Archives du séminaire Paris Game Theory Seminar
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 28/06/2021 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Online
Motivated by packet routing in computer networks, online queuing systems are composed of queues receiving packets at different rates. Repeatedly, they send packets to servers, each of them treating only at most one packet at a time. In the centralized case, the number of accumulated packets remains bounded (i.e., the system is stable) as long as the ratio between service rates and arrival rates is larger than 1. In the decentralized case, individual no-regret strategies ensures stability when this ratio is larger than 2. Yet, myopically minimizing regret disregards the long term effects due to the carryover of packets to further rounds. On the other hand, minimizing long term costs leads to stable Nash equilibria as soon as the ratio exceeds e/(e-1). Stability with decentralized learning strategies with a ratio below 2 was a major remaining question. We first argue that for ratios up to 2, cooperation is required for stability of learning strategies, as selfish minimization of policy regret, a patient notion of regret, might indeed still be unstable in this case. We therefore consider cooperative queues and propose the first learning decentralized algorithm guaranteeing stability of the system as long as the ratio of rates is larger than 1, thus reaching performances comparable to centralized strategies.
BOURSIER Etienne () Decentralized Learning in Online Queuing Systems
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 21/06/2021 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Online
We consider sender–receiver games in which the sender has finitely many types and the receiver makes a decision in a compact set. The new feature is that, after the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject in favor of an outside option. We focus on situations in which the sender’s approval is absolutely crucial to the receiver, namely, on equilibria in which the sender does not exit at the approval stage. We show that if the sender has only two types or if the receiver’s preferences over decisions do not depend on the type of the sender, there exists a (perfect Bayesian Nash) partitional equilibrium without exit, in which the sender transmits information by means of a pure strategy. The previous existence results do not extend: we construct a counter-example (with three types for the sender and type-dependent utility functions) in which there is no equilibrium without exit, even if the sender can randomize over messages. Communication equilibria without exit always exist in the three type case, and the question is open for 4 or more types.
RENAULT Jérôme () Strategic Information transmission with sender’s approval
Co-author: Françoise Forges
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 14/06/2021 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Online
We consider a problem where items arrive sequentially over time and two agents compete to choose the best possible item. We describe the game induced by the problem in two settings: one in which only take-it-or-leave-it strategies are allowed and another where it is possible to select an item that appeared in the past, if it is still available. We study the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoffs and we find tight bounds for the Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability of the latter setting when the number of arrivals is two.
PIZARRO Dana () On a competitive selection problem with recall
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 31/05/2021 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Online
To deal with issues of inconsistency faced by iterated elimination of weakly or strictly dominated strategies (IEWDS or IESDS), we propose a new elimination procedure. Our procedure, named iterated elimination of top dominated strategies (IETDS), is based on the new notion of top dominance. It is more consistent than IESDS in a certain sense. Top dominance is more restrictive than weak dominance (and may be more restrictive than strict dominance): it requires weak dominance and strict payoff domination of the strategy on a specific profiles set. Furthermore, it requires that the dominating strategy to be not weakly dominated. Contrary to IESDS, IETDS may reduce the set of Nash equilibria (whilst never eliminating strict Nash equilibria) without the problems of order dependence, mutability and spurious Nash equilibria encountered by IEWDS and IESDS.
PATTY Morgan () Top Dominance
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 17/05/2021 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Online
The talk is based on two papers. The first is joint work with Benoit Duvocelle, Mathias Staudigl, Dries Vermeulen, and the second with Benoit Duvocelle, Hui Min Shi, Dries Vermeulen.
