Calendrier du 07 décembre 2017
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 07/12/2017 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris - salle R2-21
BANERJEE Abhijit (MIT)
*Trade, Capital Markets and Inequality
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 07/12/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan, 48 bd Jourdan - 75014 Paris
CARAYOL Nicolas (Université de Bordeaux )
Evaluating the underlying qualities of items and raters from a series of reviews
écrit avec joint with M. Jackson
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 07/12/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30
STANCANELLI Elena (PSE)
Partial retirement and partners' labor supply: learning from a Norwegian retirement reform
Flexible partial retirement stands out among policies aimed at extending individual working lives. Because most people of retirement age are partnered and likely plan their retirement together, partial retirement of one partner may impact labor supply of the other. We exploit a 2011 pension reform in Norway that incentivized partial retirement for some workers but not for others, focusing on couples in which only one partner directly faced changed incentives. Drawing on employer-employee register data matched with records from social security and population registers and using a difference-in-differences setup, we find that, for both men and women, the reform increased own labor supply by 5 to 7 hours per week and reduced the probability of full retirement by 20 percentage points. The reform also increased labor supply of wives of treated husbands by 1 to 2 hours per week and reduced their full retirement rate by 4 to 6 percentage points. In line with asymmetries in spousal employment responses found in prior studies, we do not uncover similar indirect effects for husbands of treated wives.
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 07/12/2017 de 12:30 à 14:00
salle H402, Sciences Po - 28 rue des Saints-Pères, 75007 Paris
KRANTON Rachel (Duke University )
Deconstructing Group Bias: Individual Groupiness and Income Allocation
écrit avec Rachel Kranton, Matthew Pease, Seth Sanders, and Scott Huettel
This paper finds significant, divergent patterns in how people allocate income in group
settings. The results indicate that the tendency to favor people conditional on group affiliation,
which we call “groupiness,” could be an individual trait. Each participant allocates income in
two group treatments, an arbitrary minimal group setting and a political group setting. Many
subjects are “not groupy,” showing no favoritism to ingroup in either setting; others are “groupy,”
with equally positive favoritism in both. Less than half of subjects are “conditionally groupy,”
with greater favoritism in the political group treatment. Using latent class models, we structurally
identify nine distinct patterns of behavior. The most prevalent type, 23% of subjects, weighs own
and other subjects’ income similarly regardless of group affiliation of others; the second most
prevalent type, 20%, puts almost no weight on other subjects’ income regardless of group
affiliation of others. Both show no ingroup favoritism albeit in different ways. Twelve percent of
subjects’ have particularly high favoritism in both settings. Overall, three of our nine types are
not groupy, three are groupy, and three are conditionally groupy. Thus, observed bias in a group
setting might not be due to the nature of the setting but rather the selection or composition of
individuals within the group.