Calendrier du 16 octobre 2017
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 16/10/2017 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
PENTA Antonio (UW-Madison)
Rationalizability and Observability
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 16/10/2017 de 13:00 à 14:00
Salle S/3, MSE, 106 boulevard de l'Hôpital, 75013 Paris
EL MALLAKH Nevine (Paris 1)
Disentangling channels of FDI spillover: Evidence from India
Governments spend large amounts of resources in order to attract multinational companies to their country, based on their belief that such companies generate positive spillovers to domestic firms. Although the existence of positive externalities correlated to FDI presence has been proved for the US, concerns on the significance of these effects for developing countries were raised. Also the literature has not provided empirical evidence on the validity of the channels leading to these effects. For these reasons, this paper exploits FDI reforms and Trade liberalization episodes in India in the early 1990’s to disentangle channels of FDI spillover on productivity of domestic firms; namely, the technical know-how and the foreign competition channels. Using firm level data on the period (1989-1997), we are able to identify the two main channels. Results confirm positive technological spillover through imported inputs as well as positive foreign competition. Findings also suggest that these channels are stronger for industries that are relatively more capital intensive and medium sized firms.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 16/10/2017 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
CHEN Stéphanie (University of Chicago)
Competitive Personalized Pricing with Sophisticated Consumers
écrit avec Chongwoo Choe, Monash University
Abstract
Personalized pricing, a limiting case of price discrimination as the number of targeted consumer segments increases, becomes increasingly common due to the availability of vast amount of individual-level data. This paper studies personalized pricing in a Hotelling setting when each firm has a given target segment and consumers can be sophisticated. Sophisticated consumers can overcome the hurdles for price discrimination and have access to the price offered to non-targeted consumers, which naive consumers cannot. When all consumers are naive, personalized pricing leads to intense competition and total industry profit lower than that under the Hotelling equilibrium. But market is always fully covered. Sophisticated consumers raise the firm's cost of serving non-targeted consumers, hence discourage firms from poaching the rival's targeted customers. This softens competition. When firms have sufficiently large and non-overlapping target segments, consumer sophistication allows firms to extract full surplus from their targeted customers through perfect price discrimination. Consumers are strictly worse-off under competitive personalized pricing, a result in contrast to the common view in the literature. With sophisticated consumers, firms also choose not to serve the entire market when the commonly non-targeted market segment is small. Thus consumer sophistication can lead to lower consumer surplus and lower social welfare. We also discuss the implications for the regulation of the use of customer data by firms.
Key words: Personalized pricing, consumer sophistication, customer targeting, privacy
JEL Classification: D43, D8, L13, L5
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 16/10/2017 de 11:00 à 12:00
Salle 01 (RDC), Centre Emile Borel, Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, 75005 Paris
SOLAN Eilan (Tel Aviv University )
Optimal Dynamic Inspection
We study a discounted repeated inspection game with two agents and one principal.
Both agents may pro.fit by violating certain rules, while the principal can inspect on
at most one agent in each period, in.flicting a punishment on an agent who is caught
violating the rules. The goal of the principal is to minimize the discounted number of
violations, and he has a Stackelberg leader advantage. We characterize the principal's
optimal inspection strategy.