Abstract: We introduce a discrete-time search game, in which two players compete to find an object first. The object moves according to a time-varying Markov chain on finitely many states. The players know the Markov chain and the initial probability distribution of the object, but do not observe the current state of the object. The players are active in turns. The active player chooses a state, and this choice is observed by the other player. If the object is in the chosen state, the active player wins and the game ends. Otherwise, the object moves according to the Markov chain and the game continues at the next period. We show that this game admits a value, and for any error-term epsilon>0, each player has a pure (subgame-perfect) epsilon-optimal strategy. Interestingly, a 0-optimal strategy does not always exist. We derive results on the properties of the value and the epsilon-optimal strategies. Moreover, we examine the performance of the finite truncation strategies. We devote special attention to the time-homogeneous case, where additional results hold. We also investigate a related model, where the active player is chosen randomly at each period. In this case, the results are quite different, and greedy strategies (which always recommend to choose a state that contains the object with the highest probability) play the main role
FLESCH Janos () A competitive search game with a moving target
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 10/05/2021 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
online
We present a model of repeated games in which players can strategically make use of objective ambiguity. In each round of the repeated game, in addition to the classic pure and mixed actions, players can employ objectively ambiguous actions by using imprecise probabilistic devices such as Ellsberg urns to conceal their intentions. We find that adding an infinitesimal level of ambiguity can be enough to approximate collusive payoffs via subgame perfect equilibrium strategies of the finitely repeated game. Our main theorem states that if each player has many continuation equilibrium payoffs in ambiguous actions, any feasible payoff vector of the original stage-game that dominates the mixed strategy maxmin payoff vector is both ex-ante and ex-post approachable by means of subgame perfect equilibrium strategies of the finitely repeated game with discounting. Our condition is also necessary.
DEMEZE-JOUATSA Ghislain-Herman () Repetition and cooperation: a model of finitely repeated games with objective ambiguity
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 03/05/2021 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
online
The secretary problem is a classic online decision problem. In this problem, an adversary first chooses some n numbers, then these numbers are shuffled at random and presented to the player one by one. For each number, the player has two options: discard the number and continue, or keep the number and stop the game. The player wins if she keeps the highest number of the whole set. It is clearly not possible to win all the time: when one decides to stop there might be a higher number in the rest of the sequence, and when one discards a number, it might actually be the highest of the sequence. But surprisingly one can win with probability 1/e. This has been known for several decades. An issue with the secretary problem is that it assumes that the player has absolutely no information about the numbers, which reduces its applicability. A recent research direction is to understand what happens when one knows a distribution or samples etc. We study a simple such setting for which we prove tight results.
FEUILLOLEY Laurent () The Secretary Problem with Independent Sampling
Co-authors: José Correa, Andrés Cristi, Tim Oosterwijk, and Alexandros Tsigonias-Dimitriadis
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 08/02/2021 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
online
A designer is privately informed about the state and chooses an information disclosure mechanism to influence the decisions of multiple agents playing a game. We define an intuitive class of incentive feasible information disclosure mechanisms which we coin interim optimal mechanisms. We prove that an interim optimal mechanism exists, and that it is an equilibrium outcome of the interim information design game. An ex-ante optimal mechanism may not be interim optimal but it is in leading settings in which action sets are binary. Likewise, in settings in which an ex-ante optimal mechanism is full disclosure then it is interim optimal. We relate interim optimal mechanisms with other solutions of informed designer problems.
Koessler Frédéric () Information Design by an Informed Designer
Co-author : Vasiliki Skreta
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 01/02/2021 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
online
We consider a general equilibrium productive economy with negative externalities. Investors seek to maximize returns, entrepreneurs profits, and a socially responsible fund social welfare. We show that the fund is able to raise assets and improve social welfare iff: (i) it commits to finance only firms that cap their emissions and (ii) capital allocation is subject to frictions. The fund should prioritize investments in companies with acute negative externalities and facing strong capital search friction. It can amplify its impact by imposing restrictions on the suppliers of the firms it finances. Investing in already clean sectors has no impact.
LOVO Stefano (HEC) Socially responsible finance: How to Optimize Impact?
