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Programme de la semaine


Liste des séminaires

Les séminaires mentionnés ici sont ouverts principalement aux chercheurs et doctorants et sont consacrés à des présentations de recherches récentes. Les enseignements, séminaires et groupes de travail spécialisés offerts dans le cadre des programmes de master sont décrits dans la rubrique formation.

Les séminaires d'économie

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Atelier Histoire Economique

Behavior seminar

Behavior Working Group

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar

Development Economics Seminar

Economic History Seminar

Economics and Complexity Lunch Seminar

Economie industrielle

EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar

Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés

GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar

Histoire des entreprises et de la finance

Industrial Organization

Job Market Seminar

Macro Retreat

Macro Workshop

Macroeconomics Seminar

NGOs, Development and Globalization

Paris Game Theory Seminar

Paris Migration Seminar

Paris Seminar in Demographic Economics

Paris Trade Seminar

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

PhD Conferences

Propagation Mechanisms

PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar

Regional and urban economics seminar

Régulation et Environnement

RISK Working Group

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie

The Construction of Economic History Working Group

Theory Working Group

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Travail et économie publique externe

WIP (Work in progress) Working Group

Les séminaires de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Casse-croûte socio

Déviances et contrôle social : Approche interdisciplinaire des déviances et des institutions pénales

Dispositifs éducatifs, socialisation, inégalités

La discipline au travail. Qu’est-ce que le salariat ?

Méthodes quantitatives en sociologie

Modélisation et méthodes statistiques en sciences sociales

Objectiver la souffrance

Sciences sociales et immigration

Archives d'économie

Accumulation, régulation, croissance et crise

Commerce international appliqué

Conférences PSE

Economie du travail et inégalités

Economie industrielle

Economie monétaire internationale

Economie publique et protection sociale

Groupe de modélisation en macroéconomie

Groupe de travail : Economie du travail et inégalités

Groupe de travail : Macroeconomic Tea Break

Groupe de travail : Risques

Health Economics Working Group

Journée de la Fédération Paris-Jourdan

Lunch séminaire Droit et Economie

Marché du travail et inégalités

Risques et protection sociale

Séminaire de Recrutement de Professeur Assistant

Seminaire de recrutement sénior

SemINRAire

Archives de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Conférence du Centre de Théorie et d'Analyse du Droit

Espace social des inégalités contemporaines. La constitution de l'entre-soi

Etudes halbwachsiennes

Familles, patrimoines, mobilités

Frontières de l'anthropologie

L'auto-fabrication des sociétés : population, politiques sociales, santé

La Guerre des Sciences Sociales

Population et histoire politique au XXe siècle

Pratiques et méthodes de la socio-histoire du politique

Pratiques quantitatives de la sociologie

Repenser la solidarité au 21e siècle

Séminaire de l'équipe ETT du CMH

Séminaire ethnographie urbaine

Sociologie économique

Terrains et religion


Calendrier du 04 décembre 2023

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Du 04/12/2023 de 17:00 à 18:30

R1-09

SANDMANN Christopher (LSE)

Market Structure and Adverse Selection (with Dakang Huang)





This paper adopts a uni?ed perspective on multi-contracting in competitive markets plagued by adverse selection. We subsume the two polar cases of exclusive and nonexclu-sive competition by introducing the concept of a market structure, i.e., a trading rule thatspeci?es the subset of sellers with whom buyers can jointly trade. The existing literature shows that the market structure matters greatly in shaping competitive allocations, allow-ing for either separating allocations (as shown by Rothschild-Stiglitz) or layered pooling(Jaynes-Hellwig-Glosten) allocations. We prove the existence of intermediate “Pooling +Separating” equilibria that allow for simultaneous pooling and low-risk buyer separation.Crucially, those allocations alleviate at the same time the concern of excessive rationing under separation of and cross-subsidies paid by low-risk buyers. They oftentimes Pareto dominate the Rothschild-Stiglitz separating allocation. Our analysis singles out the “1+1”market structure where sellers are separated into two subgroups so that buyers can trade with at most one seller from each subgroup. Any “Pooling + Separating” allocation is an equilibrium here. Finally, we prove that “Pooling + Separating” allocations satisfy a notion of stability that we call serendipitous-aftermarket-proofness.

Econometrics Seminar

Du 04/12/2023 de 16:15 à 17:30

ZOOM

FORNERON Jean-Jacques (Boston University)

Occasionally Misspecified





When fitting a particular Economic model on a sample of data, the model may turn out to be heavily misspecified for some observations. This can happen because of unmodelled idiosyncratic events, such as an abrupt but short-lived change in policy. These outliers can significantly alter estimates and inferences. A robust estimation is desirable to limit their influence. For skewed data, this induces another bias which can also invalidate the estimation and inferences. This paper proposes a robust GMM estimator with a simple bias correction that does not degrade robustness significantly. The paper provides finite-sample robustness bounds, and asymptotic uniform equivalence with an oracle that discards all outliers. Consistency and asymptotic normality ensue from that result. An application to the “Price-Puzzle,” which finds inflation increases when monetary policy tightens, illustrates the concerns and the method. The proposed estimator finds the intuitive result: tighter monetary policy leads to a decline in inflation.



Texte intégral

Paris Migration Economics Seminar

Du 04/12/2023 de 12:30 à 13:30

R1.14

DUPAS Pascaline()
ROSSI Pauline(Ecole Polytechnique - CREST)
FALEZAN Camille()
MABEU Marie Christelle()

Long-run Impacts of Forced Labor Migration on Fertility Behaviors: Evidence from Colonial West Africa





Is the persistently high fertility in West Africa today rooted in the decades of forced labor migration under colonial rule? We study the case of Burkina Faso, considered the largest labor reservoir in West Africa by the French colonial authorities. Hundreds of thousands of young men were forcibly recruited and sent to work in neighboring colonies for one or two years. The practice started in the late 1910s and lasted until the late 1940s, when forced labor was replaced with voluntary wage employment. We digitize historical maps, combine data from multiple surveys, and exploit the historical, temporary partition of colonial Burkina Faso (and, more specifically, the historical land of the Mossi ethnic group) into three zones with different needs for labor to implement a spatial regression discontinuity design analysis. We find that, on the side of the border where Mossi villages were more exposed to forced labor historically, there is more temporary male migration to Cote d’Ivoire up to today, and lower realized and desired fertility today. We show evidence suggesting that the inherited pattern of low-skill circular migration for adult men reduced the reliance on subsistence farming and the accompanying need for child labor. We can rule out women’s empowerment or improvements in human and physical capital as pathways for the fertility decline. These findings contribute to the debate on the origins of family institutions and preferences, often mentioned to explain West Africa’s exceptional fertility trends, showing that decisions on family formation can change if modes of production change.

Régulation et Environnement

Du 04/12/2023 de 12:00 à 13:30

R1-09

DURRMEYER Isis (TSE)

*The Welfare Consequences of Urban Traffic regulations



écrit avec Nicolas Martinez




We develop a structural model to represent individual transportation decisions, the equilibrium road traffic levels, and speeds inside a city. The model is micro-founded and incorporates a high level of heterogeneity: individuals differ in access to transportation modes, values of travel time, and schedule constraints; road congestion technologies vary within the city. We apply our model to the Paris metropolitan area and estimate the model parameters from publicly available data. We predict the road traffic equilibria under driving restrictions and road tolls and measure the policy consequences on the different welfare components: individual surplus, tax revenues, and cost of emissions.