

# Market for votes and corporate control

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The purpose of the working group is to provide an up-to-date assessment of voting and control contests in corporations. It includes issues such as ownership concentration, one class-dual class, shareholder agreements, shareholder activism, vote buying. Participants will present recent articles, preferably among those tagged with a [\$]. Those marked with [S] are Surveys, with [\*] fundamental articles.

**Please register before January 8 at demange@pse.ens.fr**

**Schedule :** Tuesdays 2-4 p.m. : January 15, 22, 29, February 5, 13.

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#### Ownership/votes: one class or dual class?

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