. But equilibrium markups and elasticities are likely to be affected by concentration, so our analysis highlights that it is crucial to understand where observed markups come from to understand monetary policy transmission.

4.2 Within-Sector Heterogeneity

We now allow for permanent heterogeneity within sectors. Much of the menu-cost literature (e.g., Midrigan 2011, Alvarez and Lippi (2014)) assumes for tractability that there are within-sector demand shocks offsetting perfectly the productivity differences between firms, so as to keep market shares the same. Under this assumption, the model is isomorphic to one with homogeneous firms once we replace prices with markups.

Without these perfectly correlated demand and cost shocks, more productive or demanded firms have a larger market share, and this creates differences in residual demand elasticities as in Atkeson and Burstein (2008), to which we come back in detail in section 5.3.

In general, computing the slopes \(\frac{\partial g_i}{\partial p_j}\) once we allow for heterogeneity requires a more structural approach like the one in section (5). However, in the special case of \(n = 2\) firms, our sufficient statistic formula can be adapted to arbitrary heterogeneity stemming from cost or demand differences:
**Proposition 4.** Consider a sector with two firms $i = a, b$, that can have different demand functions $d^i$ and different marginal costs $MC_i$. Then the slopes of the reaction functions $\beta^a = \frac{\partial g^a}{\partial p^b}$ and $\beta^b = \frac{\partial g^b}{\partial p^a}$ around the steady state $(\bar{p}_a, \bar{p}_b)$ are functions of steady state sufficient statistics:

$$\beta^i = \lambda + \rho \frac{-e^i}{\lambda} - \frac{p_i}{p_j - MC_i}$$

where $e^i = \frac{\partial \log d^i}{\partial \log p^k}$.

All else equal, firm $j$’s high price can now be justified by either its rival $i$’s high slope $\beta^i$ as before, or by its rival’s high price. The case of two firms allows us to capture any Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) between $1/2$ and $1$; with more symmetric firms we can also obtain HHIs of $1/3$, $1/4$, and so on. In the case of $n \geq 3$ heterogeneous firms, we cannot back out the slopes from the steady state prices. Intuitively, the system is underdetermined because there are multiple ways to generate the same steady state prices.

Given the slopes $\beta^i$ (whether they are given by Proposition 4 or computed in the full model solution), we can aggregate the stochastic dynamics in each sector to obtain deterministic aggregate dynamics of the price level as before. While the general case presents no particular difficulty, most of the insights can be gleaned by assuming again that there are two firms $a$ and $b$:

**Proposition 5.** Suppose there are two heterogeneous firms $a$ and $b$ in each sector. The aggregate price index evolves to first order in $\delta$ as

$$\log P(t) - \log \bar{P} = -\delta \left[ \frac{1 - S_a}{\sqrt{\frac{p_a}{p_b} \beta^a}} - \frac{S_a}{\sqrt{\frac{p_a}{p_b} \beta^b}} \right] \left( \frac{\sqrt{\frac{p_a}{p_b} \beta^a} - \sqrt{\frac{p_a}{p_b} \beta^b}}{2} \right) e^{\mu_+ t}$$

$$- \delta \left[ \frac{1 - S_a}{\sqrt{\frac{p_a}{p_b} \beta^a}} + \frac{S_a}{\sqrt{\frac{p_a}{p_b} \beta^b}} \right] \left( \frac{\sqrt{\frac{p_a}{p_b} \beta^a} + \sqrt{\frac{p_a}{p_b} \beta^b}}{2} \right) e^{\mu_- t}.$$  

where

$$\mu_+ = -\lambda \left( 1 + \sqrt{\beta^a \beta^b} \right), \quad \mu_- = -\lambda \left( 1 - \sqrt{\beta^a \beta^b} \right)$$

and $S_a$ is the steady state market share of firm $a$.
Figure 2: $\beta^a$ and $\beta^b$ as a function of firm $a$’s market share $S_a$. The half-life of the heterogeneous economy is $\frac{1}{\lambda (1-\bar{\beta})}$, where the dashed black line shows $\bar{\beta}$.

Figure 2 shows how $\beta^a, \beta^b$ respond to permanent multiplicative demand shocks, once we solve the model as in section 5 below. Heterogeneity does not make a substantial difference at the aggregate level, as shown by the relatively flat black dashed line $\bar{\beta}$ that gives the equivalent half-life with symmetric firms. The reason is that there are two offsetting forces. As heterogeneity increases, firm $a$ with a larger market share responds more strongly to firm $b$’s price while firm $b$ becomes less responsive, consistent with the patterns documented by Amiti et al. (2019). This spread in $\beta$ decreases the dominant eigenvalue $\mu_-$ due to the concavity of $\sqrt{\beta^a \beta^b}$. However, the aggregate (sales-weighted) price index also puts more weight on firm $a$’s price, which is “more sticky”, as firm $a$ will not adjust by much if it gets to change its price first.

5 The Effects of Rising Concentration and other Comparative Statics

The sufficient static approach from the previous question answers the question: given the observed markups, concentration and demand elasticities, how is price stickiness affected?

In this section we seek to answer how stickiness would change when market concentration and other observables change. To do so, we take a more structural approach: instead of using the observed equilibrium markup as a sufficient statistic, we seek to solve for these variables given target elasticities. This allows us to
perform counterfactual analyses, and investigate in depth which factors cause the oligopolistic model to depart from the standard monopolistic model. We are particularly interested in the effect of a change in market concentration, captured by the number of firms $n$, as it is likely to affect both the markup and the residual demand elasticity that enter formula (4).

From now on, we assume that within-sector aggregation $H_s$ follows Kimball preferences: sectoral consumption $C_s$ is the unique solution to

$$\frac{1}{n_s} \sum_{i \in I_s} \phi_s \left( \frac{c_{i,s}}{C_s} \right) = 1$$

(9)

for some increasing, concave, function $\phi_s$ such that $\phi_s (1) = 1$. An important benchmark is the case where $\phi_s$ is a power function, in which case we obtain the standard CES aggregator across firms, i.e. $C_s = \left( \frac{1}{n_s} \sum_{i \in I_s} c_{i,s} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}}$.

5.1 Methodology

In general, solving for the steady state markup requires solving the full MPE. Since we want a solution for any number of firms, the state space can become very large. Indeed, the IO literature also acknowledges this challenge and employs approximate solution concepts such as “oblivious equilibria” (Weintraub, Benkard and Van Roy, 2008). Here we avoid the computational burden by approximating consumer’s utility in a way that generates an equilibrium that we can solve analytically. Crucially, our approximation leaves enough degrees of freedom to flexibly parametrize the elasticities of the demand system that can be estimated in practice.

Our construction is detailed in Appendix F, and the main idea is as follows. Our earlier sufficient statistic result stems from manipulating the envelope condition applied to the Bellman equation (40) to get rid of derivatives of the value function. The outcome is equation (3) that relates the steady state markup, the elasticity $\epsilon_i'$, and the first derivative $g'$ of the equilibrium strategy. Differentiating (40) further with respect to all its arguments will generate more such equations, that now relate the derivatives $g'$, $g''$, and so on, to the steady state markup, demand elasticity $\epsilon_i'$, superelasticity $\epsilon_{ii}'$, and so on. If we keep iterating, we obtain an infinite system of equations, and the standard interpretation treats the sequence of derivatives of $g$ as unknowns, and the sequence of higher-order elasticities (all evaluated at the steady
state) as parameters. Instead, we take the view that it is empirically impossible to know such fine properties of demand functions, since we can only estimate a finite number of elasticities. Acknowledging this limitation, we take a dual view of the infinite system of envelope equations: we treat higher order elasticities as flexible unknowns that can be perturbed to achieve some desired properties of the derivatives of $g$. In particular, we seek to simplify the characterization of equilibrium by making $g$ locally polynomial, meaning that all its derivatives higher than an arbitrary order vanish when evaluated at the steady state.

Formally, denote $\epsilon_{(k)}$ is the $k$th-own-superelasticity evaluated at a symmetric $\bar{p}$, i.e.,

$$
\epsilon_{(1)} = \frac{\partial \log d^i(p)}{\partial \log p_i}, \quad \epsilon_{(k)} = \frac{\partial \epsilon_{(k-1)}(p)}{\partial \log p_i} \quad \forall k \geq 2.
$$

**Proposition 6.** For any order of approximation $m \geq 1$ and target elasticities $(\epsilon_{(1)}, \ldots, \epsilon_{(m)})$, there exist Kimball within-sector preferences $\tilde{\phi}$ such that

(i) the resulting elasticities up to order $m$ match the target elasticities, and

(ii) any MPE of the game with within-sector preferences $\tilde{\phi}$, strategy $\tilde{g}$ and steady state $\tilde{p}$ satisfies $\tilde{g}^{(k)}(\tilde{p}) = 0$ for $k \geq m$.

**Remark 4.** Our approximation relates to the algorithm used in Krusell, Kuruscu and Smith (2002) and later called “Taylor projection” by Levintal (2018). Krusell et al. (2002)’s idea is to fix the parameters and approximate the unknown policy and value functions by polynomials of order $m$. Instead, we take the view that we lack reliable estimates of higher order elasticities that are taken as inputs to parametrize the game, and show that we can take them as unknowns instead of parameters in the infinite system of equations, while still matching the target elasticities up to order $m$.

In the remainder of the paper we will apply Proposition 6 in the case $m = 2$, which makes the game linear-quadratic. For given elasticity $\epsilon_i^j$ and superelasticity $\epsilon_{ii}$, we solve for the steady state price $\bar{p}$ and slope $\beta = \frac{\partial \bar{g}}{\partial \bar{p}_j}$ given a locally linear equilibrium.

---

10 In a microeconomic context, Jun and Vives (2004) studied a linear-quadratic dynamic duopoly with Bertrand and Cournot competition and quadratic adjustment costs in prices and quantities, focusing on how dynamics can amplify or reverse static strategic complementarities.
Corollary 1. In a locally linear equilibrium \((m = 2)\), \(\bar{p}\) and \(\beta\) solve the system of two equations:

\[
\beta = \frac{(\lambda + \rho) \Pi^i_i (\bar{p})}{\lambda (n - 2) \Pi^i_i (\bar{p}) - \lambda (n - 1) \Pi^j_j (\bar{p})}
\]

\[
0 = A_{ii} (\beta) \Pi^i_i (\bar{p}) + A_{ij} (\beta) \Pi^j_j (\bar{p}) + A_{jj} (\beta) \Pi^j_j (\bar{p}) + A_{jk} (\beta) \Pi^j_k (\bar{p})
\]

where \(A_{ii}, A_{ij}, A_{jj}, A_{jk}\) are given by system (39) in Appendix G.

Parametrizing the Two Dimensions of Demand. In what follows, we use Klenow and Willis (2016)'s functional form for the Kimball aggregator \(\phi_s\), which is simpler to define through its derivative

\[
\phi'_s(x) = \frac{\eta - 1}{\eta} \exp \left( \frac{1 - x^{\theta/\eta}}{\theta} \right). \tag{10}
\]

\(\eta\) and \(\theta\) control the elasticity and the superelasticity of demand, respectively: in the limit of monopolistic competition \(n \rightarrow \infty\), the demand own-elasticity \(\epsilon^i_i\) converges to \(-\eta\) and the ratio \(\epsilon^j_j/\epsilon^i_i\), named the “superelasticity” of demand by Klenow and Willis (2016), converges to \(\theta\). The limit \(\theta \rightarrow 0\) corresponds to a standard CES demand with \(\phi_s (x) = x^{\eta^{-1}}\).

With finite \(n\), the perceived elasticities also depend on \(n\) because firms face a residual demand that depends on the number of rivals they have, as is well known in the CES case studied by Atkeson and Burstein (2008). We generalize the CES expressions for perceived elasticities as a function of \(n\) to any Kimball aggregator in Appendix E, and also derive new expressions for the perceived superelasticities. In particular, with the functional form (10) we have:

\[
\epsilon^i_i = \frac{\partial \log d^i_i}{\partial \log p_i} = -\eta + \frac{\eta - 1}{n} \tag{11}
\]

\[
\epsilon^i_{ii} = \frac{\partial^2 \log d^i_i}{\partial \log p_i^2} = -\frac{n - 1}{n^2} \left[ (\eta - 1)^2 + (n - 2)\theta \eta \right]. \tag{12}
\]

These expressions imply a precise dependence on \(n\) for the elasticities \(\epsilon^i_i, \epsilon^i_{ii}\), but

\footnote{Recall that we set \(\omega = 1\); otherwise residual elasticities would be weighted averages of inner and outer elasticities, for instance \(\epsilon^i_i = - \left[ \frac{n - 1}{n} \eta + \frac{1}{n} \omega \right]\), which specializes to (11) with \(\omega = 1\).}
they stem from parametric assumptions made for tractability that have no particular empirical grounding. In section 5.3 we turn to a more general non-parametric model that controls the superelasticity $\epsilon_i^j(n)$ directly (which is isomorphic to letting $\theta$ depend on $n$ in (12)) to match the heterogeneity in idiosyncratic cost pass-through observed in the data.

5.2 Preferences

We first consider changes in steady state markups driven by preferences, holding market concentration (i.e., the number of firms $n$) fixed.

Changes in the Elasticity of Substitution $\eta$. We first highlight the importance of allowing for more than two firms in each sector. The duopoly model is a knife-edge case, because in sectors with only two firms, the steady state markup and the demand elasticity are related one-to-one, making it sufficient to know a single statistic, the markup, to infer the half-life of monetary shocks. In other words, CES demand systems are without loss of generality within the class of Kimball aggregators in the case $n = 2$, as can be seen from expression (12) (or equation (32) in Appendix E for a non-parametric formulation). When $n$ is above 2, however, CES demand is not without loss, and knowing the markup is not enough to infer the slope: we also need information on demand elasticities.

To illustrate this point, consider Figure 10, which shows the half-life as a function of the steady state markup. Variation in markups is produced through variation in the parameter $\eta$ that captures the within-sector elasticity of substitution; higher $\eta$ implies lower markups. When $n = 2$, the value of the superelasticity parameter $\theta$ does not matter, and we have a negative relation between the markup and the half-life. This pattern is also present in the duopoly model with menu costs of Mongey (2018). However, as soon as there are at least $n = 3$ firms, there is a crucial interaction between $\theta$ and $\eta$. When $\theta = 0$ (CES), we have the same negative relation as in the duopoly case, but with a high enough value of $\theta$, the half-life becomes negatively related to the steady state markup. We will provide an intuition behind this fact in section 6.

Changes in the Superelasticity Parameter $\theta$. A crucial difference between our framework and a monopolistically competitive economy is that the superelasticity
parameter $\theta$ can generate variations in the steady state markup $\bar{\mu}$ while keeping $\eta$ and hence the demand elasticity $(11)$ constant. Note that such an experiment that varies the markup while fixing the demand elasticity is impossible with a duopoly, as $\theta$ becomes irrelevant in $(12)$ when $n = 2$.

