Calendrier du 01 avril 2021
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 01/04/2021 de 16:00 à 17:30
Using Zoom
PACIELLO Luigi (EIEF)
Firm Adjustment in Worker Flows and Prices
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 01/04/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
Using Zoom
ADDA Jérôme (Bocconi)
There is more to Marriage than Love: The Effect of Legal Status and Cultural Distance on Intermarriages and Separations
écrit avec Paolo Pinotti and Giulia Tura
This paper analyses the marriage decisions of natives and migrants focusing on the role of legal status and cultural distance. We exploit a natural experiment, the successive enlargements of the European Union, that shifted the incentives of some groups of foreigners to marry natives. Using Italian administrative data on the universe of marriages and separations, we show that it profoundly changed the composition of mixed marriages. Access to legal status reduces by half the probability of immigrants intermarrying with natives. Building on this evidence, we develop and structurally estimate a multidimensional equilibrium model of marriage and separation allowing for trade-offs between cultural distance, legal status, and other socio-economic spousal characteristics, where individuals match on observed and unobserved characteristics. We quantify the role of legal status and the strength of cultural affinity and show how it relates to linguistic, religious or genetic distance.
Texte intégral
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 01/04/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
online
ISPANO Alessandro (CY Cergy)
Designing Interrogations
We provide an equilibrium model of interrogations with two-sided asymmetric information. The suspect knows his status as guilty or innocent and the likely strength of law enforcers' evidence, which is informative about the suspect's status and may also disprove lies. We study the evidence strength standards for interrogating and for drawing adverse inferences from silence that minimize prosecution errors. We consider scenarios where interrogations can be delegated. We describe the optimal mechanism under full commitment and a dynamic interrogation with two-sided information revelation implementing the optimum in equilibrium.
Behavior seminar
Du 01/04/2021 de 11:00 à 12:00
On line
KIFMANN Mathias (University Hamburg)
Rewards for information provision in patient referrals: a theoretical model and an experimental test
We study whether bonus payments for information provision can improve the information flow between physicians. We consider the situation of a primary care physician (PCP) deciding on the provision of information of varying qualities to a specialist while referring a patient. Our theoretical model, which includes altruism and the aversion to lose profit relative to a reference profit, predicts that bonus payments increase the provision of both high- and low-quality information. Running a controlled laboratory experiment we find support for this prediction. Moreover, we observe that in case that the beneficiary of information provision receives a higher payoff than the PCP, PCPs more often pass on high-quality information when the beneficiary is a patient instead of a specialist. In case that the beneficiary receives a lower payoff than the PCP, the type of the beneficiary (specialist or patient) does not affect the provision of high-quality information. As a consequence, specialists more often receive high-quality information when they earn smaller instead of larger profits than PCPs, while there is no such difference for patients. As such our observations suggest that the level of high-quality information transferred by PCPs depends on an interaction of who benefits from information provision and the payoff relation between beneficiaries and PCPs.