Calendrier du 16 mars 2020
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 16/03/2020 de 17:00 à 18:30
salle R2-21, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
DOVAL Laura (Columbia University)
ANNULE - Optimal Mechanism for the sale of a durable good
écrit avec Vasiliki Skreta
We show that posted prices are the optimal mechanism to sell a durable good to a privately informed buyer when the seller has limited commitment in an infinite horizon setting. We provide a methodology for mechanism design with limited commitment and transferable utility. Whereas in the case of commitment, subject to the buyer's truthtelling and participation constraints, the seller's problem is a decision problem, in the case of limited commitment, the seller's problem corresponds to an intrapersonal game, where different “incarnations of the seller represent the different beliefs he may have about the buyer's valuation.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 16/03/2020 de 12:00 à 13:00
salle R1-13, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
FISHMAN Arthur (Bar-Ilan University)
ANNULE
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 16/03/2020 de 11:00 à 12:00
Institut Henri Poincaré - 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie - 75005 Paris
LEVY John ()
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