Calendrier du 12 septembre 2019
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 12/09/2019 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-21
VIOLANTE Gianluca (Princeton)
Firm and Worker Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market
écrit avec Adrien Bilal, Niklas Engbom, and Simon Mongey
This paper develops a continuous-time random-matching model of a frictional labor market with firm and worker dynamics. Multi-worker firms choose whether to shrink or expand their employment in response to productivity shocks to their decreasing returns to scale technology. Growing entails posting costly vacancies, which are filled either by the unemployed or by employees poached from other firms. Firms also choose optimally when to enter and exit the market. Tractability is obtained by proving that, under a parsimonious set of assumptions, all worker and firm decisions can be characterized by comparisons between marginal surpluses which only depend on firm’s productivity and size. As frictions vanish, the model converges to a standard competitive model of firm dynamics. A parameterized version of the model yields longitudinal and cross-sectional patterns of net poaching in response to productivity shocks that are in line with the data. The model also generates a drop in job-to-job transitions as firm entry declines, offering an interpretation to U.S. labor market dynamics around the Great Recession. All these outcomes are a reflection of the job ladder in marginal surplus that emerges in equilibrium.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 12/09/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
COPIC Jernej (ECOLE D’ECONOMIE AIX-MARSEILLE)
Constrained Efficiency and Applications
The presentation will be about the concept of constrained efficiency and applications to market
settings, such as bilateral trade and auctions under incomplete information.
In bilateral trade, where a buyer and a seller have private cost and valuation over an indivisible
good, I show that there exist constrained efficient market equilibrium outcomes that exhibit money
burning: a wedge between the receipt of the seller and the price to the buyer where the remaining
surplus must be disposed of. Previously, it has been presumed that no ex ante or ex post constrained
efficient allocation exhibits such waste and that the traditional parametrization due to Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983) by probability of trade and expected payment from the buyer to the seller is
sufficient to capture all market equilibrium outcomes. Such a wedge between prices cannot be
represented by a lower probability of trade and the general (canonical) representation of trading
outcomes is by probability of trade and personalized prices. Consequently, characterizations of
market equilibrium mechanisms by posted prices as exhaustive, Hagerty and Rogerson (1987),
and as constrained efficient, Copic and Ponsatí Obiols (2016), are not true without the additional
assumption that there is no such wedge. Canonical representation has implications for mechanism
design, bargaining, and markets. In the presentation, I will provide specific examples where a market
equilibrium mechanism with a wedge in prices is optimal for ex ante welfare, and where it solves the
problem of a non-benevolent broker. Time permitting, the presentation will include an application to
auctions.
Texte intégral
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 12/09/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09
TEP Travail et économie publique (PSE)
Annual group meeting
Behavior seminar
Du 12/09/2019 de 11:00 à 12:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
HOPFENSITZ Astrid (TSE)
The strategic display of emotions
écrit avec Daniel Chen, Boris van Leeuwen, Jeroen van de Ven
The emotion that someone expresses has consequences for how that person is treated. We study whether people display emotions strategically. In two laboratory experiments, participants play task delegation games in which managers assign a task to one of two workers. When assigning the task, managers see pictures of the workers and we vary whether getting the task is desirable or not. We find that workers strategically adapt their emotional expressions to the incentives they face, and that it indeed pays off to do so. Yet, workers do not exploit the full potential of the strategic display of emotions.