Figure 11 shows an example with the minimal number of firms $n = 3$ that allows $\theta$ to affect the steady state markup. The left panel shows that as $\theta$ increases, the markup under dynamic oligopoly rises. Multiple factors determine equilibrium markups, so variation in $\theta$ is the most transparent way to apply our formula $(4)$, as in that case a higher markup unambiguously implies a larger half-life, as on the right panel. In a model with monopolistic competition and Kimball (1995) demand, $\theta$ would also increase non-neutrality through complementarities in pricing, but would have no effect on the markup, hence markups would be uninformative about the strength of monetary policy. The link between markups and pass-through is a crucial difference between monopolistic models with variable markups and our oligopoly model. In the next sections, we will build on this distinction to calibrate the model to cost pass-through data and then define a precise notion of dynamic strategic complementarities under oligopoly.

5.3 Market Concentration

We now turn to our main counterfactual exercise, in which we study how changes in market concentration (the number of firms $n$ in a sector) affect the transmission of monetary policy. If we knew how our sufficient statistics changed with $n$, we could just plug them into $(4)$ and it would not be necessary to solve the model further. Absent this information, we need to make assumptions on how these statistics depend on $n$, for instance by taking a stand on what parameters to keep fixed when changing $n$. We start by holding “preferences” fixed, and exogenously shifting the number of firms and varieties. We then explore an alternative, using available evidence on pass-through from costs to prices, calibrating these preferences to the number of firms to match the available evidence.

**Exogenous Changes in Number of Firms.** We first interpret $\eta$ and $\theta$ in the Klenow and Willis (2016) functional form $(10)$ as structural parameters that are robust to changes in the number of firms and varieties. The remaining parameters are described in Table 1.
Table 1: Parameter values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
<td>Annual discount rate</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda$</td>
<td>Price changes per year</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\omega$</td>
<td>Cross-sector elasticity</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta$</td>
<td>Within-sector elasticity</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Higher market concentration in the sense of lower $n$ increases monetary non-neutrality in the CES case $\theta = 0$. In the duopoly $n = 2$ case that maximizes the impact of oligopolistic competition, the half-life under oligopoly is 40% higher than under monopolistic competition. The amplification decreases rapidly with $n$, however: with $n = 10$ firms it is around 10%. But as the blue line in Figure 3 shows, for high values of $\theta$ that generate strong demand complementarities and thus large effects of monetary policy under monopolistic competition $n \to \infty$, decreasing the number of firms in each sector can dampen monetary policy. In theory, this dampening effect can be arbitrarily large: the half-life under monopolistic competition is unbounded above when $\theta$ increases, but the half-life under duopoly is invariant to $\theta$, and thus always the same as with CES demand. This example shows that there is no guarantee that oligopolistic competition generates more non-neutrality than monopolistic competition: the direction of the effect depends on finer properties of demand systems, in particular how concentration affects the superelasticity of demand. We show below how to infer these properties from available pass-through estimates.

A Calibration Based on Pass-Through. Previously, we fixed preference parameters and changed the number of firms. We now provide an alternative that recalibrates other parameters as we change the number of firms. In particular, the shape of demand is crucial to understand how market structure impacts the transmission of monetary shocks, which affect all firms at the same time. As Atkeson and Burstein (2008) emphasized in a static setting, changes in residual demand also link market structure and the pass-through of own cost shocks, hereafter simply “pass-through”. We now argue that the most recent and detailed pass-through estimates imply that market concentration significantly amplifies monetary non-neutrality.\footnote{Computing counterfactuals necessarily requires assumptions, and this recalibration strategy can be justified in two ways. First, we can assume that if a sector becomes more concentrated due to its}
Amiti et al. (2019) find considerable heterogeneity in pass-through. Small firms behave as under a CES monopolistic competition benchmark, passing through own marginal cost shocks fully (and thus maintaining a constant markup) while not reacting to competitors’ price changes orthogonal to their own cost. Large firms exhibit substantial strategic complementarities: they only pass through around half of their own cost shocks, thus letting their markup decline to absorb the other half. Amiti et al. (2019) show that this pattern is consistent with a static model of oligopolistic competition a la Atkeson and Burstein (2008). Importantly, they argue that with nested CES demand, Cournot competition can match the degree of heterogeneity in pass-through but Bertrand competition cannot. As already remarked by Krugman (1986) in his seminal paper on pricing-to-market, under the nested CES assumption, Bertrand and Cournot competition both imply qualitatively that the elasticity of residual demand declines with market share, but quantitatively, Bertrand competition implies only a mild decline relative to Cournot.

We argued above that an increase in concentration (lower $n$) can dampen or amplify monetary policy transmission once we depart from nested CES systems. For the same reasons, in a static oligopolistic model with more general demand, an increase in market share holding industry concentration fixed could dampen or firms growing larger, then these firms’ idiosyncratic cost pass-through becomes similar to the pass-through of large firms currently observed in other sectors. Second, we can assume that aggregate concentration increases due to concentrated sectors becoming larger in a way that preserves within-sector demand (and thus pass-through).

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See also Berman, Martin and Mayer (2012), who show that the pass-through of exchange rates to export prices is lower for larger firms.
amplify pass-through. Reinterpreting Amiti et al. (2019)’s estimates within our dynamic model, we show that the empirical pattern of heterogeneity is consistent with a large superelasticity for large firms, and a small superelasticity for small firms. Our results also highlight that the distinction between Cournot and Bertrand is only meaningful under the CES restriction. With more general preferences, Bertrand models, which are more common to model price-setting in macroeconomics, can also match the sharp decline in pass-through.

Rewrite (1) as allowing for permanent cost shocks:

\[(\rho + n\lambda) V^i (p, mc) = \Pi^i (p, mc_i) + \lambda \sum_j V^i (g_j (p_{-j}, mc), p_{-j}, mc) \]  

(13)

where as usual \(mc = (mc_i, mc_{-i})\) is the vector of marginal costs. Pass-through, defined in logs as in the empirical literature, is

\[\alpha = \frac{c_i \partial g_i}{p_i \partial c_i}\]

and can be computed following the same envelope arguments as before. It is actually possible to express \(\alpha\) in non-parametric closed form as a function of \(n\), the markup and the elasticity, just like in our sufficient statistic formula (4) for \(\beta\); however the expression is more complex and does not bring particular insight, so we directly describe the results.

When studying the relation between market share and pass-through, we vary \(n\) and maintain the symmetry assumption, so that the number of firms is the only source of variation in market share. The results would be very similar with variation in market share stemming from within-sector heterogeneity instead. Indeed, under static Bertrand or Cournot competition, market share is a sufficient statistic for pass-through: a large firm with a given market share passes through its costs to its prices in the same way whether it faces many small competitors or a few large ones. The same insight applies quantitatively in the dynamic model: Figure 12 shows that pass-through as a function of market share is essentially the same, whether variation in market share comes from varying the number \(n\) of symmetric firms, or from heterogeneity among a fixed number of firms.

Remark 5. Amiti et al. (2019) also provide direct estimates of strategic complementarities, defined as the coefficient \(\gamma\) of a firm’s price change on its competitors’ price
change, controlling for own cost change:

\[
\Delta p_{it} = \alpha \Delta mc_{it} + \gamma \Delta p_{-it} + \epsilon_{it}
\]

In a static oligopoly model, the regression coefficient \(\gamma\) corresponds exactly to the slope of the firm’s best response function. In a dynamic model, however, estimates \(\gamma\) do not directly reveal the slopes \(\beta\) that enter the transitional dynamics (7), even when looking at long-run price changes. The discrepancy between \(\gamma\) and \(\beta\) stems from the fact that competitors’ (current) prices \(p_{-i}\) are not a sufficient statistic for firm \(i\)’s reaction \(g_i\) in the presence of cost shocks: as can be seen in the Bellman equation (13), competitors’ costs \(mc_{-i}\) matter independently for the value \(V^i\), even though they do not affect the flow profit \(\Pi^i\). Intuitively, competitors’ costs affect how they will change their own prices \(p_{-i}\) in the future, hence enter firm \(i\)’s decision when it gets to reset \(p_i\). Viewed through the lens of our model, estimates of strategic complementarities \(\gamma\) could be used as alternative targets in the calibration. We use estimates of own cost pass-through \(\alpha\) because they are a more widely studied empirical object.

**Results.** Figure 4 displays pass-through, computed in the dynamic model, under three specifications for within-sector demand. “AIK” is our baseline calibration: the superelasticity varies as a function of \(n\) through a variable parameter \(\theta(n)\) (defined as in (12)) so as to match the relationship between market share and pass-through in a static Cournot model with \(\eta = 10\) which, Amiti et al. (2019) argue, provides a good fit to their Belgian data. In “KW”, \(\theta\) is fixed at 10 as in Klenow and Willis (2016) and in standard DSGE calibration such as Smets and Wouters (2007). In “CES” \(\theta\) is fixed at 0. In all cases, \(\eta\) equals 10, a common benchmark in the literature since Atkeson and Burstein (2008).

We hold \(\eta\) fixed to focus the discussion on how pass-through and hence the residual superelasticity of demand changes with concentration, but there is no reason for the residual elasticity itself to vary exactly as in (11). Ideally, one would obtain non-parametric estimates of \(\epsilon^1_{ij}(n)\) and \(\epsilon^2_{ii}(n)\) from matching jointly the relation of markups and pass-through with market shares. However, there is no direct counterpart to Amiti et al. (2019), in part because markups are notably harder to estimate than pass-through. In the model with constant \(\eta = 10\), going from \(n = 4\) to 5 firms decreases prices by around 2%, which is broadly consistent with the evidence.
Figure 4: Pass-through as a function of market share $1/n$. AIK: variable superelasticity to match heterogeneity in pass-through from Amiti et al. (2019). KW: Fixed $\theta = 10$. CES: Fixed $\theta = 0$. In all cases, $\eta = 10$.

Figure 5: Half-life as a function of number of firms $n$. AIK: variable superelasticity to match heterogeneity in pass-through from Amiti et al. (2019). KW: Fixed $\theta = 10$. CES: Fixed $\theta = 0$. In all cases, $\eta = 10$. 
in Atkin, Faber and Gonzalez-Navarro (2018) and Busso and Galiani (2019). Recent work by Burstein, Carvalho and Grassi (2020) examines the relation between market shares and markups at the firm and sectoral levels. They find that a linear regression of the inverse markup against the sectoral HHI yields a coefficient of $-0.44$. In our dynamic model, the corresponding coefficient is $-0.27$ and gets closer to their estimate than a CES model, which would yield $-0.15$. Allowing $\eta$ to increase with $n$ instead of fixing $\eta = 10$ would improve the fit further.

Figure 6 shows that under the calibration consistent with the micro evidence on pass-through, a rise in national concentration corresponding to an increase in the average Herfindahl index $1/n$ from 0.05 to 0.1, reflecting the observed trends since 1990 in e.g. Gutiérrez and Philippon (2017), amplifies the real effects of monetary policy by around 15%. Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2020), however, argue that rising national concentration goes hand in hand with an even stronger decline in local concentration, as the entry of large firms in local markets increases local competition but also these firms’ national market share. An interesting open question is then which level of geographic or economic aggregation (what we call “sectors” $s$) is most relevant for the competition that determines consumer price inflation. If, for instance, competition at the county level matters the most and the local HHI has fallen from 0.15 to 0.05, in line with the evidence from Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2020), then our results would suggest that the half-life of monetary shocks has fallen substantially, by around 25%.
5.4 Frequency of Price Changes

**Steady State Markups.** Another important feature captured by the dynamic oligopoly model is that the frequency of price changes $\lambda$ can affect steady state markups and pass-throughs. Figure 13 shows that markups increase with $\lambda$, and more so for low $n$. Together with the effect of the superelasticity in section 5.2, this finding confirms that equilibrium markups are complex objects that depend on many features of the environment beyond residual demand elasticities, something that dynamic monopolistic competition models ($n = \infty, 0 < \lambda \leq \infty$) and static oligopolistic models ($n < \infty, \lambda = 0$) fail to capture. Yet recall that when observed, markups can be used as sufficient statistic in Proposition 1 exactly because we do not need to know exactly where they come from.

In the limit $\lambda \to 0$, the dynamic oligopoly game converges to the static game, both in terms of steady state markup and reaction function: as prices become infinitely sticky, firms play the one-shot best-response, and so the equilibrium is the static Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. When prices are fully flexible (which could be viewed as the case $\lambda = \infty$), firms play the same static Bertrand-Nash equilibrium repeatedly at each instant. But surprisingly, the limit of infinitely frequent price changes $\lambda \to \infty$ does not equal the frictionless (flexible price) model. This type of discontinuity in the limit of infinitely flexible prices has been noted in other contexts, such as quadratic Rotemberg adjustment costs in Jun and Vives (2004).

**Heterogeneous Frequency of Price Changes and Monetary Policy Transmission.** The effect of the frequency of price changes on markups and therefore reaction functions is magnified in the presence of sector heterogeneity in $\lambda$. Several papers have documented correlations between frequency of price changes and market structure. Most recently, Mongey (2018) shows that price changes are less frequent in more concentrated wholesale markets. Given that market shares and pass-through are negatively correlated, this fact is also consistent with Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010), who show price changes are less frequent for goods with a lower long-run exchange rate pass-through. Models with menu costs such as those proposed in these papers provide a microfoundation for the effect of concentration on price flexibility. Although our Calvo framework does not endogenize these correlations, interesting insights still arise from taking these correlations as given, by letting $\lambda_s$ in sector $s$ vary with the number of firms $n_s$ and deriving implications for the aggregate effects.
of monetary policy.

We have shown that in our baseline calibration “AIK” defined in section 5.3, higher concentration increases the half-life for a given frequency of price changes. For instance, the half-life of the price level in sectors with an effective number of firms \( n = 3 \) is more than twice the average time between price changes. Moreover, concentration matters a lot if prices do not change frequently (low \( \lambda \), long price duration) but it makes little difference if prices are very flexible. Generalizing (8), the cumulative output effect for a monetary shock of size \( \delta \) is:

\[
\frac{\delta}{\sigma} \times \left\{ \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{1}{\lambda_s} \right] \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{1}{1 - (n_s - 1)\beta_s} \right] + \text{Cov} \left( \frac{1}{\lambda_s}, \frac{1}{1 - (n_s - 1)\beta_s} \right) \right\}. 
\]

(14)

More concentrated sectors feature a higher slope \( (n_s - 1)\beta_s \) hence if they are also characterized by a higher price duration \( \frac{1}{\lambda_s} \), then the term \( \text{Cov} \left( \frac{1}{\lambda_s}, \frac{1}{1 - (n_s - 1)\beta_s} \right) \) is positive, and thus contributes to increases non-neutrality further relative to a case with homogeneous frequency of price changes across sectors. This amplification effect is specific to the oligopoly model, and differs from the role of heterogeneity under monopolistic competition, e.g., in Carvalho (2006) under Calvo pricing or Nakamura and Steinsson (2010) under menu costs. Even under monopolistic competition and CES demand, the cumulative output effect \( \frac{\delta}{\sigma} \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{1}{\lambda_s} \right] \) is convex in the sectoral frequencies \( \{\lambda_s\} \), hence non-neutrality is amplified relative to a homogeneous economy that matches the average frequency \( \mathbb{E} [\lambda_s] \). We point out an additional effect stemming from the empirical positive correlation between concentration and price duration.

