Calendrier du 05 juin 2023
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 05/06/2023 de 17:00 à 18:15
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 75014 Paris
HARRINGTON JOE (Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania)
*Cost Coordination
When firms engage in price discrimination under competition, they can face a trade-off when choosing to collude. In order to maintain price discrimination, upper-level executives may have to involve those lower-level employees with the demand information needed to tailor prices to markets and customers. However, that comes with an enhanced risk of the cartel's discovery. Alternatively, those executives could centralize pricing authority and coordinate on a more uniform price but that means foregoing some of the profits from price discrimination. Here we put forth a third option which is for upper-level executives to coordinate on inflating the cost used in pricing by lower-level employees. Coordinating cost reports is shown to be more profitable than coordinating prices when market heterogeneity is sufficiently great or firms' products are sufficiently differentiated. Recent cartel episodes in which executives coordinated list prices or surcharges are explained to have some of the crucial features of this collusive scheme.
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 05/06/2023 de 16:00 à 17:15
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-01
FERNANDEZ-URBANO Roger ()
Universal Basic Income: A Dynamic Assessment
écrit avec Diego Daruich
Universal basic income (UBI) is an increasingly popular policy proposal but there is no evidence
regarding its longer-term consequences. We find that UBI generates large welfare losses in a general equilibrium model with imperfect capital markets, labor market shocks, and intergenerational linkages via skill formation and transfers. This conclusion is robust to various alternative ways of financing UBI. By using observationally-equivalent models that eliminate different sources of endogenous dynamic linkages (equilibrium capital market and parental investment in child skills) we show that the latter are largely responsible for the negative welfare consequences.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 05/06/2023 de 12:00 à 13:15
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 75014 Paris
SUZUKI Shiba (Seikei University)
*Green Bonds and Term Premiums
This study tackles a public finance issue on climate change: a carbon tax and government bonds to finance public spending for adaptation. This type of bond is known as “green bonds” and presents remarkable growth in the global market. We construct an asset-pricing model in which climate change stochastically damages the TFP growth rate. The government can control the risk of such economic damage through a carbon tax to mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and government spending on adaptation. Additionally, the government raises funds by issuing bonds with different maturities. We demonstrate that green bonds yield term premiums in a dynamic economy if climate change has long-lasting economic impacts. This term premium on government bonds with different maturities serves as an arbitrage opportunity and enables the government to raise funds. We demonstrate that issuing green bonds can improve welfare compared to the balanced-budget policy.