Calendrier du 13 avril 2023
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 13/04/2023 de 16:00 à 17:15
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R1-09
PAVONI Nicola (Bocconi)
Economic Shocks and Populism: The Political Implications of Reference-Dependent Preferences
écrit avec Fausto Panunzi and Guido Tabellini
This paper studies electoral competition over redistributive taxes between a safe incumbent and a risky opponent. With reference-dependent preferences, economi- cally disappointed voters become risk lovers, and hence are attracted by the more risky candidate. We show that, the equilibrium can display policy divergence: the intrinsically more risky candidate proposes lower taxes and is supported by a coali- tion of very rich and very disappointed voters, while the safe candidate proposes higher taxes. This can explain why new populist parties are often supported by eco- nomically dissatisfied voters and yet they run on economic policy platforms of low redistribution. We show that survey data on the German SOEP are consistent with our theoretical predictions on voters’ behavior.
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 13/04/2023 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09
GOEDDE Julius (PSE)
Satiation, unraveling and compressing prices. Evidence from the sharing economy
I explore how to design peer-to-peer sharing platforms without real money. Individuals and policymakers are reluctant to use real money in a variety of contexts and are increasingly experimenting with token-money. Examples include bidding for university classes, exchanging organ donors, trading food among food banks or time among neighbors. I focus on a popular platform for exchanging holiday homes where users earn tokens by hosting others and can only spend them on visiting other homes. The platform’s rapid growth over the last 10 years demonstrates some advantages of banning cash. Yet, as users only do a limited number of holidays per year some may become satiated. Specifically, the owners of the most expensive homes may accumulate so many tokens that they can afford all the trips they want while supplying their own house only for a few nights. Perhaps, this might even induce other users to reduce their supply in turn and lead to market unraveling, a situation where trade is inefficiently low. I illustrate with a stylized theoretical model that price caps may increase trade volume and aggregate welfare. Using proprietary data on the universe of transactions I present a range of stylized facts consistent with satiation and unraveling.
Behavior seminar
Du 13/04/2023 de 11:00 à 12:00
R2-21
MASSONI Sébastien (University of Lorraine, BETA - Bureau for Economic Theory and Applications)
Judicial Decision under Ambiguity and Predictive Justice
écrit avec V. Teixeira
Going to court is always a tough decision to take. Indeed, you never know your probabilities to win, the time it will require and how much you will win or spend. Predictive justice is an AI tool that uses big data to bring information to lawyers and litigants about their probabilities to win and the potential rewards. This objective information should reduce the difficulty to make the ambiguous decision of going to court or not. Seeing judicial decision as a decision under natural ambiguity, we test the effect of three types of information on attitudes:partial ambiguity, risk and similarity. In a complement study, we elicit the willingness to pay to access this information. Results first show that attitudes toward ambiguity differ under natural and artificial settings. Then, under both settings, the information provided to a complete ambiguous situation changes the behaviors but with no major difference according to the content of information.The valuations of the types of information are relatively in line with these attitudes.