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Programme de la semaine


Liste des séminaires

Les séminaires mentionnés ici sont ouverts principalement aux chercheurs et doctorants et sont consacrés à des présentations de recherches récentes. Les enseignements, séminaires et groupes de travail spécialisés offerts dans le cadre des programmes de master sont décrits dans la rubrique formation.

Les séminaires d'économie

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Atelier Histoire Economique

Behavior seminar

Behavior Working Group

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar

Development Economics Seminar

Economic History Seminar

Economics and Complexity Lunch Seminar

Economie industrielle

EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar

Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés

GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar

Histoire des entreprises et de la finance

Industrial Organization

Job Market Seminar

Macro Retreat

Macro Workshop

Macroeconomics Seminar

NGOs, Development and Globalization

Paris Game Theory Seminar

Paris Migration Seminar

Paris Seminar in Demographic Economics

Paris Trade Seminar

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

PhD Conferences

Propagation Mechanisms

PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar

Regional and urban economics seminar

Régulation et Environnement

RISK Working Group

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie

The Construction of Economic History Working Group

Theory Working Group

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Travail et économie publique externe

WIP (Work in progress) Working Group

Les séminaires de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Casse-croûte socio

Déviances et contrôle social : Approche interdisciplinaire des déviances et des institutions pénales

Dispositifs éducatifs, socialisation, inégalités

La discipline au travail. Qu’est-ce que le salariat ?

Méthodes quantitatives en sociologie

Modélisation et méthodes statistiques en sciences sociales

Objectiver la souffrance

Sciences sociales et immigration

Archives d'économie

Accumulation, régulation, croissance et crise

Commerce international appliqué

Conférences PSE

Economie du travail et inégalités

Economie industrielle

Economie monétaire internationale

Economie publique et protection sociale

Groupe de modélisation en macroéconomie

Groupe de travail : Economie du travail et inégalités

Groupe de travail : Macroeconomic Tea Break

Groupe de travail : Risques

Health Economics Working Group

Journée de la Fédération Paris-Jourdan

Lunch séminaire Droit et Economie

Marché du travail et inégalités

Risques et protection sociale

Séminaire de Recrutement de Professeur Assistant

Seminaire de recrutement sénior

SemINRAire

Archives de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Conférence du Centre de Théorie et d'Analyse du Droit

Espace social des inégalités contemporaines. La constitution de l'entre-soi

Etudes halbwachsiennes

Familles, patrimoines, mobilités

Frontières de l'anthropologie

L'auto-fabrication des sociétés : population, politiques sociales, santé

La Guerre des Sciences Sociales

Population et histoire politique au XXe siècle

Pratiques et méthodes de la socio-histoire du politique

Pratiques quantitatives de la sociologie

Repenser la solidarité au 21e siècle

Séminaire de l'équipe ETT du CMH

Séminaire ethnographie urbaine

Sociologie économique

Terrains et religion


Calendrier du 15 mai 2023

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Du 15/05/2023 de 17:00 à 18:15

Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 75014 Paris

MARIOTTI Thomas (TSE)

*Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms



écrit avec Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, and Alessandro Pavan




We study the design of market information in games in which several principals contract with several privately informed agents. We investigate a new dimension of these games, namely, the possibility for the principals to asymmetrically inform the agents about how their mechanisms respond to their messages. We document two effects of such private disclosures. First, they raise the principals' individual payoff guarantees, protecting them against their competitors' threats. Second, by enlarging the set of incentive-compatible correlation patterns between the principals' decisions and the agents' types, they can be used to support equilibrium outcomes and payoffs that cannot be supported in their absence, no matter how rich the message spaces are allowed to be. These results challenge the folk theorems à la Yamashita (2010) and the canonicity of the universal mechanisms of Epstein and Peters (1999), calling for a novel approach to the analysis of these games. The one proposed here retains various elements of standard mechanism design theory while accommodating for competition in mechanisms and private disclosures.

Econometrics Seminar

Du 15/05/2023 de 16:00 à 17:15

CREST, room 3001

NOACK Claudia (Oxford)

Flexible Covariate Adjustments in Regression Discontinuity Designs





Empirical regression discontinuity (RD) studies often use covariates to increase the precision of their estimates. In this paper, we propose a novel class of estimators that use such covariate information more efficiently than the linear adjustment estimators that are currently used widely in practice. Our approach can accommodate a possibly large number of either discrete or continuous covariates. It involves running a standard RD analysis with an appropriately modified outcome variable, which takes the form of the difference between the original outcome and a function of the covariates. We characterize the function that leads to the estimator with the smallest asymptotic variance, and show how it can be estimated via modern machine learning, nonparametric regression, or classical parametric methods. The resulting estimator is easy to implement, as tuning parameters can be chosen as in a conventional RD analysis. An extensive simulation study illustrates the performance of our approach.



Texte intégral

Du 15/05/2023 de 13:00 à 14:00

Maison des Sciences Economiques, Salle 116

Paris Migration Economics Seminar

Du 15/05/2023 de 12:30 à 13:30

Salle R1.14, Campus Jourdan

FELFE Christina (U. Würzburg)

On the formation of ingroup bias: The role of ethnic diversity and cultural distance


Régulation et Environnement

Du 15/05/2023 de 12:00 à 13:15

Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 75014 Paris

ELLIOTT Robert (Burmingham)

*“Centralising the enforcement of environmental regulations: Using machine learning to aid policy evaluation in China”



écrit avec Matt Cole, Bowen Lu, TuanVan Vu and Zongbo Shi




To overcome key challenges in environmental policy evaluation we use machine learning based weather normalisation techniques to strip out the effect of weather on air pollution estimates. Combined with Augmented Synthetic Control Methods (ASCM) we provide a causal estimate of the impact of China’s decision to centralise environmental policy enforcement. Focusing on Hebei province we find that the recently introduced Central Environmental Inspection Policy led to a short term reduction in PM2.5 and SO2 immediately after the inspection. However, within 3 months of the inspection team leaving, pollution levels had returned to previous levels. Comparisons with Difference-in-Difference estimations show the importance of both weather normalising and using an ASCM approach, particularly in the absence of parallel pre-trends.