6 Inspecting the Mechanism: Strategic Behavior vs. Atomistic Feedback a la Kimball

The presence of a finite number of firms has two distinct effects on competition and pricing incentives: “feedback effects” capture the fact that each firm cares about its rivals’ current and future prices when setting its price; “strategic effects” capture instead the fact that each firm realizes its current pricing decision can affect how its rivals will set their prices in the future. Feedback effects are what the literature with monopolistic competition calls strategic complementarities in pricing, that could arise from variable markups as in our setting, or other channels such as interme-
diately inputs or decreasing returns in production. The decomposition we propose is only meaningful under oligopoly, because under monopolistic competition, no single firm can affect the sectoral price index hence strategic effects are nil.

We disentangle the two effects through the lens of a “non-strategic” model. For each \( n \), the associated non-strategic model is an economy with monopolistic competition \( (n = \infty) \) and modified Kimball preferences that match the residual demand elasticity and superelasticity of the oligopolistic model with Kimball preferences \( \phi \) and \( n \) firms.\(^{14}\) The non-strategic model captures all the feedback (which in our context only arises from properties of the demand system), while suppressing strategic effects thanks to the monopolistic competition assumption.

We compute the half-life \( \tilde{hl}(n) \) of this non-strategic model, and then define strategic effects in the MPE as the increase in the half-life (relative to \( 1/\lambda \), the half-life in the standard New Keynesian model with monopolistic competition and CES demand) not explained by the non-strategic model:

\[
\frac{hl(n)}{1/\lambda} = \frac{\tilde{hl}(n)}{1/\lambda} \times \frac{hl(n)}{\tilde{hl}(n)}.
\]

As \( n \) goes to infinity, \( hl/\tilde{hl} \) goes to 1 and the strategic effect disappears; what is left is the standard feedback effect that can stem from a Kimball (1995) demand with positive superelasticity.

### 6.1 The Non-Strategic Model

The steady state price of the non-strategic model is the static Bertrand-Nash price \( p^{NE} \), that solves \( \Pi_i(p^{NE}) = 0 \). We look for a symmetric equilibrium where, to first order, each resetting firm \( i \) sets \( p_i^*(t) = \tilde{\beta} \sum_{j \neq i} p_j(t) \). When it resets, given other firms’ strategies \( \tilde{\beta} \), firm \( i \) chooses \( p_i^*(t) \) to maximize

\[
\mathbb{E}_t \left[ \int_t^\infty e^{-(\lambda+\rho)(s-t)} \Pi_i(p_i^*(t), p_{-i}(t+s)) ds \right].
\]

\(^{14}\)This non-strategic model also has a behavioral interpretation. Suppose that all firms are non-strategic in the following sense: when resetting their price, they form correct expectations about the stochastic process governing their competitors’ future prices, but incorrectly assume that their own price-setting will have no effect on those competitors’ future prices.
The key difference with the MPE defined by the Bellman equation (1) is that here, firm \( i \) treats the evolution of rivals’ prices as exogenous to its choice \( p_i^* \). Define

\[
\Gamma_n = \frac{(n - 1) \Pi_{ij}}{-\Pi_{ii}}
\]

\( \Gamma_n \) is a measure of static feedback effects: it is the slope of the best response of a firm to a simultaneous price change by all its competitors in a static Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. Under static monopolistic competition, \( \Gamma_\infty/(1 - \Gamma_\infty) \) is known as the markup elasticity (Gopinath and Itskhoki, 2010) (as it measures the elasticity of a firm’s desired markup to its own relative price) or responsiveness (Berger and Vavra, 2019). In Appendix D we show the following:

**Proposition 7.** The half-life of the aggregate price level in the non-strategic equilibrium is

\[
\tilde{hl}(n) = \frac{1}{\lambda \left( 1 - \left( \frac{\rho + 2\lambda}{2\lambda} \right) \left[ 1 - \sqrt{1 - \frac{4\lambda(\rho + \lambda)}{(\rho + 2\lambda)^2} \Gamma_n} \right] \right)}.
\]

(15)

We can reexpress \( \Gamma_n \) around the Nash markup in terms of the demand elasticities \( e_i^i = \frac{\partial \log d_i}{\partial \log p_i} \) and \( e_{ii}^i = \frac{\partial^2 \log d_i}{\partial \log p_i^2} \) as:

\[
\Gamma_n = \frac{e_{ij}^i(n)}{e_{ii}^i(n)} - e_i^i(n) - 1.
\]

(16)

In the standard CES case, as \( n \) goes to infinity and the model converges to monopolistic competition, \( \frac{e_{ij}^i(n)}{e_{ii}^i(n)} \) goes to 0 hence \( \tilde{hl} \) converges to \( 1/\lambda \). Away from CES, \( \Gamma \) can converge to a positive limit. With a finite number of firms, even CES demand implies \( \frac{e_{ij}^i(n)}{e_{ii}^i(n)} > 0 \) and thus \( \tilde{hl} > 1/\lambda \).

**Comparative Statics.** The effect of oligopoly on monetary policy transmission is transparent in the non-strategic model, as it is entirely captured by \( \Gamma_n \) that we can compute in closed form. When \( \Gamma_n > 0 \), a higher own price leads to more elastic demand and thus a lower desired markup; this force, known as “Marshall’s second law of demand”, increases with \( \Gamma_n \). In turn, (15) shows that higher \( \Gamma_n \) increases the feedback effect.

We can now see that the behavior of \( \Gamma_n \) plays a large part our earlier findings
in section 5.2. Recall that in the Klenow and Willis (2016) specification, $e_i^i$ and $e_{ii}^i$ are given by (11) and (12), respectively. Thus $\Gamma_n$ decreases with the elasticity of substitution $\eta$ (and thus the observed markup) if and only if

$$\theta < \frac{n}{n - 2} \times \frac{(\eta - 1)^2}{1 + (n - 1) \eta^2},$$

which explains why, in Figure 10, the half-life is decreasing in the markup $\bar{\mu}$ under CES but not when $\theta$ is high enough.

Similarly, we can use the non-strategic model to understand how concentration affects the half-life. As shown numerically in Figure 3, this depends again on the value of $\theta$. Indeed, feedback $\Gamma_n$ is decreasing in $n$ (increasing in concentration) if and only if

$$\theta < \frac{(\eta - 1)^2}{\eta + 1}.$$

In theory, insights based on the non-strategic model could fail to be valid in the full MPE, due to sufficiently strong strategic effects that work in the opposite direction. But as we show next, we find that strategic effects $hl/\tilde{hl}$ are quantitatively modest.
6.2 Measuring Strategic Effects

While strategic effects are important determinants of steady state markups, as we saw in Figure 11, we find that quantitatively, they do not explain much of the aggregate response to monetary shocks under oligopoly. Figure 7 displays the strategic effect, defined as $\frac{h_l(n)}{\tilde{h}_l(n)}$, as $n$ varies. We contrast our baseline calibration “AIK” with variable superelasticity (defined in section 5.3) with the CES case and a Kimball demand with fixed $\theta = 10$ “KW” (as in Klenow and Willis 2016). There is an interaction between strategic effects and feedback effects: strategic effects are considerably stronger in the “AIK” calibration, which features stronger feedback effects as well. This interaction is intuitive: the only reason a firm acts strategically is that its price will have a feedback effect on competitors when they get to reset their prices. Yet in all specifications, strategic effects are negligible as the half-life is always less than 5% higher than the non-strategic half-life. Consistent with their definition, strategic effects vanish as $n$ grows and the economy approaches monopolistic competition: they fall below 1% when $n$ exceeds 6.

Overall, our results suggest that oligopolistic competition can significantly amplify or dampen the real effects of monetary shocks, but primarily through “feedback effects”, that is changes in residual demand elasticities as measured by $\Gamma_n$. While this implies that a simpler model of oligopolistic that abstracts away from strategic interactions goes a long way in explaining the economy’s response to monetary shocks, this quantitative conclusion can only be reached after formulating and solving the fully strategic model. Moreover, in the next section we show that strategic effects can play a much more important role once we generalize the model to more complex monetary policy experiments.

7 A Three-Equation Oligopolistic New Keynesian Model

We focused so far on the dynamics following a permanent monetary shock, under the Golosov and Lucas (2007) assumptions (6). In this section we take a step closer to the New Keynesian framework. We leverage our perturbation argument from section 5.1 further, to allow for general preferences as well as non-stationary dynamics. The main payoff is an oligopolistic Phillips curve that maps any path of future real marginal cost shocks to current inflation, and can be embedded in a standard DSGE model once combined with an Euler equation and a monetary policy rule.
7.1 The Oligopolistic Phillips Curve

Denote \( k(t) = \log MC(t) - \log P(t) \) the log real marginal cost. In Appendix H we show the following. In this section we denote \( i(t) \) the nominal interest rate.

**Proposition 8.** There exists a \( q \times q \) matrix \( A \) with \( q \leq 7 \) that depends on the steady state demand elasticities, markup and slope \( \beta \) (described in Appendix H) such that inflation follows

\[
\pi(t) = \int_0^\infty \gamma_k(s) k(t+s) \, ds + \int_0^\infty \gamma_c(s) c(t+s) \, ds + \int_0^\infty \gamma_i(s) (i(t+s) - \rho) \, ds
\]

(17)

where for each variable \( x \in \{k, c, i\} \), \( \gamma^x(s) \) is a linear combination of \( \{e^{-v_j s}\}_{j=1}^q \) with \( \{v_j\}_{j=1}^q \) the eigenvalues of \( A \), e.g.,

\[
\gamma^k(s) = \sum_{j=1}^q \gamma^k_j e^{-v_j s}
\]

for some constants \( \{\gamma^k_j\}_{j=1}^q \).

In general \( q = 7 \) but under condition (45) in Appendix H, which we assume in what follows, \( q \) can be reduced to 3. Under monopolistic competition, even with Kimball preferences parametrized by \( \Gamma \) (as in section 6), there is a single eigenvalue \( v_1 = \rho \) instead of three, and \( \gamma^c = \gamma^i = 0 \), and the Phillips curve in integral form is simply

\[
\pi(t) = \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho s} (1 - \Gamma) \lambda (\lambda + \rho) k(t+s) \, ds.
\]

(18)

The slope of the Phillips curve is usually defined as the coefficient \( \gamma^k(0) \) that captures how inflation reacts to current marginal cost. It is equal to \( \lambda (\lambda + \rho) (1 - \Gamma) \) under monopolistic competition: higher feedback effects \( \Gamma \) flatten the Phillips curve, but are isomorphic to a higher degree of stickiness \( \lambda \).

In the case of oligopolistic competition, inflation is also determined by a weighted average of future marginal costs, with two important differences. First, there are multiple eigenvalues. Second, inflation depends on more than future marginal costs, as the second sum in (17) relates current inflation to future consumption and nominal interest rates. In the standard New Keynesian model, real marginal costs capture all the forces that influence price setting. Here, consumption and in-
Interest rates have an independent first-order effect because they alter the strategic complementarities between firms, as in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). These two differences imply that oligopoly is not equivalent to a higher stickiness parameter \( \lambda \). As with our earlier permanent money supply shocks, we can compare (17) to a “non-strategic” Phillips curve that corresponds to a monopolistic competitive economy with Kimball preferences that match the elasticity and superelasticity of the oligopolistic economy, characterized by (18) with \( \Gamma = \Gamma_n \) given in (16).

We can also get an equivalent scalar ordinary high-order differential equation for inflation:

**Corollary 2.** Inflation \( \pi \) solves a third-order ODE

\[
3 \sum_{j=0}^{3} \gamma_j^{\pi} \frac{d^j \pi}{dt^j} + 2 \sum_{j=0}^{2} \left( \gamma_j^{k} \frac{d^j k}{dt^j} + \gamma_j^{c} \frac{d^j c}{dt^j} + \gamma_j^{i} \frac{d^j i}{dt^j} \right) = 0.
\]

(19)

with weights \( \{\gamma_j^{\pi}, \gamma_j^{k}, \gamma_j^{c}, \gamma_j^{i}\} \) defined in (46) in Appendix H, and boundary conditions \( \frac{d^j \pi(t)}{dt^j} \rightarrow 0 \) as \( t \rightarrow \infty \) for all \( j = 0, 1, 2 \).

Numerically, it turns out that the oligopolistic Phillips curve (19) is essentially a second-order ODE. For instance, for \( n = 3 \), under the AIK calibration and other parameters as in Table 1, we have

\[
\dot{\pi} = 0.08 \pi - 0.2k + 0.37 \dot{k} + 1.53 \ddot{\pi} + 0.03 (i - \rho).
\]

(20)
The corresponding non-strategic Phillips curve and the standard CES Phillips curve under the same parameters are respectively

\[ \dot{\pi} = 0.05\pi - 0.17k, \quad (21) \]
\[ \dot{\pi} = 0.05\pi - 1.05k. \quad (22) \]

Relative to (21), the oligopolistic Phillips curve (20) features (i) more discounting, (ii) inflation persistence in the term \(1.53\dot{\pi}\), and (iii) a term that resembles an endogenous “cost-push” shock

\[ u = - \left[ 0.37k + 0.03 (i - \rho) \right]. \quad (23) \]

We study next how these differences can generate significant differences between the oligopoly model and Kimball monopolistic competition, that is, significant strategic effects.

### 7.2 Three Equations Model

We can now analyze a three-equation New Keynesian model that combines the oligopolistic Phillips curve (19) with an Euler equation

\[ \dot{c} = \sigma^{-1} (i - \pi - r^m), \]

and a monetary policy rule

\[ i = \kappa\rho + (1 - \kappa) r^m + \phi \pi + e^m, \]

where \(r^m(t) = \rho + e^r(t)\) is the natural real interest rate and \(e^m(t)\) is a monetary shock. For simplicity, agents have perfect foresight over the shocks \(e^r, e^m\).

**Calibration.** Wages are flexible, technology is linear in labor \(Y = \ell\) and households have preferences \(\frac{C^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} - \frac{\ell^{1+\psi}}{1+\psi}\), hence \(k = (\psi + \sigma) c\). We set standard values of \(\sigma^{-1} = 1\) for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (as in our monetary shock experiments), \(\psi^{-1} = 0.5\) for the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and \(\phi \pi = 1.5\) for the Taylor rule coefficient on inflation. \(1 - \kappa\) measures how well the central bank is able to track the natural rate; \(\kappa\) can be thought of as monetary policy inertia. We set \(\kappa = 0.8\).
Figure 9: Impact effect of a $\epsilon^m_0 = -1\%$ monetary shock on consumption $c(0)$ (log-deviation from steady state) as a function of number of firms $n$. AIK: variable superelasticity to match heterogeneity in pass-through from Amiti et al. (2019). KW: Fixed $\theta = 10$. CES: Fixed $\theta = 0$. In all cases, $\eta = 10$.

**One-time Shocks.** Consider first geometrically decaying unanticipated shocks

$$e^m(t) = \epsilon^m_0 e^{-\xi t}, \quad e^r(t) = \epsilon^r_0 e^{-\xi t}$$

with the same decay $\xi$ (a particular case being only one type of shock). It is a standard result in the literature (Woodford, 2003) that under monopolistic competition, all the equilibrium variables are proportional to $e^{-\xi t}$. The same applies to the oligopolistic model, hence all the differences between economies are summarized by the impact effect, e.g. $c(t) = c(0) e^{-\xi t}$ and the cumulative output effect is $c(0)/\xi$. This contrasts with the case of permanent money supply shocks, for which impact effects were common to all economies and differences were summarized by the half-life.

