Calendrier du 11 avril 2019
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 11/04/2019 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-21
FARIA-E-CASTRO Miguel (Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis)
Fiscal Multipliers and Financial Crises
I study the macroeconomic effects of the US fiscal policy response to the Great Recession,
accounting not only for standard tools such as government purchases and transfers but also for
financial sector interventions such as bank recapitalizations and credit guarantees. A global
solution to a quantitative model calibrated to the US allows me to study the state-dependent
effects of different types of fiscal policies. I combine the model with data on the US fiscal policy
response to find that the fall in aggregate consumption would have been twice as worse in
the absence of that response with a cumulative loss of 14.5%. Transfers and bank recapitalizations
yielded the largest fiscal multipliers at the height of the crisis through new transmission
channels that arise from linkages between household and bank balance sheets.
Texte intégral
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 11/04/2019 de 12:30 à 14:00
Sciences Po - 28 rue des Saints-Pères, 75007 Paris
JHA Saumitra (STANDFORD)
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TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 11/04/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-01 Campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan, 75014 Paris
LEVIN Dan (Ohio State University)
Misbehavior in Common Value Auction
écrit avec Jim Peck (Ohio State University)
We study optimal misbehavior by an auctioneer (shill bidding) or by (rings of) bidders in two auction formats in a pure CV environment. Specifically, we consider the dynamic English (EA), and the static Sophi auction, that are outcome equivalent without misbehavior. We first characterize the optimal misbehavior strategy of the ring or the auctioneer, and then compare/rank those formats by their immunity to such misbehavior. The recent theoretical and experimental literature documented and explained the observation that often dynamic auctions outperform their “equivalent” static (one shot) strategic implementation. A main result is that the static version is more immune to several forms of misbehavior, which might be one reason why it still flourishes.
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 11/04/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
MONTALBAN CASTILLA José (Paris School of Economics)
School Choice, Student Mobility and School Segregation: Evidence from Madrid
écrit avec Co-authors: Lucas Gortázar and David Mayor
Most of the empirical literature in market design has focused on the relative performance and strategic implications of alternative matching mechanisms, taking the inputs of school choice -preferences, priorities and capacities- as exogenous. This work aims at broadening the scope of market design questions to school choice by examining how student priorities affect families choices and student sorting across schools. We test the impact of a large-scale inter-district school choice reform on families' choices for schools, and how this decision impacts school immigrant and social segregation (according to parental education). This reform expanded choice by merging previously distinct school zones within the city of Madrid. Using unique administrative data on parents’ applications to schools, the paper shows that families reacted to the reform by exerting more inter-district choice and by applying to schools located further away from home than before the reform. In particular, parents from highest education levels and parents of non-immigrant students were those who reacted the most, while parents of immigrant children did not reacted at all. We find a decrease of social segregation and an increase of immigrant segregation, showing that levels of segregation prior to the reform may matter to predict potential effects on relaxing neighborhood priorities. Results suggest that when parents' school choices exhibit a strong degree of polarization by social and immigrant background, priority structures need to be carefully designed to achieve diversity objectives.
Behavior seminar
Du 11/04/2019 de 11:00 à 12:00
salle R2-21, campus Jourdan 75014 Paris
ALGER Ingela (TSE)
Evolution of Preferences in Structured Populations
écrit avec Laurent Lehmann (Lausanne University) et Jörgen Weibull (Stockholm School of Economics)
During human evolution, individuals interacted in bands connected by limited migration and sometimes conflicts. If the spread of preferences, from one generation to the next, depends on their material success, which preferences will prevail ? Building on population biology models of spatially structured populations, and assuming preferences to be private information, we characterize which preferences, if any, cannot be displaced, once established. We find that such uninvadable preferences represent different motives when expressed in terms of fitness than when expressed in terms of material payoffs. At the fitness level, individuals appear be driven by a mix of self-interest and a Kantian motive, which involves evaluating one's behavior in light of what own fitness would be if others were to choose the same behavior. This Kantian motive is borne out from kin selection (be it genetic or cultural). At the material payoff level, individuals appear to be driven by these two motives, but also in part by an other-regarding motive (spite or altruism) towards individuals with whom they interact. We show how population structure---size of bands, migration rates, probability of conflicts between bands, cultural loyalty towards parents---shape the relative importance of these motives.