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Programme de la semaine


Liste des séminaires

Les séminaires mentionnés ici sont ouverts principalement aux chercheurs et doctorants et sont consacrés à des présentations de recherches récentes. Les enseignements, séminaires et groupes de travail spécialisés offerts dans le cadre des programmes de master sont décrits dans la rubrique formation.

Les séminaires d'économie

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Atelier Histoire Economique

Behavior seminar

Behavior Working Group

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar

Development Economics Seminar

Economic History Seminar

Economics and Complexity Lunch Seminar

Economie industrielle

EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar

Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés

GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar

Histoire des entreprises et de la finance

Industrial Organization

Job Market Seminar

Macro Retreat

Macro Workshop

Macroeconomics Seminar

NGOs, Development and Globalization

Paris Game Theory Seminar

Paris Migration Seminar

Paris Seminar in Demographic Economics

Paris Trade Seminar

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

PhD Conferences

Propagation Mechanisms

PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar

Regional and urban economics seminar

Régulation et Environnement

RISK Working Group

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie

The Construction of Economic History Working Group

Theory Working Group

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Travail et économie publique externe

WIP (Work in progress) Working Group

Les séminaires de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Casse-croûte socio

Déviances et contrôle social : Approche interdisciplinaire des déviances et des institutions pénales

Dispositifs éducatifs, socialisation, inégalités

La discipline au travail. Qu’est-ce que le salariat ?

Méthodes quantitatives en sociologie

Modélisation et méthodes statistiques en sciences sociales

Objectiver la souffrance

Sciences sociales et immigration

Archives d'économie

Accumulation, régulation, croissance et crise

Commerce international appliqué

Conférences PSE

Economie du travail et inégalités

Economie industrielle

Economie monétaire internationale

Economie publique et protection sociale

Groupe de modélisation en macroéconomie

Groupe de travail : Economie du travail et inégalités

Groupe de travail : Macroeconomic Tea Break

Groupe de travail : Risques

Health Economics Working Group

Journée de la Fédération Paris-Jourdan

Lunch séminaire Droit et Economie

Marché du travail et inégalités

Risques et protection sociale

Séminaire de Recrutement de Professeur Assistant

Seminaire de recrutement sénior

SemINRAire

Archives de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Conférence du Centre de Théorie et d'Analyse du Droit

Espace social des inégalités contemporaines. La constitution de l'entre-soi

Etudes halbwachsiennes

Familles, patrimoines, mobilités

Frontières de l'anthropologie

L'auto-fabrication des sociétés : population, politiques sociales, santé

La Guerre des Sciences Sociales

Population et histoire politique au XXe siècle

Pratiques et méthodes de la socio-histoire du politique

Pratiques quantitatives de la sociologie

Repenser la solidarité au 21e siècle

Séminaire de l'équipe ETT du CMH

Séminaire ethnographie urbaine

Sociologie économique

Terrains et religion


Calendrier du 06 juin 2024

Du 06/06/2024 de 16:00 à 17:15

PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-21

BILAL Adrien (Harvard)

*


Travail et économie publique externe

Du 06/06/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30

PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R2-21

PIIL DAMM Anna (Aarhus University)

Co-Ethnic Neighbors and Assimilation



écrit avec Ahmad Hassani,Trine Skriver Høholt Jensen and Marie Louise Schultz-Nielsen




Economic theory predicts that a common language and culture facilitate social interaction. The value of assimilation is larger for an individual from a small minority than for one from a large minority. We test the theory and confirm it by exploiting a natural experiment in Denmark between 2004 and 2015, when refugee immigrants were assigned to neighborhoods quasi-randomly and language training was a condition for receiving social assistance. The assigned share of co-language neighbors reduces the probability of having completed a language course four years since arrival, irrespective of gender and skills. While the share of neighbors who speak their native tongue has little impact on the economic success of men, it increases women’s fertility and reduces their employment probability, earnings, and likelihood of working in communication- intensive jobs. Moreover, while favorable local labor market conditions improve individual labor market outcomes, they slow down the language course progression of men. Our results support the economic theory and have important implications for immigration and integration policies.



Texte intégral

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Du 06/06/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30

R1-14

ELMSAUHER Béla (PSE)

Level 0 specification in 3x3 games: an experiment





One regular critic of the level-k model is the level 0 specification, which is often chosen arbitrarily. In this experiment, I present multiple 3x3 games (2 players having 3 possible strategies) to understand what is the most realistic level 0 specification. The most commonly used level 0 specification is the uniform one (i.e. the level 0 plays randomly) and it can be compared to a maxmax level 0 (i.e. the behavior with the highest potential) and to a maxmin level 0. In my experiment these level 0 specifications are also compared to a cooperation strategy. In a pilot session with 62 participants, I found that subjects played quite heterogeneously with the cooperation strategy being played the most often

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Du 06/06/2024 de 12:30 à 14:00

Science Po

OUSS Aurélie (UPenn)

Conviction, Incarceration, and Recidivism: Understanding the Revolving Door



écrit avec joint with John Eric Humphries, Kamelia Stavreva, Megan Stevenson, and Winnie van Dijk




Noncarceral conviction is a common outcome of criminal court cases: for every individual incarcerated, there are approximately three who are recently convicted but not sentenced to prison or jail. We develop an empirical framework for studying the consequences of noncarceral conviction by extending the binary-treatment judge IV framework to settings with multiple treatments. We outline assumptions under which widely-used 2SLS regressions recover margin-specific treatment effects, relate these assumptions to models of judge decision-making, and derive an expression that provides intuition about the direction and magnitude of asymptotic bias when they are not met. Under the identifying assumptions, we find that noncarceral conviction (relative to dismissal) leads to a large and long-lasting increase in recidivism for felony defendants in Virginia. In contrast, we find that incarceration relative to noncarceral conviction leads to a short-run reduction in recidivism, consistent with incapacitation. %We argue that, while it is unlikely that the assumptions on judge decision-making hold exactly in our data, their violation is unlikely to overturn our qualitative findings regarding the effect of conviction. We argue that failure of the assumptions restricting judge decision making is unlikely to change our qualitative findings regarding the effect of conviction. Lastly, we introduce an alternative empirical strategy, and find that it yields similar estimates. Collectively, our results suggest that noncarceral felony conviction is an important and potentially overlooked driver of recidivism.

Behavior Working Group

Du 06/06/2024 de 10:00 à 11:00

R1.09

GALLEGATI Giacomo (PSE)
GALLEGATI Giacomo (PSE)

Don’t judge the paper by its cover





Biases in the peer review process can result in disparities in how scholarly work is assessed, unfairly affecting the careers and opportunities of researchers. In this paper, we conduct a randomised field experiment to explore the role of affiliation biases in the peer review process of an early career workshop in economics. When affiliation is displayed, we find significant increases in paper grades and the probability of being accepted to the conference