Figure 9 displays the impact effect on consumption $c(0)$ for a 100 bps monetary shock $\epsilon^m_0 = -0.01$ with $\xi = 1$. The message is consistent with what we found for permanent shocks to the money supply: concentration amplifies monetary non-neutrality by a significant amount. As Figure 14 shows, a large part of the amplification can again be explained by feedback effects. Denoting $\tilde{c}(0)$ the initial consumption jump in the monopolistic Kimball economy calibrated to match the parameter $\Gamma_n$ for each $n$, we find that $c(0)$ is actually lower than $\tilde{c}(0)$ (so that “strategic effects” are not amplifying) and can deviate from $\tilde{c}(0)$ by around 5% when $n = 3$. 

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More General Shocks. The one-time shocks are not without loss of generality. For instance, the common exponential decay leaves no room for the endogenous cost-push shocks (23) to generate different inflation persistence across models.

Once we allow for a more general process for shocks, there are also meaningful differences between the oligopolistic economy and the non-strategic economy. Consider for instance paths for real and monetary shocks generated from an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process (a continuous-time version of AR(1) processes)

\[ d\epsilon = -a\epsilon + \sigma dZ \]

where \( Z \) in a standard Brownian motion, and \( a, \sigma > 0 \) parametrize the speed of mean-reversion and variance of the shocks, respectively.\(^{15}\) We set \( a = 0.3, \sigma = 0.01 \). Note that we are still assuming perfect foresight about the path, as in the case of exponentially decaying shocks. Here we see that the standard deviations of inflation and consumption are smaller in the oligopolistic model than in the corresponding non-strategic model. The higher-order terms in the oligopolistic Phillips curve smooth out the path for inflation, which in turn makes the real rate and consumption less volatile. This example demonstrates that the strong equivalence between oligopoly and Kimball economies that we observe in the case of the literature’s benchmark shocks (permanent money supply shocks and exponentially decaying interest rate shocks) does not necessarily transpose to more general processes.

8 Conclusion

In this paper, we studied how oligopolistic competition affects monetary policy transmission. We derived a closed-form formula for the response of aggregate output to monetary shocks as a function of three measurable sufficient statistics: demand elasticities, market concentration, and markups. Under our calibration, oligopolistic competition amplifies monetary non-neutrality, but, in the case of the standard shocks to money supply or interest rates studied in the literature, the response approximates a monopolistic competition model with Kimball demand that matches the residual demand elasticity and superelasticity of the oligopolistic model.

This does not imply, however, that oligopoly is isomorphic to monopolistic com-

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\(^{15}\)Technically we also multiply \( \epsilon \) by a very slow exponential decay to ensure that the economy converges towards the deterministic steady state as \( t \to \infty \).
petition. First, a unique prediction of our model is the link between markups and subtle properties of demand functions such as superelasticities. Under monopolistic competition, superelasticities affect cost pass-through and thus monetary policy, but are irrelevant for markups. Under oligopolistic competition, higher superelasticities raise both markups and cost pass-through. Other factors, such as the frequency of price changes, also affect markups and pass-through: we discuss new implications for the role of sectoral heterogeneity in the transmission of monetary policy. Second, in the context of our three-equations oligopolistic New Keynesian model that allows for more general shocks and non-stationary dynamics, we find that the oligopolistic model can depart significantly from the recalibrated monopolistic model. In particular, the oligopolistic Phillips curve features a form of endogenous inflation persistence (or equivalently, endogenous cost-push shocks) that does not matter with standard shocks, but plays a role once we allow for richer dynamics.

Our calibration relies on estimates of exchange rate pass-through, as we believe they are the most relevant sources of information when studying strategic interactions. In the menu costs literature, it is more common to target moments of the distribution of price changes. The open economy literature on pass-through and the closed economy monetary literature have thus evolved mostly in parallel, with different conclusions regarding the strength of strategic complementarities in pric-
ing. Our framework provides a natural way to reconcile these two strands: larger firms have more market power, only pass through a fraction of their idiosyncratic shocks, but drive most of the aggregate price stickiness. An interesting avenue for future empirical work would be to analyze how the distribution of price changes itself depends on firm size and market share.
References


Appendix
For Online Publication

A  Additional Figures

Figure 10: Half-life as a function of resulting steady state markup when $\eta$ varies.

Figure 11: Markup and half-life when $\theta$ varies in a model with $n = 3$ and $\eta = 10$. 
Figure 12: Pass-through as a function of market share under CES. Black line: market share varies through the number $n = 2, 3, \ldots$ of symmetric firms (black). Gray dashed line: market share varies through heterogeneity in productivity among a fixed number $n = 4$ of firms.

Figure 13: Steady state markup as a function of frequency of price changes $\lambda$. Dashed lines: static Bertrand-Nash equilibrium markups.
Figure 14: Impact effect of a $\epsilon_{0}^{m} = -1\%$ monetary shock on consumption relative to non-strategic model $c(0) / \tilde{c}(0)$ as a function of number of firms $n$ under AIK calibration.
B Stationary Dynamics after a Permanent $M$ shock

If the consumer maximizes
\[
\int e^{-\rho t} \left[ \frac{C(t)^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} - \frac{N(t)^{1+\psi}}{1+\psi} + \frac{m(t)^{1-\chi}}{1-\chi} \right] dt
\]
we have
\[
\frac{\dot{C}(t)}{C(t)} = \frac{1}{\sigma} (i(t) - \pi(t) - \rho)
\]
\[
N(t)^\psi C(t)^\sigma = \frac{W(t)}{P(t)} \Rightarrow \psi \frac{\dot{N}(t)}{N(t)} = \frac{\dot{W}(t)}{W(t)} - i(t) + \rho
\]
\[
M(t)^{-\chi} P(t)^{\chi} C(t)^\sigma = i(t)
\]

We look for an equilibrium with constant nominal interest rate $i(t) = i$ and nominal wage $W(t) = W$ following a permanent shock to $M$. Suppose $\psi = 0$ then we get
\[
\frac{\dot{W}(t)}{W(t)} = i - \rho
\]
To get constant wage $W(t) = W$ we need $i = \rho$ (this is necessary, otherwise we would get permanent wage inflation). The constant wage implies
\[
P(t) C(t)^\sigma = W
\]
Then the third equation gives
\[
\rho M^\chi = P(t)^\chi C(t)^\sigma
\]
So we need $\chi = 1$ for our guess to be indeed an equilibrium.

The representative consumer’s expenditure in sector $s$ at time $t$ is
\[
E_s(t) = P_s(t)^{1-\omega} [C(t) P(t)^{\omega}]
\]
where $P(t)$ is the aggregate price level $(\int_s P_s(t)^{1-\omega} ds)^{\frac{1}{1-\omega}}$ hence the real demand vector in sector $s$ is (given our within-sector CRS assumption as in Kimball)
\[
D \left( \{ p_{j,s}(t) \} , E_s(t) \right) = D \left( \{ p_{j,s}(t) \} , 1 \right) P_s(t)^{1-\omega} C(t) P(t)^{\omega}
\]
where \( P_s \) is the sectoral price index. Denote the function of prices in sector \( s \) only

\[
d \left( \{ p_{j,s} \} \right) = D \left( \{ p_{j,s} \}, 1 \right) P_s^{1-\omega}
\]

The nominal profit of firm \( i \) in sector \( s \) given all the other prices in the economy is

\[
d^i (p_{i,s}, p_{-i,s}) C(t) P(t)^{\omega} \left[ p_{i,s} - MC^i(t) \right]
\]

where \( p_{-i,s} = \{ p_{j,s} \}_{j \neq i} \). Thus the real profit is

\[
d^i (p_{i,s}, p_{-i,s}) C(t) P(t)^{\omega-1} \left[ p_{i,s} - MC^i(t) \right]
\]

Firm \( i \) maximizes the present discounted value of real profits using Arrow-Debreu SDF, that is

\[
\int e^{-\rho t} C(t)^{-\sigma} d^i (p_{i,s}, p_{-i,s}) C(t) P(t)^{\omega-1} \left[ p_{i,s} - MC^i(t) \right]
\]

so with \( \sigma = 1 \) and \( \omega = 1 \), firms can ignore the behavior of aggregate variables \( P(t) \) and \( C(t) \).

With general \( \sigma \) (but linear disutility of labor and log-utility of real balances, that are needed to obtain constant nominal interest rate and wage) we have that

\[
P(t) C(t)^{\sigma} = W = \text{constant}
\]

Therefore the demand shifter becomes

\[
C(t)^{1-\sigma} P(t)^{\omega-1} = \frac{C(t) P(t)^{\omega}}{W} = \frac{W^{1-\sigma}}{W^{1-\sigma}} P(t)^{\omega-\frac{1}{2}}
\]

so we need

\[
\omega\sigma = 1
\]

for firms to ignore the behavior of aggregate variables during the transition to the new steady state.
C  Aggregation

C.1 Homogeneous Firms

Fix $n$ and a sector $s \in [0, 1]$. Define the state $v_s(t)$ as

$$v_s = (z_1, \ldots, z_n)'$$

where $z_i = p_i - \bar{p}$ (prices are in log). Denote first-order expansions of best responses by $p'_i = \alpha + \beta \left( \sum_{j \neq i} p_j \right)$ or equivalently $z'_i = \beta \left( \sum_{j \neq i} z_j \right)$. When firm $i$ adjusts its price, the state of sector $s$ changes to $v'_s(t) = M_i v_s(t)$ where $M_i$ is the identity matrix except for row $i$ which is equal to $(\beta, \ldots, \beta, 0, \beta, \ldots, \beta)$.

Define the aggregate state variable

$$V(t) = \int_{s \in [0,1]} v_s(t) ds \in \mathbb{R}^n$$

Between $t$ and $t + \Delta t$, a mass $n\lambda \Delta t$ of firms adjusts prices so $V$ evolves as

$$V(t + \Delta t) = (1 - n\lambda \Delta t) V(t) + \int_{a \text{ firm in } s \text{ adjusts}} v_s(t + \Delta t) ds$$

$$= (1 - n\lambda \Delta t) V(t) + (\lambda n \Delta t) \frac{\sum_i M_i}{n} V(t)$$

therefore in the limit $\Delta t \to 0$

$$\dot{V}_t = n\lambda \left( \frac{\sum_i M_i}{n} - I_n \right) V_t$$

where

$$\frac{\sum_i M_i}{n} - I_n = \begin{pmatrix}
\frac{-1}{n} & \frac{\beta}{n} & \cdots & \frac{\beta}{n} \\
\frac{\beta}{n} & \frac{-1}{n} & \cdots & \frac{\beta}{n} \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
\frac{\beta}{n} & \frac{\beta}{n} & \cdots & \frac{-1}{n}
\end{pmatrix}$$

The aggregate price level is then, to first order, $\log P(t) = LV_t + \bar{p}$ where $L = \frac{1}{n}(1, \ldots, 1)$. The eigenvalues of $n\lambda \left( \frac{\sum_i M_i}{n} - I_n \right)$ are:

- $\mu_1(n) = -\lambda(1 + \beta(n))$ with multiplicity $n - 1$,
- $\mu_2(n) = -\lambda[1 - (n - 1)\beta(n)]$ with multiplicity 1.
The vector \((1, \ldots, 1)\)' is an eigenvector of \(\mu_2(n)\), so if we start from symmetric initial conditions
\[ V(0) = (p_0 - \bar{p}, \ldots, p_0 - \bar{p}) \]
we have
\[ V(t) = V(0)e^{\mu_2(n)t} \]

hence, to first order,
\[ \log P(t) = \log \bar{P} + (\log P(0) - \log \bar{P})e^{\mu_2(n)t}. \]

With heterogeneous sectors \(s\) differing in the number of firms \(n_s\) (and potentially the frequency of price adjustment captured by \(\lambda_s\)) we can just use the previous steps for each positive mass \(\omega_n\) of sectors with \(n\) firms and aggregate to
\[ \log P(t) = \log \bar{P} + (\log P(0) - \log \bar{P}) \sum_n \omega_n e^{\mu_2(n)t}. \]

### C.2 Heterogeneous Firms

Suppose there are two types of firms \(a\) and \(b\) with \(n_a + n_b = n\). In general, we need to solve for four steady state objects:
\[ g_{i,a}^i, g_{j,a}^j, g_{i,b}^i, g_{j,b}^j \]

Firms of type \(a\)'s Bellman equation is
\[ (\rho + n\lambda) V_{i,a}^i (p) = \Pi_{i,a}^i (p) + \lambda V_{i,a}^i \left(g_{i,a}^j (p_{-i}), p_{-i}\right) \]
\[ + \lambda \left\{ \sum_{j \in A} V_{i,a}^i \left(g_{j,a}^j (p_{-j}), p_{-j}\right) + \sum_{j \in B} V_{i,a}^i \left(g_{j,b}^j (p_{-j}), p_{-j}\right) \right\} \]

and similarly for firms of type \(b\). The envelope conditions evaluated at a symmetric steady state \(p^a, p^b\) for firms of type \(a\) are
\[ (\rho + n\lambda) V_{i,a}^i = \Pi_{i,a}^i + \lambda \sum_{j \neq i} \left[V_{i,j}^i (g_j(p_{-j}), p_{-j}) + V_{j,a}^i (g_j(p_{-j}), p_{-j}) g_{i,a}^j (p_{-j}) \right] \]
\[ 0 = \Pi_{i,a}^i + \lambda (n_a - 1) \left[V_{i,a}^i + V_{j,a}^i g_{i,a}^j \right] + \lambda n_b \left[V_{i,a}^i + V_{j,b}^i g_{j,b}^i \right] \]
\[(\rho + n\lambda) V_{ik}^{i,a} = \Pi_{ka}^{i,a} + \lambda \sum_{j \neq k} \left[ V_{pj}^{i,a} (g_{j}(p_{-j}), p_{-j}) \frac{\partial g_{i}}{\partial p_{k}} + V_{pk}^{i,a} (g_{j}(p_{-j}), p_{-j}) \right] \quad \forall k \neq i \]

which leads to Proposition 4 after simplifying

In general, we cannot solve for the slopes as functions of steady state elasticities.

