Calendrier du 11 mars 2021
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 11/03/2021 de 16:00 à 17:30
Using Zoom
LACAVA Chiara ( Goethe University Frankfurt)
Why are some regions so much more productive than others?
Texte intégral
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 11/03/2021 de 12:30 à 14:00
https://sciencespo.zoom.us/j/94141173582 ID de réunion : 941 4117 3582
COUTTENIER Mathieu (ENS Lyon)
The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Production Network Approach
We provide new evidence on how conflict adversely affects economic outcomes. Specifically, we ask whether and how the production network is a first-order determinant of the propagation of conflict to firms outside of conflict zone. Using microdata on Indian manufacturing plants and geo-coded information on Maoist insurgency, we first provide an estimate of the direct exposure to conflict. Firms located in conflict affected areas suffer a loss of 7-11% of their output. Estimating structurally a general equilibrium model of production networks, we then obtain an estimate for the overall macroeconomic impact of the Maoist insurgency by taking this propagation effects into account. We find that the Maoist insurgency resulted in a 0.4-0.7% decline in aggregate output of Indian’s manufacturing sector. Only the 20% of this loss is due to direct exposure to conflict, whereas the remaining 80% explained by the indirect exposure to conflict through the network production.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 11/03/2021 de 12:00 à 13:00
online
MOULIN Hervé (University of Glasgow)
Worst Case Voting and Bargaining
écrit avec with Anna Bogomolnaia & Ron Holzman
The guarantee of a given anonymous mechanism is the worst case welfare an agent can secure even against unanimously adversarial other agents. The higher the guarantee, the easier the participation in the mechanism. The worst case design question is how high can such guarantee be, and what type of mechanism achieves it? We adress this question in the n-person probabilistic voting/bargaining model. Feasible guarantees include the Uniform lottery over of the p deterministic outcomes, and those implemented by the Random Dictator mechanism or Voting by Veto. Finding the set M(n; p) of maximal (unimprovable) guarantees is simple only if n > p ñit reduces to the Uniform one ñ, and when n = 2 ñit is a polytope where each vertex combines a round of veto with one of random dictatorship ñ. If 3 6 n < p the set M(n; p) is a simplicial complex of dimension d = d p n e, that we describe in detail only when d = 1. In general the Uniform, Veto and Random Dictator guarantees are still the building blocks of 2 d simplices in M(n; p); each of dimension d. The corresponding guarantees are easy to interpret and implement.
Behavior Working Group
Du 11/03/2021 de 11:00 à 12:00
MUN Sofiia (CES, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)
Deliberate Randomization and Ambiguity: Is There a Connection?
écrit avec Elias Bouacida (Lancaster University, Management School)