Calendrier du 12 avril 2021
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 12/04/2021 de 17:30 à 18:20
PEREIRA DOS SANTOS Joao (NOVA)
Cousins From Overseas: The Labour Market Impact of Half a Million Portuguese Repatriates
écrit avec joint with Lara Bohnet and Susana Peralta
This paper investigates the labour market consequences of an exogenous increase in the labour supply, exploiting the large and unexpected inflow of repatriates to Portugal following the end of the Portuguese Colonial War in 1974-76. We explore the impact on labour force participation, unemployment, and different types of employment of both male and female natives. Using a novel instrumental variable approach which exploits information on the places of birth of the repatriates, we find no increase in unemployment but some displacement effects, with a stronger adverse effect on females. Female and male native workers are found to be driven out of employment as employees. However, men compensate for this loss by moving to self-employment, while native women move to inactivity
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 12/04/2021 de 17:00 à 18:00
online
BERGSTROM Ted (UCSB)
Condorcet winners despite extremist preferences
It is well-known that if voters' preference profiles are single-peaked, then pairwise voting among several candidates will result in a Condorcet winner, who can not be defeated by any other candidate. This paper exploits a simple idea to
identify a larger class of preference profiles for which there is a Condorcet winner. We observe that if two voters have opposite preferences about every pair of candidates, then the results of majority voting will be unchanged if neither of their votes is counted. We define a reduced form preference ordering as one in which for each pair of opposite preferences, the number of votes for the candidate having fewer voters is set to zero and the number of votes for the
opposite candidate is reduced by the number of votes for its opposite. When there are 3 candidates, this operation reduces the number of individual preference orderings in the preference profile from 6 to 3, but preserves the outcome of all pairwise contests. We show that with three candidates, voting has a Condorcet winner if and only if either the reduced form preference profile is single peaked or more than half of the voters in the reduced form share the same preference ordering. This assumption is much weaker than the assumption that the original preference ordering is single-peaked. It will be satisfied if
there is a right left positional ordering such that center-left preferences outnumber right-leaning extremists and center-right preferences outnumber left-leaning extremists. The use of reduced preference profiles allows for more easily proved and more sharply stated versions of standard results. It also allows a clearer explanation of the relation between voting ties and the incentive compatibility of sincere voting.
Econometrics Seminar
Du 12/04/2021 de 16:00 à 17:15
KOCK Anders (Aarhus University/University of Oxford)
Consistency of p-norm based tests in high-dimensions: characterization, monotonicity, domination
écrit avec Co-author: David Preinerstorfer
To understand how the choice of a norm affects power properties of tests in high-dimensions, we study the consistency sets of p-norm based tests in the prototypical framework of sequence models with unrestricted parameter spaces. The consistency set of a test is here defined as the set of all arrays of alternatives the test is consistent against as the dimension of the parameter space diverges. We characterize the consistency sets of p-norm based tests and find, in particular, that the consistency against an array of alternatives can not be determined solely in terms of the p-norm of the alternative. Our characterization also reveals an unexpected monotonicity result: namely that the consistency set is strictly increasing in p in (0,infty), such that tests based on higher p strictly dominate those based on lower p in terms of consistency. This monotonicity allows us to construct novel tests that dominate, with respect to their consistency behavior, all p-norm based tests without sacrificing asymptotic size.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 12/04/2021 de 12:00 à 13:15
online
LOGEART Rosanne ()
The Environmental Safeguards Team: An Analysis of NGOs' Advocacy at the European Commission
This paper sheds light on lobbying activities undertaken by environmental non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) in the European Union (EU), and in particular at the European Commission (EC). With a general theoretical analysis, I find that when NGOs choose their level of
lobbying effort, they can either cooperate between them or choose to differentiate, depending
on the form of legislative change functions. I use data from the EU Transparency Register
and EC meetings information to empirically determine whether NGOs’ lobbying efforts at the
EC are strategic complements or substitutes. I find evidence for cooperation, NGOs’ lobbying
efforts reinforce one another. It means that others’ effort increases sufficiently the marginal
legislative change due to a given NGO’s effort for this NGO to be willing to increase its effort
over subjects for which other NGOs advocate more and to decrease its effort over subjects for
which other NGOs advocate less. I also study the selection process of NGOs into the ones
attending meeting with EC members and the others. It shows that meeting holding NGOs
are bigger and spend more in lobbying activities. However, their financial situation does not
impact their specialization, or diversification, level.