Calendrier du 07 mai 2020
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 07/05/2020 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - Using ZOOM https://zoom.us/j/98487882758?pwd=eWxMT2NIdDBaZjNXUW4wdkVCbVBjUT09
SCHILLING Linda (Polytechnique)
Cryptocurrencies, Currency Competition, and the Impossible Trinity
We analyze a two-country economy with complete markets, featuring two national currencies as well as a global (crypto)currency. If the global currency is used in both countries, the national nominal interest rates must be equal and the exchange rate between the national currencies is a risk- adjusted martingale. We call this result 'Crypto-Enforced Monetary Policy Synchronization (CEMPS)'. Deviating from interest equality risks approaching the zero lower bound or the abandonment of the national currency. If the global currency is backed by interest-bearing assets, additional and tight restrictions on monetary policy arise. Thus, the classic Impossible Trinity becomes even less reconcilable.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 07/05/2020 de 14:00 à 15:00
online
GHOSH Rajarshi (ESSEC)
ZOOM. Optimal Identification: An Equilibrium Model of Decision Making under Uncertainty in a Social Context
In the economic literature, there is little behavioral foundation for why and how people use their social identity in decision making. This paper presents an equilibrium model that studies the use of social identity in decision making under uncertainty through the interaction between the agent and her social context. The uncertainty in the decision-making process stems from the fact that agents only have access to noisy private data about their ability type. Agents learn from experience whether they will consider data related to their social identity when they process this private data into an estimate of the probability of success of a task. With the use of their social identity, agent's aim to maximize the likelihood that they will make the welfare-maximizing choice, given the possible realizations of their private data. The model shows therefore that agents use their social identity to reduce the uncertainty in decision making, which shows that choice behavior can be driven by the agents' observable characteristics, even when these observable characteristics have no direct effect on the agents' utility. I derive the conditions under which a social identity becomes salient and show that agents choose the identity from the set of salient identities that best reduces uncertainty given the cost of adoption of this identity. Through a selection, population and minority effect, the agents' perception of the social context is self-reinforcing and both asymmetric and symmetric population equilibria co-exist. Finally, I analyze the implications for labor market outcomes and I derive the necessary demand-side conditions for effective affirmative action policy.
Behavior seminar
Du 07/05/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00
online
BROOME John (University of Oxford)
ZOOM - Population, separability and discounting
When economists aggregate people’s wellbeing to make judgement about the overall good of a society, they sometimes discount later wellbeing compared with earlier wellbeing. This makes good sense only if all wellbeing is dated, which implies that wellbeing is separable across times. But this sort of separability makes it hard to take proper account of the value of extending people’s lives. Any solution to this problem will depend on a theory about the value of population. The upshot is that any theory of discounting is committed to a particular ethics of population.
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 07/05/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00
Using ZOOM
KIRCHER Philipp (EUI)
Eliciting time preferences under changing background consumption - the case of job search
écrit avec Michele Belot and Paul Muller
We propose a new method of eliciting individual time preference measures in settings where background consumption might vary substantially. The method relies on allocating lottery tickets with low winning probabilities but high rewards. In standard intertemporal choice models, but even in many non-standard ones, the high reward decouples the allocation of lottery tickets from the current and expected future background consumption levels (i.e., from changes in wealth and other income over time). Standard time preference measures elicit the marginal value of money across different periods of time. If consumption remains constant, in standard models this identifies the discount factor. If consumption is volatile, it measures the discount factor and changes in the marginal consumption utility. Consider a hand-to-mouth job seeker who receives unemployment benefits currently but expects to obtain well-paying job next period. Compare him to a similar individual with the only difference that he does not expect to find a job next period. Even with identical discount factor the former has less need of additional money in the second period because he expects to earn well, so will appear more eager to take current payments than future ones compared to the second. Without further controls he appears to have a lower discount factor. Our high-stakes lottery method intends to isolate the pure discount factor effect by offering rewards far outside the current range of consumption. We show within standard theories that this indeed uncovers the true discount factor independently from expectations about the consumption stream. We also show how this extends to environments with non-standard preferences, and with savings, and show that our measure still ordered individuals correctly. We validate our method on experimentally on two student samples drawn from the same pool. They are subjected to a standard time preference elicitation method, and to our method. One set of students is asked about discount factors in December at a time when their current budget is reduced by extraordinary expenditures for Christmas and Saint Nicholas gifts. The other one is asked in February when no such extra constraints exist. Our hypothesis is that both groups share the same true discount factor, but the former have less consumption now then in the future and therefore value current money higher. We expect this not to a?ect our measure, but the standard one. We also expect both measures to correlate well for the second group without income shocks, but not for the first. Finally, we apply our method to elicit discount factors from unemployed job seekers which naturally have varying income streams. We show a low degree of present bias, and are in the process of studying e?ects on job findings, reservation wages and effort over time.
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 07/05/2020
RUIZ Celia (PSE)
POSTPONED