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Programme de la semaine


Liste des séminaires

Les séminaires mentionnés ici sont ouverts principalement aux chercheurs et doctorants et sont consacrés à des présentations de recherches récentes. Les enseignements, séminaires et groupes de travail spécialisés offerts dans le cadre des programmes de master sont décrits dans la rubrique formation.

Les séminaires d'économie

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Atelier Histoire Economique

Behavior seminar

Behavior Working Group

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar

Development Economics Seminar

Economic History Seminar

Economics and Complexity Lunch Seminar

Economie industrielle

EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar

Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés

GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar

Histoire des entreprises et de la finance

Industrial Organization

Job Market Seminar

Macro Retreat

Macro Workshop

Macroeconomics Seminar

NGOs, Development and Globalization

Paris Game Theory Seminar

Paris Migration Seminar

Paris Seminar in Demographic Economics

Paris Trade Seminar

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

PhD Conferences

Propagation Mechanisms

PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar

Regional and urban economics seminar

Régulation et Environnement

RISK Working Group

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie

The Construction of Economic History Working Group

Theory Working Group

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Travail et économie publique externe

WIP (Work in progress) Working Group

Les séminaires de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Casse-croûte socio

Déviances et contrôle social : Approche interdisciplinaire des déviances et des institutions pénales

Dispositifs éducatifs, socialisation, inégalités

La discipline au travail. Qu’est-ce que le salariat ?

Méthodes quantitatives en sociologie

Modélisation et méthodes statistiques en sciences sociales

Objectiver la souffrance

Sciences sociales et immigration

Archives d'économie

Accumulation, régulation, croissance et crise

Commerce international appliqué

Conférences PSE

Economie du travail et inégalités

Economie industrielle

Economie monétaire internationale

Economie publique et protection sociale

Groupe de modélisation en macroéconomie

Groupe de travail : Economie du travail et inégalités

Groupe de travail : Macroeconomic Tea Break

Groupe de travail : Risques

Health Economics Working Group

Journée de la Fédération Paris-Jourdan

Lunch séminaire Droit et Economie

Marché du travail et inégalités

Risques et protection sociale

Séminaire de Recrutement de Professeur Assistant

Seminaire de recrutement sénior

SemINRAire

Archives de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Conférence du Centre de Théorie et d'Analyse du Droit

Espace social des inégalités contemporaines. La constitution de l'entre-soi

Etudes halbwachsiennes

Familles, patrimoines, mobilités

Frontières de l'anthropologie

L'auto-fabrication des sociétés : population, politiques sociales, santé

La Guerre des Sciences Sociales

Population et histoire politique au XXe siècle

Pratiques et méthodes de la socio-histoire du politique

Pratiques quantitatives de la sociologie

Repenser la solidarité au 21e siècle

Séminaire de l'équipe ETT du CMH

Séminaire ethnographie urbaine

Sociologie économique

Terrains et religion


Calendrier du 11 février 2020

Paris Migration Seminar

Du 11/02/2020 de 16:30 à 19:00

PSE, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris, Salle R1-09

GATHMANN Christina(LISER)
LUKSIC Juan()

Marginal Returns to Citizenship and Skill Development




Texte intégral

Du 11/02/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30

Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris

PAUL-VENTURINE Julia ()

Reducing the gender pay gap: can we trust firms to take action?



écrit avec Bartels, Charlotte (DIW Berlin); Bach, Stefan (DIW Berlin)




This paper analyzes the effect of the 09th of November 2010 law in France that implemented financial sanctions for firms of 50+ employees who will not have implemented an agreement or an action plan in favor of professional equality between men and women by January 1st, 2012. An important difference between this law and the ones studied previously in the literature is that it does not just state the interdiction of gender discrimination but it obliges firms to take action by decentralizing the negotiation on gender inequalities in the workplace at the firm level. To develop our analysis, I build on a unique administrative dataset, a combination of the ADEP database, registering firms that signed this type of agreement, matched with the DADS database that contains detailed information on workers and firms characteristics. To identify the effects of the signature of an agreement on the wage gap, we exploit information on the timing of signature that differs between firms. Results suggest that the agreements had an effect on large firms (500+ employees) that had both human and financial resources to implement and monitor the policies elaborated but not on medium-sized firms, which lacked those resources.

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Du 11/02/2020 de 12:30 à 13:30

Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris

PAUL-VENTURINE Julia ()

Reducing the gender pay gap: can we trust firms to take action?





All around the world, one of the most common and persistent characteristics of labor markets is that women's earnings are lower than those of men. In France, women earn about 20% less than men and the cost of this discrimination against women is estimated to be substantial. Policies to decrease the gender pay gap are thus key but state intervention is often criticized as creating one-approach-for-all which is inappropriate for the specific difficulties faced by each sector and firm. In this context, France decided in November 2010 to decentralize the level of action by making mandatory for firms of more than 50 employees to negotiate agreements on professional equality between men and women. In this paper, I estimate the causal effect of the signature of such agreements on the wage gap and other measures of gender inequalities. Using a unique combination of administrative datasets, I exploit the staggered signature of agreements over the 2010-2013 period and find that the law had indeed an effect on the signature of those agreements but none on the gender wage gap or on any other measure of inequalities. Those results can be explained by several factors. First, the law made mandatory the signature of agreements but no obligation of results was put in place. Second, the labour inspectors would enforce only the signature of agreements but not their content. Hence, firms did sign agreements but without negotiating any constraining actions, leading to those null effects.