Co-author : Augustin Landier
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 25/01/2021 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
on line
We study a dynamic sender-receiver game, where the sequence of states follows a Markov chain. The sender provides valuable information but gets no feedback on the receiver’s actions. Under certain assumptions, we characterize the set of uniform equilibrium payoffs with the help of a static cheap talk game, where the marginal distribution of messages is fixed. We show that the sender is able to bridge the value of commitment and secure the Bayesian persuasion payoff of the static game.
JAIN Atulya (HEC) Dynamic cheap talk with no feedback
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 19/01/2021 de 00:00:00 à 00:00:00
LARAKI Rida, laraki@poly.polytechnique.fr (HEC) Workshop Games, Approachability and Learning 
Texte intégral
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 18/01/2021 de 00:00:00 à 00:00:00
LARAKI Rida, laraki@poly.polytechnique.fr (HEC) Workshop Games, Approachability and Learning Texte intégral
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 11/01/2021 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Zoom : https://hec-fr.zoom.us/j/95796468806 ID de réunion : 957 9646 8806
Shapley operators of undiscounted zero-sum two-player games are order-preserving maps that commute with the addition of a constant. The fixed points of these Shapley operators play a key role in the study of games with mean payoff: the existence of a fixed point is guaranteed by ergodicity conditions, moreover, fixed points that are distinct (up to an additive constant) determine distinct optimal stationary strategies. We provide a series of characterizations of fixed point sets of Shapley operators in finite dimension (i.e., for games with a finite state space). Some of these characterizations are of a lattice theoretical nature, whereas some other rely on metric geometry and tropical geometry. More precisely, we show that fixed point sets of Shapley operators are special instances of hyperconvex spaces (non-expansive retracts of sup-norm spaces) that are lattices in the induced partial order. They are also characterized by a property of ``best co-approximation'' arising in the theory of nonexpansive retracts of Banach spaces. Moreover, they retain properties of convex sets, with a notion of ``convex hull'' defined only up to isomorphism. We finally examine the special case of deterministic games with finite action spaces. Then, fixed point sets have a structure of polyhedral complexes, which include as special cases tropical polyhedra. These complexes have a cell decomposition attached to stationary strategies of the players, in which each cell is an alcoved polyhedron of An type.
GAUBERT Stéphane (INRIA, CMAP, Ecole Polytechnique) The geometry of fixed points sets of Shapley operators
Marianne Akian and Sara Vannucci
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 04/01/2021 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
RAGEL Thomas (INRIA, CMAP, Ecole Polytechnique) TBA
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 14/12/2020 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
On line
MARLATS Chantal (LEMMA, Paris 2) Voluntary confinement
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 02/11/2020 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
We provide a simple refinement of sequential equilibria in generic finite extensive form games. In these equilibria, at information sets that are one (agent) deviation away from the equilibrium path, the beliefs put positive probability only on those nodes which can be reached by one deviation of an agent. Namely, multiple deviations of agents are infinitely less likely than a single deviation of a single agent. In generic games Mertens stable outcomes can be supported with such a belief.
LARAKI Rida, laraki@poly.polytechnique.fr (LEMMA, Paris 2) A simple refinement of sequential equilibria
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 12/10/2020 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
room 314 (third floor) at Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème.
We study receiver-optimal test design under manipulations by an agent who can falsify the data input of the test. We characterize an optimal test and an optimal falsification proof tests under different assumptions on the cost function, and discuss the welfare properties of such tests.
PEREZ-RICHET Eduardo (Sciences Po, département d’économie) Test design with unobservable falsification
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 05/10/2020 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
room 314 (third floor) at Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème.
We study the rational behaviors of participants in committee-based blockchains. Committee-based blockchains rely on specific blockchain consensus that must be guaranteed in presence of rational participants. We consider a simplified blockchain consensus algorithm based on existing or proposed committee-based blockchains that encapsulates the main actions of the participants: voting for a block, and checking its validity. Knowing that those actions have costs, and achieving the consensus gives rewards to committee members, we study using game theory how strategic players behave while trying to maximizing their gains.
