Calendrier du 02 mars 2020
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 02/03/2020 de 17:00 à 18:30
salle R2-21, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
VIGIER Adrien (Oslo Business school)
Who Acquires Information in Dealer Markets?
écrit avec Jesper Rüdiger
We study information acquisition in dealer markets. We first identify a one-sided strategic complementarity in information acquisition: the more informed traders are, the larger market makers' gain from becoming informed. When quotes are observable, this effect in turn induces a strategic complementarity in information acquisition amongst market makers. We then derive the equilibrium pattern of information acquisition and examine the implications of our analysis for market liquidity and price discovery. We show that increasing the cost of information can decrease market liquidity and improve price discovery.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 02/03/2020 de 13:00 à 14:00
MSE, room 019
COTTERLAZ-CARRAZ Pierre (CEPII & Sciences Po (Department of Economics))
Information in the First Globalization: News Agencies and Trade
écrit avec Etienne Fize (Science Po & CAE)
This paper documents the effect of information frictions on trade using a historical large-scale improvement in the transmission of news: the emergence of global news agencies. The information available to potential traders became more abundant, was delivered faster and at a cheaper price between countries covered by a news agency. By exploiting differences in the timing of telegraph openings and news agency coverage across pairs of countries, we are able to disentangle the pure effect of information from the effect of a reduction in communication costs. Panel gravity estimates reveal that bilateral trade increased by 30 % more for pairs of countries covered by a news agency and connected by a telegraph than for pairs of countries simply connected by a telegraph.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 02/03/2020 de 12:00 à 13:00
salle R1-13, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
RHODES Andrew (TSE)
Dynamic Consumer Search
We consider a model in which firms sell differentiated products, and consumers are interested in buying repeatedly over time but need to search for price and product information. Firms and consumers turn over at an exogenous rate. We show that provided the search cost is not too large, the market exhibits pure strategy price dispersion. Specifically, older firms charge higher prices because they face a larger and `better-matched' demand. The fact that sellers gradually raise their prices over time also leads to rich consumer search and purchase dynamics. For example, consumers may initially search a lot for a product, return to the seller and buy for several periods, but then faced with successive price increases quit the firm and search again for a new product. We also provide conditions under which the ability of sellers to contact past customers and offer them personalized prices leads to higher consumer surplus.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 02/03/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00
Institut Henri Poincaré - 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie - 75005 Paris
ZSELEVA Anna ()
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