Calendrier du 09 juin 2022
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 09/06/2022 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1.14, Campus Jourdan 75014 Paris
LOJKINE Ulysse (PSE, Université de Nanterre)
A general power index
I propose a general power index in games. The power of an agent over an outcome is understood as the equilibrium effect on the outcome of variations in the agent’s preferences. I show that the new index, ?, has the following properties: (i) classic measures of freedom of choice are a special case of the ? index in the context of individual choice; (ii) the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices are special cases of the ? index in the context of binary voting games; (iii) in bargaining games, the ? index of a player combines his outside option and other parameters; (iv) the ? index allows a generalization of the Barry decomposition of success between power and luck to all unidimensional spatial games; (v) the ? power of a firm on its price is related to its Lerner index, but also to its technology and to the potential entry of competitors; (vi) in a simple competitive exchange setting, each agent has zero ? power on the equilibrium price but a ? power density can be defined, which, under some assumptions on preferences, is proportional to the agents’ wealth.
Du 09/06/2022 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09
DOUSSET Léa (PSE)
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brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 09/06/2022 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09
TARTOVA Desislava (PSE)
Teacher value-added in the absence of annual test scores: utilising teacher networks
The literature that studies teacher effects on student outcomes has been restricted to a handful of countries because of the availability of annual standardised testing. The latter is important, as past grades are key to control for potential sorting between teachers and students based on ability. I propose an alternative method which exploits within-classroom across-subject variation and controls for sorting by exploiting networks of teachers - teachers from the same subject who are observed in classrooms with a unique link teacher from another subject. Using administrative data for the universe of middle schools in Metropolitan France, I find that for a 1 s.d. increase in the teacher value-added within school, student scores improve by 0.18 s.d. in Math and 0.16 s.d. in French. Consistent with the literature, I show that while teacher value-added estimates are positively associated with pedagogical grades, salaries and experience, no observable teacher characteristic explains a substantial part of the value-added estimates.
Behavior seminar
Du 09/06/2022 de 11:00 à 12:00
Salle R2.21, Campus Jourdan 75014 Paris
DESSI Roberta (Toulouse School of Economics )
Shame, Guilt, and Motivated Self-Confidence
écrit avec Junjie Ren (National University of Singapore) and Xiaojian Zhao (Monash University)
The available evidence from anthropology, economics, and psychology suggests that sensitivity to the emotions of shame and guilt varies across cultures. So does (over)confidence in ability and skills. Is there a connection between these observations? We address this question theoretically and empirically. We find significant evidence, consistent with our model, of a negative relationship between the cultural importance of shame relative to guilt and individual confidence. The relationship holds across countries, and for US immigrants relative to the culture of origin countries.
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 09/06/2022 de 11:00 à 12:00
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R1-15
KURUSCU Burhan (University of Toronto)
Taxing Wealth and Capital Income when Returns are Heterogeneous
écrit avec Fatih Guvenen, Gueorgui Kambourov, and Sergio Ocampo Diaz
When is a wealth tax preferable to a capital income tax? We study this question theoretically in an infinite-horizon model with entrepreneurs and workers, in which entrepreneurial firms are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks and collateral constraints. There are two types of steady-state equilibria. The first one—which emerges under a wide set of plausible parameter values—is inefficient and exhibits capital misallocation and heterogeneous returns. The second one is efficient and exhibits homogeneous returns, but requires implausibly lax borrowing limits. In the heterogeneous returns equilibrium, replacing a capital income tax with a wealth tax increases steady-state aggregate productivity and output if (and only if) entrepreneurial productivity is positively auto-correlated. The gains result from the “use-it-or-lose-it” effect, which causes a reallocation of capital from entrepreneurs with low productivity to those with high productivity. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a switch to wealth taxes to imply higher average welfare, which amount to a lower bound on the capital-elasticity of output,?—around 1/3 for most parameter combinations. We then study the optimal mix when both tax instruments can be used jointly to maximize welfare. Optimal policy depends on two thresholds. When ? is sufficiently high, optimal policy involves a positive wealth taxand a negative capital income tax (a subsidy); the sign flips when ? is sufficiently low, and both taxes are positive between these two thresholds. Finally, we consider extensions that introduce a corporate sector, rent-seeking behavior, and endogenous entrepreneurial effort.
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