Calendrier du 10 mars 2016
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 10/03/2016 de 12:45 à 13:45
VENEL Xavier (Paris 1 et PSE)
Dynamical strategic interaction in social networks
We consider a dynamical model of influence with a set of non-strategic agents and two strategic agents. The non-strategic agents are organized in a fixed network describing how they influence each other. The strategic agents have opposite opinion and try to drive the opinion of the society by targeting key-players in the network. We formulate this problem as a two-player zero-sum stochastic games allowing the strategic agents to change their target at every stage of the game. We prove the existence of the uniform value: if the player are sufficiently patient, both players can guarantee the same mean-average opinion without knowing the exact discount factor.