Calendrier du 07 mai 2018
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 07/05/2018 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
DEBASIS Mishra (India Statistical Institute Dehli)
Selling to a naive agent with two rationales
A seller is selling an object to an agent who uses two rationales to compare pairs
of outcomes - (allocation probability, transfer) pairs. Each rationale is generated by
quasilinear preference over the outcome space, and hence, can be represented by a val-
uation. However, the agent faces a budget constraint when making decisions using the
rst rationale. The agent compares any pair of outcomes using his pair of valuations
in a lexicographic manner: rst, he compares using the valuation corresponding to the
rst rationale; then, he compares using the valuation corresponding to the second ra-
tionale if and only if the rst rationale cannot compare (due to budget constraint). We
show that the optimal mechanism is either a posted price mechanism or a mechanism
involving a pair of posted prices (a menu of three outcomes). In the latter case, the
optimal mechanism involves randomization and pools types in the middle.