Calendrier du 12 octobre 2017
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 12/10/2017 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris - salle R1-09
DEBORTOLI Davide (CREI)
Monetary Policy with Heterogeneous Agents: Insights from TANK models
écrit avec Jordi Gali
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 12/10/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30
TO Maxime (IPP)
Labour supply and taxation with restricted choices
A model of labour supply is developed in which observed hours reflect both the distribution of preferences and restrictions on the choice of hours. In the absence of information on the choice set facing each individual, observed hours may appear not to satisfy the revealed preference conditions for ‘rational’ choice. We focus on the case where the choice set contains at most two offers and show that when the choice set distribution is known, preferences can be identified. We then show that, where preferences are known, the choice set distribution can be fully recovered. Conditions for identification of both preferences and the distribution of choice sets are also developed. We illustrate this approach in a labour supply setting with nonlinear budget constraints. Non-linearities in the budget constraint are used to directly reveal restrictions on the choice set. This framework is used to study the labour supply behaviour of a large sample of working age mothers in the UK, accounting for nonlinearities in the tax and welfare benefit system, fixed costs of work and restrictions on hours choices.
Behavior seminar
Du 12/10/2017 de 11:00 à 12:00
PSE 48, bld Jourdan salle R2-21
EMERIC Henry(Science Po and CEPR)
JACQUEMET Nicolas.(Université Paris I and PSE)
GALBIATI Roberto(Sciences-Po)
Learning, Spillovers and Persistence: Institutions and the Dynamics of Cooperation
We study how cooperation-enforcing institutions dynamically affect values and behavior using a lab experiment designed to create individual specific histories of past institutional exposure. We show that the effect of past institutions is mostly due to “indirect” behavioral spillovers: facing penalties in the past increases partners’ cooperation in the past, which in turn positively affects ones’ own current behavior. We demonstrate that such indirect spillovers induce persistent effects of institutions. However, for interactions that occur early on, we find a negative effect of past enforcement due to differential learning under different enforcement institutions.
Behavior Working Group
Du 12/10/2017 de 10:00 à 11:00
R1-15
ETILÉ Fabrice(PSE)
YIN Rémi(PSE)
Personal Identity and Preferences: Empirical extensions