Calendrier du 10 décembre 2020
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 10/12/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30
online
GOURSAT Laure (PSE)
Whether and Where to Apply: Competition and coordination on a matching market with common preferences and priorities and Single and Scored Application mechanism.
This paper defines a class of Bayesian games, termed “Application Game”, to model strategic interactions on a two-sided one-to-one agent-object matching market, where preferences and priorities are common and the allocation occurs through the “Single and Scored Application” (SSA) mechanism, equivalently 1-truncated serial dictatorship. The analysis derives the Bayes-Nash equilibria, which amounts to answering the question: “Whether and where to apply?”. It elicits the trade-off between ambition (accepting competition on high-value objects), and pragmatism (seeking coordination on under-demanded objects). A surprising common feature of the multiple equilibria is the block structure, namely agents sort into a finite number of blocks of neighboring priority where they adopt exactly the same application strategy.
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 10/12/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30
USING ZOOM
MONTANA Jaime (Paris School of Economics)
Wage posting and multidimensional skills mismatch
This paper gives a new answer to an old question in labor economics, Who matches with whom?, by introducing a setting where firms and workers are different in many dimensions and we allow workers to be over and under qualified for the jobs they end up occupying. I present a random search model with two side multidimensional heterogeneity in which firms choose and post a wage with commitment i.e. maintaining the posted wage, independent of the productivity of the new worker. Posted wages determine the set of acceptable jobs for each worker and a unique applicants pool for each firm. The composition of these sets varies in size and composition across workers and firms. The optimal posted wage level takes into consideration the requirements of each firm and the characteristics of the applicants pool. In equilibrium, sorting is assortative but mismatches can occur across all skills dimensions. Using French data on workers observed skills and matches, I calculate structural parameters associated with the model for France. I find that the disutility of non cognitive skills is higher when mismatched, while employers value more highly good matches on cognitive skills. I also find that the number of dimensions plays an important role, since it is another source for frictions.
Texte intégral
Behavior seminar
Du 10/12/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00
ALGAN Yann (SciencesPo)
The Role of Mindset in Education: A Large-Scale Field Experiment in Disadvantaged School
écrit avec With Coralie Chevallier5, Elise Huillery, Adrien Bouguen, Axelle Charpentier
This article provides experimental evidence of the impact of a school-based intervention aimed at developing students’ growth mindset and internal locus of control. Using a randomized experiment conducted in 97 disadvantaged middle schools in France, we follow 23,000 students over four years to assess the impact of the intervention. We find a 0.07 percent of a standard deviation increase in GPA, associated with a change in students’ mindset, improved behavior as reported by teachers and school registers, and higher educational
and professional aspirations. Given the low intensity of the intervention—12 one-hour in-class sessions over four years—and its small cost—65 euros per student—the intervention is particularly cost-effective in comparison with most education programs. Importantly, while all students eventually benefit from the program, better-behaved and higher-performing students benefit more.