Calendrier du 08 novembre 2018
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 08/11/2018 de 12:30 à 13:45
VON EHRLICH Maximilian (University of Bern)
Cities and the Structure of Social Interactions: Evidence from Mobile Phone Data
écrit avec Co-author: Konstantin Büchel
Social interactions are considered pivotal to agglomeration economies. We explore a
unique dataset on mobile phone calls to examine how distance and population density
shape the structure of social interactions. Exploiting an exogenous change in travel
times, we show that distance is highly detrimental to interpersonal exchange. Despite
distance-related costs, we find no evidence that urban residents benefit from larger
networks when spatial sorting is accounted for. Higher density rather generates a more
efficient network in terms of matching and clustering. These differences in network
structure capitalize into land prices, corroborating the hypothesis that agglomeration
economies operate via network efficiency.
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 08/11/2018 de 12:30 à 14:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdn 75014 Paris
CANTONI Davide (LMU Munich)
Persistence and Activation of Right-Wing Political Ideology
écrit avec Felix Hagemeister und Mark Westcott
We investigate the persistence of right-wing ideology in Germany. The “Alternative for Germany” (AfD), founded as a party espousing fiscal conservatism, has turned to an openly nationalist and anti-immigrant platform since 2015. We document this rhetorical change with quantitative text analysis. We further show that municipalities that voted more for the AfD after 2015 also exhibited higher support for the Nazi party in the 1920s and 30s. The historical correlation we observe is positive, significant, and large. In our preferred specification, a one standard deviation increase in historical support for the Nazi party is associated with a 0.15 standard deviations larger change in votes towards the AfD. Our results are robust to controlling for a large set of historical and contemporary covariates, especially relating to unemployment and the recent inflow of refugees from the Middle East.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 08/11/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan, 75014 Paris
LEVY John (HEC)
Concerned with careers? Career development, task assignment, and labour market competition
écrit avec Heski Bar Isaac (Rotman School of Management)
Firms have discretion over the kinds of task to which they assign workers.
This affects workers' opportunities to advance their careers and,
consequently, their efforts. Both firms' task allocation and workers' effort
decisions interact through the extent of labour market competition: more
competition increases the return to effort, but decreases firms' incentives
to assign workers to informative tasks. Competition can therefore increase
or decrease firm profits, worker payoffs, and welfare. One consequence is
that firms may choose strategies that lead to increased competition. When
the employee pool is heterogeneous, firms might choose different strategies
that attract different kinds of workers and differentiate themselves through
the career opportunities that they offer.
Behavior seminar
Du 08/11/2018 de 11:00 à 12:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 PARIS
LAPORTE Audrey (PSE)
Making the Grossman Model Stochastic: Investment in Health as a Stochastic Control Problem
It is well known that uncertainty is a key consideration in theoretical health economics analysis. The literature has shown that uncertainty is a multifaceted concept, with the individual’s optimal response depending on the formal nature of the uncertainty and the time horizon involved. This paper extends the literature by considering uncertainty with regards to the cumulative effect on health capital of on-going health behaviours. It uses techniques of stochastic optimal control to analyze uncertainty which can be represented as a Weiner process and shows how, in a Grossman health investment framework, the optimal lifetime health investment trajectory might be affected.
JEL codes: I1, I12