Calendrier du 03 mai 2021
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 03/05/2021 de 17:30 à 18:20
SEDOVA Barbora (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research)
Global food prices, local weather and migration in Sub-Saharan Africa
écrit avec joint with Lars Ludolph
In this paper, we study the effect of exogenous global crop price changes on migration from agricultural and non-agricultural households in Sub-Saharan Africa. We show that, similar to the effect of positive local weather shocks, the effect of a locally-relevant global crop price increase on household out-migration depends on the initial household wealth. Higher international producer prices relax the budget constraint of poor agricultural households and facilitate migration. The order of magnitude of a standardized price effect is approx. one third of the standardized effect of a local weather shock. Unlike positive weather shocks, which mostly facilitate internal rural-urban migration, positive income shocks through rising producer prices only increase migration to neighboring African countries, likely due to the simultaneous decrease in real income in nearby urban areas. Finally, we show that while higher producer prices induce conflict, conflict does not play a role for the household decision to send a member as a labor migrant.
Texte intégral
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 03/05/2021 de 17:00 à 18:00
online
NIKOLOWA Radoslawa (QMUL)
Corporate Capture of Blockchain Governance
écrit avec Co-authors: Daniel Ferreira, Jin Li
We develop a theory of blockchain governance. In our model, the proof-of-work system, which is the most common set of rules for validating transactions in blockchains, creates an industrial ecosystem with specialized suppliers of goods and services. We analyze the interactions between blockchain governance and the market structure of the industries in the blockchain ecosystem. Our main result is that the proof-of-work system leads to a situation where a large firm captures the governance of the blockchain.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 03/05/2021 de 13:00 à 14:00
https://zoom.univ-paris1.fr/j/92902544804?pwd=NFJlbWo5NUVVd01NUG5tMjQvRS9PUT09
MUNOZ-MORALES Juan (IESEG)
Traded Non Tradables: Offshoring Service Jobs Through Labour Mobility
This paper investigates how labour mobility policies can allow "non tradable" services to be offshored on-site, exposing new sectors and workers to foreign competition, and raising questions on whether destination or origin labour taxes should apply to these novel flows of workers. To shed light on this issue, I study the largest historical experiment of services exports mobility liberalization in the world: the European posting policy. Within the EU, firms are free to send their workers abroad in order to perform a service, while workers "posted" abroad are exempted from taxes in the destination country. Assembling novel and exhaustive administrative data on this continent-wide experiment, I show that the staggered lifting of posting mobility restrictions increased permanently international service provision by 500% within the EU. Cross-border services supply has also been highly responsive to tax rules applied to posted workers. Combining quasi-experimental tax reforms and a theory-consistent gravity estimation, I show that the elasticity of posting flows with respect to payroll cost differentials created by the scheme lies above 1. I then turn to the unequal distribution of these aggregate mobility-trade effects, both between and within countries. Liberalizing on-site offshoring redistributed economic activity and tax revenue to sending — mostly low-wage — countries, increasing non-tradable employment in sending countries by 17% and taxes paid at home by sending firms by 30%, while employment in exposed sectors in receiving countries decreases by 6%. Using detailed firm-level data, I show that workers' wage rate rise by 10%, while capital-owners increase their profits by 30%, after a firm starts posting workers abroad, implying that services suppliers in formerly non-tradable sectors captured 2/3 of the overall mobility-dependent export premium. I find that these gains however disappear when the posting mission ends, suggesting that non-tradable services sectors exhibit little "learning by exporting".
Régulation et Environnement
Du 03/05/2021 de 12:00 à 13:15
online
FABRA Natalia (uc3m)
Technology Neutral vs. Technology Specific Procurement
écrit avec Co-author : Juan Pablo Montero
An imperfectly-informed regulator needs to procure multiple units of some good (e.g., green energy, market liquidity, pollution reduction, land conservation) that can be produced with heterogeneous technologies at various costs. How should she procure these units? Should she run technology specific or technology neutral auctions? Should she allow for partial separation across technologies (technology banding or minimum technology quo tas)? Should she instead post separate prices for each technology? What are the trade-offs involved? We find that one size does not fit all: the preferred instrument depends on the nature of the available technologies, the extent of information asymmetry regarding their costs, the costs of public funds, and the degree of market power. Using Spanish data on recently deployed renewable energies across the country, we illustrate how our theory can shed light on how to more effectively procure these technologies.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 03/05/2021 de 11:00 à 12:00
online
FEUILLOLEY Laurent (LIRIS,CNRS, Université Lyon 1)
The Secretary Problem with Independent Sampling
écrit avec Co-authors: José Correa, Andrés Cristi, Tim Oosterwijk, and Alexandros Tsigonias-Dimitriadis
The secretary problem is a classic online decision problem. In this problem, an adversary first chooses some n numbers, then these numbers are shuffled at random and presented to the player one by one. For each number, the player has two options: discard the number and continue, or keep the number and stop the game. The player wins if she keeps the highest number of the whole set. It is clearly not possible to win all the time: when one decides to stop there might be a higher number in the rest of the sequence, and when one discards a number, it might actually be the highest of the sequence. But surprisingly one can win with probability 1/e. This has been known for several decades. An issue with the secretary problem is that it assumes that the player has absolutely no information about the numbers, which reduces its applicability. A recent research direction is to understand what happens when one knows a distribution or samples etc. We study a simple such setting for which we prove tight results.