This is a linear system of 4 equations in 4 unknowns.

\begin{align*}
(\rho + n\lambda) V_{ja}^{i,a} & = \Pi_{ja}^{i,a} + \lambda (n_a - 2) [V_{ja}^{i,a} s_{ka}^{i,a} + \lambda n_b V_{jb}^{i,a} g_{ja}^{i,b}] \\
(\rho + n\lambda) V_{ja}^{i,b} & = \Pi_{ja}^{i,b} + \lambda (n_a - 1) [V_{ja}^{i,b} s_{ka}^{i,b} + \lambda (n_b - 1) V_{jb}^{i,b} g_{ja}^{i,a}] \\
(\rho + \lambda) V_{ja}^{i,a} & = \Pi_{ja}^{i,a} + \lambda (n_a - 2) V_{ja}^{i,a} s_{ja}^{i,a} + \lambda n_b V_{jb}^{i,a} g_{ja}^{i,b} \\
(\rho + \lambda) V_{ja}^{i,b} & = \Pi_{ja}^{i,b} + \lambda (n_a - 1) V_{ja}^{i,b} s_{ja}^{i,b} + \lambda (n_b - 1) V_{jb}^{i,b} g_{ja}^{i,a}
\end{align*}

and the equivalent equations for \( b \):

\begin{align*}
(\rho + \lambda) V_{jb}^{i,b} & = \Pi_{jb}^{i,b} + \lambda (n_b - 2) V_{jb}^{i,b} s_{kb}^{i,b} + \lambda n_a V_{ja}^{i,b} g_{ja}^{i,a} \\
(\rho + \lambda) V_{jb}^{i,a} & = \Pi_{jb}^{i,a} + \lambda (n_b - 1) V_{jb}^{i,a} s_{kb}^{i,a} + \lambda (n_a - 1) V_{ja}^{i,a} g_{ja}^{i,b}
\end{align*}

This is a linear system of 4 equations in 4 unknowns \( \{V_{ja}^{i,a}, V_{ja}^{i,b}, V_{jb}^{i,a}, V_{jb}^{i,b}\} \); we can then inject the solutions into

\begin{align*}
0 & = \Pi_{ja}^{i,a} + \lambda (n_a - 1) V_{ja}^{i,a} s_{ja}^{i,a} + \lambda n_b V_{jb}^{i,a} g_{ja}^{i,b} \\
0 & = \Pi_{ja}^{i,b} + \lambda (n_a - 1) V_{ja}^{i,b} s_{ja}^{i,b} + \lambda n_a V_{ja}^{i,a} g_{ja}^{i,a}
\end{align*}

In general, we cannot solve for the slopes as functions of steady state elasticities.

However, when \( n_a = n_b = 1 \), we obtain the formulas in Proposition 4. Then

\[0 = \Pi_{ja}^{i,a} + \frac{\Pi_{ja}^{i,a}}{\rho + \lambda} g_{ja}^{i,b}\]

which leads to Proposition 4 after simplifying

\[\frac{-\Pi_{ja}^{i,a}}{\Pi_{ja}^{i,a}} = \frac{d_{ja}^{i,a} (p_a - MC_a) + d_{ja}^{i,a}}{d_{ja}^{i,a} (p_a - MC_a)}\]

\[\frac{1}{\epsilon_{ja}^{a}} \left[ -\epsilon_{ja}^{a} - \frac{p_b}{p_a - MC_a} \right]\]

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As before, \( V(t) = \int_{s \in [0,1]} v_s(t) ds \) follows

\[
\dot{V}(t) = \lambda \left( \frac{-1}{\frac{p_b}{p_a} - 1} \right) V(t).
\]

The two eigenvalues are \( \mu_+ = -\lambda \left( 1 + \sqrt{\beta^a \beta^b} \right) \) and \( \mu_- = -\lambda \left( 1 - \sqrt{\beta^a \beta^b} \right) \).

Hence the solution is

\[
V(t) = \frac{\sqrt{\frac{p_b}{p_a}} \beta^a (p_b(0) - p^*_b) - \sqrt{\frac{p_a}{p_b}} \beta^b (p_a(0) - p^*_a)}{2} \left( \frac{-1}{\sqrt{\frac{p_b}{p_a}}} \right) e^{\mu_+ t} + \frac{\sqrt{\frac{p_a}{p_b}} \beta^b (p_a(0) - p^*_a) + \sqrt{\frac{p_b}{p_a}} \beta^a (p_b(0) - p^*_b)}{2} \left( \frac{1}{\sqrt{\frac{p_b}{p_a}}} \right) e^{\mu_- t},
\]

hence (supposing the economy only features such sectors)

\[
\frac{\log P(t) - \log \bar{P}}{\log P(0) - \log \bar{P}} = \left[ \frac{1 - S_a}{\sqrt{\frac{p_b}{p_a}} \beta^a} - \frac{S_a}{\sqrt{\frac{p_a}{p_b}} \beta^b} \right] \left( \sqrt{\frac{p_b}{p_a}} \beta^a - \sqrt{\frac{p_a}{p_b}} \beta^b \right) \left( \frac{-1}{2} \right) e^{\mu_+ t} + \left[ \frac{1 - S_a}{\sqrt{\frac{p_b}{p_a}} \beta^a} + \frac{S_a}{\sqrt{\frac{p_a}{p_b}} \beta^b} \right] \left( \sqrt{\frac{p_a}{p_b}} \beta^a + \sqrt{\frac{p_b}{p_a}} \beta^b \right) \left( \frac{1}{2} \right) e^{\mu_- t}.
\]

where \( S_a \) is the steady state market share of type \( a \) firms.

**D Non-Strategic Model**

The quadratic approximation of profit \( \Pi^i \) of firm \( i \) around the non-strategic steady state which is the static Nash \( p^{NE} \) writes (in log deviations)

\[
\pi^i(p_i, Q_i, R_i) = BQ_i + CQ_i^2 + DP_iQ_i + EP_i^2 + FR_i
\]

where

\[
Q_i = \sum_{j \neq i} p_j
\]

\[
R_i = \sum_{j \neq i} p_j^2
\]
There is no term $Ap_i$ because we are approximate around the Nash price $p^{NE}(n)$ where $\Pi_i = 0$ for all $i$. The most important coefficients $D$ and $E$ are

$$D = \Pi_{ij} \left( p^{NE}(n) \right)$$

$$E = \frac{\Pi_{ii}}{2} \left( p^{NE}(n) \right)$$

We look for a symmetric equilibrium where each resetting firm $j$ sets

$$p^*_j(t) = \beta Q_j(t)$$

Then between $s$ and $s + \Delta s$ we have

$$E_t Q_i(s + \Delta s) = (1 - (n - 1)\lambda \Delta) E_t Q_i(s) + \lambda \Delta E_t \sum_{j \neq i} [Q_i(s) - p_j(s) + \beta Q_j(s)]$$

hence taking the limit $\Delta s \to 0$

$$\frac{d}{ds} E_t Q_i(s) = \lambda \left\{ \beta \sum_{j \neq i} E_t Q_j(s) - E_t Q_i(s) \right\}$$

thus the variable $Z(s) = \sum_i E_t Q_i(s)$ follows

$$\frac{d}{ds} Z(s) = -\lambda [1 - \beta (n - 1)] Z(s)$$

Therefore, by symmetry

$$E_t Q_i(s) = Q_i(t) e^{-\lambda [1 - \beta (n - 1)] (s - t)}$$

When it resets, firm $i$ chooses $p^*_i(t)$ such that

$$\max_{p^*_i(t)} E_t \left[ \int_t^\infty e^{-(\lambda + \rho) (s-t)} \pi^t(p^*_i(t), Q_i(t + s), R_i(t + s)) ds \right]$$
The FOC is

\[ p_i^*(t) = -\int_t^\infty e^{-(\lambda+\rho)(s-t)} DE_i [Q_i(s)] ds \]

\[ = -\int_t^\infty e^{-(\lambda+\rho)(s-t)} \left( DQ_i(t)e^{-\lambda(1-(n-1)\beta)(s-t)} \right) ds \]

\[ = -\frac{D(\lambda+\rho)}{2E [\lambda+\rho+\lambda(1-(n-1)\beta)]} Q_i(t) \]

So we need

\[ (n-1)\beta = \left( \frac{(n-1)D}{-2E} \right) \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\lambda}{\rho+\lambda} [1-(n-1)\beta]} \]

\[ = \left( \frac{(n-1)\Pi_{ij}}{-\Pi_{ii}} \right) \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\lambda}{\rho+\lambda} [1-(n-1)\beta]} \]

Note that in a static model, the ratio \( \frac{(n-1)\Pi_{ij}}{-\Pi_{ii}} \) would be the slope of the static best response to a simultaneous price change by all firms \( j \neq i \) and we need it to be strictly lower than 1 for a static symmetric Nash equilibrium to exist. The slope of the dynamic non-strategic best response at a stable steady state, if one exists, is always smaller than the slope of the static best response. Thus we already see a form of dynamic complementarity. \( n \) affects demand functions and hence the level of the non-strategic steady state, just like it affects the level of the static Nash equilibrium (they are the same). \( n \) also affects profit complementarities (potentially in an independent way, away from CES) and thereby the slope of the reaction functions in the static and dynamic (non-strategic) models. But there is a stable relation between the two across \( n \), described by the solution below.

The second-order polynomial

\[ X^2 - \left( \frac{\rho+2\lambda}{\lambda} \right) X + \left( \frac{\rho+\lambda}{\lambda} \right) \left( \frac{(n-1)D}{-2E} \right) \]

has a real root if

\[ \frac{(n-1)D}{-2E} < \frac{(\rho+2\lambda)^2}{4\lambda(\rho+\lambda)} = 1 + \frac{\rho^2}{4\lambda(\rho+\lambda)} \]
The stable root in $(0, 1)$ can only be

$$(n - 1)\beta = \left(\frac{\rho + 2\lambda}{2\lambda}\right) \left[1 - \sqrt{1 - 4\left(\frac{(n - 1)D}{-2E}\right)\frac{\lambda(\rho + \lambda)}{(\rho + 2\lambda)^2}}\right]$$

### E Demand Elasticities

In what follows recall that we assume an outer elasticity $\omega = 1$. From budget exhaustion, for any $i$ and $p$

$$c^i + \sum_j p_j \frac{\partial c^i}{\partial p_i} = 0 \tag{24}$$

Then Slutsky symmetry and constant returns to scale imply

$$\epsilon^i_i + \sum_{j \neq i} \epsilon^i_j = -1 \tag{25}$$

where $\epsilon^i_j = \frac{\partial \log c^i}{\partial \log p_j}$. At a symmetric price, this becomes

$$\epsilon^i_j = -\frac{1 + \epsilon^i_i}{n - 1}$$

so the convergence to Nash holds as long as the own elasticity $\epsilon^i_i$ is bounded. Call for any pair $j, k$

$$\epsilon^i_{jk} = \frac{\partial^2 \log d_i}{\partial \log p_k \partial \log p_j}$$

We can differentiate (25) with respect to $\log p_i$ to get

$$\epsilon^i_{ii} + \sum_{j \neq i} \epsilon^i_{ij} = 0$$

hence at a symmetric price,

$$\epsilon^i_{ii} + (n - 1)\epsilon^i_{ij} = 0$$

Differentiating once more the budget constraint with respect to $p_i$

$$2\frac{\partial c^i}{\partial p_i} + \sum_j \frac{\partial^2 c^i}{\partial p^2_i} = 0 \tag{26}$$
Elasticities and second-derivatives are related by
\[
\frac{\partial^2 c^i}{\partial p_k \partial p_j} = \frac{c^i}{p_k p_j} \left[ \epsilon^i_{jk} + \epsilon^i_{jk} \right] \quad \text{for any } j \neq k
\]
\[
\frac{\partial^2 c^i}{\partial p_j^2} = \frac{c^i}{p_j^2} \left[ \epsilon^i_{jj} - \epsilon^i_{jj} + \left( \epsilon^i_{jj} \right)^2 \right] \quad \text{for any } j
\]

At a symmetric price (using \( \epsilon^j_{ii} = \epsilon^i_{jj} \)), we have from (26)
\[
\epsilon^i_{jj} = \epsilon^i_{j} \left(1 - \epsilon^i_{j}\right) - \frac{1}{n - 1} \left[ \epsilon^i_{ii} + \epsilon^i_{i} \left(1 + \epsilon^i_{i}\right) \right] \quad (27)
\]

Finally, differentiating (24) with respect to \( p_k \) for some \( k \neq i \) gives
\[
\frac{\partial c^i}{\partial p_k} + \frac{\partial c^k}{\partial p_i} + \sum_{j \neq i, k} p_j \frac{\partial^2 c^i}{\partial p_k \partial p_j} + p_i \frac{\partial^2 c^i}{\partial p_k \partial p_i} + p_k \frac{\partial^2 c^k}{\partial p_k \partial p_i} = 0
\]

and at a symmetric price \( p \)
\[
2 \frac{\partial c^i}{\partial p_k} + (n - 2) \frac{\partial^2 c^i}{\partial p_k \partial p_j} + 2 \frac{\partial^2 c^i}{\partial p_k \partial p_i} = 0
\]

Therefore, in elasticities at a symmetric price,
\[
2\epsilon^i_{j} + (n - 2) \left[ \epsilon^i_{jk} + \left( \epsilon^i_{j} \right)^2 \right] + 2 \left[ \epsilon^i_{ij} + \epsilon^i_{ij} \epsilon^i_{ii} \right] = 0 \quad (28)
\]

for \( k \neq j, i, j \neq i \). The own-superelasticity is defined as the elasticity of (minus the) elasticity:
\[
\Sigma_i = \frac{\partial \log(-\epsilon^i_{ii})}{\partial \log p_i} = \frac{\epsilon^i_{ii}}{\epsilon^i_{i}}
\]

So in the end we have two degrees of freedom: \( \{ \epsilon^i_{ii}, \epsilon^i_{ii} \} \) to parametrize a symmetric steady state.

**Special case: \( n = 2 \).** If \( n = 2 \) there is only 1 degree of freedom, so CES is without loss of generality (locally). From (28), the cross-superelasticity \( \epsilon^i_{ij} \), hence the own-superelasticity \( \epsilon^i_{ii} = -(n - 1)\epsilon^i_{ij} \) is determined by elasticities.
E.1 Special case: CES

With CES utility

\[ h(x) = \left( \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} x_j^{\frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon}} \right)^\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1} \]

we have only one degree of freedom \( \epsilon > 1 \) and at any symmetric price

\[
\begin{align*}
\epsilon_i &= -\epsilon + \frac{\epsilon - 1}{n} \\
\epsilon_{ii} &= -(\epsilon - 1)^2 \frac{n - 1}{n^2} \\
\epsilon_{jj} &= \epsilon_{ii}
\end{align*}
\]

which implies from the equalities above

\[
\begin{align*}
\epsilon_j &= \frac{\epsilon - 1}{n} \\
\epsilon_{jk} &= \frac{(\epsilon - 1)^2}{n^2}
\end{align*}
\]

E.2 Special case: Kimball Demand

Start with a general Kimball (1995) aggregator that defines \( C \) as

\[ \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i} \Psi \left( \frac{c_i}{C} \right) = 1 \] (29)

where \( \Psi \) is increasing, concave, and \( \Psi(1) = 1 \) which ensures the convention that at a symmetric basket \( c_i = c \), we have \( C = c \). The consumer’s problem is

\[ \min_{\{c_i\}} \sum_{i} p_i c_i \text{ s.t. } \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i} \Psi \left( \frac{c_i}{C} \right) = 1 \]

There exists a Lagrange multiplier \( \lambda > 0 \) such that for all \( i \)

\[ p_i = \lambda \Psi' \left( \frac{c_i}{C} \right) \frac{1}{C} \] (30)

If we define the sectoral price index \( P \) by

\[ \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i} \varphi \left( \Psi'(1) \frac{p_i}{P} \right) = 1 \]
where

$$\varphi = \Psi \circ (\Psi')^{-1}$$

then at a symmetric price $p_i = p$ we have $P = p$, and $\lambda \Psi'(1) = PC$ so we can rewrite (30) as

$$\frac{p_i}{P} \Psi'(1) = \Psi'\left(\frac{c_i}{C}\right)$$

Taking logs and differentiating (30) with respect to log $p_i$ yields

$$1 = \frac{\partial \log P}{\partial \log p_i} + \frac{\Psi''\left(\frac{c_i}{C}\right)}{\Psi'\left(\frac{c_i}{C}\right)} \left[ \epsilon^i - \frac{\partial \log C}{\partial \log p_i} \right]$$

