Calendrier du 10 octobre 2019
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 10/10/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09
GARRIGA Santiago (Paris School of Economics)
Incidence and wage effects of means-tested transfers: Evidence from a change in the payment system
This paper explores whether the way in which means-tested transfers are paid has any effect on employer’s behavior, wages, and employment. We exploit a change in the payment system that was gradually rolled out between 2003 and 2010 in Argentina. Under the old system, employers were intermediaries that paid family allowances to their employees together with their corresponding salary, and they were allowed to deduct this transfer from employer social security contributions. The new system eliminated the intermediary role played by employers and centralized the payments in a government agency that started disbursing the allowances directly to eligible workers. Using employer-employee micro-data and an event-study design, we show that the way tax credits are disbursed is not neutral. Our evidence suggests that, under the old system, employers shift part of the incidence of the transfer by paying lower wages. This result is in line with recent literature in public finance that calls into question the standard incidence model.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 10/10/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
WANG Olivier (NYU Stern)
Decision Making under Time Pressure
This paper studies individual decision making when deadlines are random. Since the quality of any decision relies on information and it takes time to gather information, a decision maker should have a preference over deadlines as well as over menus. Past research studies rationally inattentive decision making without deadlines. It is established that a decision maker’s informational constraint is revealed by her distaste for contingent planning. This paper extends the analysis to random deadlines and establishes the relationship between a decision maker’s preference over timed choice problems and the set of information acquisition paths she has available. It is demonstrated that if a decision maker’s preference over random deadlines satisfies the von Neumann-Morgenstern independence axiom, then it is as if the decision maker’s optimal way to acquire information depends only on the menu she is presented with and is independent of the deadline. Moreover, if no information is lost along any path then the decision maker’s distaste for contingent planning becomes weaker as she is allowed more time to decide.
Texte intégral
Behavior seminar
Du 10/10/2019 de 11:00 à 12:00
salle R1-09, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
DASKALOVA Vessela (IAST Toulouse)
Discrimination in Collective Decisions
This paper presents a model of discrimination in collective decisions. The focus is on the role of the institutional set-up for whether discrimination is mitigated or exacerbated. In particular, I consider the interaction of committee composition - homogeneous versus diverse with the decision making rule - unanimity versus majority voting. The analysis suggests that under uncertainty about the extent of the other decision makers' biases diversity in committees may help avoid own group favoritism. In homogeneous committees unanimity rule is more conducive to discrimination than majority rule.
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 10/10/2019