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Programme de la semaine


Liste des séminaires

Les séminaires mentionnés ici sont ouverts principalement aux chercheurs et doctorants et sont consacrés à des présentations de recherches récentes. Les enseignements, séminaires et groupes de travail spécialisés offerts dans le cadre des programmes de master sont décrits dans la rubrique formation.

Les séminaires d'économie

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Atelier Histoire Economique

Behavior seminar

Behavior Working Group

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar

Development Economics Seminar

Economic History Seminar

Economics and Complexity Lunch Seminar

Economie industrielle

EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar

Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés

GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar

Histoire des entreprises et de la finance

Industrial Organization

Job Market Seminar

Macro Retreat

Macro Workshop

Macroeconomics Seminar

NGOs, Development and Globalization

Paris Game Theory Seminar

Paris Migration Seminar

Paris Seminar in Demographic Economics

Paris Trade Seminar

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

PhD Conferences

Propagation Mechanisms

PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar

Regional and urban economics seminar

Régulation et Environnement

RISK Working Group

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie

The Construction of Economic History Working Group

Theory Working Group

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Travail et économie publique externe

WIP (Work in progress) Working Group

Les séminaires de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Casse-croûte socio

Déviances et contrôle social : Approche interdisciplinaire des déviances et des institutions pénales

Dispositifs éducatifs, socialisation, inégalités

La discipline au travail. Qu’est-ce que le salariat ?

Méthodes quantitatives en sociologie

Modélisation et méthodes statistiques en sciences sociales

Objectiver la souffrance

Sciences sociales et immigration

Archives d'économie

Accumulation, régulation, croissance et crise

Commerce international appliqué

Conférences PSE

Economie du travail et inégalités

Economie industrielle

Economie monétaire internationale

Economie publique et protection sociale

Groupe de modélisation en macroéconomie

Groupe de travail : Economie du travail et inégalités

Groupe de travail : Macroeconomic Tea Break

Groupe de travail : Risques

Health Economics Working Group

Journée de la Fédération Paris-Jourdan

Lunch séminaire Droit et Economie

Marché du travail et inégalités

Risques et protection sociale

Séminaire de Recrutement de Professeur Assistant

Seminaire de recrutement sénior

SemINRAire

Archives de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Conférence du Centre de Théorie et d'Analyse du Droit

Espace social des inégalités contemporaines. La constitution de l'entre-soi

Etudes halbwachsiennes

Familles, patrimoines, mobilités

Frontières de l'anthropologie

L'auto-fabrication des sociétés : population, politiques sociales, santé

La Guerre des Sciences Sociales

Population et histoire politique au XXe siècle

Pratiques et méthodes de la socio-histoire du politique

Pratiques quantitatives de la sociologie

Repenser la solidarité au 21e siècle

Séminaire de l'équipe ETT du CMH

Séminaire ethnographie urbaine

Sociologie économique

Terrains et religion


Calendrier du 06 mai 2024

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Du 06/05/2024 de 17:00 à 18:30

DILLENBERGER David (UPenn)

Allocation Mechanisms with Mixture-Averse Preferences



écrit avec Uzi Segal




Consider an economy with equal amounts of N types of goods, to be allocated to agents with strict quasi-convex preferences over lotteries. We show that ex-ante, all feasible and Pareto efficient allocations give almost all agents binary lotteries. Therefore, even if all preferences are the same, some identical agents necessarily receive different lotteries. Our results provide a simple criterion to show that many popular allocation mechanisms are ex-ante inefficient. Assuming the reduction of compound lotteries axiom, social welfare deteriorates by first randomizing over these binary lotteries. Efficient full ex-ante equality is achieved if agents satisfy the compound independence axiom.

Paris Migration Economics Seminar

Du 06/05/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30

R1-14

EMERIAU Mathilde (SciencesPo)

In or Out? Xenophobic Violence and Immigrant Integration. Evidence from 19th century France



écrit avec Stephane Wolton




How do foreigners respond to xenophobic violence? We study Italian immigrants' response to anti-Italian violence triggered by the assassination of the French president by an Italian anarchist in June 1894. Using French nominative census records from 1881, 1886, 1891 and 1896 and official naturalization decrees published between 1887 to 1898, we study the decision of Italian immigrants to either leave their local communities or apply for naturalization using a difference-in-differences design, comparing the change in exit and naturalization application rate of Italians before and after the assassination to that of other foreigners in the same period. We document how xenophobic violence triggered an increase in both exits and naturalization applications, with greater violence or threat thereof associated with more exits. We also find that well-integrated Italians, as proxied by intermarriage, occupation, and position in the household, are more likely to naturalize and less likely to exit than less integrated ones and less integrated ones are more likely to exit. We present a stylized model of immigrants' choices to make sense of these findings.

Du 06/05/2024 de 12:00 à 13:30

R1-09

() *;

La séance est annulée

Régulation et Environnement

Du 06/05/2024 de 12:00 à 13:30

R1-09

OLLIVIER Hélène (PSE)

The Cost of Air Pollution for Workers and Firms





This paper shows that even moderate levels of air pollution, such as those found in Europe, harm the economy by decreasing firm performance. We estimate the causal effect of fine particulate matter pollution (PM2.5) on firms' monthly sales and worker absenteeism using matched employer-employee data from France from 2009 to 2015. We exploit variation in air pollution induced by changes in monthly wind directions at the postcode level. We find that a 10 percent increase in monthly PM2.5 exposure decreases sales in the following two months by 0.7 percent on average, with heterogeneous effects across sectors ranging from a 0.4 percent decrease in manufacturing, construction, and business-to-business trade and services, 1.0 percent in food retail and supermarkets, to 1.4 percent in other business-to-consumer services. Concurrently, worker absenteeism due to sick leave increases by 1 percent, underscoring the negative effects of air pollution on workers' health. Yet sales losses are an order of magnitude larger than we would expect if worker absenteeism was the main channel underlying sales decrease. A heterogeneity analysis by sector and industry highlights two other important mechanisms: a detrimental effect of air pollution on the productivity of non-absent workers, and on local demand. The results from our study suggest that reducing air pollution in line with the World Health Organization's guidelines generates economic benefits largely exceeding the cost of regulation in France.