Calendrier du 14 juin 2021
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 14/06/2021 de 17:30 à 18:20
HAMMER Luisa (Freie Universität Berlin)
EU Enlargement and (Temporary) Migration: Effects on Labour Market Outcomes in Germany
écrit avec joint with Matthias S. Hertweck
EU Eastern Enlargement elicited a rise in (temporary) labour market oriented immigration to Germany starting in May 2011. This paper quantifies the resulting labour market outcomes using administrative SIAB data (2005-2017). For this purpose, we classify EU immigrants into “new arrivals” and “stayers”, i.e. a (positively selected) subset of previous new arrivals who remain in the German labour market. This allows us to separately identify the short- and medium-run effects of recent EU immigration. We find a temporary negative wage effect among natives, particularly at the bottom of the wage distribution; and a permanent positive effect on native (full-time) employment.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 14/06/2021 de 17:00 à 18:00
online
DOVAL Laura (Columbia University)
Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good
écrit avec Co-author: Vasiliki Skreta
A buyer wishes to purchase a durable good from a seller who in each period chooses a mechanism under limited commitment. The buyer’s valuation is binary and fully persistent. We show that posted prices implement all equilibrium outcomes of an infinite-horizon, mechanism selection game. Despite being able to choose mechanisms, the seller can do no better and no worse than if he chose prices in each period, so that he is subject to Coase’s conjecture. Our analysis marries insights from information and mechanism design with those from the literature on durable goods. We do so by relying on the revelation principle in Doval and Skreta (2020).
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Econometrics Seminar
Du 14/06/2021 de 16:00 à 17:15
Online
KOOPMAN Siem Jan ( Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
Forecasting in a changing world: from the great recession to the COVID-19 pandemic
écrit avec Co-authors: Mariia Artemova, Francisco Blasques, and Zhaokun Zhang
We develop a new targeted maximum likelihood estimation method that provides improved forecasting for misspecified linear dynamic models. The method weighs data points in the observed sample and is useful in the presence of data generating processes featuring structural breaks, complex nonlinearities, or other time-varying
properties which cannot be easily captured by model design. Additionally, the method reduces to classical maximum likelihood when the model is well specified, which results in weights which are set uniformly to one. We show how the optimal weights can be set by means of a cross-validation procedure. In a set of Monte Carlo experiments we reveal that the estimation method can significantly improve the forecasting accuracy of autoregressive models. In an empirical study concerned with forecasting the U.S. Industrial Production, we show
that the forecast accuracy during the Great Recession can be significantly improved by giving greater weight to observations associated with past recessions. We further establish that the same empirical finding can be found for the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, for different macroeconomic time series, and for the COVID-19
recession in 2020.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 14/06/2021 de 13:00 à 14:00
https://zoom.univ-paris1.fr/j/93088322381?pwd=RkVaVWsvcnJPbEgzNnJzQUlFS2JiQT09
TORUN David (Saint-Gallen)
Globalization, income inequality and political realignment: evidence from Costa Rica
This project aims to test whether globalization shocks (trade, FDI, and immigration) could explain part of the transition from a two-party to a multi-party system, such as the striking change in the political landscape in Costa Rica that started around 2000. We study the effect of several FTA signed by the country in the last two decades, and two immigration waves from Nicaragua in the same period, on electoral outcomes (turnout, voting shares, campaign contributions). We make two main contributions: (1) expand the extensive literature on the subject by exploring globalization and political realignment in a developing country with a long democratic tradition, and (2) combine administrative data at the individual level to answer these questions. We observe that districts with higher levels of income inequality vote less in both presidential and local elections, and districts with more immigrants also exhibit lower electoral turnout. Similarly, while higher exposure to trade and FDI reduce private campaign contributions, especially to traditional parties, higher exposure to immigrants increases them. Hence, those “affected” by international trade and FDI support new parties, while those “affected” by immigration find refuge in the traditional ones.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 14/06/2021 de 11:00 à 12:00
Online
PIZARRO Dana (TSE)
On a competitive selection problem with recall
We consider a problem where items arrive sequentially over time and two agents compete to choose the best possible item. We describe the game induced by the problem in two settings: one in which only take-it-or-leave-it strategies are allowed and another where it is possible to select an item that appeared in the past, if it is still available. We study the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoffs and we find tight bounds for the Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability of the latter setting when the number of arrivals is two.