Calendrier du 08 décembre 2022
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 08/12/2022 de 16:00 à 17:15
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-21
TAMON Asonuma (IMF)
Expenditure Consolidation and Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Front- or Back-loaded
Sovereigns implement expenditure consolidation prior to debt crisis—“front-loaded”. We compile data on strategies of expenditure consolidation and restructurings in 1975–2020. We find that (i) expenditure consolidation precedes—front-loaded—preemptive restructuring, while occurs upon post-default restructurings—back-loaded—; and (ii) public investment and restructuring duration differ between preemptive and post-default restructurings. We construct a theoretical sovereign debt model that embeds endogenous choice of preemptive and post-default renegotiations, public capital accumulation, and expenditure composition. The model quantitatively shows the sovereign’s choice of front-loaded expenditure consolidation and preemptive restructuring results in quick debt settlement and public investment recovery. Data support theoretical predictions.
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 08/12/2022 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R2-01
BAGUES Manuel (U. Warwick)
The Psychological Gains from COVID-19 Vaccination: Who Benefits the Most?
écrit avec Velichka Dimitrova
We estimate the impact of COVID-19 vaccination on psychological well-being using information from a large-scale panel survey representative of the UK population. Exploiting exogenous variation in the timing of vaccinations, we find that vaccination increases psychological well-being (GHQ-12) by 0.12 standard deviations, compensating for one-half of the deterioration in mental health caused by the pandemic. This improvement persists for at least two months, and is linked to higher engagement in social activities and a decrease in the self-reported likelihood of contracting COVID-19. The main beneficiaries are individuals who became mentally distressed during the pandemic, supporting their prioritization in vaccination rollouts.
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TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 08/12/2022 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-14, Campus Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ROESLER Anne-Kathrin (University of Toronto)
*How informed do you want your principal to be? joint with Rahul Deb and Mallesh Pai
presentation joint with Roy Seminar
A buyer's value for a good depends on his private type and the quality that is unknown to him. The seller of the good learns about the quality via a signal; the signal realization is the seller's private information. We pose and answer the following question: how much (if any) private information would the buyer want the seller to have? Formally, we characterize the buyer-optimal outcome: this is the signal and the corresponding seller-optimal equilibrium of the informed principal game that yield the highest consumer surplus. We show that there are conditions under which private information for the seller can lead both to greater profits and higher consumer surplus; that is, compared to being uninformed, seller private information can lead to Pareto gains. The seller's signal in the buyer optimal outcome is typically not fully informative.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 08/12/2022 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-14, Campus Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ROESLER Anne-Kathrin (University of Toronto)
*How informed do you want your principal to be? joint with Rahul Deb and Mallesh Pai
presentation joint with Seminar TOM
A buyer's value for a good depends on his private type and the quality that is unknown to him. The seller of the good learns about the quality via a signal; the signal realization is the seller's private information. We pose and answer the following question: how much (if any) private information would the buyer want the seller to have? Formally, we characterize the buyer-optimal outcome: this is the signal and the corresponding seller-optimal equilibrium of the informed principal game that yield the highest consumer surplus. We show that there are conditions under which private information for the seller can lead both to greater profits and higher consumer surplus; that is, compared to being uninformed, seller private information can lead to Pareto gains. The seller's signal in the buyer optimal outcome is typically not fully informative.