Differentiating (29) yields

$$\sum_j \Psi'\left(\frac{c_j}{C}\right) \frac{c_j}{C} \left[ \frac{\partial \log c_j}{\partial \log p_i} - \frac{\partial \log C}{\partial \log p_i} \right] = 0$$

hence

$$\frac{\partial \log C}{\partial \log p_i} = \frac{\sum_j \Psi'\left(\frac{c_j}{C}\right) \frac{c_j}{C} \epsilon^i_j}{\sum_j \Psi'\left(\frac{c_j}{C}\right) \frac{c_j}{C}}$$

Using Slutsky symmetry $p_j\epsilon^i_j = p_i\epsilon^i_j$ to express this using demand elasticities for good $i$ only, we can reexpress as

$$\frac{\partial \log C}{\partial \log p_i} = \frac{\sum_j \Psi'\left(\frac{c_j}{C}\right) \frac{c_j}{C} \epsilon^i_j}{\sum_j \Psi'\left(\frac{c_j}{C}\right) \frac{c_j}{C}}$$

At a symmetric price, budget exhaustion with constant returns implies

$$\frac{\partial \log C}{\partial \log p_i} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_j \epsilon^i_j = -\frac{1}{n}$$

For any $k \neq i$ we can differentiate

$$\log \Psi'\left(\frac{c^i}{C}\right) - \log \Psi'\left(\frac{c^k}{C}\right) = \log p_i - \log p_k$$
with respect to $\log p_i$ to get
\[
\frac{\Psi''(\frac{c^i}{C})}{\Psi'(\frac{c^i}{C})} \left( \frac{\partial}{\partial \log p_i} \right) \left[ \log \frac{c^i}{C} \right] - \frac{\Psi''(\frac{c^k}{C})}{\Psi'(\frac{c^k}{C})} \left( \frac{\partial}{\partial \log p_i} \right) \left[ \log \frac{c^k}{C} \right] = 1
\]
or, defining
\[
R(x) = \frac{x \Psi''(x)}{\Psi'(x)}
\]
\[
R \left( \frac{c^i}{C} \right) \left[ \epsilon_i^i - \frac{\partial \log C}{\partial \log p_i} \right] - R \left( \frac{c^k}{C} \right) \left[ \epsilon_i^k - \frac{\partial \log C}{\partial \log p_i} \right] = 1 \tag{31}
\]
Hence at a symmetric steady state, using $\epsilon_i^k = \epsilon_i^k = -\frac{1 + \epsilon_i^i}{n-1}$ we have
\[
\epsilon_i^i = \frac{n - 1}{n} \frac{1}{R(1)} - \frac{1}{n}
\]
Differentiating once more with respect to $\log p_i$,
\[
R' \left( \frac{c^i}{C} \right) \left[ \epsilon_i^i - \frac{\partial \log C}{\partial \log p_i} \right]^2 - R' \left( \frac{c^k}{C} \right) \left[ \epsilon_i^k - \frac{\partial \log C}{\partial \log p_i} \right]^2 + R \left( \frac{c^i}{C} \right) \left[ \epsilon_{ii}^i - \frac{\partial^2 \log C}{\partial \log p_i^2} \right] - R \left( \frac{c^k}{C} \right) \left[ \epsilon_{ii}^k - \frac{\partial^2 \log C}{\partial \log p_i^2} \right] = 0
\]
At a symmetric steady state,
\[
R' \left( 1 \right) \left[ \epsilon_i^i + \frac{1}{n} \right]^2 - R' \left( 1 \right) \left[ \epsilon_i^k + \frac{1}{n} \right]^2 + R \left( 1 \right) \left[ \epsilon_{ii}^i - \epsilon_{ii}^k \right] = 0
\]
\[
R' \left( 1 \right) \left[ \epsilon_i^i + \frac{1}{n} \right]^2 - R' \left( 1 \right) \left[ \epsilon_i^k + \frac{1}{n} \right]^2 + R \left( 1 \right) \left[ \epsilon_{ii}^i - \epsilon_{jj}^i \right] = 0
\]
Using (27) we get
\[
R' \left( 1 \right) \left[ \frac{n - 1}{n} - \frac{1}{R(1)} + \frac{1}{n} \right]^2 - R' \left( 1 \right) \left[ \frac{1 + \epsilon_i^i}{n-1} + \frac{1}{n} \right]^2 + R \left( 1 \right) \left[ \epsilon_{ii}^i - \epsilon_i (1 - \epsilon_i) + \frac{1}{n-1} \left[ \epsilon_i (1 + \epsilon_i) \right] \right] = 0
\]
Now differentiating (31) with respect to $\log p_j$ for some $j \neq i, k$
\[
R' \left( \frac{c^i}{C} \right) \left[ \epsilon_i^i - \frac{\partial \log C}{\partial \log p_j} \right] \left[ \epsilon_j^j - \frac{\partial \log C}{\partial \log p_j} \right] + R \left( \frac{c^i}{C} \right) \left[ \epsilon_{ij}^i - \frac{\partial^2 \log C}{\partial \log p_j^2} \right] \left[ \epsilon_j^j - \frac{\partial \log C}{\partial \log p_j} \right] - R \left( \frac{c^k}{C} \right) \left[ \epsilon_{ij}^k - \frac{\partial^2 \log C}{\partial \log p_j^2} \right] \left[ \epsilon_j^j - \frac{\partial \log C}{\partial \log p_j} \right] = 0
\]
At a symmetric price,

\[
R'(1) \left[ e^i_j + \frac{1}{n} \right] \left[ e^i_j + \frac{1}{n} \right] + R(1) e^i_j = R'(1) \left[ e^i_j + \frac{1}{n} \right]^2 + R(1) e^i_k
\]

Therefore, using (28) we have

\[
\begin{align*}
\epsilon_{ii} & = - \frac{n - 1}{n^2} \left[ \frac{R(1)(1 + R(1))^2 + R'(1)(n - 2)}{R(1)^3} \right] \\
\epsilon_{jj} & = \frac{(n - 2)R'(1) - (n - 1)R(1) [1 + R(1)]^2}{n^2 R(1)^3} \quad (j \neq i) \\
\epsilon_{ij} & = \frac{R(1) [1 + R(1)]^2 + (n - 2)R'(1)}{n^2 R(1)^3} \quad (j \neq i) \\
\epsilon_{jk} & = \frac{R(1) [1 + R(1)]^2 - 2R'(1)}{n^2 R(1)^3} \quad (j \neq k, n \geq 3)
\end{align*}
\]

Klenow and Willis (2016) use the functional form

\[
\Psi'(x) = \frac{e - 1}{e} \exp \left( \frac{1 - x^{\theta/e}}{\theta} \right)
\]

\[
\Psi''(x) = - \frac{x^{\theta-1}}{e} \Psi'(x)
\]

\[
\Psi'''(x) = \left[ \frac{x^{\theta-1}}{e} \right]^2 - \left( \frac{\theta - e}{e^2} \right) x^{\theta-2} \right] \Psi'(x)
\]

Therefore

\[
R(1) = - \frac{1}{e}
\]

\[
R'(1) = - \frac{\theta}{e^2}
\]
so that this nests CES with $\theta = 0$. We thus have

$$
e_i = -e + \frac{e - 1}{n}
$$

$$
e_j = \frac{e - 1}{n}
$$

$$
e_{ii} = -\frac{n - 1}{n^2} \left[ (e - 1)^2 + (n - 2)\theta e \right]
$$

$$
e_{ij} = \frac{(e - 1)^2 + \theta e(n - 2)}{n^2}
$$

$$
e_{jj} = -\frac{(n - 1)(e - 1)^2 + \theta e(n - 2)}{n^2}
$$

$$
e_{jk} = \frac{(e - 1)^2 - 2\theta e}{n^2}
$$

The superelasticity, defined as $\frac{e_{ii}}{e_i}$, satisfies

$$
\frac{e_{ii}}{e_i} = \frac{1}{S} + \frac{\eta}{S} \left[ \theta \eta + \left( \eta - 1 \right)^2 - 2\theta \eta \right] S
$$

$$
\approx \theta + \left[ \frac{(\eta - 1)^2}{\eta} - 2\theta \right] S
$$

with $S = 1/n$ denoting the market share. The approximation in the second line holds if $S$ is small relative to $\eta / (1 + \eta)$, as is the case in a calibration with $\eta = 10$. With constant $\theta$ and $\eta$, the superelasticity is approximately linear in the Herfindahl index, as in Figure 15. If $\theta$ is lower than $\frac{(\eta - 1)^2}{2\eta}$ which equals 4.05 when $\eta = 10$ (as in the CES case $\theta = 0$) then $\frac{e_{ii}}{e_i}$ increases with $S$. With high enough $\theta$, it can actually decrease with $S$, but a high fixed $\theta$ is at odds with pass-through being larger for smaller firms.

F Perturbation of utility

Proof of Proposition 6. We start from the system that defines an MPE:

$$
(\rho + n\lambda) V(p) = \Pi(p) + \lambda \sum_j V(g(p-j), p-j)
$$

$$
V_p(g(p-j), p-j) = 0
$$
Differentiating \(k\) times the Bellman equation (33) gives us for each \(k \geq 1\) a linear system in the \(k\)th-derivatives \(V^{(k)} = (V_{11\ldots11}, V_{11\ldots12}, V_{11\ldots22}, \ldots)\) of the value function \(V\) (evaluated at the symmetric steady state \(\bar{p}\)), which we can invert to obtain these derivatives as a function of the profit derivatives \(\Pi^{(k)} = (\Pi_{11\ldots11}, \ldots)\) and derivatives of the policy function (there are \(k + 1\) such equations in the case of \(n = 2\) firms).

We can then compute \(\Pi^{(k)}\) as a function of \(\bar{p}\) and own- and cross-superelasticities of the demand function \(d\) of order up to \(k\).

Combining the solution \(V^{(k)}\) with the \(k - 1\)th-derivative of the FOC (34) gives us a sequence of equations that must be satisfied at a steady state

\[
F^k \left( \bar{p}, g' (\bar{p}), g'' (\bar{p}), \ldots, g^{(k)} (\bar{p}); \epsilon_{(0)}, \epsilon_{(1)}, \epsilon_{(2)}, \ldots, \epsilon_{(k)} \right) = 0
\]

where \(F^k\) is linear in \(\epsilon_{(k)}\). Thus we can construct recursively a unique sequence \(\tilde{\epsilon}_{(k)}\) starting from \(k = m + 1\), using

\[
F^{m+1} \left( \bar{p}, g', \ldots, g^{(m-1)}, 0, 0; \epsilon_{(1)}, \epsilon_{(2)}, \ldots, \epsilon_{(m+1)} \right) = 0
\]

\[
F^{m+2} \left( \bar{p}, g', \ldots, g^{(m-1)}, 0, 0; \epsilon_{(1)}, \epsilon_{(2)}, \ldots, \epsilon_{(m+1)}, \tilde{\epsilon}_{(m+1)} \right) = 0
\]

and so on. Section F.1 below shows that there are indeed enough degrees of freedom to make the equations \(F^{m}, F^{m+1}, \ldots\) independent.
Define \( \tilde{\phi} \) as
\[
\tilde{\phi}(x) = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \frac{\tilde{\phi}^{(k)}(1)}{k!} (x-1)^k
\]
where \( \tilde{\phi}^{(k+1)}(1) \) is characterized by \( (\epsilon(1), \ldots, \epsilon(m), \tilde{\epsilon}(m+1), \ldots, \tilde{\epsilon}(k)) \) through the same computations as in Appendix E.

Given this construction, \( \bar{p}, g', \ldots, g^{(m-1)} \) are pinned down by \( (\epsilon(1), \ldots, \epsilon(m)) \) as the solution to the system of equations \( F^k \) for \( k = 1, \ldots, m \).

### F.1 Counting the degrees of freedom

The main potential impediment to the proof above is that demand integrability (e.g., demand functions being generated by actual utility functions) imposes restrictions on higher-order elasticities that would prevent us from constructing the sequence \( \tilde{\epsilon} \). Indeed, in Appendix E we saw that with \( n = 2 \) firms, general Kimball demand functions cannot generate superelasticities beyond those arising from CES demand. We now show that as long as \( n \geq 3 \), this is not the case, by proving that the number of elasticities exceeds the number of restrictions.

Formally, we want to compute \( \#_n(m) \), the number of cross-elasticities of order \( m \), that is derivatives
\[
\frac{\partial^m \log d^1(p)}{\partial^{i_1} \log p_1 \partial^{i_2} \log p_2 \ldots \partial^{i_n} \log p_n}
\]
where
\[
0 \leq i_1, \ldots, i_n \leq m \\
i_1 + \cdots + i_n = m
\]
as functions of the own-\( m \)th-elasticity \( \epsilon_{11}^{m} \) and compare \( \#_n(m) \) to the number of restrictions imposed by demand integrability and symmetry arguments.

**Step 1: Computing \( \#_n(m) \).** By Schwarz symmetry, in a smooth MPE, we can always invert 2 indices in the derivatives. Moreover, from the viewpoint of firm 1 (whose demand \( d^1 \) we’re differentiating), firms 2 and 3 are interchangeable. For instance, in the case of \( n = 3 \) firms and order of differentiation \( m = 3 \), these symme-
tries reduce the number of potential elasticities $n^m = 27$ to only 6 elasticities

$$
e_{111}^1, e_{112}^1, e_{122}^1, e_{123}^1, e_{222}^1, e_{223}^1.$$

Denote

$$q_n (M)$$

the number of partitions of an integer $M$ into $n$ non-negative integers. For $M \geq n$ we have

$$q_n (M) = p_n (M + n)$$

where $p_n (M)$ is the number of partitions of an integer $M$ into $n$ positive integers. We can see this by writing, starting from a partition of $M$ into $n$ non-negative integers $i_1, \ldots, i_n$:

$$M + n = (i_1 + 1) + \cdots + (i_n + 1)$$

We can then compute $p_j (M)$ using the recurrence formula

$$p_j (M) = \underbrace{p_j (M - j)}_{\text{partitions for which } i_k \geq 2 \text{ for all } k} + \underbrace{p_{j-1} (M - 1)}_{\text{partitions for which } i_k = 1 \text{ for some } k}$$

**Lemma 1.** For any $n \geq 1$ and $m \geq 1$ the number of elasticities of order $m$ is

$$\#_n (m) = \sum_{k=0}^{m} q_{n-1} (m - k) \quad (35)$$

hence $\#_n (m + 1) = \#_n (m) + q_{n-1} (m + 1)$.

**Proof.** Firm 1 is special, so we need to count the number of times we differentiate with respect to $\log p_1$, which generates the sum over $k$. Then we get each term in the sum by counting partitions of $m - k$ into $n - 1$ non-negative integers. \qed

**Step 2: Computing the number of restrictions arising from demand integrability.** Next, we want to use economic restrictions to reduce the number of degrees of freedom, ideally to 1, by having $\#_n (m) - 1$ independent equations. Our restrictions are

$$\Phi (p) = \sum_j p_j d_j^i (p) = 0 \quad \forall p \quad (36)$$

$$d_j^i (p) = d_j^i (p) \quad \forall p, \forall i, j \quad (37)$$
The first equation is the budget constraint. The second equation is the Slutsky symmetry condition (constant returns to scale allow to go from Hicksian to Marshallian elasticities). Note that $\Phi$ defined in (36) is symmetric, unlike the demand function $d^1$ we are using to compute elasticities. Therefore $\Phi$’s derivatives give us fewer restrictions than what we need in (35), leaving room for restrictions to come from the Slutsky equation.

