Calendrier du 16 mai 2024
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 16/05/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R2-21
ISPHORDING Ingo (IZA)
Feedback, Overconfidence and Job Search Behavior
Job seekers face uncertainty about their abilities, and whether these match with job requirements. Such uncertainty may result in sub-optimal job search outcomes and job matches. We conduct a field experiment among job seekers in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Participants underwent a skill assessment and were asked about their willingness to pay (WTP) for information about their relative performance on a test of general intelligence. WTP is positive for about 80 percent of the population, and is associated with gender and personality. Feedback provision leads individuals to update their beliefs which only persists for individuals with low WTP. We provide evidence that suggests imperfect recall as potential mechanism for the lack of persistence. Feedback increases job search intensity but relatively less for initially overconfident individuals and those with negative or zero WTP. This results in lower realized wages for these groups. The heterogeneity in belief updating, recall and job search behavior is consistent with some overconfident job seekers being unable to forget information and, thus, to maintain motivated beliefs, but being sophisticated about this inability to forget.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 16/05/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30
R1-14
BLUMENTHAL Benjamin (ETH Zurich)
Informational Lobbying and Implementation Standards
Policymakers are often uncertain about the right course of action. To inform their decisions, policymakers might rely on information provided by interest groups (IGs). Given that their interests are often misaligned, IGs might under-provide information to policymakers. This paper explores the possibility for policymakers of committing to implementation standards prior to IGs' lobbying, to induce more information transmission. I show that setting implementation standards ex-ante can benefit policymakers, despite possible ex-post inefficiencies, by inducing informational lobbying in cases in which IGs would not have lobbied with implementation standards set ex-post. I discuss implications of these results for constitutional design, legislative politics, and bureaucratic politics.
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 16/05/2024
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle
GUVENEN Fatih (University of Minnesota)
International Macroeconomics Chair Lecture