Calendrier du 08 septembre 2022
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 08/09/2022 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R2-01
SALDARRIAGA Víctor (PSE)
The Distributional Dynamics of Wages Over the Business Cycle
Examining cyclical changes in the wage distribution of the U.S. over 1980-2019, I document three novel facts. In recessions, the wage distribution: (i) becomes more positively skewed, (ii) shrinks at the bottom and widens at the top, and (iii) displays a higher fraction of overall dispersion condensed at the top tail. Contrasting standard views, these facts indicate that wage inequality rises during recessions result from changes at the top rather than at the bottom of the wage distribution. I propose a wage bargaining model incorporating two-sided heterogeneity, aggregate uncertainty, on-the-job search, and targeted recruiting by firms to explain this idea. Over the cycle, firms adjust their recruiting efforts along two margins: the number of vacancies advertised and the skills required to fill these vacancies. In recessions, matches need higher skills from workers to be worth forming, so firms target their vacancies towards high-skill workers. Job offers befall disproportionately more among the high-skilled, improving their bargaining position and preventing wages at the top of the distribution from falling sharply. This mechanism prompts a higher wage inequality. The model reproduces key features of the U.S. labor market and renders a varying distribution of wages that mimics the cyclical patterns observed in the data. I further examine a series of policy interventions and document that, while certain policies, such as increased unemployment insurance, can fix labor market inefficiencies generated by the private behavior of firms, they are less effective in reducing wage inequality in economic downturns.
Behavior seminar
Du 08/09/2022 de 11:00 à 12:00
R2-21
BARRERA Oscar (Paris School of Economics)
Quantitative and Qualitative Economics on Attitudes and Tax Preferences Towards the Top 1 Percent. (Avec Emmanuel Chávez)
We study the effects of providing quantitative and qualitative information about top earners on people's attitudes and tax preferences towards the richest 1 percent. We conduct an online experiment with 2000 French respondents assigned randomly to quantitative information on the income levels of the top 1 percent and their respective income sources (capital vs. labor), or to quantitative information plus qualitative egalitarian descriptions on the consequences of inequality and high capital income shares. We find that: (i) respondents overestimate the income of the richest 1 percent and want them to pay a higher income tax rate than the current one. (ii) Quantitative information shifts attitudes about top earners towards the unfavorable spectrum, but it has no effect on the desired income tax rate at the top. The effect on attitudes comes mainly from information on income sources. (iii) Quantitative plus qualitative information leads respondents to choose a higher income tax rate for the richest 1 percent. The effect comes mainly from the qualitative information on the consequences of inequality.