Calendrier du 07 mai 2024
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 07/05/2024 de 14:30 à 16:00
PSE, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-01
GUIGUE Etienne (ENSAE)
Markups and Markdowns in the French Dairy Market
écrit avec Rémi Avignon
Separately measuring firm buyer and seller power is important for policy-making, but chal-
lenging. In this paper, we suggest a new methodology to do so and apply it to French dairy
processors. These firms exert buyer power when purchasing raw milk, and seller power when
marketing dairy products. The analysis is based on plant-level data on dairy firms, with obser-
vations on prices and quantities of raw-milk input by origin and output by product from 2003
to 2018. We rely on a production function approach to estimate total margins. The existence
of a commodity, (i) substitutable as an input or as an output, and (ii) exchanged on global
markets where firms are price-takers, allows us to separately estimate firm-origin markdowns
and firm-product markups. We show this methodology can also be useful in other contexts,
with more limited data. Markdown estimates imply that dairy firms on average purchase raw
milk at a price 16% below its marginal contribution to their profits, while markup estimates
indicate that firms sell dairy products at a price exceeding their marginal costs by 41%. Our re-
sults show substantial variations in buyer and seller power exploitation across firms, products,
and time. We analyze how shocks to local farmer costs and international commodity prices
pass through the supply chain. Processors partially absorb such shocks by adjusting markups
and markdowns, thus smoothing variations in farmer revenues. It further implies that 65% of
subsidies are currently diverted from farmers due to processor buyer power. A price floor on
raw milk could be an alternative welfare-improving policy.
Texte intégral
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 07/05/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30
R1-09
LLEONART ANGUIX Manuel (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
Firm Organization Under Cover-Ups
This paper explores the dynamics of optimal organizational hierarchies in environments where supervisors may engage in cover-ups upon detecting mistakes. Employing a theoretical model, I investigate how firm size, the cost of mistakes, and their probability influence the wage structure within firms. I discuss the potential implications of organizational culture and the likelihood of cover-ups on the optimal firm hierarchy. This study contributes to the understanding of optimal organizational design and provides insights for firms seeking to mitigate the risks associated with errors and cover-ups in hierarchical structures
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 07/05/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30
R2-21
TOCHEV Todor (IPP)
Financial Support and Training Participation for Job-Seekers: Evidence from France
How does financial support affect job-seeker participation in adult vocational training? To answer this question, I focus on a 2019 reform in France using a triple-differences methodology that exploits variation over regions, time, and eligibility. Increased monthly financial support only increases training starts when coupled with an upfront training grant. This is primarily driven by courses preparing for further training. Using a novel dataset with information on absenteeism, I find that only increasing the monthly training grant results in more missed hours of training, suggesting at least some job-seeker trainees are credit-constrained.