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Programme de la semaine


Liste des séminaires

Les séminaires mentionnés ici sont ouverts principalement aux chercheurs et doctorants et sont consacrés à des présentations de recherches récentes. Les enseignements, séminaires et groupes de travail spécialisés offerts dans le cadre des programmes de master sont décrits dans la rubrique formation.

Les séminaires d'économie

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Atelier Histoire Economique

Behavior seminar

Behavior Working Group

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar

Development Economics Seminar

Economic History Seminar

Economics and Complexity Lunch Seminar

Economie industrielle

EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar

Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés

GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar

Histoire des entreprises et de la finance

Industrial Organization

Job Market Seminar

Macro Retreat

Macro Workshop

Macroeconomics Seminar

NGOs, Development and Globalization

Paris Game Theory Seminar

Paris Migration Seminar

Paris Seminar in Demographic Economics

Paris Trade Seminar

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

PhD Conferences

Propagation Mechanisms

PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar

Regional and urban economics seminar

Régulation et Environnement

RISK Working Group

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie

The Construction of Economic History Working Group

Theory Working Group

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Travail et économie publique externe

WIP (Work in progress) Working Group

Les séminaires de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Casse-croûte socio

Déviances et contrôle social : Approche interdisciplinaire des déviances et des institutions pénales

Dispositifs éducatifs, socialisation, inégalités

La discipline au travail. Qu’est-ce que le salariat ?

Méthodes quantitatives en sociologie

Modélisation et méthodes statistiques en sciences sociales

Objectiver la souffrance

Sciences sociales et immigration

Archives d'économie

Accumulation, régulation, croissance et crise

Commerce international appliqué

Conférences PSE

Economie du travail et inégalités

Economie industrielle

Economie monétaire internationale

Economie publique et protection sociale

Groupe de modélisation en macroéconomie

Groupe de travail : Economie du travail et inégalités

Groupe de travail : Macroeconomic Tea Break

Groupe de travail : Risques

Health Economics Working Group

Journée de la Fédération Paris-Jourdan

Lunch séminaire Droit et Economie

Marché du travail et inégalités

Risques et protection sociale

Séminaire de Recrutement de Professeur Assistant

Seminaire de recrutement sénior

SemINRAire

Archives de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Conférence du Centre de Théorie et d'Analyse du Droit

Espace social des inégalités contemporaines. La constitution de l'entre-soi

Etudes halbwachsiennes

Familles, patrimoines, mobilités

Frontières de l'anthropologie

L'auto-fabrication des sociétés : population, politiques sociales, santé

La Guerre des Sciences Sociales

Population et histoire politique au XXe siècle

Pratiques et méthodes de la socio-histoire du politique

Pratiques quantitatives de la sociologie

Repenser la solidarité au 21e siècle

Séminaire de l'équipe ETT du CMH

Séminaire ethnographie urbaine

Sociologie économique

Terrains et religion


Calendrier du 08 septembre 2022

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Du 08/09/2022 de 12:30 à 13:30

PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R2-01

SALDARRIAGA Víctor (PSE)

The Distributional Dynamics of Wages Over the Business Cycle





Examining cyclical changes in the wage distribution of the U.S. over 1980-2019, I document three novel facts. In recessions, the wage distribution: (i) becomes more positively skewed, (ii) shrinks at the bottom and widens at the top, and (iii) displays a higher fraction of overall dispersion condensed at the top tail. Contrasting standard views, these facts indicate that wage inequality rises during recessions result from changes at the top rather than at the bottom of the wage distribution. I propose a wage bargaining model incorporating two-sided heterogeneity, aggregate uncertainty, on-the-job search, and targeted recruiting by firms to explain this idea. Over the cycle, firms adjust their recruiting efforts along two margins: the number of vacancies advertised and the skills required to fill these vacancies. In recessions, matches need higher skills from workers to be worth forming, so firms target their vacancies towards high-skill workers. Job offers befall disproportionately more among the high-skilled, improving their bargaining position and preventing wages at the top of the distribution from falling sharply. This mechanism prompts a higher wage inequality. The model reproduces key features of the U.S. labor market and renders a varying distribution of wages that mimics the cyclical patterns observed in the data. I further examine a series of policy interventions and document that, while certain policies, such as increased unemployment insurance, can fix labor market inefficiencies generated by the private behavior of firms, they are less effective in reducing wage inequality in economic downturns.

Behavior seminar

Du 08/09/2022 de 11:00 à 12:00

R2-21

BARRERA Oscar (Paris School of Economics)

Quantitative and Qualitative Economics on Attitudes and Tax Preferences Towards the Top 1 Percent. (Avec Emmanuel Chávez)





We study the effects of providing quantitative and qualitative information about top earners on people's attitudes and tax preferences towards the richest 1 percent. We conduct an online experiment with 2000 French respondents assigned randomly to quantitative information on the income levels of the top 1 percent and their respective income sources (capital vs. labor), or to quantitative information plus qualitative egalitarian descriptions on the consequences of inequality and high capital income shares. We find that: (i) respondents overestimate the income of the richest 1 percent and want them to pay a higher income tax rate than the current one. (ii) Quantitative information shifts attitudes about top earners towards the unfavorable spectrum, but it has no effect on the desired income tax rate at the top. The effect on attitudes comes mainly from information on income sources. (iii) Quantitative plus qualitative information leads respondents to choose a higher income tax rate for the richest 1 percent. The effect comes mainly from the qualitative information on the consequences of inequality.