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Programme de la semaine


Liste des séminaires

Les séminaires mentionnés ici sont ouverts principalement aux chercheurs et doctorants et sont consacrés à des présentations de recherches récentes. Les enseignements, séminaires et groupes de travail spécialisés offerts dans le cadre des programmes de master sont décrits dans la rubrique formation.

Les séminaires d'économie

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Atelier Histoire Economique

Behavior seminar

Behavior Working Group

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar

Development Economics Seminar

Economic History Seminar

Economics and Complexity Lunch Seminar

Economie industrielle

EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar

Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés

GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar

Histoire des entreprises et de la finance

Industrial Organization

Job Market Seminar

Macro Retreat

Macro Workshop

Macroeconomics Seminar

NGOs, Development and Globalization

Paris Game Theory Seminar

Paris Migration Seminar

Paris Seminar in Demographic Economics

Paris Trade Seminar

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

PhD Conferences

Propagation Mechanisms

PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar

Regional and urban economics seminar

Régulation et Environnement

RISK Working Group

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie

The Construction of Economic History Working Group

Theory Working Group

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Travail et économie publique externe

WIP (Work in progress) Working Group

Les séminaires de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Casse-croûte socio

Déviances et contrôle social : Approche interdisciplinaire des déviances et des institutions pénales

Dispositifs éducatifs, socialisation, inégalités

La discipline au travail. Qu’est-ce que le salariat ?

Méthodes quantitatives en sociologie

Modélisation et méthodes statistiques en sciences sociales

Objectiver la souffrance

Sciences sociales et immigration

Archives d'économie

Accumulation, régulation, croissance et crise

Commerce international appliqué

Conférences PSE

Economie du travail et inégalités

Economie industrielle

Economie monétaire internationale

Economie publique et protection sociale

Groupe de modélisation en macroéconomie

Groupe de travail : Economie du travail et inégalités

Groupe de travail : Macroeconomic Tea Break

Groupe de travail : Risques

Health Economics Working Group

Journée de la Fédération Paris-Jourdan

Lunch séminaire Droit et Economie

Marché du travail et inégalités

Risques et protection sociale

Séminaire de Recrutement de Professeur Assistant

Seminaire de recrutement sénior

SemINRAire

Archives de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Conférence du Centre de Théorie et d'Analyse du Droit

Espace social des inégalités contemporaines. La constitution de l'entre-soi

Etudes halbwachsiennes

Familles, patrimoines, mobilités

Frontières de l'anthropologie

L'auto-fabrication des sociétés : population, politiques sociales, santé

La Guerre des Sciences Sociales

Population et histoire politique au XXe siècle

Pratiques et méthodes de la socio-histoire du politique

Pratiques quantitatives de la sociologie

Repenser la solidarité au 21e siècle

Séminaire de l'équipe ETT du CMH

Séminaire ethnographie urbaine

Sociologie économique

Terrains et religion


Calendrier du 12 juin 2024

Development Economics Seminar

Du 12/06/2024 de 16:30 à 18:00

R1-15

KOEHLER-DERRICK Gabriel (NYU Abu Dhabi)

Tribal Voting in New Democracies: Evidence from 6 Million Tunisian Voter Records





Do candidates who share a tribal identity with voters outperform candidates who do not? Considerable research has examined this question in the Middle East, but in many of these key cases autocratic regimes supported political institutions that reinforced tribal ties, making it hard to discern the independent effect of tribal identity on voter behavior. We revisit this question in (at the time) democratic Tunisia, where post-independence governments tried to uproot tribal identity, making it a “least likely” case to uncover tribal influence on election outcomes. To estimate the effect of tribal influence on voting, we match an historical dictionary of Tunisian tribes to surnames from the universe of both registered voters and candidates from Tunisia’s recent local elections (2018). We find preliminary evidence consistent with the claim that tribal affiliations do “matter:” lists whose candidates share a tribal identity with the underlying population consistently outperform lists who do not share this identity. Our work suggests that despite decades of policies designed to suppress tribes, tribal identity exerted a measurable effect on local politics during a period of democratic transition

Economic History Seminar

Du 12/06/2024 de 12:00 à 13:30

R1.09

MOSHRIF Rowaida (PSE)

Long-run Land inequality and Land Reform in Egypt (1896-2020)





This study focuses on the long-term evolution of land inequality in Egypt and assesses the redistributive role of the 1952 agrarian land reform. Using newly digitized data on landownership distribution since 1896, I provide the first long-term estimates of land inequality covering the late 19th century up to 2020. The findings indicate that land distribution was highly unequal in the first half of the 20th century, with the top 1% of landowners holding over 45% of total private agricultural land in Egypt. Of this, 25% of the land was owned by foreigners, while the rest belonged to Egyptian large landowners who were granted land by the Muhammed Ali dynasty in the 19th century. The 1952 agrarian land reform reduced land inequality by redistributing land from large landowners to small landowners. Specifically, the landownership share of the top 1% decreased from 43% to 28%, while the landownership of the bottom 90% rose from 27% to 42%. This redistribution was more substantial following the abolition of religious endowments, known as ”Waqf,” which were initially used by large landowners to preserve large properties from fragmentation through inheritance