We need to differentiate these two equations to obtain independent equations that relate the $m$th-cross-elasticities to the $m$th-own-elasticity. The number of restrictions coming from derivatives of $\Phi$ at order $m$ is simply the number of partitions of $m$ into $n$ non-negative integers

$$q_n(m)$$

How many restrictions $b_n(m)$ do we have from derivatives of the Slutsky equation? The initial equation

$$d_2^1 = d_1^2$$

is irrelevant at a symmetric steady state; it only starts mattering once we differentiate it. The first terms are (see in next subsection)

$$b_n(1) = 0$$
$$b_n(2) = 1$$

$$b_n(3) = \begin{cases} 2 & \text{if } n \geq 3 \\ 1 & \text{if } n = 2 \end{cases}$$

$$b_n(4) = \begin{cases} 5 & \text{if } n \geq 4 \\ 4 & \text{if } n = 3 \\ 3 & \text{if } n = 2 \end{cases}$$

Step 3: Comparing the two. We actually do not need to compute $b_n(m)$ exactly. The following lemma shows that there are always enough degrees of freedom $\#_n(m)$ to construct the Kimball aggregator in 6:

**Lemma 2.** For $n \geq 3$ and any $m$ we have

$$q_n(m) + b_n(m) + 1 \leq \#_n(m)$$
Proof. We know by hand that (38) holds for $m = 1, 2$ so take $m \geq 3$. Then all the Slutsky conditions can be written as starting with

$$d^1_{12\ldots} = \ldots$$

hence we have

$$b_n(m) \leq \#_n(m-2) = \#_n(m) - p_{n-1}(n+m-1) - p_n(n+m-2)$$

hence the number of equations is bounded by

$$q_n(m) + b_n(m) \leq p_n(n+m) + \#_n(m) - p_{n-1}(n+m-1) - p_n(n+m-2)$$

Then we have (38) if

$$p_n(n+m) < p_{n-1}(n+m-1) + p_n(n+m-2)$$

$$\Leftrightarrow p_{n-1}(n+m-1) + p_n(m) < p_{n-1}(n+m-1) + p_n(n+m-2)$$

$$\Leftrightarrow p_n(m) < p_n(n+m-2)$$

which holds for $n \geq 3$. 

Note that so far we have considered general CRS demand functions. Restricting attention to the Kimball class makes the inequality (38) bind, meaning that we can parametrize all the cross-elasticities of order $m$ using the own-elasticity of order $m$.

What fails in the knife-edge case $n = 2$? Slutsky symmetry imposes too many restrictions: at $m = 2$ we only have 3 elasticities $\epsilon_{11}, \epsilon_{12}, \epsilon_{22}$ and also 3 restrictions, so we can solve out all the superelasticities as functions of $\epsilon_{11}$, which prevents us from constructing the Kimball aggregator in Proposition 6.
G Locally Linear Equilibrium

G.1 Homogeneous Firms

We first solve the linear system in \( \{ V_i, V_i', V_{ij}, V_{ij}', V_{jk} \} \) obtained from envelope conditions

\[
\begin{align*}
(\rho + \lambda) V_j^i &= \Pi_j^i + \lambda (n-2) V_j^i \beta \\
(\rho + \lambda) V_{ii}^i &= \Pi_{ii}^i + \lambda (n-1) \left(V_{jj}^i \beta^2 + 2V_{ij}^i \beta \right) \\
(\rho + 2\lambda) V_{ij}^i &= \Pi_{ij}^i + \lambda (n-2) \left(V_{jj}^i \beta^2 + V_{ij}^i \beta + V_{jk}^i \beta \right) \\
(\rho + \lambda) V_{jj}^i &= \Pi_{jj}^i + \lambda (n-2) \left(V_{jj}^i \beta^2 + 2V_{ij}^i \beta \right) + \lambda \left(V_{ii}^i \beta^2 + 2V_{ij}^i \beta \right) \\
(\rho + 2\lambda) V_{jk}^i &= \Pi_{jk}^i + \lambda (n-3) \left(V_{jj}^i \beta^2 + 2V_{ij}^i \beta \right) + \lambda \left(V_{ii}^i \beta^2 + 2V_{ij}^i \beta \right)
\end{align*}
\]

Injecting the solution into the derivative of the first-order condition sub

\[ V_{ii}^i \beta + V_{ij}^i = 0 \]

yields

\[ 0 = A_{ii} \Pi_{ii}^i (\bar{p}) + A_{ij} \Pi_{ij}^i (\bar{p}) + A_{jj} \Pi_{jj}^i (\bar{p}) + A_{jk} \Pi_{jk}^i (\bar{p}) \]

with coefficients

\[
\begin{align*}
A_{ii} &= \beta \left( (\beta + 1) \lambda \left( 2 \left( \beta^2 + 3 \beta + 2 \right) + \beta (\beta + 1) \right) a^2 - (\beta^2 + 9 \beta + 10) a - 24 a + 22 \right) + \lambda^2 \left( \beta^2 \left( a^2 - 2 a + 1 \right) + \beta^2 \left( 2 a^2 + 15 a + 22 \right) + \beta (24 + 9 \beta + 8) + \lambda^2 \left( \beta^2 (a - 2) + \beta (3n - 8) - 5 \right) - \beta^2 \right) \\
A_{ij} &= -\beta \lambda \left( 2 (\beta + 1) \lambda \left( 2 \left( \beta^2 + 3 \beta + 2 \right) + \beta (\beta + 1) \right) a^2 - (\beta^2 + 9 \beta + 10) a + \lambda^2 \left( 4 a^2 + 10 a + \beta (\beta + 1) \right) a - (3 a^2 + 7 a + 2) a + \lambda^2 \left( \beta^2 + 9 \beta + 3 \right) a + 6 + \lambda^2 \left( \beta^2 (a - 1) + \beta^2 \right) \right) \\
A_{jj} &= \beta \lambda \left( 2 \left( \beta^2 + 3 \beta + 2 \right) + \beta (\beta + 1) \right) a^2 - (\beta^2 + 9 \beta + 10) a + \lambda^2 \left( 4 a^2 + 10 a + \beta (\beta + 1) \right) a - (3 a^2 + 7 a + 2) a + \lambda^2 \left( \beta^2 (a - 1) + \beta^2 \right) \]

G.2 Heterogeneous Firms

Suppose as in section C.2 that there are two types of firms, \( a \) and \( b \), with \( n = n_a + n_b \). \( a \) and \( b \) firms can differ permanently in their marginal costs, their demand, or both.

We know need to solve for six unknowns \( \{ \beta_a^g, \beta_b^g, \beta_a^b, \beta_b^b, p_a, p_b \} \) where \( \beta_i^j \) is the reaction of a firm of type \( i \) to the price change of a firm of type \( j \). The envelope
conditions for firms of type $a$ are

$$(\rho + \lambda) V_{i}^{i,a} = \Pi_{i}^{i,a} + \lambda (n_{a} - 1) V_{ja}^{i,a} \beta_{a}^{a} + \lambda n_{b} V_{jb}^{i,a} \beta_{b}^{b}$$

$$(\rho + \lambda) V_{ja}^{i,a} = \Pi_{ja}^{i,a} + \lambda (n_{a} - 2) V_{ja}^{i,a} \beta_{a}^{a} + \lambda n_{b} V_{jb}^{i,a} \beta_{b}^{b}$$

$$(\rho + \lambda) V_{jb}^{i,a} = \Pi_{jb}^{i,a} + \lambda (n_{a} - 1) V_{ja}^{i,a} \beta_{a}^{a} + \lambda (n_{b} - 1) V_{jb}^{i,a} \beta_{b}^{b}$$

and

$$(\rho + 2\lambda) V_{ii}^{i,a} = \Pi_{ii}^{i,a} + \lambda (n_{a} - 1) \left[V_{ja}^{i,a} (\beta_{a}^{a})^{2} + 2 V_{ja}^{i,a} \beta_{a}^{a}\right] + \lambda n_{b} \left[V_{jb}^{i,a} (\beta_{b}^{b})^{2} + 2 V_{jb}^{i,a} \beta_{b}^{b}\right]$$

$$(\rho + 2\lambda) V_{ij}^{i,a} = \Pi_{ij}^{i,a} + \lambda (n_{a} - 2) \left[V_{ja}^{i,a} (\beta_{a}^{a})^{2} + 2 V_{ja}^{i,a} \beta_{a}^{a}\right] + \lambda n_{b} \left[V_{jb}^{i,a} (\beta_{b}^{b})^{2} + 2 V_{jb}^{i,a} \beta_{b}^{b}\right]$$

$$(\rho + 2\lambda) V_{ik}^{i,a} = \Pi_{ik}^{i,a} + \lambda \left[V_{ja}^{i,a} (\beta_{a}^{a})^{2} + 2 V_{ja}^{i,a} \beta_{a}^{a}\right] + \lambda (n_{a} - 2) \left[V_{ja}^{i,a} (\beta_{a}^{a})^{2} + 2 V_{ja}^{i,a} \beta_{a}^{a}\right] + \lambda n_{b} \left[V_{jb}^{i,a} (\beta_{b}^{b})^{2} + 2 V_{jb}^{i,a} \beta_{b}^{b}\right]$$

We can use these 11 envelope conditions to solve linearly for \(\{V_{i}^{i,a}, V_{ja}^{i,a}, V_{jb}^{i,a}, \ldots\}\),

and then inject the solution into the first-order conditions

$$V_{i}^{i,a} = 0$$
$$V_{ii}^{i,a} \beta_{a}^{a} + V_{ija}^{i,a} = 0$$
$$V_{ii}^{i,a} \beta_{b}^{b} + V_{ijb}^{i,a} = 0$$

The same steps for firms of type $b$ give us 3 more equations.
H Oligopolistic Phillips Curve

Consider the general non-stationary versions of the Bellman equation (1) and the first-order condition (2):

\[(i_t + n\lambda) V^i (p, t) = V^i_t (p, t) + \Pi^i (p, MC_t, Z_t) + \lambda \sum_j V^i \left(g^j (p_{-j}, t), p_{-j}, t\right)\]  
(40)

\[V^i \left(g^i (p_{-i}, t), p_{-i}, t\right) = 0\]  
(41)

Nominal profits are given by

\[\Pi^i (p, MC, Z) = ZD^i (p) [p_i - MC]\]

where \(Z\) is an aggregate demand shifter that can depend arbitrarily on \(C_t\) and \(P_t\).

Define \(\alpha (t)\) as

\[g^i (\alpha (t), \alpha (t), \ldots, \alpha (t), t) = \alpha (t)\]

This is the price that each firm would set if all the firms were resetting at the same time. \(\alpha\) is the counterpart of the reset price in the standard New Keynesian model.

To obtain the dynamics of \(\alpha\) from (40), we start by deriving time-varying envelope conditions evaluated at the symmetric price \(p_1 = p_2 = \cdots = p_n = \alpha (t)\). After applying symmetry and using Proposition 6 to make the strategies approximately linear in the neighborhood of the steady state, the non-linear first-order and second-order envelope conditions of the non-stationary game imply the following partial differential equations (PDEs)

\[0 = V^i_{it} + \Pi^i_t + \lambda (n - 1) V^i_j \beta\]  
(42a)

\[(i_t + \lambda) V^i_j = V^i_{jt} + \Pi^i_j + \lambda (n - 2) V^i_j \beta\]  
(42b)

\[(i_t + \lambda) V^i_{ii} = V^i_{iit} + \Pi^i_{ii} + \lambda (n - 1) \left(V^i_{jj} \beta^2 + 2V^i_{ij} \beta\right)\]  
(42c)

\[(i_t + 2\lambda) V^i_{ij} = V^i_{ijt} + \Pi^i_{ij} + \lambda (n - 2) \left(V^i_{jj} \beta^2 + V^i_{ij} \beta + \beta V^i_{ij}\right)\]  
(42d)

\[(i_t + \lambda) V^i_{jj} = V^i_{jjt} + \Pi^i_{jj} + \lambda (n - 2) \left(V^i_{jj} \beta^2 + 2\beta V^i_{jk}\right) + \lambda \left(V^i_{ii} \beta^2 + 2\beta V^i_{ij}\right)\]  
(42e)

\[(i_t + 2\lambda) V^i_{jk} = V^i_{jkt} + \Pi^i_{jk} + \lambda (n - 3) \left(V^i_{jj} \beta^2 + 2\beta V^i_{jk}\right) + \lambda \left(V^i_{ii} \beta^2 + 2\beta V^i_{ij}\right)\]  
(42f)

\(^{16}\)In section 4, conditions (6) ensured a constant \(Z_t\).
Denote the functions
\[ W_i^j(t) = V_i^j(\alpha(t), \ldots, \alpha(t), t), \quad W_{ii}^j(t) = V_{ii}^j(\alpha(t), \ldots, \alpha(t), t) \]
and so on for all derivatives of the value function \( V^i \). We can transform the system (42) into a system of ordinary differential equations in the functions \( W_i^j(t), W_{ii}^j(t) \), and so on. The partial derivatives with respect to time such as
\[ V_{it}^i = \frac{\partial V_i^i}{\partial t}(\alpha(t), \ldots, \alpha(t), t) \]
in equations (42) can be mapped to corresponding total derivatives of \( W \) functions
\[ \dot{W}_{it}^i = \frac{dW_i^i}{dt} \] using
\[
\begin{align*}
V_{it}^i &= \dot{W}_i^i - \left[ V_{ii}^i + \sum_{j \neq i} V_{ij}^j \right] \dot{\alpha} \\
V_{jt}^j &= \dot{W}_j^j - \left[ V_{jj}^j + V_{jj}^j + \sum_{k \neq i, j} V_{ij}^k \right] \dot{\alpha} \\
V_{iit}^i &= \dot{W}_{ii}^i - \left[ V_{iii}^i + \sum_{j \neq i} V_{ij}^j \right] \dot{\alpha} \\
V_{ijt}^j &= \dot{W}_{ij}^j - \left[ V_{ijj}^j + V_{ijj}^j + \sum_{k \neq i, j} V_{ijk}^k \right] \dot{\alpha} \\
V_{jjt}^j &= \dot{W}_{jj}^j - \left[ V_{jjj}^j + V_{jjj}^j + \sum_{k \neq i, j} V_{jjk}^j \dot{\alpha} \\
V_{jkt}^j &= \dot{W}_{jk}^j - \left[ V_{ijk}^j + V_{ijk}^j + V_{jkk}^j + \sum_{l \neq i, j, k} V_{jkl}^j \right] \dot{\alpha}
\end{align*}
\]
where the third derivatives of \( V \) at the steady state come from the third-order enve-
lope conditions of the stationary game, solving the linear system:

\[(\rho + \lambda) V_{iii}^i = \Pi_{iii}^i + \lambda (n - 1) \left\{ V_{jjj}^i \beta^3 + 3 V_{jjj}^i \beta^2 + 3 V_{jjj}^i \beta \right\} \]

\[(\rho + 2\lambda) V_{ijj}^i = \Pi_{ijj}^i + \lambda (n - 2) \left\{ V_{jjj}^i \beta^3 + 2 V_{jjj}^i \beta^2 + 2 V_{jjj}^i \beta + V_{jjj}^i \right\} \]

\[(\rho + 2\lambda) V_{iij}^i = \Pi_{iij}^i + \lambda (n - 2) \left\{ V_{jjj}^i \beta^3 + 2 \beta^2 V_{jjj}^i + \beta^2 V_{jjj}^i + 2 \beta V_{jjj}^i + \beta V_{jjj}^i \right\} \]

\[(\rho + 3\lambda) V_{ijk}^i = \Pi_{ijk}^i + \lambda (n - 3) \left\{ V_{jjj}^i \beta^3 + 2 \beta^2 V_{jjj}^i + \beta^2 V_{jjj}^i + 2 \beta V_{jjj}^i + \beta V_{jjj}^i \right\} \]

\[(\rho + \lambda) V_{iij}^i = \Pi_{iij}^i + \lambda (n - 2) \left\{ \beta^3 V_{iij}^i + 3 \beta^2 V_{iij}^i + 3 \beta V_{iij}^i \right\} \]

\[(\rho + 2\lambda) V_{ijj}^i = \Pi_{ijj}^i + \lambda (n - 3) \left\{ \beta^3 V_{ijj}^i + 3 \beta^2 V_{ijj}^i + \beta V_{ijj}^i + 2 \beta V_{ijj}^i \right\} \]

\[(\rho + 3\lambda) V_{ijk}^i = \Pi_{ijk}^i + \lambda (n - 4) \left\{ \beta^3 V_{ijk}^i + 3 \beta^2 V_{ijk}^i + 3 \beta V_{ijk}^i \right\} \]

Importantly, to approximate the second derivatives of \( V^i \), we need to solve for the third derivatives of \( V^i \) around the steady state by applying the envelope theorem one more time.

