Calendrier du 07 décembre 2023
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 07/12/2023 de 16:00 à 17:15
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-21
PRATO Marta (Bocconi)
*Career Choice of Entrepreneurs and the Rise of Smart Firms
écrit avec Ufuk Akcigit, Harun Alp, and Jeremy Pearce
New technologies emerge and translate into economic growth through the team effort of inventors, entrepreneurs and production workers. This paper provides a unified life-cycle framework to characterize the population split across these three groups and connects the relationship between entrepreneurs and inventors to economic growth. We proceed by inking detailed micro-data from Denmark on individual entrepreneurs, inventors, workers, and firms to a novel quantitative endogenous growth model with occupational sorting and matching between inventors and entrepreneurs. Empirically, we find that while parental exposure is a key determinant of entrepreneurship, sorting into inventing occupations is primarily determined by education and IQ. Entrepreneurs with higher ability, as proxied by IQ, hire more inventors, hire inventors of higher ability, create more innovative firms and grow faster. Further, entrepreneurs who went to a school that has more high-IQ students hire more and better R&D workers, conditional on their own talent. We build the quantitative model based on this evidence and use it to characterize how entrepreneurs and inventors stimulate economic growth. Individuals self-select into different occupations and entrepreneurship depending on their characteristics (e.g., background, talent, preferences) and entrepreneurs assemble teams in order to innovate and grow firms. The model highlights the importance of assortative matching between talented entrepreneurs and inventors for the rise of successful firms. In addition to matching the data, the model admits various counterfactuals to study the underlying mechanics of entrepreneurs and inventors. We find that the assortative matching between entrepreneurs and R&D workers explains 7% of economic growth and 14% of firm growth, indicating the importance of matching the right team early in the firm.
Du 07/12/2023 de 16:00 à 17:00
R1.14
VONYO Tamas ()
War and Socialism: Economic Backwardness in Eastern Europe, monograph in preparation
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 07/12/2023 de 12:30 à 14:00
R2.21
RO'EE LEVY Jonathan (Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics)
Decomposing the Rise of the Populist Radical Right
Support for populist radical right parties in Europe has dramatically increased in recent years. We decompose the rise of these parties from 2005 to 2020 into four components: shifts in party positions, changes in voter attributes (opinions and demographics), changes in voter priorities, and a residual. We merge two wide datasets on party positions and voter attributes and estimate voter priorities using a probabilistic voting model. We find that shifts in party positions and changes in voter attributes do not play a major role in the recent success of populist radical right parties. Instead, the primary driver behind their electoral success lies in voters' changing priorities. Particularly, voters are less likely to decide which party to support based on parties' economic positions. Rather, voters---mainly older, nonunionized, low-educated men---increasingly prioritize nativist cultural positions. This allows populist radical right parties to tap into a preexisting reservoir of culturally conservative voters. Using the same datasets, we provide a set of reduced-form evidence supporting our results. First, while parties' positions have changed, these changes are not consistent with the main supply-side hypothesis for populist support. Second, on aggregate, voters have not adopted populist right-wing opinions. Third, voters are more likely to self-identify ideologically based on their cultural rather than their economic opinions.
Texte intégral
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 07/12/2023 de 12:30 à 13:30
R1-15
KIRNEVA Margarita (CREST)
Informing to Divert Attention
I study a multidimensional Sender-Receiver game in which Receiver can acquire limited information after observing the Sender's signal. Depending on the parameters describing the conflict of interest between Sender and Receiver, I characterise optimal information disclosure and the information acquired by Receiver as a response. I show that in the case of partial conflict of interests (aligned on some dimensions and misaligned on others) Sender uses the multidimensionality of the environment to divert Receiver's attention away from the dimensions of misalignment of interests. Moreover, there is negative value of information in the sense that Receiver would be better off if she could commit not to extract private information or to have access to information of lower quality. I present applications to informational lobbying and consumer's choice.
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 07/12/2023 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09
WREN-LEWIS Liam (Paris School of Economics / INRAE. )
The impact of childhood inter-ethnic contact on hiring decisions
This paper analyzes whether inter-ethnic contact in childhood affects the hiring behavior of managers. To overcome selection bias, we exploit quasi-random variation in the share of immigrant students across cohorts within Danish schools. Using administrative employer-employee data, we find that more immigrant peers of the same gender in school lead Danish managers to hire more immigrants later in life. We do not find any evidence that this relationship is driven by economic opportunities.
Behavior seminar
Du 07/12/2023 de 11:00 à 12:00
R2.21
SHOGREN Jason (University of Wyoming, USA) *;
La séance est annulée