AMOUSSOU-GUENOU Yackolley (Sciences Po, département d’économie) Is distributed consensus possible in committee-based blockchains?
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 28/09/2020 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
either amphi Hermite (ground floor) or room 314 (third floor) at Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
What is the role of biased mediators for reaching negotiated settlements in social conflicts? Previous empirical research in Political Sciences has suggested that mediators are often more effective if they are unbiased (or impartial).This research contributes to the previous debate following a game theoretic analysis. We study a model of cheap-talk in which an agent possesses private information about a binary state of the world. This information is required by an uninformed principal in order to take an action in the real line. Individuals have quadratic preferences, with a difference in their bliss point parameterized by a state-dependent bias parameter. Therefore, a conflict of interests between both parties arises because of a discrepancy in their bliss point. Provided that mediation is beneficial for at least one party, we show that whenever the variation of the bias across states is large enough, the agent will refuse to participate in a mediation process that is biased towards the principal. Otherwise, the mediator’s bias is inconsequential for reaching an agreement, hence a biased mediator is as effective as an unbiased one.
SALAMANCA Andrés (Sciences Po, département d’économie) Biased Mediators in Conflict Resolution
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 25/05/2020 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincaré - 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie - 75005 Paris
SHMAYA Eran (Sciences Po, département d’économie) *
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 18/05/2020 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincaré - 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie - 75005 Paris
SMOLIN Alex (Sciences Po, département d’économie) *
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 27/04/2020 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincaré - 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie - 75005 Paris
LOVO Stefano (Sciences Po, département d’économie) *
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 30/03/2020 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincaré - 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie - 75005 Paris
RENOU Ludovic (Sciences Po, département d’économie) *
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 16/03/2020 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincaré - 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie - 75005 Paris
LEVY John () *
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 09/03/2020 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincaré - 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie - 75005 Paris
Krähmer Daniel () *
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 02/03/2020 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincaré - 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie - 75005 Paris
ZSELEVA Anna () *
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 27/01/2020 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincaré - 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie - 75005 Paris
MERTIKOPOULOS Panayotis () *
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 20/01/2020 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincaré - 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie - 75005 Paris
MATYSKOVA Ludmila () *
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 13/01/2020 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincaré - 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie - 75005 Paris
GAUJAL Bruno () *
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 16/12/2019 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
Costly-signaling games have a remarkably wide range of applications (education as a costly signal in the job market, handicaps as a signal for fitness in mate selection, politeness in language). The formal analysis of evolutionary dynamics in costly-signaling games has only recently gained more attention. In this paper, we study evolutionary dynamics in two basic classes of games with two states of nature, two signals, and two possible reactions in response to signals: a discrete version of Spence’s (1973) model and a discrete version of Grafen’s (1990) formalization of the handicap principle. We first use index theory to give a rough account of the dynamic stability properties of the equilibria in these games. Then, we study in more detail the replicator dynamics and to some extent the best-response dynamics.
PAWLOWITSCH Christina () Evolutionary dynamics of costly signaling
Josef Hofbauer
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 09/12/2019 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
Dynamic network flows, or network flows over time, constitute an important model for real-world situations where steady states are unusual, such as urban traffic and the Internet. These applications immediately raise the issue of analyzing dynamic network flows from a game-theoretic perspective. In this paper we study dynamic equilibria in the deterministic fluid queuing model in single-source single-sink networks, arguably the most basic model for flows over time. In the last decade we have witnessed significant developments in the theoretical understanding of the model. However, several fundamental questions remain open. One of the most prominent ones concerns the Price of Anarchy, measured as the worst case ratio between the minimum
time required to route a given amount of flow from the source to the sink, and the time a dynamic equilibrium takes to perform the same task. Our main result states that if we could reduce the inflow of the network in a dynamic equilibrium, then the Price of Anarchy is exactly e/(e ? 1) ? 1.582. This significantly extends a result by Bhaskar, Fleischer, and Anshelevich (SODA 2011). Furthermore, our methods allow to determine that the Price of Anarchy in parallel-link networks is exactly 4/3. Finally, we argue that if a certain very natural monotonicity conjecture holds, the Price of Anarchy in the general case is exactly e/(e ? 1).
