Calendrier du 03 octobre 2023
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 03/10/2023 de 17:00 à 18:00
R1-13
TZINTZUN Iván (PSE)
Extreme temperatures during pregnancy and adverse birth outcomes: Evidence from 2007 to 2019 Brazilian national birth data
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 03/10/2023 de 14:45 à 16:15
Sciences Po, 28 rue des Saints-Pères, 75007 Paris (M° Saint Germain des Prés), SALLE H 405
EGGER Peter (ETHZ)
How Uncertainty shapes the Spatial Economy
écrit avec Katharina Erhardt, Davide Suverato
We develop a dynamic general equilibrium trade model in which the economy is a collection of
spatially separated competitive markets and agents (workers/consumers) choose optimally where
to locate and seeking for a job. Agents are heterogeneous based on (i) their pre-determined choice
of a region, sector and occupation and, also, on (ii) a non-insurable risk of aging, that implies
a lower option value when changing region and job characteristics.
By solving for the resulting dynamic spatial quantitative model with labor mobility under
uncertainty we show that rational households behave differently compared to a setting with
perfect foresight (e.g. Caliendo et al., 2019). In particular, adjustment to shocks slows down,
with more people being stuck in poorer regions and higher inequality across regions and sectors
in the long run. Furthermore, greater volatility in the productivity of a job (holding constant
the mean) results in a strong decline in the attractiveness of those jobs. Using detailed administrative
French data, we quantify the productivity-loss-equivalent of a rise in uncertainty and
we document that the impact on the individual lifetime welfare of an increase in uncertainty is
comparable to the one of a medium-large negative productivity shock.
Texte intégral
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 03/10/2023 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2.21
THESMAR David (MIT)
The Effects of Mandatory Profit-Sharing on Workers and Firms: Evidence from France
Since 1967, all French firms with more than 100 employees are required to share a fraction of their excess-profits with their employees. Through this scheme, firms with excess-profits distribute on average 10.5% of their pre-tax income to workers. In 1990, the eligibility threshold was reduced to 50 employees. We exploit this regulatory change to identify the effects of mandated profit-sharing on firms and their employees. The cost of mandated profit-sharing for firms is evident in the significant bunching at the 100 employee threshold observed prior to the reform, which completely disappears post-reform. Using a difference-in-difference strategy, we find that, at the firm-level, mandated profit-sharing (a) increases labor share by 1.8 percentage points, (b) reduces the profit share by 1.4 percentage points, and (c) does not affect investment nor pro- ductivity. At the employee level, mandated profit-sharing increases low-skill workers’ total compensation and leaves high-skill workers total compensation unchanged. Over- all, mandated profit-sharing redistributes excess-profits to lower-skill workers in the firm, without generating significant distortions or productivity effects.