Calendrier du 14 avril 2022
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 14/04/2022 de 16:00 à 17:15
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-21
ZANETTI Francesco (University of Oxford)
STATE DEPENDENCE OF FISCAL MULTIPLIERS: THE SOURCE OF FLUCTUATIONS MATTERS
écrit avec Mishel Ghassibe
Texte intégral
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 14/04/2022 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09
SKANDALIS Daphné (U. Copenhague)
Racial inequality in the U.S. unemployment insurance system
écrit avec Ioana Marinescu et Maxim Massenkoff
While unemployment insurance (UI) could help attenuate racial income disparities in
the U.S., Black unemployed workers seem to receive less UI benefits than White ones.
To understand why, we analyze administrative data from random audits on UI claims
in all U.S. states. We first document a large racial gap in the UI that unemployed
workers receive after filing a new claim: Black claimants receive a 18:28% (6:51ppt)
lower replacement rate (i.e. benefits relative to prior earnings) than White claimants.
In principle, the replacement rate of each claimant mechanically depends on her
work history, and on the rules prevailing in her state. Since we observe claimants'
UI-relevant work history and state, we are in a unique position to decompose the
causes of the racial gap among UI claimants. First, we show that racial differences in
work history prior to unemployment create a 10:16% gap (3:62ppt); second, differ-
ences in rules across states create an 8:45% gap (3:01ppt); finally, we find no residual
racial gap, once we account for state rules and work history differences. Thus, the de-
centralized design of the UI system generates new gaps in income between Black and
White claimants, even when they have the same work history. Our results highlight
that, even in the absence of individual discrimination, institutions can perpetuate
racial inequality.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 14/04/2022 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1.14, Campus Jourdan 75014 Paris
KLEIN Paul (SU)
Strategic Investment and Learning with Private Information
écrit avec Peter Wagner
We study a two-player game of strategic experimentation with private information in which agents choose the timing of risky investments. Agents learn about future returns through privately observed signals, others' investment decisions and from public experimentation outcomes when returns are realized. We characterize symmetric equilibria, and relate the extent of strategic delay of investments in equilibrium to the primitives of the information structure. Agents invest without delay in equilibrium when the most optimistic interim belief exceeds a threshold. Otherwise, delay in investments induces a learning feedback that may either raise or depress beliefs and investment choices. We show that private information in strategic experimentation can increase ex-ante welfare.
Behavior seminar
Du 14/04/2022 de 11:00 à 12:00
Salle R2.21, Campus Jourdan 75014 Paris
DE PAULA Aureo (UCL)
Identifying Network Ties from Panel Data: Theory and an Application to Tax Competition
Social interactions determine many economic behaviors, but information on social ties does not exist in most publicly available and widely used datasets. We present results on the identification of social networks from observational panel data that contains no information on social ties between agents. In the context of a canonical social interactions model, we provide sufficient conditions under which the social interactions matrix, endogenous and exogenous social effect parameters are all globally identified. While this result is relevant across different estimation strategies, we then describe how high-dimensional estimation techniques can be used to estimate the interactions model based on the Adaptive Elastic Net GMM method. We employ the method to study tax competition across US states. We find the identified social interactions matrix implies tax competition differs markedly from the common assumption of competition between geographically neighboring states, providing further insights for the long-standing debate on the relative roles of factor mobility and yardstick competition in driving tax setting behavior across states. Most broadly, our identfication and application show the analysis of social interactions can be extended to economic realms where no network data exists.
Econometrics Seminar
Du 14/04/2022 de 11:00 à 12:00
PSE, Salle R2.21
DE PAULA Aureo (UCL)
Identifying Network Ties from Panel Data: Theory and an Application to Tax Competition
écrit avec Co-authors: Imran Rasul and Pedro CL Souza
Social interactions determine many economic behaviors, but information on social ties does not exist in most publicly available and widely used datasets. We present results on the identification of social networks from observational panel data that contains no information on social ties between agents. In the context of a canonical social interactions model, we provide sufficient conditions under which the social interactions matrix, endogenous and exogenous social effect parameters are all globally identified. While this result is relevant across different estimation strategies, we then describe how high-dimensional estimation techniques can be used to estimate the interactions model based on the Adaptive Elastic Net GMM method. We employ the method to study tax competition across US states. We find the identified social interactions matrix implies tax competition differs markedly from the common assumption of competition between geographically neighboring states, providing further insights for the long-standing debate on the relative roles of factor mobility and yardstick competition in driving tax setting behavior across states. Most broadly, our identification and application show the analysis of social interactions can be extended to economic realms where no network data exists.