CORREA José () On the Price of Anarchy for flows over time
Andres Cristi and Tim Oosterwijk
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 02/12/2019 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
We show that several classical economic models such as two-sided matching models, min-cost flow problems, hedonic models, and dynamic programming problems are subcases of a more general class of problems called equilibrium flow problems. To analyze this problem, we introduce a novel notion of gross substitutes for correspondences called "multivocal gross substitutes". We show that this notion generalizes some familiar notions of substitutes (such as weak gross substitutes) while strengthening others (such as that of Kelso and Crawford). Our main result, the inverse isotonicity theorem, establishes that if an excess supply correspondence satisfies multivocal gross substitutes, then the inverse correspondence is isotone in the strong set order, extending to the corresponding case results by Berry, Gandhi and Haile (2013). As another consequence, extend the lattice structure results of Demange and Gale (1985) to general networks beyond the bipartite case.
Galichon Alfred () The equilibrium flow problem and multivocal gross substitutes
Larry Samuelson and Lucas Vernet
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 25/11/2019 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Centre Emile Borel, Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
Predtetchinski Arkadi () Arkadi PREDTETCHINSKI
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 18/11/2019 de 11:30:00 à 12:30:00
Centre Emile Borel, Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
MOULIN Hervé () Toto
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 11/11/2019 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Radja prenom ... () Test service info
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 04/12/2017 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
PRADELSKI Bary () *
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 20/11/2017 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
CORREA José () *
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 06/11/2017 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Salle 01 (RDC), Centre Emile Borel, Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, 75005 Paris
SAVANI Rahul () *
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 16/10/2017 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Salle 01 (RDC), Centre Emile Borel, Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, 75005 Paris
We study a discounted repeated inspection game with two agents and one principal.
Both agents may pro.fit by violating certain rules, while the principal can inspect on
at most one agent in each period, in.flicting a punishment on an agent who is caught
violating the rules. The goal of the principal is to minimize the discounted number of
violations, and he has a Stackelberg leader advantage. We characterize the principal's
optimal inspection strategy.
SOLAN Eilan () Optimal Dynamic Inspection
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 09/10/2017 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Salle 01 (RDC), Centre Emile Borel, Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, 75005 Paris
In many cases of practical interest, the players of a repeated game may not know the structure of the game being played - simply think of commuters driving to work every day, ignorant of the number of commuters at each part of the road. In such cases, it is often assumed that players follow a no-regret procedure, i.e. an updating policiy that provably minimizes each player's individual regret against any possible play of their opponents.
This talk focuses on the following question: does the sequence of play induced by a no-regret learning process converge to an equilibrium of the underlying stage game? I will present some recent contributions to this question (in both finite and continuous games), and I will discuss the impact of the feedback available to the players.
