Calendrier du 08 avril 2019
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 08/04/2019 de 17:00 à 18:30
R1-09, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
GOYAL Sanjeev (University of Cambridge)
Network Formation in Large Groups
écrit avec Syngjoo Choi and Frédéric Moisan
We conduct an experiment to understand the principles that govern network formation. The design of the experiment builds on a model of linking and efforts taken from Galeotti and Goyal [2010]. In order to reduce cognitive complexity facing human subjects and facilitate learning, we develop a new experimental platform that integrates a network visualization tool using an algorithm of Barnes and Hut [1986] with
an interactive tool of asynchronous choices in continuous time.
Our experiment provides strong support for macroscopic predictions of the theory:
there is specialization in linking and efforts across all treatments. Moreover, and in line
with the theory, the specialization is more pronounced in larger groups. Thus subjects
abide by the law of the few.
Information on payoffs provided to subjects affects their behavior and yields differential welfare consequences. In the treatment where subjects see only their own payoffs, in large groups, the most connected individuals compete fi ercely they exert large efforts and have small earnings. By contrast, when a subject sees everyone's payoffs, in large groups, the most connected individuals engage in less intense competition they
exert little effort and have large earnings. The effects of information are much more muted in small groups.
Texte intégral
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 08/04/2019 de 13:00 à 14:00
Campus MSE - Room 19
PANON Ludovic (Sciences Po)
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Régulation et Environnement
Du 08/04/2019 de 12:00 à 13:00
salle R1-13, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
KASSAB Dina (University of Cairo)
Agree to Disagree ? Making sense of vagueness in International Environmental Agreements
International Environmental Agreements (IEA) tend to bear a high degree of vagueness. They are expressed in terms of levels of standards, with a permitted degree of discretion to the signatories, rather than a specific policy commitment. Why would negotiators craft vague agreements that risk non-compliance ? Using a game-theoretic model, where information regarding institutional capacities of potential participants is asymmetric, I argue that vagueness offers the ability to manage uncertainty over policy outcomes. In doing so, I contribute to the theory of international environmental agreements, which has overwhelmingly assumed non-compliance to be observable and non-enforcement to be punishable. By also incorporating countries ratification decisions, this paper makes several important contributions : it contributes to a more realistic modeling of the treaty formation, it endogenizes the number of participants as well as their characteristics and it identifies the determinants of the optimal level of ambiguity in designing an IEA.