Calendrier du 02 novembre 2020
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 02/11/2020 de 17:30 à 18:20
HAMMAR Olle (Uppsalla University)
The Cultural Assimilation of Individualism and Preferences for Redistribution
In this study, I analyze the relationship between individualism and preferences for income redistribution and equality, using variation in immigrants’ countries of origin to capture the impact of cultural beliefs on individual preferences. Using global survey data for a large number of individuals and countries around the world, I find strong support for the hypothesis that coming from a more individualistic culture is negatively and significantly associated with an individual’s preferences for redistribution. The results are confirmed using a variety of robustness checks, including matching estimators and the grammatical rule of a pronoun drop as an instrumental variable. Cultural assimilation analysis, however, indicates that the impact of the cultural origin weakens off with time spent in the new country, and that the culture of origin has no statistically significant effect on an individual’s current preferences for redistribution if migration took place before the age of 10.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 02/11/2020 de 13:00 à 14:00
https://zoom.univ-paris1.fr/j/98263373635?pwd=QlduZzA3ZFdwbU5sMC90emJXOFRJUT09
ASSEM Hoda (PSE)
How Political Tensions Impact Trade: Evidence from Egypt
This paper explores the impact of low-intensity political conflicts on trade relations. In particular, I study the impact of political tensions based on United Nations voting data on Egyptian imports. Additionally, I explore specific channels through which political disputes may impact trade flows, particularly trade with state-owned firms (SOEs) and politically connected firms. For this purpose, a sectoral gravity model is estimated using customs data on Egyptian imports from 2005-2015, UNGA voting data to measure political tensions as well as sectoral data on state-owned and politically connected firms in Egypt. Results show that indeed political tensions have a significant negative impact on imports to Egypt. This impact is particularly significant for developing, non-EU and middle income countries as well as non-democracies. The negative impact of political tensions on Egyptian imports seems to come mainly from politically connected firms in the manufacturing sector, and from state-owned firms in the non-manufacturing sector where SOEs are larger and more productive.
Texte intégral
Du 02/11/2020 de 12:00 à 13:00
https://zoom.us/j/98281389413?pwd=cWxiVzVPdVdCYm1Ec2pDcDYybk5tQT09
écrit avec L. Jacobi and A. Allocca
As illicit substances move into legal product space, substitution patterns with legal products become more salient. In particular, marijuana legalization may have implications for use of other sin goods, such as alcohol and cigarettes, given their joint use pattern observed in the data. In this paper we introduce a model for illegal and legal products that is based on bundle choices to assess complementarities in a framework that models the patterns of observed joint usage. The estimation method allows for the analysis of substance price elasticities while controlling for persistence in use and addressing challenges coming from unobserved illicit substance prices and access restrictions. The empirical analysis investigates marijuana, cigarette and alcohol use among the high risk group of adolescents using pre-legalization data from the US. Our results inform the policy debate regarding the impact of marijuana legalization on the long-term use of sin goods.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 02/11/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00
We provide a simple refinement of sequential equilibria in generic finite extensive form games. In these equilibria, at information sets that are one (agent) deviation away from the equilibrium path, the beliefs put positive probability only on those nodes which can be reached by one deviation of an agent. Namely, multiple deviations of agents are infinitely less likely than a single deviation of a single agent. In generic games Mertens stable outcomes can be supported with such a belief.