MERTIKOPOULOS Panayotis () No-Regret Learning in Games
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 27/06/2016 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
LARAKI Rida, laraki@poly.polytechnique.fr ()
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 20/06/2016 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
LARAKI Rida, laraki@poly.polytechnique.fr ()
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 13/06/2016 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
LARAKI Rida, laraki@poly.polytechnique.fr ()
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 06/06/2016 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
ZACCOUR Georges ()
SCHROEDER Marc ()
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 30/05/2016 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
LARAKI Rida, laraki@poly.polytechnique.fr ()
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 23/05/2016 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
LARAKI Rida, laraki@poly.polytechnique.fr ()
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 09/05/2016 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
RITZBERGER Klaus ()
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 11/04/2016 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
SANTAMBROGIO ()
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 04/04/2016 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
LOVO Stefano ()
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 21/03/2016 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
QUINCAMPOIX Marc ()
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 14/03/2016 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
ZILIOTO Bruno ()
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 07/03/2016 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
RADY Sven ()
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 15/02/2016 de 11:15:00 à 12:15:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
MANNOR Shie (Technion) Time Series Analysis Between stochastic and adversarial: forecasting with online ARMA model
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 08/02/2016 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
HERNANDEZ Penelope (Technion)
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 01/02/2016 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
LARAKI Rida, laraki@poly.polytechnique.fr (Technion)
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 25/01/2016 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
HEINRICH Max (Technion)
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 18/01/2016 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
FAURE Matthieu (Technion)
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 11/01/2016 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
KLIMM Max (Technion)
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 14/12/2015 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
Lessard Sabin (Technion)
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 07/12/2015 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
Kanade Varun (ENS)
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 30/11/2015 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
Babichenko Yakov (ENS)
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 23/11/2015 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
Predtetchinski Arkadi (ENS) Optimal Stationary Strategies for lim sup Stochastic Games
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 16/11/2015 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
Jehiel Philippe (PSE) Investment strategy and selection bias: An equilibrium perspective on overconfidence
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 09/11/2015 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
Hart Sergiu (the Hebrew University of Jerusalem) (1) The Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibria
(with Noam Nisan), and (2) Smooth Calibration, Leaky Forecasts, and Finite Recall (with Dean P. Foster)
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 02/11/2015 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
Wan Cheng (University of Oxford) Strategic decentralization in binary choice congestion games
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 03/12/2012 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare 11, rue pierre et marie curie – 7500
MENAGER Lucie (Universités Panthéon-Assas et Lille 1) Strategic observation in bandit models
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 26/11/2012 de 10:00:00 à 11:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare 11, rue pierre et marie curie – 7500
CARDALIAGUET Pierre (Université Paris Dauphine) Some aspects of mean field games
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 19/11/2012 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare 11, rue pierre et marie curie – 7500
FLESCH Janos (Maastricht University) On subgame-perfection in games with perfect information
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 12/11/2012 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare 11, rue pierre et marie curie – 7500
VIOSSAT Yannick (Université Paris Dauphine) No-regret dynamics and fictitious-play
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 17/09/2012 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pier
WEINSTEIN Jonathan (Northwestern University) Robustness in Repeated Games
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 30/04/2012 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 5, 314 ou 201
VENEL Xavier (TSE & Université Toulouse 1) A distance for probability spaces and long-term values in Markov Decision Processes and Repeated Games.
Co-author(s): J. Renault
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 02/04/2012 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 5, 314 ou 201
BALKENBORG Dieter (Exeter University) Strict equilibrium sets
Co-author(s): K. Schlag et D. Vermeulen
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 26/03/2012 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 5, 314 ou 201
KANDORI Michihiro (University of Tokyo) Asynchronous Revision Games
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 19/03/2012 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 5, 314 ou 201
BRAVO Mario (Université Paris 6) An Adjusted Payoff-Based Procedure for Normal Form Games
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 12/03/2012 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 5, 314 ou 201
