Calendrier du 03 février 2020
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 03/02/2020 de 13:00 à 14:00
MSE(106, Blv de l'Hôpital, salle 019) 75013 Paris
MARSHALIAN Michelle (DIAL, Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne, Dauphine)
Trade, Tariffs and Missing Imports: Using trade liberalization to understand business-state relations in Egypt
Over the past half a century, Egypt developed from a statist economy, with strong business-state relations, to a more liberal open-market economy as it slowly began opening up to international markets. Its entry into international markets came alongside several exogenous changes to trade policy. Exploiting a change in trade reform policies that aligned administrative, tariff and non-tariff barriers to international standards, I use a differences-in-differences method to measure the impact of trade liberalization reforms on import values, between industries where connected firms are known to exist, and those were no known connection exists. The outcomes show that the reduction of trade barriers associated with the reform, improved the inflow of imported goods to non-connected industries more than connected industries, suggesting a corrective impact of administrative simplification on the competitiveness between industries. I tested different explanations for the treatment outcomes and found evidence of tax evasion as an important strategy for firms in connected industries. When checking for heterogeneities by technological complexity of industrial output, the reform benefited non-connected industries more than connected industries, except for in natural resources and medium level manufacturing activities.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 03/02/2020 de 12:00 à 13:00
salle R1-13, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
FRANçOIS Manon (PSE)
Profit shifting and destination-based taxes
We study the impact of destination-based cash-flow taxation on tax competition and on adoption spillovers in a model with asymmetric countries. We build a model with endogenous tax rates and endogenous profit shifting in which countries choose between source-based and destination-based taxation. We find that tax competition is eliminated only if both countries use destination-based taxes and is reduced if one country unilaterally adopts destination-based taxes. We also find that countries do not have a clear incentive to be the first to adopt destination-based taxes but that a universal adoption is preferred to a unilateral adoption.