Calendrier du 14 mai 2020
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 14/05/2020 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-21
BLANCO Julio Andres (Michigan)
POSTPONED Devaluations, Inflation, and Labor Income Dynamics.
écrit avec Andrés Drenik, Emilio Zaratiegui
We study labor income dynamics during large devaluations in Argentina, using a novel monthly administrative employer-employee matched dataset covering the universe of formal workers in the 1994-2019 period. After the 2002 devaluation, real labor income decreases due to a sluggish nominal income adjustment relative to a massive increase in inflation. In the recovery, inequality decreases due to slower recovery of income at the top of the income distribution. Between-firm heterogeneity is the main contributor to the heterogeneous speed of recovery. Labor market mobility and unionization are the driving mechanisms for the heterogeneous recovery. Facts are robust across other devaluations.
Texte intégral
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 14/05/2020 de 14:00 à 15:00
online
TERCIEUX Olivier (PSE)
Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants without Money
écrit avec M. Akbarpour, J. Combe, Y. He, V. Hiller and R. Shimer
We propose a new matching algorithm—Unpaired kidney exchange—to tackle the problem of double coincidence of wants without using money. The fundamental idea is that “memory” can serve as a medium of exchange. In a dynamic matching model with heterogeneous agents, we prove that average waiting time under the Unpaired algorithm is close-to optimal, and substantially less than the standard pairwise and chain exchange algorithms. We evaluate this algorithm using a rich dataset of the kidney patients in France. Counterfactual simulations show that the Unpaired algorithm can match nearly 57% of the patients, with an average waiting time of 424 days (state-of-the-art algorithms match about 31% with an average waiting time of 675 days or more). The optimal algorithm performs only slightly better: it matches 58% of the patients and leads to an average waiting time of 410 days. The Unpaired algorithm confronts two incentive-related practical challenges. We address those challenges via a practical version of the Unpaired algorithm that employs kidneys from the deceased donors waiting list. The practical version can match nearly 87% of patient-donor pairs, while reducing the average waiting time to about 141 days.
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 14/05/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00
Using ZOOM
PAN Jessica (National University of Singapore)
Gender Differences in Job Search and the Earnings Gap: Evidence from Business Majors
écrit avec Patricia Cortes, Laura Pilossoph and Basit Zafar
To understand gender differences in the job search process, we collect rich information on job offers and acceptances from past and current undergraduates of Boston University's Questrom School of Business. We document two novel empirical facts: (1) there is a clear gender difference in the timing of job offer acceptance, with women accepting jobs substantially earlier than men, and (2) the gender earnings gap in accepted offers narrows in favor of women over the course of the job search period. Using rich survey data on risk preferences and beliefs about anticipated earnings, we present empirical evidence that the patterns in job search are largely driven by higher levels of risk aversion of women and higher levels of overconfidence of men. We next develop and estimate a formal job search model that incorporates these gender differences in risk aversion and degree of (over)confidence about the offer distribution. The estimated model is broadly able to match the survey findings. Our counterfactual exercises show that gender differences in risk preferences and overconfidence have similar quantitative importance in explaining the observed gender gap in accepted earnings. While overconfidence, on average, leads to higher earnings for males, the welfare implications are heterogeneous.