Calendrier du 07 novembre 2023
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 07/11/2023 de 14:45 à 16:15
Sciences Po, 28 rue des Saints-Pères, 75007 Paris (M° Saint Germain des Prés), SALLE H 405
BOLER Esther Ann (Imperial AC)
Strapped for cash: the role of financial constraints for innovating firms
écrit avec Andreas Moxnes and Karen Helene Ulltveit-Moe
This paper makes use of a reform that allowed firms to use patents as stand-alone collateral, to estimate the magnitude of collateral constraints and to quantify the aggregate impact of these constraints on misallocation and productivity. Using detailed firm- and matched firm-bank data for Norway, we find that bank borrowing increased for firms affected by the reform relative to the control group. We also find an increase in the capital stock, employment and innovation as well as equity funding. We interpret the results through the lens of a model of monopolistic competition with potentially collateral constrained heterogeneous firms. Parameterizing the model using well-identified moments from the reduced form exercise, we find quantitatively large gains in output per worker in the sectors in the economy dominated by constrained (and intangible-intensive) firms. The gains are primarily driven by capital deepening, whereas within-industry misallocation plays a smaller role.
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 07/11/2023 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2.21
FRéMEAUX Nicolas (LEMMA, Université Paris Panthéon-Assas)
Less but better? The influence of gender on political activity
écrit avec Paul Maarek
In this article, we study gender differences in the quality of parliamentarians by studying their activity and effectiveness. We collected detailed data on French parliamentarians between 1993 and 2022. Using fixed-effect regressions and RDD strategies based on close elections, we find than women are more active than men when we consider reports and oral questions but less active when it comes to bills, amendments and oral interventions. The gap for bills (large and statistically significant) is observed only for newcomers and fades after a few years, suggesting a behavioral explanation rather than a selection effect. Regarding effectiveness, female parliamentarians are more likely to have their amendments passed. This is mostly due to the use and the quality of their amendments, which again suggests a behavioral explanation. On the other hand, women in the opposition party are less likely to have their bills passed than men in the opposition party. This is linked to discrimination within the party, which less often selects bills drafted by women to submit them to a vote.