VERMEULEN Dries (Maastricht University) *
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 05/03/2012 de 10:00:00 à 11:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 5, 314 ou 201
HAMADENE Said (Université du Maine) Multi-players Nonzero-sum Dynkin Game in continuous time
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 30/01/2012 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 5, 314 ou 201
LE TREUST Maël (Supélec) Correlation and min-max levels in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 23/01/2012 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 5, 314 ou 201
WOZNY Lukasz (Warsaw School of Economics) A Constructive study of Markov equilibria in stochastic games with strategic complementarities
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 16/01/2012 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 5, 314 ou 201
RIEDEL Frank (Bielefeld University) Strategic use of ambiguity
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 09/01/2012 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 5, 314 ou 201
SCARSINI Marco (LUISS) Monopoly pricing in the presence of social learning
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 12/12/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 5, 314 ou 201
ETTINGER David (Université Paris-Dauphine) o Deception in a repeated expert/agent interaction: theory and experiment
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 05/12/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 5 ou Salle 314 ou 201
MORTIMORT David (PSE) Aggregate Representations of Aggregate Games
Co-author(s): Lars Stole
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 28/11/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 5, 314 ou 201
MERTENS Jean-François (CORE, Université de Louvain) Shapley value with a continuum of agents: stable bridges with index 1; () ;
La séance est annulée
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 21/11/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 5, 314 ou 201
PERETZ Ron (Tel Aviv University) The entropy method and repeated games with bounded complexity
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 14/11/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 5, 314 ou 201
ZAPECHLNYUK Andriy (Queen Mary, Univ. of London) Eliciting Information from a committee
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 07/11/2011 de 10:00:00 à 11:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 5, 314 ou 201
SKRETA Vasiliki (NYU) Transparency and Commitment
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 31/10/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 5, 314 ou 201
SEREA Oana (Université Paris 6) Differential games and Zubov's method
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 24/10/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 5, 314 ou 201
WAN Cheng (Université Paris 6) Coalitions in nonatomic congestion games
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 17/10/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 5, 314 ou 201
HORNER Johannes (Yale University) Stationary equilibria in continuons-time games with private monitoring
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 10/10/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 5, 314 ou 201
LACLAU Marie (HEC Paris) Communication in repeated games played on a fixed network
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 03/10/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 5, 314 ou 201
OURY Marion (Université de Cergy) Continuous implementation: a full characterization for finite environments
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 27/06/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
CELIK Gorkem (ESSEC) Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 20/06/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
ABDOU Joseph (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne) Stability Index and Application to the Meet Game on a Lattice
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 06/06/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
LASAULCE Samson (Supelec) Multiuser channels and games
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 30/05/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
TOMALA Tristan (HEC) Belief-free communication equilibria in repeated games
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 23/05/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
SUDDERTH William (University of Minnesota) Perfect Information Games with Upper Semicontinuous Payoffs
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 16/05/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
HERINGS Jean-Jaques (Maastricht University) Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games: Structure, Selection, and Computation
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 09/05/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
TERCIEUX Olivier (PSE) Robust Equilibria in Sequential Games under Almost Common belief
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 02/05/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
Different people use language in different ways. Private information about language competence can be used to re ect the idea that language is imperfectly shared. In optimal equilibria of common interest games there will generally be some benefit from communication with an imperfectly shared language, but the efficiency losses from private information about language competence in excess of those from limited competence itself may be significant. In optimal equilibria of common-interest sender-receiver games, private information about language competence distorts and drives a wedge between the indicative meanings of messages (the decision-relevant information indicated by those messages) and their imperative meanings (the actions induced by those messages). Indicative meanings are distorted because information about decision relevant information becomes confounded with information about the sender's language competence. Imperative meanings of messages become distorted because of the uncertain ability of the receiver to decode them. We show that distortions of meanings persist with higher-order failures of knowledge of language competence. In a richer class of games, where both senders and receivers move at the action stage and where payoffs violate a self-signaling condition, these distortions may result in complete communication failure for any finite-order knowledge of language competence.
