Calendrier du 03 avril 2019
Development Economics Seminar
Du 03/04/2019 de 16:30 à 18:00
Salle R2.01 Campus Jourdan, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
DIZON-ROSS Rebecca (University of Chicago, Booth School of Business)
Incentivizing Behavioral Change:The Role of Time Preferences
écrit avec Shilpa Aggarwal (Indian School of Business), Ariel Zucker (UC Berkeley)
How should the design of incentives vary with the time preferences of agents? We
formulate predictions for two incentive contract variations that should increase efficacy
for impatient agents relative to patient ones: increasing the frequency of incentive
payments, and making the contract “dynamically non-separable” by only rewarding
compliance in a given period if the agent complies in a minimum number of other
periods. We test the efficacy of these variations, and their interactions with time preferences,
using a randomized evaluation of an incentives program for exercise among
3,200 diabetics in India. On average, providing incentives increases daily walking by
1,300 steps or roughly 13 minutes of brisk walking, and decreases the health risk factors
for diabetes. Increasing the frequency of payment does not increase e?ectiveness,
suggesting limited impatience over payments. However, making the payment function
dynamically non-separable increases cost-e?ectiveness. Consistent with our theoretical
predictions, agent impatience over walking appears to play a role in non-separability’s
efficacy: both heterogeneity analysis based on measured impatience and a calibrated
model suggest that the non-separable contract works better for the impatient.
Texte intégral
Economic History Seminar
Du 03/04/2019 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R2.01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
MOHR Cathrin (University of Bonn )
Carrots and Sticks: Targeting the Opposition in an Autocratic Regime
Autocratic regimes can use carrots or sticks to ensure that they are not overthrown by their
opposition in the population. Carrots increase popularity of the regime, but also the incentives to show discontent. Sticks decrease the incentives to engage in opposition, but lower popularity.This paper looks at the joint allocation of resources and repression by considering the unique case of construction activity and military presence in the German Democratic Republic. Using a difference-in-differences approach, I ?nd that after an uprising in 1953 residential construction in municipalities that engaged in protests increased, compared to construction in municipalities without protests. Protest municipalities receive more military troops and are more likely to have hidden objects of the Secret Police. Construction especially increases after new military units are assigned to municipalities. This paper thus provides the ?rst empirical evidence that autocratic regimes do target their opposition with carrots and sticks, and that carrots are to some extent used as a means to alleviate the negative effect of sticks.