Calendrier du 08 décembre 2016
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 08/12/2016 de 13:00 à 14:15
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10
LINDEBOOM Maarten (VU Amsterdam)
Disability Insurance reforms and employment of impaired workers
écrit avec Mathilde Godard, Patrick Hullegie et Pierre Koning
The Dutch Disability Insurance (DI) system was internationally known for its extremely high enrolment rates that led some researchers even to classify it as the most out of control disability program of OECD countries (Burkhauser et al., 2008). Indeed, expressed as a percentage of the insured working population, DI enrolment increased rapidly to around 12% in the mid-eighties and then remained more or less constant at this unprecedented level until the beginning of the 21th century. From then on some radical reforms were implemented that were very effective in curbing DI inflow and DI enrolment.
It has been argued that the introduction of the gatekeepers protocol and the drastic reform of the Dutch DI system in 2006 has been responsible for this huge drop in DI inflow rates. The main goal of these reforms was to reduce DI inflow, to increase employment rates of workers with disabilities and to ensure that benefits were provide to those who really needed them. The latter refers to the issue of targeting efficiency. First evidence suggests that the reforms were indeed very successful in reducing DI inflow. Less clear is whether the reforms did increase employment rates and improved targeting efficiency. Increased stringency of the program may on the one hand reduce the number of false positives, but may also increase false rejections and induced perverse self-screening, meaning that part of the truly sick may not apply. The main objective of this paper is to look at these issues. More specifically, we first use administrative individual level data from Statistics Netherlands and the Dutch National Spcial Insurance Institute (NSII) to examine recent trends in the employment gap of healthy and unhealthy workers. We use individual level hospitalization rates to define the worker’s health status. We next examine the sensitivity of DI application rates to changes in the stringency of the award process. We then look at employment rates of awarded and rejected applicants and examine trends in the mortality rate of these groups. We combine the results of our analyses to infer whether increases in the DI stringency efficiently targeted their incentive effects to the more able individuals.
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 08/12/2016 de 12:30 à 14:00
DUBE Oeindrila (University of Chicago)
Queens
écrit avec S.P. Harish
A large scholarship claims that states led by women are less conáictual than states led by men. However, it is theoretically unclear why female leaders would favor more conciliatory war policies. And, it is empirically challenging to identify the e§ect of female rule, since women may gain power disproportionately during periods of peace. We surmount this challenge by exploiting features of hereditary succession in European polities over the 15th-20th centuries. In this context, women were more likely to acquire power if the previous monarch lacked a male Örst-born child, or had a sister who could follow as successor. Using these factors as instruments for female rule, we Önd that queenly reigns participated more in inter-state conáicts, without experiencing more internal conáict. Moreover, the tendency of queens to participate as conáict aggressors varied based on marital status. Among unmarried monarchs, queens were more likely to be attacked than kings. Among married monarchs, queens were more likely than kings to participate as attackers and Öght with allies. These results are consistent with an account in which marriages strengthened queenly reigns, both because of alliances, and because queens utilized their spouses to help them rule. Kings, in contrast, were less inclined to utilize a similar division of labor. This asymmetry in how queens utilized male spouses and kings utilized female spouses increased the relative capacity of queenly reigns, enabling them to pursue more aggressive war policies.
Texte intégral
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 08/12/2016 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle F, Bât G
HAGENBACH Jeanne (Sciences Po)
Communication with Evidence in the Lab
écrit avec E. Perez-Richet
We study communication with evidence in the lab. Our experimental design involves a collection of sender-receiver games with various payoffs and permits partial disclosure. We use local and global properties of the sender's incentive graph to uncover behavioral regularities and explain performance across games. Sender types whose interests are aligned with those of the receiver fully disclose, while sender types whose interests are not aligned with those of the receiver remain silent or partially disclose. When partially disclosing senders mostly disclose favorable pieces of evidence and hide unfavorable ones. But the cognitive cost of partial disclosure, as measured by response times, is higher for both senders and receivers. Receivers take evidence into account and tend to be skeptical about vague messages in games whose graph is acyclic. They perform better in acyclic games, whereas senders perform better in cyclic games.
Behavior seminar
Du 08/12/2016 de 12:00 à 13:00
FOURNIER Patrick (Université de Montréal)
The Human Negativity Bias: A Comparative Experimental Study