Calendrier du 17 octobre 2017
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 17/10/2017 de 17:00 à 18:00
TENAND Marianne ()
Horizontal equity in professional home care use. An assessment in the context of the French APA scheme
écrit avec Marianne Tenand
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 17/10/2017 de 14:45 à 16:15
ScPo, 28 rue des Saints Pères, 75007 Paris, salle H405
ANDERSON Chris (LSE)
*Short Run Gravity
écrit avec Y. Yotov
NGOs, Development and Globalization
Du 17/10/2017 de 14:30 à 17:00
Campus Jourdan - Salle R1-15
PLATTEAU Jean Philippe(University of Namur)
JACQUEMART Karine(Director - Foodwatch France)
*
14:30-15:20 - Karine Jacquemart (Director - Foodwatch France)
Insights from a citizen-based watchdog in the food sector
15:20-15:50 - Coffee Break
15:50-16:40 Jean Philippe Platteau (University of Namur)
Optimal management of transfers : an odd paradox (with François Bourguignon)
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 17/10/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-09 Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
MEHMOOD Sultan (PSE & PARIS-DAUPHINE)
Judiciary’s Achilles Heel: Executive Control via Appointment Power
How does an increase of executive constraints impact the judiciary? We exploit a change in judicial selection procedure in a weak democracy, from the president selecting the judges to the selection of judges through a judicial commission, to ascertain the causal effects of an increase in executive constraints on judicial independence. By exploiting the across-district and over-time variation in reform exposure generated by random exit of judges, we are able to ascertain the causal effect of this reform on judicial outcomes. We find that this reform has a large effect on judicial independence. In particular, we show that the change in the selection procedure of judges caused a 20% reduction in state victories. This increase in independence does not come at the expense of increased case delay. Furthermore, the analysis of mechanisms reveal that the steepest fall in state victories occurred in less politically connected districts. We also provide suggestive evidence that the new appointment procedure also incentivised the incumbent judges to adjudicate against the state more often, though less so than the judges appointed under the new selection procedure.