Imposing symmetry again, the following non-linear system of ODEs in the 8 functions \( \left( \alpha, \beta, W^i_j, W^i_j', W^i_{ij}, W^i_{ij}', W^i_{ijk}, W^i_{ijk}' \right) \) holds exactly (omitting the time argument):

\[0 = - \left[ W^i_{ij} + (n - 1) W^i_{ij}' \right] \hat{a} + \Pi^i_{ij} + \lambda (n - 1) W^i_{ij} \beta \quad (44a)\]

\[(i + \lambda) W^i_{ij} = W^i_{ij} - \left[ V^i_{ij} + (n - 1) V^i_{ij}' \right] \hat{a} + \Pi^i_{ij} + \lambda (n - 1) \left( W^i_{ij} \beta^2 + 2 W^i_{ij} \beta \right) \quad (44b)\]

\[0 = W^i_{ij} \beta + W^i_{ij}' \quad (44c)\]

\[(i + \lambda) W^i_{ijk} = W^i_{ijk} - \left[ V^i_{ijk} + (n - 1) V^i_{ijk}' \right] \hat{a} + \Pi^i_{ijk} + \lambda (n - 1) \left( W^i_{ijk} \beta^2 + 2 W^i_{ijk} \beta \right) \quad (44d)\]

\[(i + 2\lambda) W^i_{ij} = W^i_{ij} - \left[ V^i_{ij} + V^i_{ij}' + (n - 2) V^i_{ij}'' \right] \hat{a} + \Pi^i_{ij} + \lambda (n - 2) \left( W^i_{ij} \beta^2 + W^i_{ij} \beta + W^i_{ij} \beta \right) \quad (44e)\]

\[(i + \lambda) W^i_{ijk} = W^i_{ijk} - \left[ V^i_{ijk} + V^i_{ijk}' + (n - 2) V^i_{ijk}'' \right] \hat{a} + \Pi^i_{ijk} + \lambda (n - 2) \left( W^i_{ijk} \beta^2 + 2 \beta W^i_{ijk} \right) + \lambda \left( W^i_{ijk} \beta^2 + 2 \beta W^i_{ijk} \right) \quad (44f)\]

\[(i + 2\lambda) W^i_{ij} = W^i_{ij} - \left[ V^i_{ij} + V^i_{ij}' + (n - 3) V^i_{ij}'' \right] \hat{a} + \Pi^i_{ij} + \lambda (n - 3) \left( W^i_{ij} \beta^2 + 2 \beta W^i_{ij} \right) + \lambda \left( W^i_{ij} \beta^2 + 2 \beta W^i_{ij} \right) \quad (44g)\]

Next, we linearize system (44) around a symmetric steady state \( \bar{\alpha} = \alpha (\infty) \) with zero inflation (and steady state values of aggregate variables \( \bar{C}, \bar{P} \)). Let lower case variables denote log-deviations, e.g., \( a (t) = \log \alpha (t) - \log \bar{\alpha} \), and write marginal
cost as

\[ mc(t) = p(t) + k(t) \]

where \( k(t) \) is the log-deviation of the real marginal cost. Profit derivatives such as \( \Pi^i_i(t) \) in (44) are evaluated at the moving price \( \alpha(t) \), hence become once linearized\(^\text{17}\)

\[
\begin{align*}
\pi^i_i(t) &= \bar{\alpha} \left[ \Pi^i_{ii} + (n-1) \Pi^i_{ij} \right] a(t) + \bar{MC}_{i,MC} \left( p(t) + k(t) \right) + \Pi^i_i \left( z_c(t) + z_p p(t) \right) \\
\pi^i_j(t) &= \bar{\alpha} \left[ \Pi^i_{ij} + \Pi^j_{jj} + (n-2) \Pi^j_{jk} \right] a(t) + \bar{MC}_{j,MC} \left( p(t) + k(t) \right) + \Pi^j_i \left( z_c(t) + z_p p(t) \right) \\
\pi^i_{ij}(t) &= \bar{\alpha} \left[ \Pi^i_{ii} + (n-1) \Pi^i_{ij} \right] a(t) + \bar{MC}_{ii,MC} \left( p(t) + k(t) \right) + \Pi^i_i \left( z_c(t) + z_p p(t) \right) \\
\pi^i_{jj}(t) &= \bar{\alpha} \left[ \Pi^i_{ij} + \Pi^j_{jj} + (n-2) \Pi^j_{jk} \right] a(t) + \bar{MC}_{ij,MC} \left( p(t) + k(t) \right) + \Pi^j_i \left( z_c(t) + z_p p(t) \right) \\
\pi^i_{jk}(t) &= \bar{\alpha} \left[ \Pi^i_{ijk} + 2 \Pi^j_{ik} + (n-3) \Pi^j_{kl} \right] a(t) + \bar{MC}_{ijk,MC} \left( p(t) + k(t) \right) + \Pi^j_i \left( z_c(t) + z_p p(t) \right)
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \bar{\Pi}^i_i, \bar{\Pi}^i_{ii} \) etc. denote steady state values.

This yields the system of 6 linear ODEs in \( \left( a(t), w^i_j(t), w^i_{ii}(t), w^i_{ij}(t), w^i_{jj}(t), w^i_{jk}(t) \right) \)

\(^{17}\)It is more convenient to linearize and not log-linearize profit derivatives, but we use the notation \( \pi^i_i(t) = \Pi^i_i(t) - \bar{\Pi}^i_i \).
In general there are thus 6 ODEs because $\beta$ may be time-dependent hence $b(t) \neq 0$. But note that if $b(t) = 0$ then the system becomes block-recursive and we can solve separately the first two equations in $a$ and $w_i$. From the optimality conditions we have

$$\dot{\beta} = -\bar{\alpha} \left[ w_{ii}^i [1 - (n - 1) \beta] + (n - 1) W_{ij}^i - \beta W_{iii} \right]$$

Using our perturbation argument we can show that there exists a third-order cross-elasticity $e_{iiij}^i$ such that at the steady state

$$V_{ii}^i [1 - (n - 1) \beta] + (n - 1) V_{ij}^i - \beta V_{iii} = 0 \quad (45)$$

where $V_{ii}, V_{jj}, V_{iii}$ are solutions to the system (43). Thus in what follows we consider
\( \beta \) as constant for the first-order dynamics to simplify expressions, although we could solve the larger system without this assumption.

The last step is to replace the single “reset price” variable \( a(t) \) with two variables, the aggregate price level \( p(t) \) and inflation \( \pi(t) = \dot{p}(t) \) using our aggregation result that inflation follows

\[
\pi(t) = \lambda \left[ 1 - (n - 1) \beta(t) \right] [\log a(t) - \log P(t)].
\]

After log-linearization we have

\[
a(t) = \frac{\pi(t)}{\lambda [1 - (n - 1) \beta]} + p(t).
\]

Therefore, we obtain in matrix form that the vector \( Y(t) = \left( \pi(t), p(t), w_i^j(t) \right)' \) solves the linear differential equation

\[
Y(t) = AY(t) + Z_kk(t) + Z_c(t) + Z_i \left[ i(t) - \rho \right]
\]

where \( A \in \mathbb{R}^{3 \times 3}, Z_k, Z_c, Z_i \in \mathbb{R}^3 \) collect the terms above (evaluated at the steady state), with boundary conditions \( \lim_{t \to \infty} Y(t) = 0 \). The solution is given by

\[
Y(t) = -\int_0^\infty e^{st} \left\{ Z_kk(t+s) + Z_c(t+s) + Z_i \left[ i(t+s) - \rho \right] \right\} ds
\]

where \( e^{sA} = \sum_{k=0}^\infty \frac{s^kA^k}{k!} \) denotes the matrix exponential of \( sA \). Proposition 8 then follows by taking the first component of \( Y \).

**Proof of Corollary 2.** Let \( [M]_i \) and \( [M]_{xy} \) denote the \( i \)th line and the \((x,y)\) element of a generic matrix \( M \) respectively. Let \( B(t) = Z_kk(t) + Z_c(t) + Z_r \left[ r(t) - \rho \right] \). Iterating \( Y(t) = AY(t) + B(t) \), we have for all \( k \geq 1 \)

\[
Y^{(k)}(t) = A^kY(t) + \sum_{j=0}^{k-1} A^jB^{(k-1-j)}(t).
\]
Taking the first line for each \( k = 1, \ldots, n = 3 \), we have \( n \) equations

\[
\frac{d^k \pi (t)}{dt^k} - \left[ \sum_{j=0}^{k-1} A_j B^{(k-1-j)} (t) \right]_1 = \left[ A^k \right]_{11} Y (t)
\]

which we can each rewrite as

\[
\frac{d^k \pi (t)}{dt^k} - \left[ \sum_{j=0}^{k-1} A_j B^{(k-1-j)} (t) \right]_1 - \left[ A^k \right]_{11} \pi (t) = \sum_{i=2}^{n} \left[ A^k \right]_{1i} y_i (t)
\]

Let

\[
M = \begin{pmatrix}
A_{12} & \cdots & A_{1n} \\
[\!A^2\!]_{12} & \cdots & [\!A^2\!]_{1n} \\
\vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
[\!A^n\!]_{12} & \cdots & [\!A^n\!]_{1n}
\end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times (n-1)}
\]

Take any vector \( \gamma^\pi = \left( \gamma_j^{\pi} \right)_{j=1}^{n} \) in \( \ker M' \) (whose dimension is at least 1), i.e., such that \( M' \gamma^\pi = 0 \in \mathbb{R}^{n-1} \). Then

\[
\sum_{k=1}^{n} \gamma_k^\pi \left( \frac{d^k \pi (t)}{dt^k} - \left[ \sum_{j=0}^{k-1} A_j B^{(k-1-j)} (t) \right]_1 - \left[ A^k \right]_{11} \pi (t) \right) = 0.
\]

and we can define \( \gamma_0^\pi = -\sum_{k=1}^{n} \gamma_k^\pi \left[ A^k \right]_{11} \). This simplifies to

\[
\ddot{\pi} = (A_{\pi\pi} + A_{\pi w}) \dot{\pi} \\
+ (A_{\pi p} + A_{\pi w} A_{w\pi} - A_{\pi\pi} A_{ww}) \pi \\
+ (A_{\pi w} A_{wp} - A_{\pi p} A_{ww}) \pi \\
+ A_{\pi w} B_{w} + \dot{B}_{\pi} - A_{ww} B_{\pi}
\]

(46)
H.1 One-time shocks

Given (17) we can guess and verify that $x = \psi_x e^{-\xi t}$ for all variables $x \in \{\pi, k, c, r - \rho, i - \rho\}$ and solve for the coefficients $\psi_x$ using the system

$$
\psi_\pi \left( \gamma_0^\pi - \gamma_1^\pi \xi + \gamma_2^\pi \xi^2 - \gamma_3^\pi \xi^3 \right) = \psi_k \left( \gamma_0^k - \gamma_1^k \xi + \gamma_2^k \xi^2 \right) \\
+ \psi_c \left( \gamma_0^c - \gamma_1^c \xi + \gamma_2^c \xi^2 \right) \\
+ (\psi_i - \psi_\pi) \left( \gamma_0^i - \gamma_1^i \xi + \gamma_2^i \xi^2 \right)
$$

and

$$
-\xi \psi_c = \sigma^{-1} (\psi_i - \psi_\pi - \epsilon_i^0) \\
\psi_i = \phi_\pi \psi_\pi + \epsilon_i^{m0} + (1 - \kappa) \epsilon_i^0
$$

Thus

$$
\psi_c = \frac{1}{\sigma \xi} \left( \psi_\pi (1 - \phi_\pi) + \kappa \epsilon_i^0 - \epsilon_i^{m0} \right)
$$

and

$$
\psi_k = \psi_c (\chi + \sigma)
$$

and

$$
\psi_\pi \left( \gamma_0^\pi - \gamma_1^\pi \xi + \gamma_2^\pi \xi^2 - \gamma_3^\pi \xi^3 \right) = \frac{1}{\sigma \xi} \left( \kappa \epsilon_i^0 - \epsilon_i^{m0} - \psi_\pi (\phi_\pi - 1) \right) \left[ (\chi + \sigma) \left( \gamma_0^k - \gamma_1^k \xi + \gamma_2^k \xi^2 \right) + \left( \gamma_0^c - \gamma_1^c \xi + \gamma_2^c \xi^2 \right) \right] \\
+ (\epsilon_i^{m0} + (1 - \kappa) \epsilon_i^0 + \psi_\pi (\phi_\pi - 1)) \left( \gamma_0^i - \gamma_1^i \xi + \gamma_2^i \xi^2 \right)
$$

which yields

$$
\psi_\pi = \frac{\kappa \epsilon_i^0 - \epsilon_i^{m0}}{\sigma \xi} \left[ (\chi + \sigma) \left( \gamma_0^k - \gamma_1^k \xi + \gamma_2^k \xi^2 \right) + \left( \gamma_0^c - \gamma_1^c \xi + \gamma_2^c \xi^2 \right) \right] + (\epsilon_i^{m0} + (1 - \kappa) \epsilon_i^0) \left( \gamma_0^i - \gamma_1^i \xi + \gamma_2^i \xi^2 \right)
$$
I Non-linear Duopoly

Figure 16: In white: convergence of value function iteration algorithm towards a monotone MPE in \((\lambda, \epsilon)\) space.