BLUME Andreas (University of Pittsburgh) Language Barriers
Co-auteur(s) : Oliver BoardTexte intégral
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 04/04/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
FAURE Mathieu (Institut de mathématiques de Neuchâtel) Stochastic Approximations, Differential Inclusions and consistency in games
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 28/03/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
MARUTA Toshimasa (Nihon University) Stochastically Stable Equilibria in n-person Binary Coordination Games
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 21/03/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
RÜDIGER Jesper (Universidad Carlos III) Biased Information Transmission
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 14/03/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
JEHIEL Philippe (PSE) Reputation with Analogical Reasoning
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 07/03/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
SABOURIAN Hamid (University of Cambridge ) Repeated Implementation
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 28/02/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
YOUNG Peyton (University of Oxford) Efficiency and Equilibrium in Trial and Error Learning
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 07/02/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
LESLIE David (University of Bristol) Controlled learning in games
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 31/01/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
BICH Philippe (Université Paris 1) Relaxed Nash Equilibria of Discontinuous Games
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 24/01/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
SOLAN Eilon (Tel Aviv University) Des jeux d'arrêt en temps continu
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 17/01/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
MATHIS Jérôme (TSE and University of Paris 8) Entrusting Decision Making to Experts
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 10/01/2011 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
HALPERN Joe (Cornell University) Beyond Nash Equilibrium: Solution Concepts for the 21st Century
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 13/12/2010 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
HAFER Catherine (New York University) Institutions for Debate
Co-auteur(s) : Dimitri Landa
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 06/12/2010 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
EHUD Kalai (Northwestern University) Stability in large Games with Heterogeneouns Players
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 29/11/2010 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
FLESCH Janos (Maastricht University) Strategic disclosure of random variables
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 22/11/2010 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
WEIBULL Jorgen (Stockholm School of Economics) Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 15/11/2010 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
RITZBERGER Klaus (University of Vienna) Applications of Index Theory in Nash Equilibrium refinements
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 08/11/2010 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
CRESSMAN Ross (Wilfried Laurier University) Game Experiments on Cooperation through Punishment or Reward
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 25/10/2010 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
HEIFETZ Aviad (Open University of Israel) Comprehensive Rationalizability
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 18/10/2010 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
LAMBERT-MOGILIANSKY Ariane (PSE) Games with Type Inderteminate Players: Strategic Manipulation of Preferences
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 11/10/2010 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
BATTIGALLI PierPaolo (University of Bocconi) Strategy and Interactive Beliefs in Dynamic Games
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 04/10/2010 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institute Henri Poicaré - Salle 314 ou 201
SOSIC Greys (University of Southern California) Stable Group Purchasing Organizations
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 28/06/2010 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
KOESSLER Frederic (PSE-CNRS) Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 14/06/2010 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
RENOU Ludovic (Univ. Leicester) Ordients: optimizations and comparative statics without utility function
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 07/06/2010 de 10:00:00 à 11:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare - Salle 314 ou 201
AMIR Rabah (Univ. Arizona) Discounted stochastic games with strategic complementarities.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 17/05/2010 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare Salle 314 ou 201
DHILLON Amrita (Warwick University) Corporate Control and Multiple Large shareholders
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 10/05/2010 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincaré - Salle 314 ou 201
TAKAHASHI Satoru (Princeton University) Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for delta ?1 and a Folk Theorem
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 03/05/2010 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
IHP - Salle 314 ou 201
KALAI Ehud (Northwestern University) Engineering Cooperation in Two Player Strategic Games
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 12/04/2010 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare
GENSBITTEL Fabien (Université Paris 1) Asymptotic behavior of repeated games with incomplete information and a linear payoff
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 29/03/2010 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare
SAMUELSON Larry (Yale University) Pricing in Matching Markets.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 22/03/2010 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare
ARIELI Itai (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Infinite sequential games with incomplete information.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 15/03/2010 de 11:00:00 à 12:00:00
Institut Henri Poincare
VIDA Peter (University of Vienna) Bidder-Optimal Signal Structure in a First Price Auction.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Le 00/00/0000 de 00:00:00 à 00:00:00
Salle 01 (RDC), Centre Emile Borel, Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, 75005 Paris
Abstract: In many cases of practical interest, the players of a repeated game may not know the structure of the game being played - simply think of commuters driving to work every day, ignorant of the number of commuters at each part of the road. In such cases, it is often assumed that players follow a no-regret procedure, i.e. an updating policiy that provably minimizes each player's individual regret against any possible play of their opponents.
This talk focuses on the following question: does the sequence of play induced by a no-regret learning process converge to an equilibrium of the underlying stage game? I will present some recent contributions to this question (in both finite and continuous games), and I will discuss the impact of the feedback available to the players.
MERTIKOPOULOS Panayotis (University of Vienna) No-Regret Learning in Games