Calendrier du 11 avril 2022
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 11/04/2022 de 17:00 à 18:15
Salle R2.01 - Campus Jourdan 75014 Paris
STEWART Colin (University of Toronto)
Demand in the Dark CANCELLED
écrit avec joint with Pavel Kocourek and Jakub Steiner
A growing body of evidence suggests that consumers are not fully informed about prices, contrary to a critical assumption of classical consumer theory. We analyze a model in which consumer types can vary in both their preferences and their information about prices. Given data on demand and the distribution of prices, we identify the set of possible values of the consumer surplus. Each surplus in this set can be rationalized with simple information structures and preferences. We also show how to narrow down the set of values using richer datasets and provide bounds on counterfactual demands at perfectly observed prices.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 11/04/2022 de 13:00 à 14:00
MSE(112, Blv de l'Hôpital, Room Banquier: S03) 75013 Paris
FRANçOIS Manon (PSE)
The ownership structure of multinational enterprises and tax avoidance: complexity matters
écrit avec Vincent Vicard (CEPII)
Does the complexity of multinationals' ownership structure serve tax avoidance? We use cross-country firm-level data to provide a description of the complexity determinants of ownership structure of multinational firms and show that affiliates belonging to more complex MNEs are more likely to report zero profit, consistent with tax avoidance by multinational firms.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 11/04/2022 de 12:00 à 13:15
Salle R2.21, Campus Jourdan 75014 Paris
SIOTIS Georgios (UC3M)
Market Definition and Competition Policy Enforcement in the Pharmaceutical Industry
Market definition, the first step in competition proceedings, establishes the perimeter of the competitive analysis. In this paper, we focus on market definition in the pharmaceutical industry, where the introduction of generics in different markets provide a sequence of quasi natural experiments involving a significant competitive shock for the molecule experiencing Loss of Exclusivity. We show that generic entry alters competitive constraints and generates market-wide effects. Paradoxically, entry may soften competitive pressure for some originators. We obtain these results by econometrically estimating time-varying price elasticities. We then apply the logic of the Hypothetical Monopolist Test to delineate antitrust markets under different market structures. Our results provide strong empirical support to the approach consisting in defining relevant markets contingent on the theory of harm. We discuss the relevance of these findings in the context of ongoing cases.