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Programme de la semaine


Liste des séminaires

Les séminaires mentionnés ici sont ouverts principalement aux chercheurs et doctorants et sont consacrés à des présentations de recherches récentes. Les enseignements, séminaires et groupes de travail spécialisés offerts dans le cadre des programmes de master sont décrits dans la rubrique formation.

Les séminaires d'économie

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Atelier Histoire Economique

Behavior seminar

Behavior Working Group

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar

Development Economics Seminar

Economic History Seminar

Economics and Complexity Lunch Seminar

Economie industrielle

EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar

Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés

GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar

Histoire des entreprises et de la finance

Industrial Organization

Job Market Seminar

Macro Retreat

Macro Workshop

Macroeconomics Seminar

NGOs, Development and Globalization

Paris Game Theory Seminar

Paris Migration Seminar

Paris Seminar in Demographic Economics

Paris Trade Seminar

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

PhD Conferences

Propagation Mechanisms

PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar

Regional and urban economics seminar

Régulation et Environnement

RISK Working Group

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie

The Construction of Economic History Working Group

Theory Working Group

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Travail et économie publique externe

WIP (Work in progress) Working Group

Les séminaires de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Casse-croûte socio

Déviances et contrôle social : Approche interdisciplinaire des déviances et des institutions pénales

Dispositifs éducatifs, socialisation, inégalités

La discipline au travail. Qu’est-ce que le salariat ?

Méthodes quantitatives en sociologie

Modélisation et méthodes statistiques en sciences sociales

Objectiver la souffrance

Sciences sociales et immigration

Archives d'économie

Accumulation, régulation, croissance et crise

Commerce international appliqué

Conférences PSE

Economie du travail et inégalités

Economie industrielle

Economie monétaire internationale

Economie publique et protection sociale

Groupe de modélisation en macroéconomie

Groupe de travail : Economie du travail et inégalités

Groupe de travail : Macroeconomic Tea Break

Groupe de travail : Risques

Health Economics Working Group

Journée de la Fédération Paris-Jourdan

Lunch séminaire Droit et Economie

Marché du travail et inégalités

Risques et protection sociale

Séminaire de Recrutement de Professeur Assistant

Seminaire de recrutement sénior

SemINRAire

Archives de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Conférence du Centre de Théorie et d'Analyse du Droit

Espace social des inégalités contemporaines. La constitution de l'entre-soi

Etudes halbwachsiennes

Familles, patrimoines, mobilités

Frontières de l'anthropologie

L'auto-fabrication des sociétés : population, politiques sociales, santé

La Guerre des Sciences Sociales

Population et histoire politique au XXe siècle

Pratiques et méthodes de la socio-histoire du politique

Pratiques quantitatives de la sociologie

Repenser la solidarité au 21e siècle

Séminaire de l'équipe ETT du CMH

Séminaire ethnographie urbaine

Sociologie économique

Terrains et religion


Calendrier du 14 décembre 2020

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Du 14/12/2020 de 17:00 à 18:00

online

RENOU Ludovic (QMUL)

When are dynamic choices consistent with learning from common information?





A researcher observes a sequence of choices made by multiple agents in a binary-state, binary-action environment. Agents differ in terms of their initial prior beliefs about the unknown state, their preferences or both, but update beliefs based on common information in each time period. The state evolves according to a commonly known stochastic process and we separately examine the cases where the state is time-invariant and time-varying. We characterize the set of choices that are consistent with some preferences, priors, common information and stochastic process for the state. We apply our results to committee voting where they imply that the heterogeneity of voters in their bias versus their ideology can lead to very different sets of voting patterns.

Econometrics Seminar

Du 14/12/2020 de 16:00 à 17:15

FREYBERGER Joachim (University of Bonn)

Normalizations and misspecification in skill formation models





An important class of structural models investigates the determinants of skill formation and the optimal timing of interventions. To achieve point identification of the parameters, researcher typically normalize the scale and location of the unobserved skills. This paper shows that these seemingly innocuous restrictions can severely impact the interpretation of the parameters and counterfactual predictions. For example, simply changing the units of measurements of observed variables might yield ineffective investment strategies and misleading policy recommendations. To tackle these problems, this paper provides a new identification analysis, which pools all restrictions of the model, characterizes the identified set of all parameters without normalizations, illustrates which features depend on these normalizations, and introduces a new set of important policy-relevant parameters that are identified under weak assumptions and yield robust conclusions. As a byproduct, this paper also presents a general and formal definition of when restrictions are truly normalizations.



Texte intégral

GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar

Du 14/12/2020 de 13:00 à 14:00

https://zoom.univ-paris1.fr/j/93971422235?pwd=eDdyZEJ2SUpsQnByUnR5eUpRMkV5Zz09

RASTER Tom ()

The Hanseatic League versus its competitors: Evidence from millions of shipments





Long-distance trade has emerged and expanded throughout history despite abundant obstacles. How trade regimes, such as merchant guilds, were able to operate under such circumstances has attracted attention from scholars of institutions and market imperfections. However, whether merchant guilds were conducive to overall growth or only benefited a few members of society remains disputed; as is their use of formal versus informal rules in their internal functioning (e.g. Greif, 1989; Ogilvie, 2011). To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to quantitatively study how the trade of a merchant guild compares to that of their competitors who do not belong to any guild. I focus on the Hanseatic League (1100s-1669), a trade confederation of, at its peak, almost 200 towns in the German Lands and surrounding areas. Newly collected archival data reveals the extent and timing of each town’s participation in the League’s meetings. I combine this information with expansive, novel data of nearly all maritime trade (1.5 million shipments) between the Baltic and North Sea areas from 1497 to 1700. During this crucial period in history, institutions of the First Commercial Revolution gave way to those of the Second, which oversaw the beginning of Atlantic trade. In the empirical analysis, I exploit features of the trade data to distinguish, for each shipment, whether the trade was conducted by the Hanseatic League, more independent Dutch traders, or by another trading regime. I then compare trade across these regimes along various dimensions, such as trade value, prices (volatility), and type of goods (including new luxuries). In doing so, I test various hypotheses raised in the literature, including the relationship between trade regimes and growth. Preliminary findings suggest marked differences across trade regimes and contribute to our understanding of trade institutions, historical and contemporary, that operate in environments where coordination is difficult.



Texte intégral

Régulation et Environnement

Du 14/12/2020 de 12:00 à 13:00

https://zoom.us/j/98281389413?pwd=cWxiVzVPdVdCYm1Ec2pDcDYybk5tQT09

REGUANT Mar (Northwes)

*


Paris Game Theory Seminar

Du 14/12/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00

On line

MARLATS Chantal (LEMMA / Paris 2)

Voluntary confinement