Calendrier du 11 juin 2020
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 11/06/2020 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-21
WIEDERHOLT Mirko (Sciences Po)
POSTPONED
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 11/06/2020 de 15:30 à 16:30
Using ZOOM
VOENA Alessandra (Stanford University)
Marriage, Labor Supply and the Dynamics of the Social Safety Net
écrit avec Hamish Low, Costas Meghir and Luigi Pistaferri
The 1996 PRWORA reform introduced time limits on the receipt of welfare in the United States. We use variation by state and across demographic groups to provide reduced form evidence showing that such limits led to a fall in welfare claims (partly due to banking benefits for future use), a rise in employment, and a decline in divorce rates. We then specify and estimate a life-cycle model of marriage, labor supply and divorce under limited commitment to better understand the mechanisms behind these behavioral responses, carry out counterfactual analysis with longer run impacts and evaluate the welfare effects of the program. Based on the model, which reproduces the reduced form estimates, we show that among low educated women, instead of relying on TANF, single mothers work more, more mothers remain married, some move to relying only on food stamps and, in ex-ante welfare terms, women are worse off.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 11/06/2020 de 14:00 à 15:00
Online
KOESSLER Frédéric (PSE)
The Informed Information Designer Problem
écrit avec Vasiliki Skreta, UT Austin and UCL
Abstract (VERY PRELIMINARY)
This paper analyses interim information design as an informed principal problem. A designer is privately informed about the state and chooses an information disclosure mechanism to influence the decisions of multiple interdependent agents. We define a simple solution concept, the strong core mechanism, which is an incentive-compatible mechanism refining the notion of core mechanism and containing the neutral optimum defined in Myerson (1983). A strong core mechanism is not blocked by an alternative mechanism which is incentive compatible for some belief that assigns zero probability to states in which the designer does not benefit from the alternative mechanism. We show that a strong core mechanism always exists, and that it is an equilibrium outcome of the interim information design game. If there is a single agent with binary actions, then an ex-ante optimal allocation mechanism is a strong core mechanism. In more general settings, the solutions of the ex-ante and interim information design problems are different.
Behavior seminar
Du 11/06/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00
Online
ANDERSON Chris (LSE)
The Long Arm of the State: Citizen Compliance in Times of Crisis
Does politics influence citizens’ willingness to comply with government guidelines that severely restrict their freedom to engage in habitual private behavior? We examine how government action and political attitudes combine to induce compliance during times of extreme crisis. Based on panel surveys collected before and during the height of the COVID-19 crisis in France in March 2020, we examine the links among the exercise of public authority, citizens’ political preferences, and their expressed willingness to adjust everyday travel, hygiene, and social behavior.