Calendrier du 07 juin 2021
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 07/06/2021 de 17:30 à 18:20
SANTI FILIPPO (University of Florence and Bielefeld University)
Aid and Internal Migration in Malawi
écrit avec joint with Mauro Lanati and Marco Sanfilippo
This paper uses geographically disaggregated data to investigate the role of foreign aid as a pull factor for internal migration in Malawi over the period 1998-2008. Employing a standard gravity model of migration, we show a positive relationship between the volume of foreign assistance a district receives and the number of immigrants. While aid makes districts more attractive as migrant destinations, there is no evidence of a corresponding push factor effect on internal mobility. We also dig deeper into the mechanisms through which foreign aid can shape internal migration decisions. According to our results, the positive welfare effects of foreign assistance manifest themselves not only through a rise in economic opportunities, but also in improved access to public services in recipient districts.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 07/06/2021 de 17:00 à 18:00
online
BONATTI Alessandro (MIT Sloan)
The Economics of Social Data
écrit avec Co-authors: Dirk Bergemann, Tan Gan
We propose a model of data intermediation to analyze the incentives for sharing individual data in the presence of informational externalities. A data intermediary acquires signals from individual consumers regarding their preferences. The intermediary resells the information in a product market wherein firms and consumers can tailor their choices to the demand data. The social dimension of the individual data---whereby an individual's data are predictive of the behavior of others---generates a data externality that can reduce the intermediary's cost of acquiring the information. We derive the intermediary's optimal data policy and establish that it preserves the privacy of consumer identities while providing precise information about market demand to the firms. This policy enables the intermediary to capture the total value of the information as the number of consumers becomes large.
Texte intégral
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 07/06/2021 de 16:00 à 17:40
ZINGALES Luigi (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business)
Can Democracy Survive a Concentrated Economy?
Annual Lecture of the SCOR-PSE Chair
Régulation et Environnement
Du 07/06/2021 de 12:00 à 13:15
online
STERN Lennart (PSE)
Rewarding countries for pricing carbon emissions: optimal mechanisms under exogenous budgets
Consider a global institution with an exogenous budget that can re- ward each developing country based on its tax rate on the combustion of a given fossil fuel. I develop a model in which countries differ in the co-benefits that they derive from emissions reductions and also in their aversion to taxing carbon. Assuming a uniform type distribution and linear demand functions for the fossil fuel, I provide an explicit solution for the mechanism that maximises global welfare.
It can be implemented through a reward payment function of the following form: each country is rewarded based on how much (if at all) its carbon tax exceeds a cer- tain reference level. The reward payment is quadratic in this amount if the global institution’s budget is small. For large budgets, there is an additional term that is linear in the amount that the carbon tax exceeds the reference level. Empirical calibrations suggest that carbon pricing reward funds could play a valuable role if the world mobilizes substan- tial additional funding for supporting emissions reductions in developing countries.